

Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945)

Texts and Commentaries



Volume Three/1

Modernism –
The Creation
of
Nation-States



Edited by Ahmet Ersoy, Maciej Górný
and Vangelis Kechriotis

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AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE
(1770–1945)**

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EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

AHMET ERSOY, MACIEJ GÓRNY, VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS,
MICHAL KOPEČEK, BOYAN MANCHEV,
BALÁZS TRENCSENYI, MARIUS TURDA



MODERNISM

THE CREATION OF NATION-STATES

Edited by

Ahmet Ersoy, Maciej Górny and
Vangelis Kechriotis



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E-mail: ceupress@ceu.hu
Website: www.ceupress.com

400 West 59th Street, New York NY 10019, USA
Tel: +1-212-547-6932
Fax: +1-646-557-2416
E-mail: mgreenwald@sorosny.org

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Contributors

Nihad Dostović, Stevo Đurašković, Ildiko Erdei, Ahmet Ersoy, Maciej Górny, Rigels Halili, Nikola Iordanovski, Hamza Karčić, Vangelis Kechriotis, Ohannes Kılıçdağı, Michal Kopeček, Pavol Lukáč, Boyan Manchev, Mateja Ratej, Funda Soysal, Maria Todorova, Balázs Trencsényi, Marius Turda

Consultants

Bojan Aleksov, Sorin Antohi, Franz Leander Fillafer, Guido Franzinetti, Maciej Janowski, Pavel Kolář, Antonis Liakos, István Margócsy, Diana Mishkova, Bela Rasky, Petra Rybářová

Translations by

Alena Alexandrova (from Bulgarian), Elena Alexieva (from Bulgarian), Randy Blasing (from Turkish), Krištof Bodrič (from Serbian), Maurice Bowra (from Hungarian), Anna Bryson (from Czech), Jeremiah Curtin (from Polish), Amila Čelebić (from Bosnian), Robert Deveraux (from Turkish), Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova (from Bulgarian), Nihad Dostović (from Bosnian), Vedran Dronjić (from Serbian), Robert Elsie (from Albanian), Ahmet Ersoy (from Turkish), Leonard Fox (from Albanian), Simon Garnett (from German), Edward Dennis Goy (from Croatian), Şirin Güneşer (from Turkish), Rigels Halili (from Albanian), Kathleen Hayes (from Czech), Nikola Iordanovski (from Macedonian), Hamza Karčić (from Bosnian), Mary Kitroeff (from Greek), Ohannes Kılıçdağı (from Armenian), Mutlu Konuk (from Turkish), Mária Kovács (from Romanian), G. J. Kovtun (from Czech), Linda Krstajić (from Serbian), Jasna Levinger-Goy (from Croatian), Zuzanna Ładyga (from Polish), Pavol Lukáč (from Slovak), Adam Makkai (from Hungarian), Janice Mathie-Heck (from Albanian), W. L. McElwee (from German), Eric Mosbacher (from Polish), Joe O'Donnell (from German), Dávid Oláh (from Hungarian), Cecil Parrott (from Czech), Derek Paton (from Czech, Slovak, and German), Burton Pike (from German), Iva Polak (from Croatian), Robert Russell (from German and Czech), Henry Wickham Steed (from Croatian), A. J. P. Taylor (from German), Marius Turda (from Romanian), Alicia Tyszkiewicz (from Polish), Olga Vuković (from Slovene), Agnieszka Wiercholska (from German), Sophie Wilkins (from German), Peter Zollman (from Hungarian)

Copy-editor

Benjamin Trigona-Harany

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INTRODUCTION

The 'Identity Reader' Project

The present double volume is the third one of the series entitled *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945): Texts and Commentaries*. The history of this venture goes back to the meeting of a group of young scholars at the Balkan Summer University in Plovdiv in 1999. Step by step, a research project, hosted by the Center for Advanced Study Sofia, was formed with the intention of bringing together and making accessible basic texts of the respective national traditions. The ensuing 'Reader' was envisioned as a challenge to the self-centered and 'isolationist' historical narratives and educational canons prevalent in the region. On the whole, the 'Reader' is expected to fill in the lacunae concerning the knowledge of Central and Southeast Europe pertinent to the very core of the schooling process and academic socialization in these countries. It is hoped that our project will broaden the field of possible comparisons and make researchers look at the process of nation-building in Central and Southeast Europe from a comparative perspective.

The grouping of the texts follows neither the national provenience, nor *stricto sensu* chronological order. It is determined more by thematic similarities and resonances. The four 'meta-themes/periods,' around which the volumes are organized, are the following: Late Enlightenment (the emergence of the modern 'National Idea'); National Romanticism (the formation of national movements); Modernism (the full development of national movements and often the creation of national states along with the new formulations of national cultures); and Anti-Modernism (concentrating mainly on the radical ideologies of the inter-war period).

Within these thematic units the project analyzes various aspects of identity-formation, such as 'symbolic geography', the symbolic representation of the national community, images of the past and the production of cultural markers (i.e., national language or national character), as well as the images of the other and the 'construction' of identity in religious and socio-cultural contexts – domains that themselves exhibit revealing similarities.

This framework challenges the usual taxonomies through the *disaggregation* of a nominally unified past. In particular, this perspective questions the idea of a single point of departure that we are confronted with in nationalist histories. In fact, most of the texts selected consciously participate in many registers of identity-construction, seeking to turn the entire symbolic framework of identities into a more dynamic configuration.

In order to create a common basis for the analysis of the collected texts, each entry has a similar structure. The first section refers to the bibliographical data containing the language in which the text was written, its author and the publishing house; this data is complemented by short information about the author, such as his (her) place of birth and death, a concise biography, and main works. The second section contains a short 'contextualization' of the text, describing its political and social background and the intellectual environment in which it originated. Then, a textual analysis, a description of its ideological tendencies and historical influence and its function in the respective canon follow. In addition, the most important interpretations of the text are provided. All this is followed by the translated texts. If possible, we chose to publish them in their entirety, but in many cases their length exceeded the dimensions of the volume, and thus we strove to present the most characteristic excerpts.

*

During the years of intensive research and interaction, our group incurred a number of precious debts. First of all, we would like to thank Diana Mishkova who supported the project from the beginning and has helped us far beyond the scope commonly expected from the director of a hosting institution to bring these volumes to completion. We are also extremely grateful to the entire staff of the Center for Advanced Study Sofia who facilitated our work immensely during our numerous meetings and provided a pleasant working atmosphere in all regards.

No collaborative project of this sort is viable without substantial financial help making it possible for the participants to meet regularly. We are grateful to the Prince Bernhard Cultural Foundation (The Netherlands) for providing generous funding that made it possible for the group to meet on six occasions over the period of three years. When the first phase of the project was finished, the Foundation also offered a further grant to prepare the texts for publication. Without this generosity, it would have been impossible to share our findings with the broader public. Our special thanks goes to Wouter Hugen-

holtz (NIAS), who took upon himself the role of introducing the project to the Foundation and who followed with immense trust and sympathy our work throughout these years.

A natural focus of any comparative research in the region, the Central European University also gave us generous help to accomplish our venture. Most of all, we would like to thank László Kontler and Sorin Antohi who have been with us from the very beginning of the project, offering logistic help, sharing their advice with us and also contributing to the volumes with their insightful introductions. We are grateful to Halil Berktaş (Sabancı University, Istanbul) for his intellectual support throughout these years and also for hosting us for a workshop in 2001 where the project was first presented to a broader academic public.

In the process of preparing this third volume, we were able to obtain additional funding which enabled us to cover expenses for various purposes in different stages of our endeavour. We are grateful to the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) for sponsoring a meeting of the group at Boğaziçi University in November 2006, and the History Department there for providing logistical support. We are also grateful to Boğaziçi University for the generous grant it provided from its Research Fund, supporting the critical final stages in the preparation of the present volume. While preparing the manuscript for publication, the editor at CEU Press, Linda Kunos, provided us with important advice and took care of the burdensome institutional side of the publishing with exemplary commitment. Lastly, Benjamin Trígona-Harany, a junior colleague, took upon the burdensome task of editing the diverse body of texts linguistically.

There are cases where current political controversies and the fluidity of the international landscape in the region under consideration led the editors of the volume to make choices out of necessity and pragmatism. Two new states have appeared in the period after the editorial group had conceived and carried out this project. We decided, however, that we should not reconsider our entire agenda to trace intellectual traditions in Montenegro and Kosovo, since this is first and foremost the task of those who are involved in the state-building processes in these countries. After all, apart from the immense human tragedy it involved, the fragmentation that the war in Yugoslavia has left behind also deposited issues of bitter cultural contestation. Therefore, we had to respect the choice of the contributors who described as Croatian, Serbian, Serbo-Croatian or Bosnian, depending on national provenience, a language which, despite certain local differences, had functioned as a shared form of expression in the region for many decades.

Maria Todorova: Modernism

Like culture and civilization, imperialism and orientalism, or nations and nationalism, modernity and modernism are concepts that suffer from overuse. Some scholars despair about the impossibility to reach a consensus about their meaning and use, and call on entirely abandoning them. Yet, they are with us to stay, among others because they have long ago left specialized scholarly discussion (or entered it too late) to become part of the everyday speech of many competing discourses. This volume, the third in a series covering the cultures of the coveted, emerging, flourishing and humiliated nation-states of the region of Central and Southeast Europe from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, boldly takes on the challenge.

Writing this introduction entails a double bind. On the one hand, I was asked and agreed to provide a preface to a volume I did not help conceive. In a way, the resulting introduction is not merely a comment on the material compiled by several younger scholars and respected colleagues; it is inevitably an exegesis of its conceptualization. On the other hand, given the voluminous and controversial literature around the concept of modernism and its derivatives, this preface tentatively tries to provide some similitude of order, if only for the easier orientation through the ensuing material. Several questions will be asked in the course of this chapter: What is the difference between modernity, modernism and modernization? When and where was/is modernity, and when and where was/is modernism? Is it modernity or modernities? What is the comparative value of scrutinizing a particular region?

Why, then, is this volume encompassed under the rubric of modernism and not of modernity? Modernism may be the least problematic term, even if slightly differing interpretations exist. Henri Lefebvre distinguishes between the two by positing that modernism is a sociological and ideological fact, the consciousness that epochs, periods, successive generations have of themselves; it consists of images and projections of the self. Modernity, on the other hand, is the attempt at knowledge, the beginning of reflexion. "Moder-

nity differs from modernism, as a concept formed about society differs from social phenomena, as reflexion differs from facts.”¹ This is, arguably, one of the more sophisticated approaches to modernity and modernism, treating the two as different but intertwined takes on reality mediated by the human agent.

Most other authors consider modernism as the cultural response to the challenges of the modern condition, defined loosely as the compendium of traits such as industrialization, urbanization, and the emergence of a market-industrial economy; the growth of centralizing and unifying state institutions with the accompanying development of specialized occupations tied to them, i.e. bureaucratization; the development of the modern political party system with mass participation, the secularization of political and social authority and different models of popular rule. Modernism in this view, as expressed for example by Anthony Giddens, who insists on its difference from modernity, is often seen mostly in its aesthetic dimension, and applied to styles or trends in literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, and music.²

In a broader handling, modernism is seen as the state of mind expressed in opposition to tradition, or as the culture of modernity. In a narrower sense, it is treated as the aesthetic and negative reaction to technological modernity (in this sense conflating modernity with modernization).³ An interesting twist in the thinking about modernism is offered by the view that while modernity was born in the West (even if authors differ on whether it is a universal or an entirely western phenomenon), modernism was the product of the periphery.

¹ Henri Lefebvre, *Introduction à la modernité* (Paris, 1962), p. 10, cited in Alexis Nouss, *La modernité* (Paris, 1991), p. 21.

² Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, 1990; Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity” in Beiner, Ronald, ed., *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany NY, 1999); Eugene Lunn, *Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno* (Berkeley, 1982); Jonathan Spencer, “Modernism, Modernity and Modernisation,” in Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer ed. *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (London, 1996). It is symptomatic that, as a whole, “modernism” rarely finds a place in social sciences, which abound in theories about modernity and modernization, but its relatively prominent place in the humanities is assured. There is no entry on “modernism” in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*.

³ Matei Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism* (Durham, 1987), actually speaks of “two distinct and bitterly conflicting modernities,” one as a stage in the history of Western civilization (scientific and technological progress, industrial revolution, the sweeping economic and social changes of capitalism); the other, as an aesthetic concept opposed to the first (p. 41).

If “modernity” as a term seems to have been created by Chateaubriand in 1833, “modernism” was coined by a Nicaraguan poet in 1890: “the critique of European modernity, like so much of the modern itself, seems continually to have emerged from Europe’s borders.”⁴ Some authors even posit that modernism is not in the core, but always in the periphery, and they speak of the modernism of underdevelopment, where culture is one form through which one can belong if one is excluded from modernity. This certainly is very relevant to Eastern Europe, the first and closest periphery to the core of modernity.

In a way, the whole four-volume project is an illustration of the particular cultural and political responses—defined by the editors as enlightenment, romanticism, modernism and anti-modernism—to the social transformations that occurred with the advent of modernity. Of course, one could claim that modernism in a very broad sense encompasses all these responses: it is the general expression and style of the modern times, the state of mind expressed in opposition to tradition, or the culture of modernity. From this point of view, since the general consensus is that modernity starts with the Enlightenment and, despite all the theorizing about post-modernism, we still seem to be within its *longue durée*, it includes chronologically the whole period covered by the project. The editors have chosen to use it in a stricter sense, giving it a very definite place between romanticism and anti-modernism and an approximate chronological span from the 1860s until the decade following the First World War. For them the answer to the question “When was modernism?” is unambiguous. One could say that it coincides with the period of the powerful and unimpeded ascendancy of industrialism and the nation-state, and one can read in its expressions the unabashed triumphalism of the notion of progress. Indeed, practically all parts of this volume illustrate one or another aspect of the ambitious and optimistic construction and consolidation of the nation-state: the major ideologies that shaped this process, the projects and programs dealing with institution building and the challenges posed by imperial legacies and minority problems, and the reflexion of these processes in the sciences and the arts.

This poses the question whether modernity is synonymous with capitalism. It is a question overwhelmingly answered in the positive by theorists of modernity, from Karl Polanyi to Anthony Giddens. For Polanyi the defining

⁴ Timothy Mitchell, *Questions of Modernity* (Minneapolis, London, 2000), p. 6. In this Mitchell follows Perry Anderson. See also B. Valade, “Modernity,” in Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes ed. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Amsterdam, New York, 2001), p. 9940.

characteristic of modern society is the self-regulating market, which as an institutional structure is typical only for our times. It is the extension of commodification to the three basic elements of industry—labor, land, and money—which was the inevitable consequence of the introduction of the factory system in a commercial society and which constituted the crucial difference from preceding economic systems. Giddens sees modernity as modes of organization of social life which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence. He thus defines modernity as inherently characterized by globalization, whose main traits are the international division of labor, the global capitalist economy, the system of nation-states, and the global military order.⁵ This stress on the economic aspects of modern society inevitably raises the question of modernization and its place in the overall theorizing of modernity.

More recent theorizing emphasizes the Janus-like character of modernity in the west which is characterized by two intersecting visions of modernity: the Weberian societal/cultural modernity and the Baudelairian cultural/aesthetic modernity, where culture is the capricious and imperceptible “middle term.” In the Weberian vision, societal modernization fragments cultural meaning and unity. The Baudelairian vision, equally alert to the effects of modernization, seeks to redeem modern culture by aestheticizing it. Each has their bright and dark sides. Societal modernization was anticipated by Enlightenment philosophers as the improvement of material conditions, economic prosperity and political emancipation, technological mastery, and the general growth of specialized knowledge, but it also brought the existential experience of alienation and despair in a disenchanted world of deadening and meaningless routine. The bright side of the Baudelairian vision found aesthetic pleasure in the creative excitement of searching for a meaning, and portrayed modernization as a spectacle of speed, novelty, and effervescence. Its dark side stressed the absence of moral constraints where the aesthetic pursuit could deteriorate from disciplined Nietzschean self-assertion against an absurd world into self-absorption and hedonism.⁶

Modernity may not be explicitly addressed in this volume but it is implicitly present in its overall conception both as a sociological reality, i.e. the ensemble of traits defining the modern condition, as well as a discursive con-

⁵ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1964) (first published in 1944), pp. 43–57, 68–75, 163.

⁶ Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “On Alternative Modernities,” in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities* (Durham, 2001), pp. 8–9.

struct. There have been numerous attempts to define modernity, even though one of its analysts desists from treating it as a concept: "If it is true that a notion is intuitive knowledge, synthetic and inaccurate enough about one thing, then modernity belongs to this type of mental representation which, as opposed to concept, does not offer clearly defined contours of the abstract object to which it refers."⁷ We know intuitively that modern is what appears, exists and belongs to the present era, and modernism expresses a preference against tradition. Even before the emergence of modernity as a category, the understanding about what was modern was based on a dichotomy between "ancients" and "moderns" (the famous *querelle des anciens et des modernes* at the end of the seventeenth century), between authority and progress, between tradition and innovation. Indeed, Bruno Latour argues that the division of tradition from modernity is the central characteristic of the modernist project, where division and classification entail the work of purification.⁸

Jon Mitchell goes as far as attributing this tendency to dichotomize to a common Euro-American epistemology which divides the world into 'modern' and 'traditional', or Western and non-Western, and ultimately into 'us' and 'them.' Following Niklas Luhmann, he shows that, rather than being a homogenizing process producing a unified social whole, modernity constantly creates otherness; it is not a fixed and stable, but has differentiation at its core. He also amply demonstrates that ambivalence is common to all manifestations of modernity. In particular, the hierarchizing axis of tradition and modernity can be reversible, so that each side can be valorized at different moments. This ambivalence and anxiety is especially acute at the edges of Europe, where the stakes are higher.⁹ Similarly, stressing the ambivalence between what is modern and what traditional, Diana Mishkova shows that the distinction between nineteenth-century modernizers in Serbia and Romania (the radicals and the liberals) and traditionalists (the conservatives) is not so sharp. In actuality, all used the modern legitimizing norms and rhetoric;

⁷ Valade, *op. cit.*, p. 9939.

⁸ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (London, 1993). Since division entails a prior assumption of unity—each proposition of difference must begin with an assumption of sameness—dividing the world into traditional and modern must begin with the assumption of a shared historical trajectory. This, in the end, makes Latour question the utility of the concept "modern."

⁹ Jon P. Mitchell, *Ambivalent Europeans: Ritual, Memory and the Public Sphere in Malta*, (London and New York, 2002), pp. 12 and 241–242. For example, accession to EU in Malta is seen as both promise (security, affluence, democracy, modernity) and threat (to family, morality, community, tradition). See also Niklas Luhmann, *Observations on Modernity*, transl. W. Whobrey (Stanford CA, 1998).

all had an organicist conception of the nation; all had a paternalistic attitude to the peasant, both economically and politically; all had the consciousness of backwardness; and all were ardent nationalists.¹⁰ One can follow this in many of the entries in this volume.

Despite nuances of difference, the common denominator of most theories that analyze the modern era, i.e. modernity, is to describe the process of capitalist expansion, development and globalization through which the non-Western becomes Western. This is based on the presumption that increased globalization of the world economy necessarily entails the homogenization of socio-cultural forms. This trend was most explicitly present in the modernization theories of 1950s–60s, where the successful accomplishment of industrialization and democratization were seen as the apogee of modernization.¹¹ The severe critique to which modernization theory was subjected in the late 1970s and 1980s led to a broader critical theorization of capitalism. It prompted its theoretical reconceptualization with the emergence and introduction of a new category: modernity. Modernity was taken by the social sciences to unite, or mediate, modernization and capitalism, and define and describe the properties of the modern, “present social configuration.” It thus came to define a way of life or mode of being, raising the question whether people who don’t live this way are modern or not.¹²

Chronologically, the consensus that modernity started in Western Europe after the seventeenth century (in a few readings even earlier) has not been

¹⁰ Диана Мишкова, *Приспособяване на свободата: модерност – легитимност в Сърбия и Румъния през XIX век.* (София, 2001).

¹¹ The quintessence of this trend is Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge 1960); See also N. Smelser, “Mechanisms of and Adjustments to Change,” in T. Burns ed., *Industrial Man* (Harmondsworth, 1969); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte* (Goettingen, 1975); Paul Nolte, “Modernization and Modernity in History,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, p. 9954–9961.

¹² Peter Wagner, “Modernity: History of the Concept,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 9949–9954; Peter Wagner, “Modernity, Capitalism and Critique,” *Thesis Eleven*, 66, 2001, pp. 1–31; Peter Wagner, *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline* (London, 1994); Peter Wagner, *Theorizing Modernity. Inescapability and Attainability in Social Theory* (London, 2001); Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, 1990); Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge, 1991); Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Daniel Miller, *Modernity: An Ethnographic Approach* (Oxford, 1994); Jonathan Spencer, “Modernism, Modernity and Modernisation,” in Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer ed., *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (London, 1996).

broken; its link to capitalism has not been questioned. Yet the stress is no longer exclusively on its economic performance. Sociologists are emphasizing the unparalleled degree of structural-functional differentiation in modern societies, especially the infrastructural powers of the nation-state. Building on Talcott Parsons, Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Nikos Mouzelis understands modernity as “a type of social organization which, from a social-integration point of view, is characterized by an unprecedented level of social mobilization/incorporation into the center; and from the point of view of system integration, by an equally unprecedented level of institutional differentiation.”¹³ This leads to the destruction of segmented localism and the creation of broader, highly differentiated economic, political, social, and cultural arenas where the practices of individuated subjects are constituted and regulated by institutional complexes such as the nation-state, national markets and/or national planning agencies, national systems of welfare and population surveillance/management, mass literacy and nationalist ideologies.

Similarly, but with a stronger emphasis on *mentalité*, Zygmunt Bauman locates the defining feature of modernity in its concern with order, not so much industrialism or capitalism, because “the preoccupation with orderly, manageable society, is a common denominator of other modern undertakings [...] to make human affairs regular and amenable to planning and control was high up in the mind of the principle advocates and actors of industrialism, democracy, and capitalism.”¹⁴ For Bauman modernity and the awareness of the artificiality of social order are synonymical, and the characteristically modern obsession with ordering is the outcome of that awareness. As he points out, “from its inception, ‘modernity’ was known in one form only: that of ‘managerial’ modernity, an order-designing and order-administering modernity.”¹⁵

Bauman is also the one who unequivocally links modernity not merely to capitalism but specifically to imperialism in the era of the nation-state. This comes with a new perception of time; indeed, Bauman postulates that “the history of time began with modernity,” modernity being “more than anything else, the history of time: modernity is the time when time has a history.” Modernity emancipated time from space because, unlike space, time could be changed and manipulated through technical innovation. “Whoever traveled faster could claim more territory—and, having done that, could control it,

¹³ Nikos Mouzelis, “Modernity: a non-European conceptualization,” *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 50, No.1, March 1999, pp. 143–144 and 156–157.

¹⁴ Zygmunt Bauman & Keith Tester, *Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 78.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

map it and supervise it... Modernity was born under the stars of acceleration and land conquest.”¹⁶

Peter Osborne provides another analysis of the explicit link and hierarchical relationship between modernity and nationalism. According to him, the problem is “not how to rethink the notion of modernism from the standpoint of national cultures (modernism as national allegory, for example). It is, rather, how the problematic of the modern, concretely applied, can help *replace* the problematic of ‘national cultures’, with a broader conception of the temporal-cultural dimensions of social relations—social relations through which ‘the nation’ is itself produced as a cultural-ideological effect of various forms of state power.” Applying his very broad understanding of modernism as “a particular temporal logic of negation (the new)” together with the metaphor and theory of translation, Osborne succeeds in dissolving the discreteness of separate nationalisms and their cultures.¹⁷ We see them floating, with their ships of different size and shape, and colorful crews, which are often in conflict or fleeting alliances, in the common sea of modernity.

Thus the nation-state comes to the fore as the prototypical institutional embodiment of political modernity, nationalism in the apt expression of Josep Llobera is its god, and “the nation, as a culturally defined community, is the highest symbolic value of modernity; it has been endowed with a quasi-sacred character equaled only by religion.”¹⁸ Even a cursory look at the present volume will bear this out. From the different ideological approaches dealing with the imperial heritage and finessing projects of how to create the modern state—liberal, conservative, socialist and others—to the literary and scientific attempts at squaring the circle of individual and collective identities, the obsession with the nation, its territory and the institutions that would serve it best is obvious. It is a well-known fact that this period saw the gradual crumbling of the three empires that between themselves controlled much of what is designated as Central and Southeast Europe, or altogether Eastern Europe: the Habsburg, Ottoman and Romanov Empires. In the course of less than a century, a multitude of small to medium-sized nation-states appeared in the east of Europe, beginning in the Balkans: Greece (independence 1830), Serbia (autonomy 1830, independence 1878), Montenegro (independence 1878), Romania (unification 1859, independence 1878), Bulgaria (autonomy

¹⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass, 2000), p. 110 and 112.

¹⁷ Peter Osborne, *Philosophy in Cultural Theory* (London, 2000), pp. 59 and 61.

¹⁸ Josep R. Llobera, *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1994), p. ix.

1878, independence 1908), Albania (independence 1913), Hungary (*Ausgleich* 1867, independence 1918), Poland (independence 1918), Czechoslovakia (independence 1918), Lithuania (independence 1918), Latvia (independence 1918), Estonia (independence 1918), and finally, the two par excellence successor states Austria (1918), Turkey (1923). Russia alone preserved the similitude of empire (some would argue its essence) with the creation of the Soviet Union (1922).

For Eastern Europe the nation-state proved to be the central of the pillars of stability. It was the nation-state that was to provide and guarantee all other aspects of modern social life: industrialization, universal education, political rights, etc. In all of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe, and arguably more so in the societies of the southeast that had embarked somewhat earlier on the road to national independence, nation building was linked to the victory of the centralizing state over traditional forms of decentralized communal self-rule. This, in the end, produced everywhere powerful antagonisms between the state and society, between the city and the countryside, between the peasants and the bureaucracy.¹⁹ Yet, at the beginning, before the achievement of sovereign statehood, the advent of mass society together with the spread of the ideals of social justice and equality were mostly subordinated to the idea of equality between nations. This powerful idea was channeled into equally powerful movements aimed at reform, different types of adjustment of ethnic minorities within the old imperial frameworks, most remarkable among them the different visions of federative arrangements, and ultimately independent nation-states. The vindication of the nation-state came with a price everywhere in Europe, not only in the east, and gradually transformed the liberal and altogether inclusive character of the early to mid-nineteenth-century national doctrines by way of the conservative, exclusivist, and irredentist policies of the new political elites.²⁰

¹⁹ Wolfgang Höpken, "Zentralstaat und kommunale Selbstverwaltung in Bulgarien 1880–1910. Zur Anatomie eines Modernisierungskonfliktes," in: Zvetana Todorova, ed. *Probleme der Modernisierung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Sofia, 1994), pp. 24–39; H.-M. Böstfleisch, *Modernisierungsprobleme und Entwicklungskrisen: Die Auseinandersetzungen um die Bürokratie in Serbien 1839–1958* (Frankfurt am Main, 1987); H.-M. Miedlig, "Patriarchalische Mentalität als Hindernis für die staatliche und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung Serbien im 19. Jahrhundert", *Südost-Forschungen* 50, 1991, pp. 163–190; V. Georgiadu, *Griechenlands nicht-kapitalistische Entwicklungsaspekte im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991); Добринка Парушева, "Политическа култура и култура в политиката. Балканите в края на XIX и началото на XX", *Историческо бъдеще*, 1998, 1, pp. 111–124.

²⁰ An apt illustration is Brian A. Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland* (New York, 2000). For general

What has held as a common verdict about the whole area (with the exception of the Czech territories and several other local pockets) was the overall insufficient development of capitalism (more flagrant the further one moved to the east), something that produced an East European specificity, namely the growth of the nation-state without sufficient industrialization and urbanization, the “lack of chronological correspondence between the two processes—first, creation of nation and nation-state; only after that, modernization as an economic and social process.”²¹ This has prompted one author to speak aptly about “politics as development” and another to posit that “modernity had its full impact in Central and Eastern Europe after 1920.”²²

As already pointed out, the state was seen as a pioneering agent of industrialization and economic nationalism (protectionism), it was everywhere the

accounts of east European nationalism, see Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, 1994); Sugar, ed., *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, Md., 1995); Emil Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe* (Budapest, 1981); Andrew György, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (McLean, Va., 1970); Ronald Sussex and J.C. Eade, eds., *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe* (Columbus, 1985); Richard Plaschka, *Nationalismus, Staatsgewalt, Widerstand: Aspekte nationaler und sozialer Entwicklung in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa* (München, 1985); Gerasimos Augustinos, ed., *The National Idea in Eastern Europe: The Politics of Ethnic and Civic Community* (Lexington, 1996); Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920* (Seattle, 1977); Gale Stokes, *Nationalism in the Balkans: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York, 1984); John C. Swanson, *The remnants of the Habsburg monarchy: the shaping of modern Austria and Hungary, 1918–1922* (Boulder, 2001). Worth mentioning are also some major collective works on European nationalism in general, in which East Europe assumes the role of recipient of ideas: Mikuláš Teich and Roy Porter, eds., *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge, 1993); Louk Hagendorn et al., eds., *European Nations and Nationalism: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives* (Aldershot, 2000). For a first-class, recent comparative attempt in a general European framework that can serve as the rare example of a balanced rendition, see Ulrike v. Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard, *Nationalismen in Europa: West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich* (Göttingen, 2001).

²¹ K.-D. Grothusen, “Modernisierung und Nationsbildung. Modelltheoretische Überlegungen und ihre Anwendung auf Serbien und die Türkei,” *Südost-Forschungen*, Bd. XLIII, 1981, pp. 135–180; Rumen Daskalov, Holm Sundhaussen, “Modernisierungsansätze,” in Magarditsch Hatschikjan, Stefan Troebst, eds. *Südosteuropa. Ein Handbuch: Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur* (Munich, 1999).

²² Gale Stokes, *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia*, (Durham & London, 1990); Alan Dingsdale, *Mapping Modernities. Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe, 1920–2000* (London & NY, 2002), p. xxi. See also Gerasimos Augustinos, ed. *Diverse Paths to Modernity in Southeastern Europe. Essays in National Development* (New York, 1991).

predominant actor of modernity. Everywhere, even though seriously lagging behind the economic development of Western Europe, the half century leading to the First World War saw remarkable levels of economic resurgence, the flourishing of light industries, the beneficial effect on industries from high state expenditure on railway construction, the European arms' race, the development of technologies, industrial concentration, protectionism and cartelization. Everywhere, modernization was seen as the prime instrument to close the temporal and spatial lag vis-à-vis the west, and everywhere the often debilitating consciousness of this gap was the primary motor of activity.

It has to be added in parenthesis that probably because of this, modernization as a concept has had a much more favorable fate in Eastern Europe and was never entirely purged from its vocabulary. Modernization was always seen as the most potent catching-up device, "the process of long-term change that transforms a society resting on agriculture and its related political and social structures into an industrial society based on technological advancement, secularized culture, bureaucratic administration, and extensive (however shallow) forms of political participation."²³ Writing about Turkey, Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba welcome the emphasis on cultural identity, difference, and diversity over the homogenization and universalist claims and aspirations of modernization. Yet, they also point out the need to reclaim the universal and liberating potential of modernization as a world-historical liberating process that made it possible for people to pursue their individual interests while forming meaningful collectivities. "Just as we need to distinguish between modernity as a potentially liberating historical condition and its instrumentalization for a political project of domination, we also need to distinguish between the democratic implications of the recent post-modern critique, on the one hand, and its self-closure into a new form of orthodoxy."²⁴

All this raises two additional issues with extraordinary relevance for Eastern Europe: the notion and manifestations of backwardness, and the concept of alternative or multiple modernities. The sense of lag and lack, analytically subsumed in the notion of backwardness, has been a dominant trope not only in East European or, more broadly, in non-European perceptions. For long decades, it had been painfully present in German self-perceptions.²⁵ It con-

²³ Ian Kershaw and Moshe Levin, *Stalinism and Nazism. Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 344–345.

²⁴ Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle & London, 1997), p. 6.

²⁵ Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), pp. 359–380.

tinues to be present in Spanish and Italian discourses, although no longer with the painful overtones. In the East European context, more so than in other non-western contexts, the literature on backwardness is dominated by economic historians and political scientists. In fact, some authors have argued that the subdiscipline of economic development was created in the 1940s mostly by East Europeans who employed the cases of Eastern Europe as their original empirical base.²⁶ If cultural aspects are discussed, it is only by way of weighing cultural traditions as impediments or promoters of development. Questions like “Why did the Industrial Revolution take place in the West?” and “What causes economic growth?” are the ones that frame the discussion and while there are different explanatory systems—the dominant among them Marxism, even when unacknowledged; world systems theory, especially center-periphery relations; modernization theory; geographic determinism; and cultural determinism (in this order)—there is an overall consensus that Eastern Europe has been lagging economically at least since the sixteenth—seventeenth centuries and maybe as far back as the eleven-twelfth centuries, but in any case long before it was absorbed into the wider western world market.²⁷ As far as the explanations for this economic backwardness

²⁶ Joseph L. Love evokes the names of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurske, Kurt Martin, Hans Singer, Alexander Gerschenkron, Peter Bauer, Paul Baran, Michał Kalecki and others. Love, *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil* (Stanford, 1996), p. 6. Love argues that “in the interwar period [...] the newly independent and newly configured nations of East Central Europe constituted a ‘proto’-Third World in which the problems of economic and social backwardness were first confronted and formally theorized, against a range of development options, which included Soviet socialism.” (p. 214).

²⁷ See the important collective volume of Daniel Chirot, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, 1989), which was the result of a conference at Bellagio in 1985 and includes the first-class articles of Chirot, Robert Brenner, Peter Gunst, Jacek Kochanowicz, Fikret Adanir, John Lampe and Gale Stokes. This approach has produced important research, and at least a few other works are worth mentioning, even if they do not necessarily reach identical conclusions: John Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington, 1982); John Lampe, “Modernization and Social Structure: The Case of the pre-1914 Balkan Capitals,” *Southeastern Europe/Europe du sud-est*, 5, Pt.2, 1979, pp. 11–32; Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, *The European Periphery and Industrialization, 1780–1914* (Cambridge, 1982); Berend and Ránki, “Underdevelopment in Europe in the Context of East–West Relations in the Nineteenth Century,” *Etudes Historiques Hongroises* 1 (1980): pp. 687–710; Michael Palaret, *The Balkan Economies, 1800–1914: Evolution Without Development* (Cambridge, 1997); Nikos Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (London, 1978); Paul Bödy, *Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840–1870: A Study of Ideas of Individuality and Social Pluralism*

go, the consensus, if any, is far more brittle. These explanations range from social-structural ones of a historical *longue durée* (Jenő Szűcs) to reversing the premises of the debate: it is rapid growth rather than a tendency to stagnation that is exceptional, and Eastern Europe, from this point of view, is normalized with the rest of the world where western Europe is seen as the exception that ought to be explained.²⁸

Addressing the issue as “the trap of backwardness,” I suggested elsewhere that it should be approached through the concept of relative synchronicity within a *longue durée* framework, a perspective that circumvents the trap of origins, which carries backwardness as its corollary.²⁹ While I focused mostly on the discourse of backwardness in a cultural milieu, especially the conceptualization of comparative nationalisms, the model can be applied more broadly. After all, industrialization faces a similar challenge as nationalism. Not only did it take place over the course of several centuries over Europe, even in its core space, England, it took several centuries for its accomplishment and penetration into different areas of the country and into different branches of the industry (the eighteenth and nineteenth, or, according to a different interpretation, the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries). Surely, the mechanisms of the process and the social price at different junc-

in *Modern Politics* (Boulder, 1985); Holm Sundhausen, “Zur Wechselbeziehung zwischen frühneuzeitlichem Außenhandel und ökonomischer Rückständigkeit in Osteuropa: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der ‘Kolonialthese,’” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983), pp. 544–563; Sundhausen, “Der Wandel der osteuropäischen Agrarverfassung während der frühen Neuzeit: Ein Beitrag zur Divergenz der Entwicklungswege von Ost- und Westeuropa,” *Südost-Forschungen* 42 (1983): pp. 169–181; Sundhausen, “Die ‘Peripherisierungstheorie’ zur Erklärung Südosteuropäischer Geschichte,” in Uwe Hinrichs, Helmut Jachnow, Reinhard Lauer, and Gabriella Schubert, eds., *Sprache in der Slavia und auf dem Balkan: Slavistische und balkanologische Aufsätze; Norbert Reiter zum 65. Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden, 1993), pp. 277–288; Roland Schönfeld, ed., *Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Südosteuropa* (München, 1989); Zwetana Todorova, ed., *Probleme der Modernisierung Bulgariens im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Sofia, 1994); Witold Kula, *An economic theory of the feudal system. Towards a model of the Polish economy, 1500–1800* (London, 1976).

²⁸ Jenő Szűcs, “Three Historical Regions of Europe,” in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (London, 1988), pp. 291–331; Daniel Chirot, “Causes and Consequences of Backwardness,” in Chirot, *Origins of Backwardness*, pp. 1–14. The latter way of thinking was inspired by the significant impact of the work of Eric L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia* (Cambridge, 1981).

²⁹ Maria Todorova, “The trap of backwardness: modernity, temporality and the study of Eastern European nationalism,” *Slavic Review*, 64, 1, Spring 2005, pp. 140–164.

tures of this development were different (with pioneers and laggards in each case) but still nobody questions the epistemological adequacy of describing them within the same overall process (and the respective category). Moreover, at the end of the day, when in particular places the process has reached some completion, and is considered successful or acceptable, no one is interested in the original and the possible deviations thereof.

The reformulation I proposed is not undertaken for the sake of political correctness or diplomacy, but in order to make a methodological point. While the description that favors a distinct primary place and the transmission of the original pattern presupposes distinct geographic and historical spaces, usually clustered around the separate nation-states that were the *habitus* of modernity, the other involves Eastern Europe in a common long-term process. It, thus, redefines the region as part of a common space (European or global) which evolves, and one of whose characteristics is the homogenization (or, rather, imagined homogenization) of polities. It also allows us to deconstruct the category "west" and transform it from a model-like entity into a dynamic one which itself underwent the process unevenly and over a long period of time. Thus the notion of relative synchronicity within the *longue durée* of modernity, even as it does not exclude the existence of asynchronous developments, allows us to describe them not simply in terms of linear consecutive phenomena, diffusion and one-way transmissions, but also, in some aspects, as a process that emphasizes its dialogical nature.

For example, much of the romantic passion of George Byron and Alexander Pushkin cannot be understood outside the influence of Greek nationalism; the Polish partitions and the ensuing mobilization of Polish nationalism created waves that inspired a variety of responses, from philosophers beginning with Rousseau to the crystallization of a specific Russophobia in nineteenth-century Europe that goes a long way in explaining subsequent European international relations; the German preoccupations with folklore cannot be understood without the Serb connection, nor the introduction of the moral principle (although not necessarily morality) in British Gladstonian politics without the impetus of Bulgarian nationalism and the retaliation it invoked. In a larger context, Timothy Mitchell insists that putting empire back into the history of Europe enables the reversal of the narrative of modernization so as to see the West as the product of modernity.³⁰

Still, no matter how we deal with this problematique today (and the materials in the volume abundantly bear out such an approach), it is a fact that in

³⁰ Timothy Mitchell, *Questions of Modernity*, p. 15.

the time period covered by the readings (and, arguably, until the present if not in such dire degree), politicians and intellectuals in Eastern Europe had deeply internalized the sense of lack and lag, which either paralyzed them or prompted a volley of hectic reformist activities. In the Greek case, and this can be extended easily to the others, “Greek culture became ‘traditional’ only when it began to view itself as an inferior past living in the present—the European present. At that point, it emerged as a problem to be dealt with. It became something either to be rejected, which is to say, modernized, or to be re-invented, re-interpreted, re-valued and used, after the European fashion, as a defense against the modern.”³¹ As Gregory Jusdanis puts it: “Belated modernization, especially in nonwestern societies necessarily remains ‘incomplete’ not because it deviates from the supposedly correct path but because it cannot culminate in a faithful duplication of western prototypes.” Favoring the concept of “many modernities,” he therefore concludes that peripheral societies “internalize the incongruity between western originals and local realities as a structural deficiency.”³²

Yet how we deal with it today is more than relevant. After all it is “the problem of how to write of forms of modernity that deviate from the canonical understanding of the term.”³³ Some still insist on the necessity of an ideal-typical form, usually equated with and distilled from West European examples. Others speak of alternative, multiple or plural modernities. Still others deny modernity’s heuristic value by arguing that everything in the world is by definition modern, alternatively or not. The counter-stream to the homogenization theory of modernity is a fairly recent phenomenon of the last little over a decade, and focuses on the heterogeneity of global modernity. Arguing that the modern was produced not within Europe alone, it pluralizes modernity and explores “alternative modernities” or “multiple capitalisms,”

³¹ Vasso Argyriou, “Tradition, Modernity and European Hegemony in the Mediterranean,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, vol. 12, No. 1, 2002, p. 34. Augusta Dimou demonstrates how “belated” modernity inflected the response of socialists. While social democrats in western countries saw their principal task in exposing, analyzing, and mitigating the exigencies of the modernization process, the Bulgarian social democrats first tried to persuade public opinion and their adversaries that modernization was the desired, necessary and unavoidable path for the country (Augusta Dimou, *Entangled Paths Toward Modernity: Contextualizing socialism and nationalism in the Balkans* (Budapest, 2009).

³² Gregory Jusdanis, *Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture: Inventing National Literature* (Minneapolis, 1991), p. xiii.

³³ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies* (Chicago, 2002), p. xx.

stressing local, regional and global forces that shape particular histories of capitalist modernity.³⁴

Much of this was generalized and theorized by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt in a series of important works. Following Weber, Eisenstadt understands the core of modernity as the deconstruction of the God-ordained worldview of all axial civilizations. Since modern societies are no longer embedded in transcendental orders, they are open to continuous transformation and adaptation. For Eisenstadt, modernity is characterized by open political arenas and changing collective identities, autonomy of man in relation to authority, and multiplicity of competing visions of the public good. Traditions, instead of being dissolved by modernity, serve as its sources for perpetual constitution and reconstitution. Eisenstadt posited that the cultural and political program of modernity was first developed in Western and Central Europe when significant shifts occurred in the conception of human agency which allowed the conception of a future characterized by possibilities realizable through autonomous human agency. At the same time, various cultures undergoing modernization develop distinctive reaction patterns, institutions and ethical conceptions. There is, in this sense, a continual reinterpretation of the cultural program of modernity and, thus, the construction of multiple modernities, attempts by various groups and movements to reappropriate and redefine the discourse of modernity in their own terms. Moreover, the forms of modernity that developed in North and Latin America are not fragments of the Old World, but crystallizations of new civilizations. All these civilizations share the central structural and ideational cores of modernity.³⁵

³⁴ On alternative modernities, see: M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson, *Global Modernities* (London, 1995); Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimension of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996); Peter Geschiere and Michael Rowlands, "The Domestication of Modernity: Different Trajectories," *Africa* 66 (4) 1996, pp. 552–54; L. Rofel, *Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism* (Berkeley, 1999); Jean and John Comaroff, eds. *Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa* (Chicago, 1999); *Daedalus*, Special Issue on 'Multiple Modernities,' 129 (1) 2000; Timothy Mitchell, ed. *Questions of Modernity*, Minneapolis (London, 2000); Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities* (Durham, 2001); Dorothy Hodgson, *Gendered Modernities: Ethnographic Perspectives* (New York, 2001); Bruce M. Knauft, ed. *Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies* (Bloomington, 2002).

³⁵ Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Some Observations on Multiple Modernities," in Dominic Sachsenmaier and Jens Riedel with Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations* (Leiden, Boston, Cologne, 2002), pp. 27–41; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 129, 1, 2000, pp. 1–29; S. N. Eisenstadt, ed. *Patterns of Modernity*. vol. II: Beyond

While rightly arguing against the dangers of a Eurocentric paradigm, in which European history is sold as universal history, the now fashionable notions of alternative or multiple modernities come with their own liabilities, chief among them a possible slip into easy pluralism and cultural relativism.³⁶ “The pluralizing of modernity appears to absolve analysts of the essentializing tendency inherent in a monolithic concept of modernity, yet it can risk reproducing it, in the same way the simplistic cultural relativism risks reifying difference whilst attempting to understand it.”³⁷ Van der Veer in particular has been critical of the pluralizing move, maintaining that modernity should be seen as a singular phenomenon. He argues against using the term for a historical or social epoch, but for a political project linked to the development of the nation-state. The multiplicity of modernity, according to him, lies not in a plurality of modernities, but consists of a plurality of histories of the singular modernity, in which the emergence of the nation-state has differed.³⁸

Most sophisticated theorists, no matter what the preference, tend to reach some kind of a consensus. Dilip Gaonkar, who thinks in terms of alternative modernities, insists that it is impossible to abandon the western discourse on modernity. Modernity has traveled from the West to the rest of the world not only in term of cultural forms, social practices, and institutional arrangements, but also as a form of discourse that interrogates the present. Therefore, even if expressed in vernacular or cosmopolitan idioms, the legacy of the western discourse is inescapable. Wherever one is, one must think with and against the tradition and reflections from Marx to Weber through Baudelaire and Benjamin to Habermas and Foucault.³⁹ Jon Mitchell, following Van der Veer, builds his analysis on the premise that modernity is a singular

the West (New York, 1987); Eisenstadt, *The Great Revolutions and the Civilizations of Modernity* (Leiden, Boston, 2006), pp. 131–158.

³⁶ Stacy Pigg has argued against the concept of the modern as universal, proposing instead to attribute its influence to its cosmopolitan nature, as if modifying an adjective from the Latin to the Greek would suddenly purify its subject. Stacy Pigg, “The Credible and the Credulous: The Question of ‘Villagers’ Beliefs’ in Nepal,” *Cultural Anthropology* 11, No. 2 (1996), pp. 160–201. Cited in Christine J. Walley, “Our Ancestors Used to Bury their ‘Development’ in the Ground: Modernity and the Meanings of Development within a Tanzanian Marine Park,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 76, No. 1 (2003), pp. 33–54.

³⁷ Jon P. Mitchell, *Ambivalent Europeans*, p. 13.

³⁸ Peter Van der Veer, “The Global History of ‘Modernity,’” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 43, 3, 1998, pp. 285–294.

³⁹ Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “On Alternative Modernities,” in: *op.cit.*, pp. 14–15.

process but one with different historical trajectories at different times and places.⁴⁰ And James Ferguson who is altogether critical of the notion of alternative modernities, speaks of two types of modernity: a cultural modernity, where the idea of alternative modernities may be fecund, and an economic modernity, where it might be better to think in a more linear way.⁴¹

Finally, Timothy Mitchell contests both singular modernity and the easy pluralism of alternative modernities: "It is not that there are many different modernities, any more than there are many different capitalisms. Modernity, like capitalism, is defined by its claim to universality, to a uniqueness, unity, and universality that represents the end (in every sense) of history. Yet this always remains an impossible unity, an incomplete universal. Each staging of the modern must be arranged to produce the unified, global history of modernity, yet each requires those forms of difference that introduce the possibility of a discrepancy, that return to undermine its unity and identity. Modernity thus becomes the unsuitable yet unavoidable name for all these discrepant histories."⁴²

Without imposing or even suggesting an explicit preference, this volume offers ample material to explore some of these options. Do we approach Eastern Europe as part of a universal, if not entirely homogenizing and singular modernity? Is it the case that it can be better explained in terms of an alternative modernity or even multiple modernities? The richness and variety of texts, and the privileging of the thematic approach convincingly gesture in the direction of a successful transcendence of national boundaries which has been the organizing principle in the majority of regional surveys. Here, we can see the agents of modernity breathing the same air, thinking the same thoughts, even if they do not always converse with each other. True, the very fact that the comparative potential of the material is confined within the East European region comes with its own caveats. The East-West duality can be broken only by setting a general European or global framework, in which the

⁴⁰ Jon P. Mitchell, *Ambivalent Europeans*, pp. 241.

⁴¹ James Ferguson, "Decomposing Modernity: History and Hierarchy after Development," in Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton and Jed Esty, eds., *Postcolonial Studies and Beyond* (Durham, 2005); James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley, 1999). This view tallies well with Taylor's two theories of modernity, an "acultural" one that views transition as a set of culture-neutral operations transforming any traditional society, and a cultural theory which holds that modernity always unfolds within a specific cultural and civilizational context (Charles Taylor, "Two theories of Modernity," in Dilip P. Gaonkar, ed, *Alternative Modernities*).

⁴² Timothy Mitchell, "The Stage of Modernity," *op.cit.*, p. 24.

East European presence is organically interwoven or “entangled” as the discursive fashion would have it today. Setting the East European experience apart risks inadvertently reifying it into a discrete phenomenon. Yet this in no way is a deficiency of the volume’s conceptualization. It has to bear the burden of the existing state of historiographical accumulation and achievement, but it does so admirably. In the end, the appreciation of the universal choir can come only after one hears and learns to appreciate the distinct and original voices of the region’s soloists.

FRANTIŠEK PALACKÝ: THE IDEA OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE

Title: *Idea státu rakouského* (The idea of the Austrian state)

Originally Published: *Národ*, a set of eight articles published between 9 April and 16 May, 1865

Language: Czech

The excerpts used are from František Palacký, *Spisy drobné 1: Spisy a řeči z oboru politiky*, ed. by Bohuš Rieger (Prague: Bursík a Kohout, 1900–03), pp. 218–226, 261–267.

About the author

František Palacký [1798, Hodslavice (*Ger.* Hotzendorf, north Moravia) – 1876, Prague]: politician and historian. He came from a traditional Protestant (Bohemian Brethren) family in Moravia. He studied at the Lutheran Latin School in Trenčsén (*Slo.* Trenčín, present-day Slovakia) and the Lutheran Lyceum in Pressburg (*Hun.* Pozsony; *Slo.* Prešporok; present-day Bratislava, Slovakia), where he became acquainted with the ideas of Czech patriotism and Slavic reciprocity. Among his friends were Ján Benedikti, Pavel Josef Šafařík and **Jan Kollár**. After 1818, he was tutor to several Hungarian noble families, and was concerned principally with philosophy and aesthetics. The liberal-minded environment of Upper Hungary at that time and his experience gained in noble circles opened up the world of European culture and academic life for the young Palacký. In 1823, he went to Prague with the intention of studying Czech history, in particular the Hussite period. He was employed as a genealogist for the aristocratic Sternberg family, and studied historical methods under the tutelage of **Josef Dobrovský**. In 1829, the Estates appointed Palacký ‘Historian of the Bohemian Kingdom.’ At the same time he was instrumental in providing the Czech patriots with a firm institutional background for their cultural endeavors. In 1827, he started the *Časopis Společnosti Vlasteneckého museum v Čechách* (Journal of the Patriotic Museum Society in Bohemia) the most important Czech scholarly journal of the period. He also made important contributions in 1831 to the *Matice česká*, a foundation that supported the publication of books written in Czech. As a secretary of the ‘Patriotic Museum Society,’ he proposed in 1841 that the main task of the museum should be to present Bohemian scholarship, and he turned it into an important centre of ‘national academic life.’ Palacký entered politics in 1848 as a member of the Czech National Committee and became a deputy to the *Reichsrat* (Imperial Diet) and the president of the 1848 Slavic Congress in Prague. Moreover, he was a delegate to the Constituent Assembly of 1848–1849. He also formulated the liberal political program of the bourgeoisie, and later became the un-

challenged intellectual leader of the liberal National Party and remained so until the end of his life. He retired from active politics in the neo-absolutist period of the 1850s, but resumed his involvement in the 1860s, after the reinstatement of constitutional rule. He was a deputy to the Bohemian Diet and, in 1861, became the only Czech ever elected to the upper chamber of the *Reichsrat*. In subsequent years Palacký was one of the chief opponents of dualism and a supporter of the historical 'state rights' (*Staatsrecht*) arrangement of the Empire as opposed to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. After 1871, he concentrated on publishing collections of his articles on politics, aesthetics, history, and literature, as well as working to complete his magnum opus, *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě* (History of the Czech nation in Bohemia and Moravia). Palacký remained a leading personality of the Czech national movement for more than fifty years. In the national historical canon he used to be referred to as the 'father of the nation'; for his monumental academic work he has been dubbed the 'founder' of modern Czech historiography.

Main works: *Počátkové českého básnictví, obzvláště prozodie* [The beginnings of Czech poetry, especially prosody] with P. J. Šafařík (1818); *Starí letopisové čeští* [Old Bohemian annals] (1829); *Archiv český*, 6 vols. [Czech archive: Documents] (1840–72); *Würdigung der alten böhmischen Geschichtsschreiber* [An appreciation of the old Bohemian historians] (1830); *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 5 vols. [History of Bohemia] (1836–67); *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě*, 5 vols. [A History of the Czech nation in Bohemia and Moravia] (1848–67); *Idea státu rakouského* [The idea of the Austrian state] (1865); *Radhost. Sbirka z oboru řeči a literatury české, krásovědy, historie a politiky*, 3 vols. [Radhost: A collection from the disciplines of Czech language and literature, aesthetics, history and politics] (1871–73).

Context

Having left active politics in the 1850s, Palacký resumed his activity after the imposed constitution, the 'October Diploma,' was promulgated in 1860. Referring to the October Diploma, he suggested that the federalization of Austria should be implemented. Such hopes, however, faded after the constitution of 1861, the 'February Patent.' The government set out to work with the German liberals and the Austrian pro-constitution nobility, while Czech liberals began to coordinate their policy with the conservative nobility of Bohemia. In response to the ascendant dualist Austro-Hungarian solution to the constitutional conflict, the recognition of historical Bohemian state rights as being equal to Hungarian state rights became the main demand of Czech liberal politics in the 1860s. In the course of the decade, Palacký strove to justify the idea of equality between nations as a true historical mission and a principle to revitalize the Austrian multinational state. He tried to defend his conception of federalism against the proponents of centralist and dualist concepts.

In the spring of 1865, Palacký published a series of articles called 'The Idea of the Austrian State,' which turned out to be the most extensive and elaborate of his political treatises. At first he followed the historical development of the coexistence of Central European nations and pointed out the basic reason for their unification, namely to create a common state that could counter the threat of the expanding Ottoman Empire at the first half of the sixteenth century. In addition, Palacký argued that the Austrian state had become the hallmark of the Counter-Reformation and reaction against progress and modern enlightenment. But the situation changed in the mid-nineteenth century, when the *Weltgeist* manifested itself in the idea of the equality of nations. To implement this equality did not mean, he argued, the destruction of great multinational states because in the process of 'world centralization,' the small nations—self-standing moral and legal entities according to Palacký—must help each other against the large ones and thus balance out the historical powers of centralization that tend to make everything uniform. The true reason Austria should exist was to guarantee the freedom, justice and security of the small Central European nations on the basis of their equality. Palacký refused both the concept of centralization developed by the Viennese government and the concept of the dual monarchy favored by leading Hungarian politicians, while criticizing German and Magyar hegemonic tendencies. Instead, he basically proposed his original federalization concept of 1848/49, though with some important corrections. He did not change the emphasis on national self-determination and basic liberal tenets. He did, however, combine this with other elements, especially with the concept of historical rights, referring to **József Eötvös's** theory on the historical and political individuality of the Crown lands in Austria.

This also was why 'The idea of the Austrian state' has sometimes been understood as being in opposition to Palacký's 1848/49 concept of ethnic federalization. In this respect the apparent contradiction between two of his famous dicta was usually pointed out: "We [the Slavs] existed before Austria, and we shall exist after her!" (1865), and "If the Austrian State had not existed for ages, it would have been in the interests of Europe and indeed of humanity to endeavor to create it as soon as possible" (1848) (See **František Palacký**, *Letter to Frankfurt*). Despite Palacký's strong pessimism regarding the ability of Austria to reform itself, however, the 1865 article is by no means a program for independence. Some interpretations stress the shift of the argumentation from the doctrine of natural rights towards the politics of historical state rights. More sympathetic accounts regard these two aspects

not as contradictory, but as complimentary, a necessary combination under the political circumstances.

Since its publication, *Idea státu rakouského* has been perceived as the most important statement of Czech liberal politics in terms of its relation to the Austrian state in the nineteenth century. As such, it also received a lot of attention and support among Czech, Croat, Polish and other federalist groups in the Monarchy. On the other hand, it drew criticism from political opponents immediately after its German translation (*Oesterreichs Staatsidee*) was published in 1866. Every subsequent Czech political argument regarding Austria referred to this article, and, despite the fact that federalization was never realized, it was only during the First World War that the alternative concept of an independent Czech or Czechoslovak state gained substantial support. Afterwards, however, it still remained an emblematic expression of the mainstream Czech liberal federalist position, and as such has been referred to in numerous subsequent discussions on the coexistence, or even the possible reintegration, of various nations in Central Europe.

MK

The idea of the Austrian state

The principle of the equality of nations is as old as the doctrine of natural law in general. The source of both is the source from which morality and law stem, that is to say, a commandment implanted deep in the human heart: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." However, it took long and cruel struggles before this divine spark was lit in the soul of man and caught fire to the extent that it could stand on its own and resist brutishness, that is to say, raw and all-consuming egoism. This is also why it happened that civil, or, better said, interpersonal, law was recognized and took precedence over international law. Indeed, physical violence between nations was for centuries decisive, and mostly remains decisive to this day. With the progress of civilization, however, principles of law were formed in this respect, too, which attained general recognition in our century. But the historical fact that originally every nation used to have its own government and was therefore its own state entity meant that the law between states and the law between nations were for centuries considered, and are for the most part still considered, identical. Although the progress of world centralization and decentralization long ago caused the terms 'state' and 'nation' to cease to be one and the same, to cease to overlap, more than one

nation has divided up into several states and more than one state has sometimes contained several nations. [...]

That the feeling, consciousness and validity of the principle of nationality, in this sense, has in our age gained in strength and grown in all corners and lands of the earth is a truth that neither friends nor foes will deny. [...] One dares to say that it has never been one of the Lord's commandments that the universe should be uniform. That is why the role of the principle of nationality is, and will forever remain, in the administration of the world, and all human railing against it and taking up arms is like blowing into the wind; one may blow insignificant crumbs here and there, but that always turns out to be useless with larger amounts. This principle is still only in the early stages of its powerful effect, and the mortal eye is unable to see where it will end.

Is it not irrelevant to ask whether nationality in this sense (providing there is a difference between the nation and the state) is based on reality or whether it is a mere fiction, an empty abstraction? And if, as I hope, no one denies the reality of nationality, it is appropriate to ask: Is or is not every nation in its whole some sort of moral and legal entity? I assume that at least among thinkers there will be no doubt about that. Nations, such as the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and Germans, are a reality, they are individual and living wholes, each has its own consciousness, its desires, its common interests and consequently its rights and obligations: they are therefore moral and legal entities. And no one will deny that Germans, for example, those who live in the states of Austria, Prussia, Russia and France, have their own common national interests, for which they may make claims in full and friendly agreement, even if their governments and therefore these states argued and clawed at each other till they drew blood. [...]

In the 'Bach Period,' the principle of national equality may never have been expressly denied from above, but another principle, one that was discordant with it, indeed in outright opposition to it, acquired greater and greater validity both in theory and in practice: it was the principle of the spreading of German culture to the East. If it were understood sincerely, and if the proponents of this doctrine resembled the Apostles, accepting the Holy Ghost from above in order to spread the Gospel to all nations in their natural languages (see Acts 2), there would be nothing particular in their actions to object to; it could even be gratefully accepted. But even children immediately saw that it was a mere euphemism that concealed the attempt to raise German nationality to a place where it would not only rule over the other nationalities in Austria, but would also gradually undermine them and ultimately rob them of their lives. All culture, that is to say, all spiritual culture,

and consequently all national life were clearly meant to be dependent solely on the German language, after which the death of other nationalities would naturally follow. This would not have been wrong or an injustice, providing some nations were not conscious of themselves and of a national life, providing the nations did not consider their national existence something dear and desirable and providing they did not intend to preserve and defend it. In our day, however, when nations, no matter how neglected and asleep, awaken one after the other as soon as they are touched with the magic wand of modern enlightenment, the torture and murder of nationalities becomes a sin that is no less flagrant than the torture and murder of any rational creature of God. [...]

Now we shall posit the following premises: (1) in the state of Austria, rights and the law (that is, the will of the state), rather than physical violence or the arbitrariness of one over the other, are supposed to reign supreme; (2) the state of Austria is comprised of diverse nations; (3) no nation has any right over any other nation, nor can any nation use any other nation as a means to its own ends. Consequently, I do not see how from those premises, without blatantly false reasoning, anything other than the equality of nations in Austria may be deduced. [...]

The fact that with the creation of the Austrian Empire more than three centuries ago, and by way of voluntary agreements, such diverse nations joined together in one state entity is something I consider a great boon of divine Providence for all of them. [...] This sort of union did not, however, provide enough room for the ambition and imperiousness or domineeringness of individuals amongst them; but were there, then, fewer opportunities to practice civil virtue? After all, bad honor achieved from the use of violence does not essentially differ from the honor or, better said, the shame, of thieves, except in its extent. If someone objects that this union has not always led to the benefit or welfare of the individual parts of the whole, I shall not deny that rather a lot happened that should not have happened, and that various things could have and should have been conducted better, but a just judgment about the past belongs to the Lord God and History. Political considerations should, however, include lessons learnt from the past, yet they should turn their attention to the present and the future in order that at least what in the past proved itself to be defective and detrimental be removed from the state system. [...]

Statesmen are trying to frame the constitution of the Austrian Empire on centralistic and dualistic foundations, a contradictory effort which is based on foundations that undermine each other and are repugnant both to law and

nature; they are therefore building something that is physically and morally impossible in the long run. By the principle of constitutionalism, nations are called upon everywhere to express their will in legislation and to see to its full effect; but centralism and dualism limits this to only civil and political rights and denies it arbitrarily with regard to the right of nations. The Slavs and Romanians are therefore supposed to subordinate themselves and subject themselves to the Germans and the Magyars; as citizens they are supposed to add their will to the laws, but as nations they are not supposed to have free will. Does this comport with the basic ideas and rights of constitutionalism? Is the person still free who is told: "You are supposed to be free, but not in the way in which you want but in the way I prescribe"? What entitles the Germans and Magyars to that sort of prescription? Who, being free, will be obliged to acknowledge foreign superiority under the law? If the Germans and Hungarians determine how many national rights the Slavs should get, how can anyone in Austria still speak of the equality of nations or of justice for all? [...]

But in the womb of the great and speculative German nation, one always comes across odd philosophers who, just as they are able to draw together all rationale and irrationality into methods and systems, also know how to show a priori that the principle of national equality is in itself sheer nonsense. The common origin of all humanity is said to be, just like Adam and Eve, a mere myth; as nature does not create two perfectly identical leaves, so she does not divide up her gifts to the nations in the same way, and when she granted some superior standing to one nation, that nation has the right to make use of it. And consequently the Germans, being by nature more talented, stronger and noble than the Slavs, are not meant at all to be placed on the same level as the Slavs. And such words are expressed not only in books and periodicals but also in German taverns. [...]

If, however, we look at the matter more closely, we cannot help suspecting that the Germans, who make noises about their natural superiority over us, only wish to drown out their own conscience, not being sufficiently, convinced themselves about their own claims. It would otherwise be impossible to explain why they would be so hesitant to enter a footrace with us on equal terms, if they were sure of their superiority and victory. But precisely for such a race to be just, we demand, rightfully, that the ancient wrongs end once and for all, and that the inequality, which is only a matter of fact and not of nature, not be exacerbated any more. We may, and we must, demand that the state, with the money that it gets from us, to the same extent as the Germans, does not support only German offices and higher education in our

country; we must demand that Czech chairs at Prague University be established whenever the need arises, and that when some docent is to lecture not only on early German law but also on early Czech law, that is to say, not only on Eike von Repgow¹ but also on Ondřej z Dubé² and Viktorín ze Všehrd,³ the reply from Vienna not always be negative, and so forth. [...]

Even more backward is the pretence of the Magyars to rule in their country simply because they allegedly conquered it a thousand years ago. Were the rights they obtained by the sword not lost long ago also by the sword, because they were since then defeated a hundred times? Did they once get out of the Turkish yoke by their own power? Did they leave their last national battle at Világos as victors? But, as I have already said, one cannot carry on a discussion about right based on might, so I shall not waste any more words on the topic.

Lastly, as a reason against the introduction of national equality, one gives the allegedly inevitable need of Austria not to give up the alliance with, and support of, the German Reich, which allegedly underpins it, and without which it would not just cease to be a Great Power (*Grossmacht*), but might perhaps even cease to exist. Indeed, Austria could not receive a stranger compliment than when it is said that the conditions for its existence come from outside it, not from within! And that is how the leading organ of public opinion speaks in the very heart of Austria, Vienna! I would tend to consider such words an insult to the magnificence of the Empire; and I cannot interpret them otherwise than to say that those who think and talk like that are far more concerned that the German nation rules than that Austria survives as a great power. It is all the same to us Slavs who rules in Germany or Italy, and we think that, if only Austria could ensure the satisfaction of all its nations with wise and just institutions and make it possible for us all to be proud of the name Austria, then she would have no reason to fear any other power in the world. [...]

Recently the Germans and the Magyars became accustomed to calling each and every conscious Slav who did not want to deny his nationality ‘Pan-Slavist’ or—as they say with foppish elegance in Hungary—‘Pan-Slav.’ Of course, if every national feeling, every natural Slav effort is Pan-Slavism, if

¹ Eike von Repgow: medieval German administrator and compiler of the thirteenth-century *Sachsenspiegel* legal code.

² Ondřej z Dubé: fourteenth-century Czech nobleman, judge and jurist of municipal law.

³ Viktorín ze Všehrd: Czech humanist lawyer, writer, and Dean of Prague University.

every Slav who does not let himself be Germanized or Magyarized is a Pan-Slavist or a Pan-Slav, then there shall be millions of Pan-Slavists, and all Austria will become the promised land of Pan-Slavism—but a Pan-Slavism that not even we ourselves wish for.

We unfortunately observe how in recent times the national egoism of the tribes ruling in Cisleithania and Transleithania appears increasingly open and ruthless. We read about the bargaining between German and Magyar politicians and about the dividing up of the administration of the Empire as if there were not even any Slavdom in Austria. We hear from both sides joyful words from the masses, which are prepared to rush into the supposed dualist paradise, and our hopes, no matter how justified, in the wise and continuous resistance of the Government to such developments might (God forbid) ultimately remain unfulfilled. In that case, we would have no choice but to say one last word: if the opposite of the idea of a modern Austrian state becomes the reality and if that heterogeneous and unique Empire does not grant the same justice to all, but instead chooses tyranny and the power of one over the other, if Slavs are proclaimed by law to be a subordinate race and, as we have already discussed, the subjects of a Government representing two other nations, then nature will assume its rights, and its inevitable resistance will change peace at home into unrest, will turn hope into desperation and will ultimately give rise to friction and struggles, the direction, extent and end of which cannot be foreseen. The day when dualism is proclaimed, which is an inevitable necessity of nature, will also be the day Pan-Slavism is born in its least desirable form, and its godparents will be the parents of dualism. What will follow can be imagined by every reader himself. We Slavs shall look to that day with sincere pain, but without fear. We existed before Austria, and we shall exist after her! [...]

Translated by Derek Paton

ADOLF FISCHHOF: AUSTRIA AND THE GUARANTEE OF ITS EXISTENCE

Title: *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes. Politische Studie*
(Austria and the guarantee of its existence. A political study)

Originally published: Wien, Wallishausser'sche Buchhandlung, 1869

Language: German

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 1–8.

About the author

Adolf Fischhof [1816, Óbuda (*Ger.* Alt-Ofen, Hungary) – 1893, Emmersdorf (near Klagenfurt, Austria)]: physician and political writer. He stemmed from a Moravian Jewish merchant family which had settled in Hungary at the turn of the nineteenth century. Fischhof graduated from the Piarist gymnasium in Pest and then the department of medicine in Vienna (1836–1844), after which he worked in the maternity ward at a Viennese hospital. He emerged as one of the leaders of the revolutionary movement of 1848, making his name known with an incendiary speech to the crowd on 13 March. Later he became president of the *Sicherheitsausschuss* (Committee of public security), which functioned as a governing body during the revolutionary months in Vienna. While a supporter of the German liberal nationalist project, he was also a proponent of cooperation with the Hungarian revolutionaries and led a number of student delegations to the Hungarian Diet in Pozsony (*Ger.* Pressburg, *Slo.* Prešporok, present-day Bratislava). He was elected member of the Constituent Assembly (*Reichstag*) as a representative of a Viennese suburb, and became a key figure in the Kremsier (*Cz.* Kroměříž) Parliament, seeking to devise a liberal constitutional order for Austria. After the dissolution of the Parliament on 7 March, 1849, Fischhof was arrested and accused of high treason but was eventually acquitted. In the 1850s, forced out of politics, he built up a successful medical praxis. After the relaxation of neo-absolutism, he resumed political pamphleteering, criticizing the proposed reforms of the Schmerling administration in 1861 from a radical liberal perspective. Along these lines, he was a proponent of the Compromise with the Hungarians. After 1867 he urged further federalization, including the Czech Compromise, although this eventually failed to materialize. He remained committed to the idea of national emancipation and while he gradually lost his influence as an active politician, he continued to publish theoretical works dealing with the nationality question and the problem of European disarmament. On the whole, Fischhof is considered to be one of the most important Austrian political thinkers of the nineteenth century and also a characteristic example of the search for identity of Central European intellectuals of Jewish origin in the context of competing national movements.

Main works: *Zur Lösung der ungarischen Frage* [Concerning the solution of the Hungarian question] (with Joseph Unger) (1861); *Ein Blick auf Oesterreichs Lage* [A view on Austria's position] (1866); *Zur Erweiterung der Munizipal-Autonomie* [Concerning the extension of municipal autonomy] (1868); *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes. Politische Studie* [Austria and the guarantee of its existence. A political study] (1869); *Zur Reduktion der kontinentalen Heere* [Reduction of the Continental armies] (1875); *Die Sprachenrechte in den Staaten gemischter Nationalität* [Language rights in states of mixed nationality] (1885); *Der oesterreichische Sprachenzwist* [The Austrian language conflict] (1888).

Context

The failure of the revolutionary movements of 1848 in Central Europe was to a large extent due to the clash of liberalism and nationalism, which in the *Vormärz* period were still considered to be closely related. 1848 opened 'Pandora's box' of defining the nation both in vertical and horizontal terms and the presumed common interest of nations to achieve freedom was superseded by a competition of nation-building projects. While in most of the cases it remained an open question whether the national program also entailed an aspiration for independent statehood, it became clear that the Herderian dream of peaceful coexistence of cultural nationalisms was seriously hindered by the overlapping territorial aspirations which turned most of the multiethnic regions into hotbeds of violent conflict. This also made the Austrian liberals turn to the problem of nationalities as a cornerstone of their political agenda. One possible answer was the emergence of constitutional centralism—manifested in the proposed reforms of Anton Schmerling (1805–1893) in the early 1860s—putting forward a liberal constitutionalist program while keeping up the unitary character of the state and disregarding the national demands of Hungarians, Croats and other national groups of the Monarchy who professed a constitutional tradition of autonomy.

Adolf Fischhof came from a similar ideological background as Schmerling, participating together in the stormy events of the 1848 Revolution in Vienna and opposing the absolutist government in the 1850s; nevertheless, his diagnosis of the situation was diametrically opposed to that of the minister of state. Arguably due to his Jewish-Hungarian background, he had considerably more empathy for the individual national movements than the nobleman-jurist Schmerling. He believed that Austria faced a lethal danger due to the national disaffection of the majority of its citizens and that the only way to save the Austrian state was to solve the nationality question in a lib-

eral spirit, offering national emancipation and considerable cultural and administrative autonomy for all the nationalities of the Monarchy. In contrast to the centralist faction of the Austrian liberals, in his writings of the first half of the 1860s, he also accepted the Hungarian argument that nationality and constitutionalism could not be separated. Consequently, he published a series of pamphlets such as *Zur Lösung der ungarischen Frage* (On the solution of the Hungarian question) (co-written with the liberal politician Joseph Unger), suggesting a reconciliation with Hungary and putting forward an arrangement—the separation of common issues (such as foreign policy, military and some fiscal policies) and national competences in administration and establishing the institution of delegations based on parity—which in many ways anticipated the 1867 Compromise.

He welcomed the Hungarian nationality law of 1868 as a milestone in establishing a truly liberal nationality policy in the Monarchy, although he criticized the Hungarian claim to supremacy and emphatically rejected the notion of an official state language. In a critical dialogue with the theoreticians of the time dealing with the nationality question (such as J. S. Mill, the Austrian **Viktor von Andrian-Werburg**, the Bohemian Germans Ludwig Löhner and Friedrich Deym, the Czech **František Palacký**, or the Hungarian **József Eötvös**), he tried to formulate a theoretical framework harmonizing the interests of a supra-ethnic state structure and the various nationalities. His principal problem was how to establish the territorialization of national self-government without creating oppressive majorities and disaffected minorities (such as in the case of Galician Poles and Ruthenians) and thus proliferating the nationality conflicts even further than it was in the case of the clash of privileged Germans and disfavored non-Germans in the 1850s. Going back to the precepts of the Kremsier Constitution, he suggested that the solution to the problem was the extension of rights delegated to the municipal governments—*Kreise*—combined with an active protection of minority rights in multiethnic zones, guaranteeing the use of the native language in the administrative, judicial and educational spheres. He hoped that 1867 opened the way towards further federalization of the Empire, and actively promoted the cause of Slavic nations in the Monarchy. At the same time he retained a dose of German cultural patriotism, arguing that the envisioned liberal Austrian monarchy could simultaneously be the homeland of a dozen free nations and draw an increasing number of citizens into the orbit of the German language as a supra-ethnic *lingua franca* offering them access to a European “high culture.”

His most important book, *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes*, was written in the atmosphere of the optimistic expectations following

the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. While registering the national conflicts ravaging the state in all its provinces, he stated that the specific balance of forces in Austria made it impossible for one nationality to dominate the others. He also criticized the Western European model of nation-state formation based on homogenization, arguing that this was suicidal for the Austrian state. Instead, he put forward the model of *Nationalitätenstaat* (nationality state), which aimed at the preservation of the multiplicity of its constitutive national units. Consequently, he formulated the Austrian mission in terms of creating the possibility of free national development for all the nationalities living in the Empire and thus providing a shelter for the small peoples between Germany and Russia. In addition, he envisioned broadly conceived social and educational reforms, turning the Monarchy from a backward state into the most advanced polity in Europe.

His proposal, however, met with violently critical reactions from the mainstream of Austrian-German national liberals, who considered it a capitulation to the “subversive” Slavic national movements. As the new generation of politicians in the Monarchy, as well as in the whole of Europe, opted for a more nationalistic agenda in the 1870s, Fischhof’s ideas became increasingly anachronistic. Nevertheless, he persevered in making efforts to bring the different national movements to a reasonable compromise. Trying to mediate between the Austrian-German and Czech elites, he was the key figure behind the Emmersdorf Memorandum of 1878, seeking to find a common platform between the Czech movement (represented by František Ladislav Rieger) and the Viennese liberal circles (represented among others by Michael Etienne, the editor of the most important liberal newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*). Finally, in 1882, he made an attempt to establish a transnational liberal party. While these attempts failed in political terms, in intellectual terms Fischhof’s heritage proved to be exceptionally rich. Most importantly, at the turn of the century some of the ideologists of the emerging Austrian Social Democratic movement (see **Karl Renner**, *State and nation*) who also had to face the national divisions turned to his federalist conception for inspiration. Also, his influence can be detected in the discussions of Hungarian civic radicals (see **Oszkár Jászi**, *The future of the Monarchy*), searching for a solution to the nationality conflicts in Hungary. Finally, through Count Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi, the father of the founder of the Pan-European movement after the First World War, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Fischhof also had an impact on the idea of European federalization.

Austria and the guarantee of its existence. A political study

“None of the large nationalities of Austria can alone guarantee the continuing existence of the monarchy, however each of these can jeopardize the state by their opposition; individually they can act destructively, only in unison can they proceed constructively. If the government, the Parliament (*Volksvertretung*) and the press, both this side of the Leitha and beyond, bear this in mind at all times, then Austria will consolidate, if not—it will not.”

These were the words with which I concluded an article published on 18 July 1867 in the *Neue Freie Presse*, which also contained the following passage:

“It is to be regretted when the wishes of the majority are not respected in the constituent assembly. This disrespect is the primary reason for the fruitlessness of most of these assemblies. When the parliamentary minority is a national party, and if it has behind it the majority of the population, then this disrespect can be fatal. And indeed, the minority of the state Parliament (*Reichsrat*) undoubtedly has behind it the majority of the Cisleithanian population: the number of Slavs in the German-Slavic crown lands¹ compared to Germans themselves stands at around 10 to 6.”

These words were published at a time when the Parliament had not yet begun the discussion of the new basic law; they were not the consequence of impassioned bias, but rather the result of calm deliberation. Barely two years have passed since then and how closely the facts match my prediction!

With the exception of a few small provinces of unmixed nationality, we are seeing everywhere the old quarrel blaze up with renewed violence. In Bohemia, as well as in Moravia, the Czechs, who make up the majority in both provinces, did not attend the most recent session of the provincial Parliament (*Landtag*); in Galicia the Poles are resisting the constitution, while the Ruthenians are resisting the violence inflicted upon their language by the Poles; in Tyrol, the Italians have yet to make peace with the Germans and the *Reich*; in Trieste and Dalmatia, the Italian city dwellers and the Slavic rural dwellers are battling it out, and in the provinces, where the Slovenes live alongside the Germans, numerous smaller frictions occur that, though not major, are increasingly souring the mood and hindering prosperous collaboration between the parties.

¹ Crown lands (*Kronländer*): administrative units of the Austrian Empire. After 1867 the notion referred to the Cisleithanian parts represented in the ‘Imperial Council,’ that is to say, excluding the lands of the Hungarian Crown.

Are not such facts enough to cause deep concern in the sympathetic observer and to prompt the politician who rates nothing higher than the common good to serious reflection?

Austria possesses a constitution that offers asylum to freedom; men of great talent, moral seriousness and stamina have been involved in its construction. How has it come to pass that this edifice, despite its lauded architecture, fails to seem homely to those meant to dwell in it? Is the reason really the stubbornness of those to be accommodated, or is it perhaps due to mistakes in the architect's drawings, to faults in the structure? Does this question not suggest itself, and is not the search for an uninhibited, seriously considered response a moral duty for those who seek the truth elsewhere than in the fleeting opinion of the day?

Observing the imperatives of this duty, I will attempt to analyze this question and, true to the habits of my profession, will in doing so maintain the calm and objectivity of a natural scientist who, examining an organic being, first of all tests its constituent parts, its construction, its coherence and its significance, then looks at the medium in which it lives as well as the means by which it sustains itself and the hostile forces by which it is threatened, in order, finally, to abstract from the sum of these observations the conditions under which it may evolve and prosper.

According to this method, I wish to examine the Austrian state, which, like all living things, sustains itself, grows and strengthens only if it is constructed according to the conditions of its existence and if it *lives* with these in harmony. In order to understand the conditions of its existence, I will primarily conduct an examination of its constituent *elements* and their relation to one another; then I will look at the *medium*, namely the *spiritual atmosphere* of our times, and finally at the *hostile forces* with which it must do battle, either to be victorious, or to perish.

The elements that make up the body of Austria are: *ethnic*, its *nationalities*, and *territorial*, its crown lands.

The ethnic elements of Austria are so heterogeneous and of such seemingly antithetical nature that many politicians conclude that these components cannot be joined organically but can only be lined up against one another. In the current times, in which peoples keenly desire to gather together their disparate national elements and increase their power by means of national unification, these politicians claim that an aggregation of individual peoples such as Austria is doomed. Piece after piece, they say, will detach itself from the loose structure; either that or, during a storm, the whole rotten edifice will fall apart completely.

Contrary to the views of these pessimistic politicians, the most important statesmen of Europe along with many political thinkers have not only declared this state to be viable, but have also called its continuing existence the surest guarantee of European stability. One important historian has even commented that were there no Austria in Europe, diplomats would have to create one.²

Which of these voices are right? The pessimists or the optimists? I believe both the *one* and the *other*, depending on whether or not the policies that Austria follows are in harmony with the conditions of its existence.

Austria is reminiscent of those great but contradictory natures that we sometimes encounter, whose glaring contrasts, confined within the narrow limits of the human soul, elicit fascination. Such characters attract us, as much as they repel us at the same time, exercising upon the attentive observer an almost demonic power, while filling the fleeting acquaintance either with repulsion or admiration, depending on whether they see the bad side or the good. The Austrian state has a *dual character* of this kind; sometimes it is of high moral and cultural import, sometimes corrupting and hindering of spiritual progress; sometimes it is full of strength and stamina, sometimes decrepit and weary; and sometimes all of these in the most abrupt contrast, with no transitions to make them milder. It has never been quicker to race to unimagined heights as when it appears to have sunk to its lowest, and has never been so close to collapsing as when it seemed to be at the zenith of its power. These contrasts inspire researchers to make careful studies, while the masses are quickly ready to sing a *Hosanna* or a *de profundis*.

However, such violent and sudden jumps in the character and life of a state, and in the public's judgment of the moral significance and viability of the same, are highly alarming; apart from a clear inability to exist, there is hardly anything more dangerous for a state than constantly reoccurring doubts about its vitality; it discourages friends, encourages opponents, and undermines trust in one's own strength.

For that reason, such contradictions must not be allowed to reappear in our times; if Austria wishes to guarantee its continuing existence, it must from now on be the bearer of a lofty ethical idea; and without doubt this is also its vocation, since justice is the highest moral notion, and no other major power exists in Europe that in its innermost nature is able to identify more with this than Austria.

² Allusion to the Czech historian, František Palacký.

In a unified nation state, the national idea is foremost. Everything else is rigorously subordinated to the unity of power and the nation, and since not a single state exists in Europe without the admixture of foreign nationalities, this idea of state attains its fulfillment only at the expense of justice for those peoples in the minority. France spares no thought for the interests of its non-French speaking inhabitants, nor does Russia those of the Poles, etc. Austria on the other hand, where there is not one people powerful enough to subordinate the others and to stamp its nationality upon the state, but rather where the various peoples maintain the equilibrium, and where each is an important factor in public life, Austria, I say, is advised by its own closest interests to treat all nationalities with equal justice. Hence, its foremost idea is justice *itself*, and if it is governed in a way that corresponds to its individuality, it will, with regard to the ethical significance of its stately existence, stand out above all the other major European states.

If it is able to prove that, as soon as this idea finds a clear and definite expression in the Austrian constitution, all its peoples and cultures can go undisturbed, and can maintain their spiritual, moral, and physical property better than in any other common body, then the great *factual* importance of Austria and with it its *stability* will be placed beyond doubt. Once the Austrian peoples have realized that it is only through harmonious coexistence that they can guarantee the most precious things in life, then their solidarity of interests will coincide with their solidarity towards the state, which will in turn protect them; a recognition of individual welfare will then gradually develop into a recognition of the common good and the feeling of mutual belonging, which will bind these heterogeneous components into an organic whole and slowly but surely awaken an Austrian consciousness, which to inculcate by means of force has so far failed.

Borne by the loftiest ethical idea, seeking the roots of its strength in the combined consciousness of its peoples, Austria will then be no arbitrary conglomerate, but rather a necessary political entity, a highly important, many limbed, closely entwined, able-bodied state.

Finally, if it is proven that the destruction of this state would mean forfeiting the high cultural duty incumbent upon its German inhabitants and mutilating terribly or crushing mercilessly its other peoples and that further afield in the south east of Europe conditions would arise that would disturb the equilibrium in Europe and put occidental culture at risk, then it is also proven that the continuing existence of Austria not only has a *local* importance, but also a *major European importance*.

Austria will only have this importance, however, so long as it rests firmly and unshakably upon its ethical priorities; if it shifts these, however slightly, in one direction or another, be it in the favor of this or that nationality, then it will lose its balance and begin sway; its stately structure will relax and a premonition of imminent collapse will overcome the spirits.

Translated by Simon Garnett

JAN PALÁRIK: WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION FOR OUR NATIONALITY AND WHAT DO WE NEED MOST NOW?

Title: *Čo máme očakávať od konštitúcie uhorskej pre našu národnosť a čo nám teraz predovšetkým treba?* (What should we expect from the Hungarian Constitution for our nationality and what do we need most now?)

Originally published: *Priateľ školy a literatúry*, 1860, Vol. II., No. 45

Language: Slovak

The excerpts used are from Ján Palárik, *Za reč a práva ľudu. Kultúrnopolitické články*, ed. by Mikuláš Gašparík (Bratislava: Slovenské vydavateľstvo krásnej literatúry, 1956) pp. 29–33.

About the author

Ján Palárik [1822, Raková (*Hun.* Trencsénrákó, present-day northwest Slovakia) – 1870, Majcichov (*Hun.* Majtény, present-day west Slovakia)]: Catholic priest, journalist, playwright and politician. His father was a village teacher. He received his secondary education in Žilina (*Hun.* Zsolna) and Kecskemét, and later studied theology in Esztergom and Pressburg (*Hun.* Pozsony, *Slo.* Prešporok, present-day Bratislava) and Trnava (*Ger.* Tyrnau, *Hun.* Nagyszombat). He served as a priest in several places, including the German parish in Pest in the 1850s and in Majcichov near Trnava in the following decade. He belonged to the circle of the young Catholic intelligentsia who welcomed the codification of literary Slovak pursued by a group of Lutheran intellectuals headed by **Ludovít Štúr**. In his political and social thought Palárik strove to combine Christian and national values with liberal and democratic ideas. In 1850, while serving as chaplain in Banská Štiavnica (*Ger.* Schemnitz, *Hun.* Selmecebánya), he founded the review *Cyril a Metod* (Cyril and Methodius) where he advocated the reform of the Church, the democratization of priest education and institutional structures, and requested the establishment of a specific Slovak diocese. For these ideas, influenced by Enlightenment Catholicism of **Bernard Bolzano**, Palárik was sentenced by a Church court to one month's imprisonment in a monastery and was henceforth regarded with suspicion by his superiors. After the fall of Bach's neo-absolutist regime, he became a prominent figure in the Slovak national movement in the 1860s through his political essays published in the journal *Priateľ školy a literatúry* (The friend of school and literature). He challenged the idea that the Viennese court was the main protector of the Slovak national cause. Instead, he argued, Slovak needs would be best dealt with within a reformed Hungary. Palárik was also one of the most important and productive Slovak playwrights of his time. His comedies, critical of petty bourgeois values as well as the social and political

weaknesses of Slovak national life and cultural Magyarization were at the same time full of optimism and joy. In this way, he tried to popularize his concept of Slovak nationhood conceived within the framework of Hungarian patriotism. Palárik became a point of reference for liberal and leftist Slovak intellectuals and political activists. He was also referred to positively in the post- Second World War national communist historical literature which stressed his democratic credentials and social empathy.

Main works: *Ohlas pravdy v záležitosti spisovné reči slovenské* [The echo of truth concerning the literary Slovak language] (1852); *Incognito* (1858); *Drotár* [Tinkerer] (1860); *Dôležitosť dramatickej národnej literatúry* [The significance of the national art of drama] (1860); *Zmierenie alebo dobrodružstvo pri obžinkoch* [Reconciliation or adventure during harvest-time] (1863); *O slovanskej vzájomnosti* [On Slavic reciprocity] (1864); *Dimitrij Samozvanec* [False Dmitry] (1871).

Context

The article was written shortly after the fall of Bach's neo-absolutist regime and the announcement of the October Diploma of 1860 by which the Emperor Francis Joseph I renewed basic constitutional freedoms in the Habsburg Monarchy. In an effort to solve the crisis of the state, after the Austrian defeat in the Second War of Italian Independence in 1859, the court turned back to a sort of federalist concept based on the principles of historical right. However, this solution did not satisfy any of the Empire's nationalities. The Viennese policy aroused numerous protests, quarrels and political discussions regarding the institutional structure and political arrangements of the monarchy as well as the status of nationalities. The latter were especially concerned about the Hungarian policy of continuing constitutional negotiations with the Viennese court on various levels until the Compromise of 1867 (see **Ferenc Deák**, *The Easter article*). The national question concerned all non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary, above all the Slovaks and the Romanians, to whom the October Diploma renewed the hope for a more favorable policy on language and education and some degree of autonomy.

In Slovak politics of the 1860s, as was the case in other national contexts, various approaches to the renewed constitutional order gradually bifurcated into two main ideological trends. They both welcomed the restoration of the constitution, advocated the principle of natural rights and national equality as well as professing Hungarian state patriotism. They differed, however, in terms of tactical moves and broader conceptual assumptions and principles in Slovak national politics. The first trend became known as the Old Slovak School (*Stará škola*), whose political program was enunciated by the 'Memo-

randum of the Slovak Nation' in 1861 proclaimed in Turčiansky Svätý Martin (*Hun.* Turócszentmárton). The main demand of the Memorandum was the establishment of a Slovak national territory in Upper Hungary (*Okolie*) that would lead to an autonomous administration securing Slovak sovereignty within the constitutional framework of the Hungarian kingdom. The representatives of this view such as Ján Fransisci, Štefan M. Daxner, Jozef Miloslav Hurban, Viliam Pauliny-Tóth represent a cultural and personal continuity with the romantic ideals of the national emancipation movement of the previous decades. Dissatisfied with Hungarian politics, they relied on the Emperor and government in Vienna, hoping that they would use their influence to resolve the nationality question in Hungary.

The second trend, the so called New Slovak School (*Nová škola*) was formed as a reaction to the former under the leadership of Jan Bobula and was composed mainly of liberally minded entrepreneurs and intellectuals. This view considered Viennese centralism to be a common enemy for both the Slovaks and the Magyars. Therefore, they advocated cooperation with Magyar democratic and liberal representatives and they did not reject the possible federalization of the Empire. Nevertheless, they proposed to abandon the idea of a Slovak *Okolie* in exchange for guarantees for language and cultural rights within a unitary Hungarian state. Democrat and liberal Ján Palárik, one of the main champions of this view, tried to capitalize on the conciliatory approach of members of the Hungarian liberal opposition (Ferenc Deák, **József Eötvös**) concerning non-Magyar nations, and elaborate his concept of Slovak national rights within a Hungarian political nation. The text below represents an early formulation of Palárik's political stance, in which he tries to draw lessons from the 1848–1849 failures of Slovak politics (see *Requests of the Slovak nation*).

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, along with the persistence of the Hungarian Diet to deny the corporate rights of non-Magyar nationalities, produced great disillusionment in both Slovak political camps and led to heated debates between them. Under the new circumstances, with Magyarization on the rise, the 'Old Slovak School' transformed itself into the Slovak National Party with Viliam Pauliny-Tóth as its first chairman. Loose as it was from an organizational point of view, the Party remained the main representative of Slovak national interests until the First World War. On the other hand, for the liberal adherents of cooperation with Magyar politicians, the defeat proved to be fatal. Ján Palárik withdrew from public and political life and the group, facing serious internal crises, disintegrated in the mid 1870s. Its liberal democratic and modernizing legacy, nevertheless, remained an

important point of reference as an alternative tradition for the later generations of Slovak intellectuals both within as well as outside the Slovak National Party.

PL–MK

**What should we expect from the Hungarian Constitution
for our nationality and what do we need most now?**

The great unfinished drama of the latest political changes in Western Europe, in which the principle of nationality plays the leading role, has strongly shaken the lives of nations, and has also had an effect on the great power Austria. The greatest concessions to the peoples of Austria, and particularly to us Hungarians, made since 20 October of this year, are evidence of this. The laboriously built edifice of the state, founded by Dr Bach on absolutist and centralist theories, which threatened to destroy all historical and political individuality of the Austrian peoples, has in one fell swoop collapsed like a house of cards, and the Austrian Monarchy must rebuild itself on constitutional foundations. The supreme October 'Diploma' grants our Hungarian land with certain modifications in the form of our ancient constitution. The Hungarian Chancellery, the royal court, and self-government for the country are being established. The main administrators (*župani*) of the counties have been appointed, and his eminence, the Cardinal, Prince-Primate, has been entrusted with leading preliminary meetings on the establishment of the means of electing deputies to the Hungarian Diet, which is soon to be convened.

These highly important events did not, to be sure, surprise us very much in Pest. They were predictable from all that happened, and there was no power that could have prevented them. Many of our nationalists must have been surprised, however, by the unexpectedness of these great changes, and the sudden dashing of all hopes based on the previous state system must have completely stunned them and driven them to their knees.

But it is a good thing that it happened, my dear compatriots! You have nothing to regret, nor have you cause to fall into despondency. Together with the constitutional life of our Hungarian country a better life is coming for our Slovak nation. Though we do not find expressly in the highest concessions made to the country the principle of national equality for which we Slovaks have till now fought and which has so often been promised and confirmed by the loftiest words to us; the Hungarian language is even clearly declared official throughout the land of Hungary. This declaration about the Hungarian

language does not, however, constitute the rights of our Slovak nationality, nor can it even limit them, particularly since it does not decree that the municipalities, towns and counties, as well as individuals, should be left completely free to use their mother tongue in town meetings and negotiations, and that no violence or wrongs should be suffered in this respect. But we are fully justified in hoping that even our brothers, the Magyars, will be more considerate towards us than before 1848. They have learnt a lot since then, and we have too, and, God willing, after so many bitter experiences, we shall continue to work in sincere harmony for the development of the material and spiritual well-being of the country and its fraternal peoples. We are justified in this hope by voices in our favor from public bodies of the liberal Hungarian party, which, though it does not admit that we are entitled to equality, at least admits that “free competition in the field of nationality”; and even this means a great deal in a constitutional state, at least definitely more than the equality amongst nations which was sacredly promised in an absolutist system. The constitution grants freedom of speech, the freedom to disseminate one’s own convictions, the right to petition and freedom of assembly, and provided we Slovaks use all of this wisely and legally, we surely shall not perish. And all the more so, for in this noble endeavor or ours we shall not be alone; by our side our kinsmen are the Ruthenians and the valiant Serbs and Croats, whose steadfast endeavors, as we note with joy in periodicals, are aimed at restoring the link with the Hungarian crown and abiding by the Constitution, and at restoring the equality and free development of all nations living under the Hungarian crown. This hope of ours is also bolstered by the fact that the liberal Hungarian party wants all the rights and benefits of the Constitution to be extended as broadly as possible to all classes of the people, and in that we must sincerely join it, because we see in it, apart from material advantages for our nation, also the surest guarantee of our nationality.

Stand up, then, Slovaks! We have no reason to fear the Hungarian Constitution. After all, it is our ancient sacred birthright, which Saint Stephan, the first king, adopted from the venerable ruins of the great kingdom of the Slovaks¹ and with the Christian faith into his new state edifice, as the very names *király* = *král’* [king], *nádor* = *nádvorník* [palatine], *ispán* = *župan* [count], *komorník* [chamberlain] [*sic*], *megye* = *medja* [shire], *határ* = *chotár* [line of demarcation], *sztrázsa* [sentry], and the dividing up of the land into

¹ Palárik means the Great Moravian Empire (833–906) that the Slovak patriotic historians since the second half of the eighteenth century portrayed as the ancient foundation of modern Slovak historic statehood.

medje led by the *župan* clearly demonstrate, the fraternal nations—the Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs—worked together under its aegis for its perfection, our shared Hungarian land experienced days of glory and greatness, it grew, triumphed, and was an impenetrable bastion against the barbarian onslaught of the Crescent. We have no reason to fear the Hungarian Constitution. After all, it is our common mother, who brought us up, and without it we Slovaks and Hungarians, Croats and Serbs, would die like wretched orphans. Concerning the disputes over nationality and language, which have recently emerged between us, we shall, I believe, reach an agreement like mature citizens of a single country, like good brothers on the constitutional road, and we have to reach agreement without one nation doing wrong to the other, if we do not want some third judge interfering in our patriotic dispute, *et inter duos litigantes [tertius] gaudet*.² We must abide by one irreversible principle: ‘what is dear to one, the other shall also be entitled to’ [*Čo jednému draho, i druhému pravo*].

Stand up, Slovaks! Let us embrace our mother-constitution, and let us, as her faithful children, be prepared for new sacrifices, for new work!

Our beloved Hungarian country is now on the road to political revival. He who does not wish to forfeit his rights must claim them at this decisive time and then take action. It now holds true that he who wants to live must move. And indeed the whole country is moving towards a new life. Against the old conservatives who have come to lead the government in Hungary, some of whom who have already placed their hands on the new constitution and sworn loyalty to His Royal Highness, a strong opposition is now raising its head. This opposition comprises old liberals who want decisions to be made in the Hungarian Diet, concerning which law, if any, should be subordinate to the *Reichsrat* in Vienna for the sake of unity with Austria. And those liberals are divided into two camps. One part apparently seems to want to pursue a policy that is strictly Magyar nationalist and the other, more moderate, more mature, to grant the right to public life and free competition also to other nations living in Hungary. And so which of these parties are we Slovaks who are concerned with the welfare of the country but also with the life and spiritual well-being of our Slovak nation supposed to join? That is clear from the very names of the parties. But in any case we must stand on the side of Hungary, and demonstrate that we have a right to exist here, and that we insist on it undaunted. Clearly, to that end we mainly need an independent

² In the original Palárik omitted the word “tertius.” More common is *Duobus litigantibus, tertius gaudet*. While two men argue, the third one rejoices.

Slovak political periodical in which we can, at this decisive moment, stand up for the interests of Slovak regions in harmony with the interests of the whole country of Hungary, to defend the rights of our nationality, to shape public opinion and address the public, and to instruct and lead our nation in the coming establishment of our communal and county municipalities, in the election of officials and deputies to the Hungarian Diet, and so forth. However, for the establishment of such a national periodical, which would come out two or three times a week, a deposit of 5,000 silver guilders is required, which some compatriots living in Pest-Buda are already seeing to, and with the help of God they hope to obtain it by the end of this month. It would be good if at least in the second or third month of next year, if not earlier, the first number of the nascent periodical of the Slovaks could gladden their hearts.

Translated by Derek Paton

JÓZSEF EÖTVÖS: THE NATIONALITY QUESTION

Title: *A nemzetiségi kérdés* (The nationality question)

Originally published: Pest, Ráth Mór, 1865 (simultaneously with the German edition)

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from József Eötvös, *A nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest: Révai testvérek, 1903), pp. 87–91.

About the author

József Eötvös [1813, Buda – 1871, Pest]: politician, writer, the most prominent Hungarian political thinker of the nineteenth century. Eötvös was the descendant of an aristocratic family, his father was a notoriously pro-Habsburg loyalist. He studied law at the University of Pest. Between 1836 and 1841, he studied the social conditions in England and France and was influenced by liberal philanthropy, Romantic aesthetics and social Catholicism (especially that of Félicité de Lamennais). He started his public career as a writer. His most important novel, 'The Village Notary,' satirized the backward conditions of the Hungarian countryside, while in the novel 'Hungary in 1514,' written about the peasant rebellion of György Dózsa, he sought to mobilize public opinion against serfdom. In the 1840s, he became the most important figure of the 'doctrinaire' liberal faction of the opposition, which criticized the residual feudal elements of the administration and argued for a modern state administration, the so-called 'Centralists.' In the revolutionary government of 1848, Eötvös became Minister of Education, but disagreements with **Lajos Kossuth** caused him to resign. In the autumn of the same year, he emigrated to Munich. There, he began to write 'The Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the Nineteenth Century on the State,' which was an attempt to analyze the principles of political modernity and which is considered to be the most important Hungarian work of political philosophy from the nineteenth century. He returned to Hungary in 1853. Eötvös wished to reformulate the relationship between Austria and Hungary on the basis of the principles of 1848, but taking into account the interests of the Empire. Throughout the 1860s, he worked on the problem of nationalities, and apart from publishing various works on this issue, he negotiated with the representatives of the Serbian and Romanian national movements. He also played an active role in the *Ausgleich* (Compromise) of 1867. Most importantly, he was the author of the 1868 liberal 'Law of Nationalities,' although the text was considerably altered in the parliamentary debates. In the government formed after the *Ausgleich*, he was once again Minister of Education and of Religious Affairs, until his death in 1871.

Main works: *A karthausi* [The Carthusian] (1839–1841); *A falu jegyzője* [The village notary] (1845); *Reform* (1846); *Magyarország 1514-ben* [Hungary in 1514] (1847); *A tizenkilencedik század uralkodó eszméinek befolyása az álladalomra* [The influence of the ruling ideas of the nineteenth century on the state] (1851–1854) (also published in German); *Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in Österreich* [On the emancipation of the nationalities in Austria] (1850); *Die Garantien der Macht und Einheit Österreichs* [The guarantees of power and unity of Austria] (1859); *A nemzetiségi kérdés* [The nationality question] (1865).

Context

By the end of the revolutionary struggle in 1849, the Hungarian liberal political elite became aware of the importance of the ‘nationality question’ and some of the revolutionary leaders began to take a more open stance towards non-Magyar national claims. Some of the most reflexive minds of the generation (like **Zsigmond Kemény**) came to agree that one of the crucial errors of the revolutionary leadership had been the improper handling of the nationality question, and that the positions of the Hungarian elite in their negotiations with the Habsburg Court could have been considerably strengthened by settling these issues. The works of Eötvös in the fifties and sixties dealt with the nationality question from this double perspective, asserting that the imperial and the Hungarian aspects of the nationality question were intertwined. Consequently, he sought to harmonize the principles of liberty and nationality on a theoretical level as well: in his opinion, the Hungarian ‘historical nationhood’ needed to be preserved but, at the same time, he also wanted to give concessions to those nationalities which were not considered ‘historical’ nations.

In the pages of ‘The nationality question,’ Eötvös proposed to fulfill “the reasonable demands of all the nationalities living in this country to every possible extent” and, thus, to create a multi-ethnic Hungary, which would still remain ‘Hungarian’ in terms of its macro-political character. This means that he rejected the project of accelerated assimilation, and searched for a compromise—seeking to discern what qualified as a ‘reasonable demand.’ He hoped that the civilizational advantages offered by the Hungarian state to its nationalities were substantial enough to restrain their centrifugal tendencies. Rejecting the territorialization of the nationalities from a liberal perspective, he advocated a set of pragmatic compromises, including the localization of their claims of self-government in the traditional framework of administration. This offered a practical solution to the conflict, which seemed to be otherwise theoretically irresolvable. While he did not abandon the

dogma of the territorial integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom, his attitude also meant a break with the Hungarian liberal nationalist mainstream opinion, which considered support for collective rights on the part of the nationalities as a profoundly anti-liberal effort to preserve pre-modern privileges.

Of course, to make this compromise possible, the legislator was supposed to avoid one fundamental question, that of the 'national' existence of the nationalities. If one disregards this issue, it is possible to harmonize nationality with the different levels of authority in the unitary state. This means that the legislator had to decide which (municipal, regional, etc.) level corresponded to the structure of powers allotted to the nationalities, and what functions were to be relegated to the center. Accordingly, the state would have to give up any kind of forceful assimilatory program since "the vexatious administration evokes more antipathy than the greatest despotism." The only legal privilege the Hungarian language would enjoy was to be the medium of legislation and of the central government. Otherwise, the different entities of self-government could freely decide about their official languages and the members of the nationalities could freely associate in order to cultivate their cultural heritage, exactly as individuals of the same creed gather freely to worship God in the church of their choice. This solution, rooted in Eötvös's theoretical effort to bring together the norms of civilization, liberty and nationality, was expected to have a positive impact on the entire Habsburg Monarchy, turning it into a bastion of constitutionalism and free national development. Nevertheless, Eötvös believed that the direction of human progress was towards the disappearance of ethnic divisions, and thus he hoped that, in the long run, the smaller ethnic groups would be prone to assimilation into larger political units.

Part of the wider debate on solving the nationality question in the Habsburg Monarchy (among its protagonists one can mention **František Palacký** and **Adolf Fischhof**), this proposal was probably the most sophisticated theoretical treatment of the problem in Hungary to be devised throughout the entire nineteenth century. It had some practical relevance as well as having a broad reception abroad. As demonstrated by the subsequent development of the debate on nationalities, the fragile compromise proposed by Eötvös could only be maintained if both groups were willing to set aside the thorny ideological question of 'national' allegiance. When the issue of 'political' nationhood came back to the fore in 1867, the chances of maintaining this potential compromise vanished. Nevertheless, the 'Law of nationalities' of 1868, which gave extensive personal and cultural rights to the non-Hungarian population and which was in many ways rooted in Eötvös's theories, could

still be considered an unusually liberal arrangement for its time. It was, however, increasingly disregarded by the authorities, who opted for openly assimilatory policies, and also lost its relevance for the political elites of the nationalities, who themselves abandoned the liberal intellectual framework for a more intransigent nation-building narrative.

With all these ambiguities, Eötvös has been considered one of the most broad-minded liberal theoreticians of the problem of nationalities in the nineteenth-century and perhaps the only modern Hungarian political thinker whose ideas had an impact on the mainstream European intellectual debate of his times.

BT

The nationality question

The main interest of mankind indisputably lies in the progress of civilization. And I am convinced that the new self-awareness that so many nationalities have awakened to in our age and the enthusiasm with which each of them is working on their development, are the most heartening signs and at the same time the surest assurance of this progress. Every new force partaking in the great work of civilization is a benefit for the entirety of mankind, which may expect even mightier achievements if it abounds more and more in individuality. Therefore, our task is not to decrease their numbers but instead, by strengthening the ties that bind together all these individualities into a single great entity and to ensure the opportunity of free development for each individual. And should this require that certain nationalities, which we have hitherto only known to be under oppression, now form new states and partake in the common progress as independent members of the great family of nations, then we can but rejoice at such endeavors, and we should find nothing alarming in the phenomena indicating that these endeavors might meet with success in the near future. But if this is our opinion, and if we see in advance that all the skill of our diplomats trying to cover up the signs of decay in the Ottoman Empire rivals that of the ancient Egyptians, and if we are convinced that the ardor with which certain statesmen professing to be deeply Christian strive to keep the Christian peoples of Eastern Europe under the Ottoman yoke can still not save this empire, then we are approaching the moment when the Christian peoples of Turkey will be destined to follow the Greek example and establish their own states. Doesn't all this imply that we should display twice as much precaution about everything that may have an effect on this development, the development upon which the fate of civiliza-

tion depends in this part of Europe. And who could fail to realize that the way in which the nationality question is to be solved in Hungary is of paramount importance in this regard?

Of all the European countries, Hungary is the one destined to assert a decisive influence upon the territories that were at one time in close contact with her empire. Do the relations these territories once had with our country as well as the fact that parts of Hungary are inhabited by the same nationalities as those whom we find in the Turkish empire and that here they stand on a higher level of refinement guarantee our influence upon them? Is it necessary, is it advisable for us to adopt principles upon which the formation of any new state in this part of Europe in case of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire would become impossible? And undoubtedly, the general acceptance of the principle that the survival of the individual nationalities can only be guaranteed by granting a separate territory to each of them would render it impossible that in the area presently occupied by the Ottoman Empire new states be established whose size, the number of their inhabitants and their geographical conditions would enable them to defend their independence and ensure their internal development.

The very same principles that threaten the unity of a thousand-year-old state in Hungary would be even more detrimental to the formation of a strong Romanian, Serbian or South Slavic state in the territories of the Ottoman Empire, and due to the ethnographic conditions in this part of Europe, all we could expect in their place would be tiny Slavic, Bulgarian, Serbian and Romanian territories which, constantly struggling with each other, would be incapable of defending their independence and safeguarding our civilization. This makes it evident that the application of this principle in Hungary would be in flat contradiction with not only the interests of those who adhere to Hungary's integrity or those who regard the sustenance of the Austrian Empire as one of the preconditions of Europe's peaceful development, but also the interests of the very nationalities in whose name such claims are most frequently made.

The notion that the solution of the nationality question is to be found in a legal circumscription of the sphere of authority of each nationality and by partitioning the territory and offices of the country among them is, as I believe it to be apparent from the foregoing discussion, not applicable to Hungary with its specific situation, and instead of putting an end to the frictions among the nationalities, it would only entail the termination of all individual and civic liberties. Moreover, since it would lead to the partition of Hungary and the Austrian Empire, it would at the same time paralyze the emergence

of any great state in this part of Europe that resembles Hungary in the diversity of its nationalities, and thus it would in fact ruin the future of the very nationalities for whose benefit it is advocated. Let me conclude this topic with a general observation.

We have started our essay with two statements.

The first is that the most important characteristic of our civilization is to be sought in the community that exists in the development of the peoples of Europe.

The second is that our progress is mainly the outcome of the steadiness with which the peoples of Europe are laboring on the realization of the ideals established by Christianity. The most important of these ideals are the commonalities within our human race and its common mission.

If the barriers between the nations are brought down, if we have thrown off the inhuman notions of ancient times and now regard our adversaries whom we have faced on the battlefield as our fellow human beings, if slavery has been abolished and if unlimited sovereign power, wherever it still exists, has been tamed, then all this is the consequence of these ideals, and our experiences as well as our science both proclaim their soundness.

Just as in the present we find the first aspirations for culture in hundreds of various peoples of the world, in the same manner we find in the past the ruins of hundreds of civilizations. Both facts remind us that the capacity for culture is not the monopoly of a clime or a nation but a divine gift to the whole of mankind. And when we see at the forefront of our civilization peoples that were called barbarians in antiquity and held to be incapable of culture, and if we consider that the place of the Hellenes and Romans has been taken in more recent times by the descendants of the savage inhabitants of the British isles and the fearful Cimbers and Teutons, then we cannot but smile at the self-conceit with which some regard the capacity for culture as the sole privilege of their own people and proclaim the natural subjugation of others. If there is one fact that has been put beyond all doubt by science and experience, it is that among all the peoples we know in Europe not a single one is incapable of obtaining a higher culture, and there is not one we could therefore deprive of the right to aspire for a higher position. And as long as the aspirations of the nationalities in our time spring from this conviction, and all they strive for is to clear away the barriers hindering their own free development, then these aspirations are the necessary consequences of the past development of our civilization and factors of our progress. And we should indeed call any man a fool should he hope to halt these aspirations by means of laws or governmental measures or wish to secure supremacy in a country for

one nationality, when this supremacy can only be sustained through the oppression of the other nationalities. But surely no more sober is the man who thinks that by partitioning the territory of a state among its nationalities and circumscribing the sphere of authority of each language and nationality, he can halt the natural development of things, or that he can secure by artificial means the future of anything that does not carry the seeds of its own survival.

Everything that is now proposed with such ends in view has existed before. Everyone knows that the barbarians, after having occupied the provinces of the Roman Empire, allowed the Roman people to keep their laws for a long time, and that in the period during which our new states were founded, the various nationalities lived alongside each other separated not by territorial but personal criteria, so that the citizens of the same country could follow the Roman, or the Frank, Gothic or Burgundian laws depending on which nationality they belonged to. Such conditions—undoubtedly the most consistent applications of the proposed principles now advocated again—endured until recently in Transylvania, where the Hungarian, Szekler and Saxon nations lived alongside each other for centuries, each having their own territory and rights; and this situation came to an end everywhere, not by an individual's despotism, and not because of the will of the dominant nation but due to the natural state of things, the power by which the irresistible stream of our civilization exerts its influence upon every single relation, modifying or terminating everything trying to resist its overwhelming force. And do we really believe that we can resist this, that we can interrupt the entire development of our civilization and attempt to re-introduce in our homeland the principles that had already been abandoned by the Visigoths as early as the seventh century?

I commit this question to the discernment of my readers; for my part I am firmly convinced that such an attempt, in whichever country it is carried out and under whatever form of government, even if it has the consent of all the nationalities inhabiting the country, may bring about a great confusion for a while and lead to an overwhelming oppression; moreover, I am convinced that such an attempt will hinder for some time the development in the country where it has been made. It may retard her in her development but will surely not be permanent.

Translated by Dávid Oláh

FRANJO RAČKI: YUGOSLAVISM

Title: *Jugoslovjenstvo* (Yugoslavism)

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Language: Croatian

The excerpt used is from Vladimir Koščak ed., *J.J. Strossmayer, Franjo Rački, Politički spisi: rasprave, članci, govori, memorandumi* (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971), pp. 285–290.

About the author

Franjo Rački [1828, Fužine, (near Rijeka, *It.* Fiume) – 1894, Zagreb]: Catholic priest, historian and politician. During the 1849–1860 absolutist regime in the Habsburg Empire, he was not involved in politics, teaching theology at the seminary in Senj (*It.* Segna, near Fiume). Between 1857 and 1860, he attended the St. Jerolim Institute in Rome to study the history of medieval South Slavic heretic sects (the Glagolitics, Bogomils and Patarens). In 1860, he returned to Zagreb and, together with his close friend, bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, established the *Narodna stranka* (People's Party), which advocated the idea of South Slav unity and the federal reconstruction of the Habsburg monarchy. During the 1860s, he was a parliamentary deputy, acting as the political and intellectual mastermind of the party. In 1866, he was appointed the first president of the 'Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts' in Zagreb. He directed the institution for twenty years, while devoting his time to the research of South Slavic medieval history. After the failure of party politics marked by the 'Croatian–Hungarian Compromise' of 1868, (following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867) and the party's subsequent transformation into a loyal ally of the Hungarian government in 1873, he withdrew from active politics together with Strossmayer. In the 1880s, he returned to politics as a founder of the *Neodvisna narodna stranka* (Independent People's Party), which followed the original People's Party principles: insisting on Croatian state right autonomy while pursuing the idea of the South Slav alliance. During his life Rački was acknowledged as the founder of modern historical research, while his political role was recognized only in the twentieth century, following the realization that Strossmayer's political ideas were in fact partly an appropriation of Rački's relevant theories. As such, Rački was re-incorporated into the national canon as the 'intellectual' figure, and Strossmayer as the 'political forefather' of the Croatian concept of Yugoslavism.

Main works: *Viek i djelovanje Sv. Cyrilla i Methodia, slovjanskih apoštola* [The time and work of St. Cyril and Methodius, the apostles of the South Slavs] (1857–1859); *Književni rad sv. Ćirila i Metoda* [The literary work of St. Cyril and Methodius] (1863); *Ocjena starijih izvora za Hrvatsku i Srbsku poviest* [The evaluation of the ancient sources for Croatian and Serbian history] (1864–65); *Pokret na slaven-skom jugu koncem XIV i početkom XV veka* [The movement in the Slavic South by the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries] (1868); *Bogumili i Patareni* [Bogomils and Patarens] (1869–70); *Borba južnih Slavena za državnu neodvisnost u XI vijeku* [The struggle of South Slavs for an independent state in the eleventh century] (1875); *Documenta historiae chroaticae periodum antiquam illustrantia* (1877); *Nutarnje stanje Hrvatske prije XII veka* [Interior affairs in Croatia before the twelfth century] (1886–1894).

Context

The process of the reorganization of the monarchy in the 1860s revived the pre-1848 Illyrian idea of seeking Croatian national emancipation through an alliance with Hungary against Habsburg centralism. The subsequent concept of South Slavic cooperation (see **Janko Drašković**, *Dissertation, or treatise*) was now articulated by the *Narodna stranka* (People's Party). The party inherited the Illyrian project of the unification of lands inhabited by Croats but divided between Hungary (Croatia-Slavonia) and Austria (Dalmatia). It also promoted the perception of the South Slavic ethnic homogeneity, subsequently leading to the concrete political program of South Slavic unification. Simultaneously, the party insisted on the historical rights, now described as the 'Croatian state right,' conceived as a primary tool to protect Croatian autonomy in forming an alliance with Hungary. As the state right concept implied the notion of the Croatian political nation, which equaled statehood with nationhood, it raised fierce opposition both in Dalmatia and among Croatian Serbs. In Dalmatia it was refuted by the autonomist Slavo-Dalmatine movement, which emphasized instead the 'ethnically Slavic and culturally Italian' autonomous Dalmatian identity due to the strong historical influence of Italian culture in the region. Croatian Serbs, on the other hand, refuted the notion of the Croatian political nation, since the latter recognized their cultural, but neglected their political existence, especially after 1861. Instead, they turned to the Serbian national project based on the identification of nationhood with the vernacular, which triggered the subsequent clash between the Croats and the Serbs, since both ethnic groups used the same dialect (the so-called *Štokavica*). The clash reached its peak during the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* in 1867. A year later as a result of the 'Croatian–

Hungarian Compromise,' Croatia was annexed to Hungary. The subsequent alliance treaty between the Principality of Serbia and Austria-Hungary turned Croatian Serbs into advocates of dualism. As the Compromise postponed the unification of the Croatian lands, and destroyed Croat-Serb cooperation, *Narodna stranka* lost its popularity and became an advocate of dualism in the early 1870s. This resulted in the rise of the *Stranka prava* (Party of the state right), which harshly opposed the dualist system as well as Yugoslav ideology. Instead, it advocated Croatian independence and thus radicalized the notion of a Croatian political nation by equating ethnic nationhood with statehood. This assumption denied the existence of any nationality in Croatia besides the Croats. *Stranka prava*, led by its charismatic leader Ante Starčević, became the strongest Croatian political force till the turn of the century, when the idea of South Slavic unity re-emerged.

The overall political program of the *Narodna stranka* was mirrored in Franjo Rački's text 'Yugoslavism,' written in the aftermath of the October Decree which called for the establishment of a Croatian diet, the first after the absolutist regime. The diet was supposed to facilitate the discussion of Croatian relations with Hungary, parallel to Hungarian claims for the recognition of its pre-1848 autonomy in the contemporaneous process of the constitutional redressing of the monarchy. As the reaction to the Habsburg court's pushing of Croatia into an alliance with Hungarians, the Croatian diet insisted that the constitutional rights of Croatia recognized by the court in 1848 should also be recognized by the Hungarians in the prospective Croat-Hungarian political alliance. Rački's text also resonated with *Narodna stranka* expectations of the Ottoman Empire's withdrawal from the Balkans, which were resurrected by the Bosnian Muslim rebellions against the Ottoman reforms in the 1850s as well as the unsuccessful Ottoman campaigns in Montenegro. Due to these circumstances, Rački, in the first article, exposes the ideological background of Yugoslavism, while in the second and third, he elaborates on its political implementation. To define South Slav nationality, Rački takes over the romantic Illyrian concept of the "national soul" embodied in language and literature. However, he replaces the term 'Illyrism' with the neologism 'Yugoslavism,' since the former was previously refuted both by Serbs and Slovenes as being exclusively Croatian (see **Ljudevit Gaj**, *Proclamations*). Science and art were intended to enlighten the South Slavs, transforming south Slavic 'tribes,' perceived as a folk lacking the concept of nationality ("spiritual life," as Rački calls it), into a self-conscious nation. On the political level, this concept was formulated in Strossmayer's credo *Prosvjetom ka slobodi* (From

education to freedom), which in the dualist system compensated suppressed political autonomy with the project of the people's enlightenment as a way to accomplish south Slav national integration.

In the excerpt, which is the third part of Rački's previously mentioned article, he addresses the vision of South Slavic unification as a two step process whereby Croatia would integrate Serbs in the Habsburg lands, and Serbia the Slavic populations of the Ottoman Empire, all this having their unification as the final goal. In the case of the Habsburg Slavs, Rački revives the Illyrian Austro-Slavist project of uniting South Slavs, subsequently forming with Hungary one federal unit as a safeguard against Habsburg centralism. Although Rački was influenced by **František Palacký**'s concept of a federalized monarchy as the framework for the emancipation of small Slavic nations, he doubted the ability of the Habsburg Empire to reform due to his view that the monarchy's ruling circles were under the long-standing impact of 'Pan-Germanic' ideas. Thus, he perceives Austro-Slavism only as an instrument to preserve Croatian statehood, redirecting Palacký's theory into a project of a south Slavic state. However, Rački utilizes the notion of the 'Croatian state right' not only as the basis to establish a Croatian-Hungarian alliance in the shape of two *regna coordinata*, but also as an element of national identity building, since it instigates in the popular sentiment a notion of common destiny. Thus Rački uses this argument in support of the project of unifying Dalmatia with Croatia, since Dalmatia was historically part of the medieval 'Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.' However, he argues that the argument does not hold in the case of Vojvodina, since it never was part of the Croatian medieval kingdom. Finally, Rački envisions the primacy of Croatia in the process of the south Slavic integration, due to contemporary Serbia's weak position *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman Empire.

Following Croatia's subordination to the Hungarian domain of the Dual Monarchy in 1868, Rački came to emphasize that the center of the unification should alternate according to the political circumstances, yet he never defined precisely whether the new south Slav state should be independent or incorporated into the Empire. Serbian politicians immediately refuted his proposal and Strossmayer's political project as an endeavor towards a 'Greater Austrian' ideal. Instead, Serbians developed a project of bringing together all Serbs under one state, defining Serb nationality according to the language criterion. The Croat-Serb political dispute about the unification issue was subsequently broadened by Serbia's skepticism towards Strossmayer and Rački for being Catholics. Rački and Strossmayer, on the other hand, insisted on Zagreb's cultural primacy due to its position within the 'enlight-

ened' West, perceiving Serbia as culturally backward due to its prolonged subjugation to Ottoman rule.

'Yugoslavisim' developed from the very beginning as a fundamental component of the Croatian national canon. In the interwar period, the text was influential due to Rački's use of the notions of "tribe" and "nation," while in socialist Yugoslavia it was interpreted as the predecessor of the official communist federative dogma of "brotherhood and unity." In the 1990s, Rački's 'Yugoslavisim' was initially neglected. Nevertheless, it was soon recovered in the broader context of the reappropriation of Rački and Strossmayer's ideas as the initial formulation of a claim to Croatian national emancipation, envisioned within the broader Yugoslav framework.

SĐ

Yugoslavisim

We, the Yugoslavs in the Habsburg Empire, have an important problem to solve not only for our own benefit but also for the benefit of our brothers across the Sava river¹. If we solve it in an appropriate manner, we will tip the scales in our favor. The Monarchy or at least one of its parts will seek to approach us and will join our circle when the Ottoman chains are broken.

Had we remained in the suffocating atmosphere in which we had lived in past years, the poor people across the Sava river would not have considered us seriously. Nevertheless, the Grace of our King has revived our constitutional life lately, which has become part of the Croatian national being. Moreover, we have been given total freedom to establish the relationship of our homeland with the Hungarian Kingdom in our national Parliament. What an arduous task it was!

We, the Croats, wish to cooperate with the Magyars. The latter word is used with unease because what we mean by it are the Hungarians, since we would like to negotiate constitutionally with the representatives of all peoples within the boundaries of the Hungarian Kingdom. However, we cannot but admit that the Magyars have undermined this possibility because when the Hungarian Kingdom is discussed, only the Magyars count and not the other peoples within the Hungarian Kingdom. What the Magyars want, the Hun-

¹ Sava river marks the natural border of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well of Croatia and Serbia. In the nineteenth century it was literally used as the expression denominating South Slavs living under Ottoman rule.

garians want. Consequently, words such as “Ugrians,” “Hungarians,” etc., are used indiscriminately to mean “Magyar.”

Accordingly, the Croats want to cooperate with the Magyars. They have been sharing the same destiny with the Magyars for the past eight centuries. Let the book on Hungarian history be opened: each page will reveal glorious participation of the Croatian people in every event, illustrious men of our blood whose deeds have spread the glory of the whole homeland. Each page of Hungarian history is written in Croatian blood. The Croats and Magyars alike have guarded the Hungarian Crown defending it with their own lives.

The Croats, therefore, have the same historical right to the Hungarian Crown that they themselves have chosen for their own when the domestic one became tainted. Moreover, they will not renounce it because they do not want to renounce eight centuries of their glorious past.

The Croats, therefore, want to be under the single Hungarian Crown with the Magyars. They want to be their allies, their brothers. They want their Croatian Kingdom to be unified with the Hungarian one, but neither as a *pars adnexa* nor as some kind of an *appendix*, but as a *regnum socium, regnum foedere iunctum*. The Hungarian Kingdom is a *regnum*, and so is Croatia; the latter is not a mere *pars adnexa* to the Hungarian Kingdom, but constitutes the same kind of kingdom as the former. Hungary and Croatia are two *regna, regna coordinata*, and not *subordinata* until the end of time. If there is mention of a kingdom and its character or honor, there can be no mention of brothers and allies, but only of master and servant.

Those who are familiar with Croatian history know that by joining the Hungarian Crown, the Croats have never given an inch of their political independence and administrative autonomy. Croatian unification with Hungary was personal (*unio personalis*), i.e. it was the union of two kingdoms sharing the same king. Thereupon, but especially starting with the reign of Queen Maria Theresa, the Croats were gradually deprived of their independence and autonomy, which caused rumblings that finally led to the bloody war of 1848.

We wanted that war wholeheartedly because it would influence our condition for the next ten years. During that time we experienced a bitter revenge that the tearing of the historical embroidery brought upon us. However, in order to prevent it from reappearing ever again for our own benefit and for the benefit of our brothers, the Magyars, we have to stick openly to the Latin proverb often uttered by our forefathers: *Clara pacta, boni amici*.²

² *Lat.* short reckonings make long friends.

If we stick to this premise, our negotiations cannot break down or become shattered notwithstanding the issue. *As allies of the Magyars*, as a kingdom allied and equal to the Hungarian Kingdom, *we demand total political independence and administrative autonomy*, and we will not allow any outsider to rule in our house apart from ourselves and our King.

The above stated basis of our political opinion enables us to freely negotiate and make arrangements with the Magyars. Owing to its very nature, it cannot cause discrepancies that could not be resolved. Different opinions can appear only when it comes to external realization of our union, in terms of *quomodo*³ and not in terms of *quid*⁴. This, of course, is a very crucial issue that I do ardently recommend to you, my dear *Pozor*, and to all of your readers and correspondents to consider.

Hence, my brother Croats let us all, in all our numbers that the Lord bestowed upon us, embrace this paramount principle that should govern our agreement with the Magyars. As a Kingdom, let us arrange our deeds with another kingdom by not giving an inch of our autonomy.

We are required to do so not only because of our history, but also because of our position in comparison to our Yugoslav brothers, especially to those who live with us in the same Empire. We should not give both of our hands to the Magyars: let us give one hand to them honestly and wholeheartedly, and the other to the brothers of our own blood.

The Dalmatians are the most important of them all, not only because we share the same old charters, but also because we share the same blood, language, literature, locality and destiny. Let a simple brown parchment belong to antiquarians and diplomats, let this connection of brotherly love and mutual help among nations of the same blood become more sacrosanct. Hence, our brother Dalmatians, we shall not state herein historical proof why we regard you as one of us; rather we invite you in the name of our and your homeland to join this circle of political unity. Our most honored King shall without doubt give permission to make you our constitutional brothers so that the same *ban*⁵ and the same language can govern us. Unified in the Triune

³ *Lat. how.*

⁴ *Lat. what.*

⁵ The head of the Croatian feudal diet, and simultaneously the governor of Croatia. He was elected by the diet and had to be approved by the Habsburg Emperor. After the liberal reforms in the 1870s, which transformed the Croatian diet into a modern parliament, the *ban* became the president of the Croatian government, although being appointed by the Hungarian government. The seat of the *ban* was abolished together with the Croatian parliament following the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918.

Kingdom⁶ we shall become stronger, we shall progress faster on the road to enlightenment, we shall achieve our national wellbeing faster, and, together with us, you will be able to conquer those foreigners who do not allow you to live in peace. This is not the issue of one people controlling the other or making Dalmatia subordinate to Croatia. We shall both govern and serve each other in harmony, let no one be subordinate to anybody, and let no one be outside the law as given to us by our Lord and our people. Do not let yourself be fooled by those whose thoughts and heart are on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, nor by those specific Dalmatians who seek salvation for Dalmatia in the medieval municipalization. Your first love is for the homeland that is your mother, and a more mature love is for the people who represent your father. In addition, these people are not just located in the rugged Dalmatia but all over Yugoslavia. Hence, every Dalmatian Croat must desire, from the bottom of his heart, political unification of his homeland with the brotherly Croatia and Slavonia, and participation in the Croatian Parliament from 1848, the Parliament which invites, for the second time, the Dalmatians to participate therein. And His Highness, our King, by virtue of the highest decree of the institutions of the stated Parliament, issued on 7 April 1850, has introduced the Article which reads as follows: "on the unification of Dalmatia to the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia and the conditions thereof, it is our wish that by virtue of paragraph 73 of the State Constitution, the representatives of Dalmatia and the Regional Parliament of Croatia and Slavonia through mediation of the executive authority, agree thereon and submit a report for royal approval." We all know the reasons why this royal wish has never materialized. Hopefully, now, when we stand again on our constitutional land, is the time for it to materialize.

That same unfortunate year, the Croats and Serbs from Vojvodina shook hands for the first time. This fraternity was sealed with blood. Articles 7 and 24 of the Croatian Parliament regulate relationship with the Serbian people and recognition of their Vojvodina pursuant to the wording and decision of the National Assembly of Karlovac; furthermore, the establishment of alliance between the stated Vojvodina and the Triune Kingdom, and the unanimous and mutually agreed measures are taken in view of their mutual sur-

⁶ Medieval name for the Croatian kingdom. It symbolized an expression of Croatian feudal rights on the mentioned provinces without actual reference to its territorial shape. Dalmatia was part of the Venetian Republic from the tenth till the eighteenth centuries. Moreover, after the Habsburg Empire finally annexed Dalmatia in 1815, it was constituted as a separate province of the Empire, and thus, again, outside the Croatian government.

vival and their position in relation to Austria and Hungary. This wish of the Croatian Parliament was solved by our honored King in the following manner: "The position and arrangement of Serbian Vojvodina from Articles 7, 11 and 24 of the parliamentary minute, is established *temporarily* pursuant to paragraph 72 of the state constitution from our decree from 18 November 1849, *whereas the final agreement regarding its scope and the final decision on the unification of this country with another kingdom is agreed to be solved in a constitutional manner.*" Hence, this highest decision enables the people of Vojvodina to decide freely on their unification with any kingdom by using *constitutional means*. They have never been able to express their opinion thereon due to well-known reasons. Now, however, all obstacles will be removed. At their National Assembly that, pursuant to the royal wording in the honorable letter of the patriarch Račić from 15 September of the stated year, should meet *soon*, and the activities of which should improve by all means owing to royal and imperial decision, Serbian people will be able to decide constitutionally on the following: whether they wish to preserve the *status quo* or join Hungary, which is the issue being discussed herein, or, alternatively, whether they wish to join the Triune Kingdom. The Serbian Vojvodina, as acknowledged and wished by the Serbs themselves, should be limited more to the Serbian folk because in this mixture of peoples, as it now exists, the Serbian folk can hardly develop and act.

If our wishes came true, then we, the Yugoslavs in the Habsburg Monarchy, under the leadership of our King would establish a kingdom consisting of the kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia with accompanying islands and the Serbian Vojvodina. This fully autonomous kingdom would constitute the other half of the Hungarian Crown.

I know that these wishes that come from the bottom of the heart of any patriotic Croat might seem to many as a hopeless cry for help. Hence, I hardly find Yugoslav brothers in Carniola and south Styria whose heart would beat faster in Zagreb than in Trieste or Graz. At this moment, those who are allowed to speak do not want unification with us, and those who want it are not allowed to speak.

This proposal would remain, for the time being, a *pium desiderium*⁷. In this festive moment when we are allowed to arrange our house freely, this idea will sometimes come across a fertile soil. On the other hand, I have come to realize that if Yugoslavism is not destined to become the issue for the neighboring peoples, it will sooner or later have to realize that it has to

⁷ *Lat.* pious wish.

unite literally in one political body under the Hungarian Crown in Austria and this will have an immense impact on our brothers across the Sava river when the time comes. Now is the time to seriously consider this thought.

Translated by Iva Polak

LOVRO TOMAN: TO COMPATRIOTS!

Title: *Rojakom!* (To compatriots)

Originally published: *Novice* – *gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*,
Ljubljana, J. Blaznikovi dediči, 8 January, 1862

Language: Slovene

The excerpt used is from the original publication, pp. 1–2.

About the author

Lovro Toman [1827, Kamna Gorica (*Ger.* Steinbüchel, present-day Slovenia) – 1870, Rodaun (present-day Austria)]: poet, writer and one of the most popular and influential Slovenian politicians of the nineteenth century. He studied law in Vienna, where he actively participated in the political life of the Slovenes living there. He was the editor of the first uncensored Slovenian newspaper, which began to be published in Vienna in 1848. Toman was also an active member of the *Slovenija* association, which, in 1848 advocated the formation of the Kingdom of Slovenia as an autonomous part of the Habsburg Empire. At the same time, the association worked towards the recognition of equal status for the Slovene language in public administration and in education across the Slovenian lands. In 1848 he was an active member of the association of Slovenian academics in Vienna. After the university suspended its activities in 1848, Toman continued his law studies in Graz, where he earned a doctorate in 1852. In 1856, he became the first lawyer in Radovljica (*Ger.* Radmannsdorf). From 1861 to 1870, he was a deputy in the Vienna Parliament and a member of the Provincial Diet, where he struggled for the rights of the Slovenes. Together with Janez Bleiweis and Etbin Costa, he was among the forefathers of conservative political thought in Slovenia. In 1867, the year of the ‘Compromise,’ Toman objected to the idea of a dual monarchy. He had a good grasp of the economic needs of the Slovenes, and during the 1860s he was the head of the secretarial office of the ‘Trade and Crafts Chamber’ for Carniola. His reputation among the Slovenian public tarnished after he sold the concessionary rights for the construction of the railway line in Gorenjska (Upper Carniola). Modern historians consider Lovro Toman a political figure who contributed to the process of the inculcation of a distinct national identity among the Slovenes in the mid-nineteenth century.

Main works: *Sloveniji slobodni nje sinovi zvesti na Dunaju* [To free Slovenia from her loyal sons in Vienna] (1848); *Glasi domorodni* [Patriotic voices] (1849).

Context

In the mid-nineteenth century, the lands largely populated by the Slovenes totaled some 24,000 square kilometers over four provinces. Slovenes were the majority in two provinces: Carniola and Gorizia, while in Carinthia and Styria they were a minority. The Slovenes were mainly farmers. German-speaking populations lived mainly in towns, so the intellectual atmosphere there was predominantly German in character, particularly so in the towns of Styria: Maribor (*Ger.* Marburg an der Drau), Celje (*Ger.* Cilli) and Ptuj (*Ger.* Pettau).

In the mid-eighteenth century, the incipient Slovenian national movement had reached only a thin layer of society, namely the clergy and the secular intelligentsia, while the majority of the population lacked a strong opinion on the issue of national identity. Most people felt allegiance to their province and the monarchy, the latter being identified with the dynasty and the Emperor. The sense of national belonging was not necessarily associated with one's origins and the mother tongue. So, owing to their traditional ties with the German cultural world, many Slovenes declared themselves Germans. The educated people, the aristocracy and the middle class identified with German, Italian or Hungarian culture, and only gradually acquired a modern national consciousness. In Carniola, the most Slovenian of all provinces, the term 'Slovene' slowly forced out the provincial designation '*Kranjec*' (derived from *Kranjska*, the Slovenian name for Carniola). Even though explicit national conflicts were yet to emerge, the number of nationally oriented Slovenes sharply increased (especially among the Catholic clergy), while Slovenian-German relations became strained after the Slovenes presented their national and political demands in March 1848.

After the war in Italy, the constitutional life of the Habsburg monarchy was characterized by caution and hesitation. The 'October Diploma' (1860) gave autonomy to the historical provinces, while the system that was created by the 'February Patent' (1861) was effective until the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. During the 1860s, the leading role within the Slovenian popular movement was taken by the circle around the editor of the first Slovenian newspaper *Novice* (News), Janez Bleiweis. In a debate about national and legal issues, he expressed his support for constitutional monarchy. During Anton Schmerling's term in office (1861–1865), the Slovenian leaders opposed centralism, and later supported the conservative and federation-oriented government of his successor, Richard Belcredi. This type of cautious and moderate conservative policy had vocal opponents in the Slovenian-populated provinces,

including some free-minded, liberal-oriented and educated individuals. These were especially numerous in Styria, the seedbed of the Slovenian national movement during the 1860s. But apart from the increasingly articulated Slovenian and German political camps, as early as 1848, there were also those who opposed the Slovenian movement; these were derogatorily called the *nemškutars* (derived from the Slovenian term for Germans, “Nemci”).

In March 1861, the elections for the provincial diet in Kranjska revealed the popularity of Janez Bleiweis and the already widely-celebrated patriot Lovro Toman. At that time, the process of national-political differentiation was already clearly noticeable. The term *Slovenec* (Slovene) had acquired a new meaning. It was understood to denote someone who accepted the program and politics of the Slovenian political party. Whoever denied the Slovenian policy was regarded to be antagonistic to the Slovenes, regardless of whether that person was Slovene or German speaking. At the first session of the new provincial diet of Carniola in April 1861, Bleiweis and Toman were the first to use Slovene. Toman stressed the need to preserve the Habsburg Empire and rejected accusations that the Slovenes were separatists. He demanded the right to use Slovene in the provincial chamber, and later, between May and June 1862, he filed many petitions in the Vienna Parliament demanding the equality of the Slovene language in public administration and education. This was the spirit in which Lovro Toman wrote the open letter to the Slovenes on the New Year's Day of 1862. The letter appeared as an editorial on the front page of the newspaper *Novice*.

The conservative camp's links with the Catholic Church and their cautious national policy prompted a group of liberally oriented Slovenes in Styria to found, in 1868, the newspaper *Slovenski narod* (Slovenian nation), which rejected dualism and supported federalism. It also defended enthusiastically the links with the Slavic and particularly South Slavic nations, and proclaimed the union of all Slovenian provinces under the Habsburg monarchy as the main political goal of the Slovenes. On the other hand, it generally acknowledged the close ties between the Slovenian nation and the Catholic Church. Lovro Toman, too, saw dualism as the “grave of our existence,” but as a member of the constitutional committee, he played an active part in the drafting of the December constitution of 1867. He made a crucial contribution to the formulation of Article 19, which ensured national and linguistic equality. Taking the formulation in the draft Kremsier constitution of 1849 as the point of departure, he proposed that every nation should be guaranteed the legal right to protect and develop its nationality and to use its language in schools, public administration and public life.

Toman's upright political stance also found expression in his poetry, in which he addressed the Slovenian (mainly peasant) population and encouraged their national emancipation. Accordingly, modern historians consider him a political poet who encouraged national awakening as well as a promoter of the collective spirit among the Slovenes. The most characteristic in this regard is Toman's poem *Mar i bor*, written in 1861 praising the Slovenian character of the town of Maribor. On 3 August, 1862, he attended the first anniversary of the Maribor reading club, an event dominated by Slovenian patriotism, which some Germans living in Maribor interpreted as a provocation. While Toman was drinking a toast to his Slovenian compatriots, several Germans gathered in front of the building singing *Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland*. For months after this event, the atmosphere in the otherwise tranquil town on the banks of the Drava river was tense. German newspapers blamed Toman for the resulting tensions, accusing him of allegedly saying to the Slovenes in Maribor "that they should prefer to be buried under the ruins of the town of Maribor than admit that Maribor is a German town."

In the 1860s, the Slovenian nationalist model had achieved maturity. It was based on the ethnicization of social conflicts with the understanding that the nation is an eternal category. The Slovenes were represented as the oppressed majority that struggled for its rights against the rich German, as well as smaller Italian and Hungarian, minorities. Toman's radical understanding of the nation was based on natural law and celebrated the sacred character of the Nation. His patriotism was ethnocentric and introvert. He portrayed the Slovenian character as being hysteric, overly defensive and uncertain. Toman hence earned for himself a firm reputation as the forefather of the Slovenian national ideology.

MR

To compatriots!

It is the first day of the new year! We are bidding farewell to the previous year, which was so enormously important for us—and now we must fulfill the obligations that still linger. I also have a sweet obligation yet to fulfill: to extend my gratitude to You, beloved compatriots, for showing ardent compassion over the past days when you expressed faith in my defense of the rights of the country and those of our nation. Allow me to express my gratitude, and my congratulations, now when my elated heart, aroused at the change of the year, rises and longs for the welfare of people.

My fondest moments of the last year were those which brought to me, from many Slovenian provinces, your trust and your recognition that the welfare of a nation indeed lies in national development and national strengths, and that there is no true freedom without national independence. Your recognition is the foundation of the arduous struggle undertaken by myself and many compassionate patriots. But many more of our compatriots, who grope in the darkness of mistaken foreign erudition not illuminated by the light of their own minds, feel shame when they are called by the name of the nation of their origin. Shame be with them before this world. And glory and the nation's gratitude be with you, now and for ever, you who obviously recognized yourselves as the loyal sons of the Slovenian mother! Your precious words are an appeal of the nation addressed to our ruler, a firm support for the nation's defenders, a sharp retort to the scorners and slanderers, and a clear wish and will in favor of all of us to whom has been bequeathed the realization of equal rights and therefore the destiny of the nation.

My heart is filled with ineffable joy at the feeling that our dear mother is not as desolate as some think. This knowledge makes me elated and entails the following reasoning: we lived through many long years, long centuries of disadvantage and calamity! The future is a daughter of the present and of the past. Both must be held in esteem. The black wing of the past retreated; the present stretches bright white wings beaming with radiant, awakening promises of the future! If we want to create a blissful, brilliant future, we have to eliminate oaths and mistakes that suppressed the development of the nation in the past; we must immediately set about to work. The present exacts from us the recognition of the nation's purpose and the act of implementation. The aim of our nation is the same as that of any other nation. No one can deny this to us. The goal of the nation is our welfare, both physical and intellectual. Welfare proceeds from culture, and culture proceeds from education, the sole means of which is a national language.

National awareness and national language must hence be our primary concerns. One who does not know what he is, cannot recognize his mission; one who has no sense of himself is without strength and courage. So, let us awaken our brothers and edify them about the prosperity and the benefits that will be bestowed on them lavishly through the development of the nation. Let us constantly demand respect for our language, its introduction into administration and education, and its use in everyday life. Let us reveal to those unknowledgeable the richness, the beauty, the virtue and the gracefulness of our language; let us guide those who are lazy towards learning the language and towards reading our books and newspapers. They contain many intellectual

seeds that will, once taken in, sprout and grow within the excited hearts. Let us have respect for our language in which our mother's love first spoke to us sweetly and dearly, in which many years ago our apostles taught our nation the holy, saving religion, in which we said our first prayers to the Almighty, which is a bond that ties together the children of one mother, and whose survival and use is guaranteed to us by the Constitution and the trustworthy word of the Emperor.

One who feels contempt for his language is the enemy of his religion, the ungrateful son of his mother; he disregards his country—his cradle; he is a renegade who abandoned his nation and is a foe of that nation. One who feels scorn for the national language is selfish because he despises the goal of the nation and places his own gains before those of the nation. One who says that our language should not be used in everyday life does not understand the only means of education and the path leading to it. One who declares that the supporters of the language want to lead you into poverty and ruin, and to move you away from law—do not trust him! His thoughts are malicious even when masked as affected promises; his heart is evil and malicious, even if he promises to make sacrifices for you; his words are lies, no matter how sweet and kind! Your only friends are those who adhere to the previously mentioned origins and principles which say that our national language should be in use and should live.

All other Austrian nations are already enjoying the benefits of the use of their own language; the same law applies to us, who are so loyal to the state and the Emperor; his highest servants assured us that we are by no means forbidden to use our language, and that the equality of all nations will no longer be just talk, just words, but the truth and the fact: after this has been said, can any opponent, foreign or domestic, deny this sacred right of ours!? Beyond all doubt, no! Therefore, let us adhere firmly to this first and main right. Look at other nations, from the first to the last one; no one maintains the opposite because the nation that has lost its language, has lost its character, its independence, its essence. Such a nation becomes another's slave, drowns and disappears. But we do not want to disappear; we have yet to begin to live in earnest, because that is the will of God! If until now we have been covered by an abhorrent darkness, that darkness has now been shattered by the constitutional law, under whose auspices we can wake, become aware and rise as equals to other nations.

The more our national strength develops the more valuable member of the large family our nation will be. The curse or the blessing of our nation is also the curse or the blessing of the country. I declare clearly and without appre-

hension—because my conscience obliges me to obey the law—I declare clearly that one who is the enemy of our culture, our goal and our ultimate intentions, is also the enemy of the country, willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly. These are our rules, my dear compatriots. They set apart the loyal from those who are disloyal, and friends from foes.

I have knowledge and experience of the vile lies about us spread by the shameless enemies of our nation, who impute us intentions which we have never voiced or contemplated and insinuate acts we have never committed. No matter how poisonous these arrows are—we do not feel the pain, because they bounce off honest chests. When they cannot find the true reason to accuse us and defame us, they resort to lies and conceal from their conscience their own shame and their name.

Compatriots! I am convinced that You can separate the wheat from the chaff, and that you know how to distinguish between Your friends and enemies. Our defense and our reward lie in that awareness. Therefore, be courageous and emboldened! We endured many a woe during the previous year, and we will do so also in the future. Many overdue tasks have to be accomplished—set about them now! Adhere to Your rights, never conceal them; love Your nation, our homeland, have respect for all other nations, obey the laws of our illustrious Emperor and of Him, who is the Lord of the Lords, and cherish hope, so that we truly enhance our intellectual and physical welfare, which is certainly my and Your sincere wish. Lord, bless the beginning, the progress and the end of the year. God be with You!

Radovljica, 1 January, 1862

Your faithful compatriot Dr. Lovro Toman

Translated by Olga Vuković

FERENC DEÁK: THE EASTER ARTICLE

Title: *A húsvéti cikk* (The Easter article)

Originally published: *Pesti Napló*, 16 April 1865

Language: Hungarian

The text used is from Manó Kónyi ed. *Deák Ferenc beszédei*, vol. III. (Budapest: Franklin-társulat, 1903), pp. 401–408. Modern edition: László Tőkéczki, ed., *A magyar liberalizmus* (Budapest: Osiris, 1996), pp. 121–125.

About the author

Ferenc Deák [1803, Söjtör (west Hungary) – 1876, Budapest]: Hungarian politician, lawyer. He came from the nobility of Zala county. Studied law and philosophy at the Academy of Győr (1817–1821). He was a practicing lawyer from 1823 and entered the Hungarian Diet in 1833, soon becoming a prominent figure in the liberal opposition. He was re-elected for the session of 1839–40, and was a member of the committee in charge of the reform of the Penal Code. Due to local conflicts between Reformists and Conservatives, he relinquished his candidacy for the Diet and abstained from joining the 1843–44 and 1847–48 sessions. He returned to politics in 1848, becoming Minister of Justice after the Revolution of March 1848. He opposed **Lajos Kossuth** in an attempt to prevent an open break with Austria, resigning from office upon his failure. In January 1849, he completely withdrew from public affairs. After the collapse of the revolution, he became the symbolic leader of Hungarian opposition to the neo-absolutist regime. During the 1860s, he was the most important proponent and principal engineer of the constitutional compromise between Vienna and the Hungarian ‘political nation.’ In the Diet of 1866, he cooperated with Gyula Andrássy in drawing up a report on the planned new Austrian constitution. This report was the basis of the negotiations with the Austrian chancellor, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, resulting in the *Ausgleich* (Compromise), which established the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Until his withdrawal from politics in 1873, Deák continued to act as a principal figure in Hungarian politics, even though his efforts to reach a compromise with the other nationalities on the basis of the unitary Hungarian political nation were not crowned by success.

Main works: *Követjelentés az 1839-40-i országgyűlésről* [Report by the delegates of the parliament of 1839–40] (with Károly Hertelendy) (1842); *1847-es Ellen-*

zéki nyilatkozat [The opposition declaration of 1847] (with Lajos Kossuth) (1847); *Adalék a magyar közjoghoz* [Contributions to Hungarian public law] (1865); *Deák Ferenc beszédei* 6 vols. [The speeches of Ferenc Deák] (1882–1897).

Context

After the suppression of the Hungarian revolution (1849), Deák became an iconic figure of the ‘passive resistance’ against Habsburg neo-absolutism. In 1854, he moved to Pest, and his apartment in the *English Queen* hotel became the center of Hungarian political activities seeking to re-establish constitutional rule. Although advocating the union of Austria and Hungary, he insisted on the restoration of the constitution of 1848, the territorial integrity of the country and eventually the recognition of Hungary as a separate kingdom. In 1861, at the time of the first attempt of reintroducing parliamentarism, Deák emerged as the leader of the moderate camp. Due to the lack of willingness to compromise on all sides, the attempt failed and a new *intermezzo* of neo-absolutist rule followed. In 1865, Deák published the famous ‘Easter Article.’ It was a refutation of neo-absolutist doctrines, which claimed that Hungary had lost her rights of constitutional self-government due to her unfaithfulness towards the Emperor (this was called the *Verwirkungstheorie*). The article also asserted the need for reconciliation which would entail the restoration of the constitution, which he considered to be the principal achievement of 1848. The text had an important symbolic value as it signaled the end of ‘passive resistance’ and the eagerness of the Hungarian political elite to reach a compromise. In dialogue with a series of Austrian liberal pamphlets urging the reconciliation with the Hungarians, most importantly the writings of **Adolf Fischhof**, Deák’s argumentation expressed the main tenets of mid-nineteenth century Hungarian liberalism, connecting modern liberal precepts with ‘ancient constitutionalism.’

The text is an extremely polished rhetorical parable which—on the surface—tries to subvert the claim of the Viennese semi-official journal *Botschafter* that the Hungarians were “eternal separatists.” In its depth, however, it reiterates the political, legal and historical arguments in favor of the restoration of the constitutional government in Hungary. Deák seeks to show that it was exactly the Austrian politicians’ lack of trust—exemplified by the very article he sought to refute—which undermined the Hungarian nation’s harmonic integration within the framework of the Habsburg Empire. To support this claim, he gives a historical overview of the conflicts between Vienna and the Hungarian political nation, suggesting that the conflicts origi-

nated in the negative influence of Austrian statesmen upon the sovereign. Evoking the loyalty of Hungarians to the Emperor, he created a rhetoric framework inviting Francis Joseph to restore the constitutional liberties of the Hungarians.

Deák thus offers to the liberal Austrian political elite reconciliation on the basis of mutual trust and the respect of constitutional rights and traditions. Most importantly, he suggested, the Austrian elite should give up the *Verwirkungstheorie*. The Hungarian revolts were always counter-reactions: had the Hungarians really wanted to separate, they would have had splendid opportunities in different historical situations right after their constitutional demands were satisfied. He points out that in these conspicuous moments, Hungarians actually turned out to be the most reliable partners in defending the integrity of the Empire. While *Botschafter* considers, on the one hand, the interests of the Empire and the legal system of Cisleithania (the Austrian part of the Empire, lying to the west of the river Leitha [*Hun.* Lajta]) and, on the other, the Hungarian constitution to be mutually exclusive, Deák claims that in fact these codes are not only compatible, but also mutually reinforcing. Thus, any compromise was to take into account the security of the Empire, the basic laws of the Hungarian constitution, and also the constitutional liberties of the Cisleithanian lands. This formulation prefigures a key point of the architecture of the Compromise—that is, the claim that the defense of the Empire constitutes the most important ‘common cause.’

Deák’s article had a crucial political significance and his argument had a formidable internal and external resonance. It contributed to the acceptance of the terms of the *Ausgleich* on the part of a significant segment of the Hungarian political elite. At the same time, Lajos Kossuth, in his famous ‘Cassandra Letter’ to Deák, accused him of causing the ‘death of the nation’ by binding the country’s destiny to the moribund Habsburg Monarchy. On the whole, Deák’s text represents both the strength and the weakness of the Hungarian liberal state-building project of the 1860s. It demonstrated a sophisticated legal-constitutional argumentation and a powerful vision of a normative past. At the same time, it was marked by the reluctance to question the doctrine of Hungarian political nationhood in view of the actual ethnic plurality of the country. It thus locked the political discourse into the iron cage of constitutional questions, which determined Hungarian politics up to 1918.

The Easter article

In the 9th of April issue of *Botschafter* it is written that “a desire for separation runs throughout Hungarian history, passed on from generation to generation, just as vigorously alive now as a hundred years ago.”

If by this desire for separation *Botschafter* means that the Hungarian nation has always held loyally to her own constitutional independence and has always born an unrelenting resentment towards any attempts by the government, and especially certain of its administrators, to disregard or even eliminate the Hungarian constitution in addition to absorbing the country, then we have no reason to contradict the words of *Botschafter* quoted above; for this loyal devotion and this unrelenting resentment towards absorption is in fact passed on from one generation to the next amongst the Hungarians, and it is just as vigorous now and it was a hundred years ago, and, if the grace of the Almighty stays with us, it will still be vigorous centuries later.

But if in the lines quoted above, the paper talks about a desire for separation that would contain an endeavor towards a final secession, we are forced to react to the claim with a few words.

If such a desire, nay, sometimes no less than an actual endeavor, did manifest itself in Hungarian history, what caused it and what buoyed it? The article itself answers this question when it says that the laws and constitution of Hungary have often been violated by the government or rather by its administrators.

It takes the highest degree of public dissatisfaction to arouse in a whole nation a desire or undertaking to break off a connection established after much pre-meditation, and even then only if all hope of things ever getting better has vanished can it come about. In the past, more than one Austrian statesman have, by means of their counsel and influence upon the sovereigns, done everything—willingly or not—to arouse such a desire in the nation. We could cite in this respect several sad periods in Hungarian history, all demonstrating the fact that the Hungarian nation was not the cause of this dissatisfaction and this shaken confidence. And when, for a long series of years, these assaults against the Hungarian constitution came one after another, when their natural consequence, a gradually growing bitterness, reached its peak, what was it that finally remedied the harm, calmed aroused tempers and restored shaken confidence? Did the Austrian statesmen change their views and, learning from experience, begin to give better counsel to the sovereign? No. This did not happen, or at least according to the testimony of history, it happened very infrequently. It was always the sovereigns who,

with their more profound discernment and stricter conscientiousness, withdrew the statutes aimed at the Hungarian constitution, restored the violated laws and re-awakened trust and hope in the nation.

Let us bring up a few examples from history.

There has hardly been a period more tragic than the eleven years preceding the Parliament of 1681. Besides the bloodshed, the political and religious persecution, let us underline one single fact: the constitution of the country was abrogated and the realm was placed under the authority of a governor from abroad. True, this was preceded by a widespread conspiracy whose participants paid for their actions with their life and all their possessions.¹ But there was no lack of statesmen who used the activities of these persons as an opportunity and a pretext for strict and unconstitutional acts against the whole nation. And as the ensuing resentment gradually grew, it was Leopold I himself who annulled the decrees contradictory to the constitution and who, together with the Estates, restituted the Hungarian constitution in a complete and intact form at the Parliament of 1681.

The benefits of this rightful act were not long in coming: this effect was the restoration of trust and devotion, the result of which was that the nation promptly enacted a law six years later at the Parliament of 1687 that established, in accordance with the sovereign's wishes, the principle of primogeniture in the question of the right of succession for the male line in the House of Habsburg. This the nation did for her own good as well; nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that were it not for the restoration of trust in 1681, the country would never have enacted such a law voluntarily.

In the early eighteenth century a sanguinary civil war was fought in Hungary, a civil war that was caused, or at least advanced, by a new attempt of Austrian statesmen to curb the Hungarian constitution. The Peace Treaty of Szatmár² put an end to this civil war—the peace treaty that once more warranted the country's constitutional liberty. And twelve years after this peace treaty, the Hungarian nation assigned the right of succession to the female line of the Habsburg House voluntarily, of her own free will. This is a genuine sign that confidence and devotion between the nation and the dynasty was restored. For had the Treaty of Szatmár been signed in a different form,

¹ Deák refers to the conspiracy of Hungarian magnates against Habsburg absolutism. Its leaders, Ferenc Nádasdy, Péter Zrínyi (*Cro.* Petar Zrinski) and Ferenc Frangepán (*Cro.* Fran Krsto Frankopan) were executed in 1670.

² Peace treaty of Szatmár (*Rom.* Satu Mare), made between the Hungarian insurrectionary army and the Habsburg forces in 1711, terminating the "Rákóczi Uprising."

had the country's constitution never been fully restored, the restless and distrustful nation would hardly have agreed to ratify the *Sanctio Pragmatica*. And then what would have happened in 1741?³ We have no wish to dwell upon it.

After 1780, Joseph II annulled the constitution of the country again, and adopting the old plan of certain Austrian statesmen, he set himself the goal of absorbing Hungary or at least totally terminating its constitutional independence. But in the final days of his life, he himself revoked his decrees, while in addition to restituting the Hungarian constitution, his successor, Leopold II, even strengthened it with new and expedient laws in accord with the Estates of the country.

Soon came the bloody French wars, which for a long time took an adverse turn for Austria. These wars proved that the Hungarian nation that was loyal to the completely restored constitution was also loyal to her king. She fulfilled her obligations in the defense of the empire with full readiness and much enthusiasm. And when in 1809 the mighty emperor of the triumphant enemy stood here in this country with his victorious army and called upon the Hungarian nation to secede from Austria, feeding her with hopes whose realization seemed quite possible, these proclamations did not shake the nation's lawful devotion and confidence. All such alluring promises and flattering vanished into thin air.

In 1823, one of the fundamental laws of the constitution was assaulted by the commanding words and arms of the government. But a few years later the just ruler solemnly declared in the Parliament of 1825 that these events, which had been displeasing to his fatherly heart as well, would never occur again in the future, and with the approval of the Estates of the country he enacted Article No. 3, in which he proclaimed that he was "fully convinced that the happiness of the sovereign and the country is founded upon the strict observance and intactness of the laws, and if any rights of either the king or the Estates are curtailed, the whole structure of laws and the legal system of the country sanctioned by centuries shall be undermined." He also proclaimed that he would "protect and maintain at all times the constitution of the country, which he had confirmed by his coronation oath. For the same reason he will closely observe and make others observe Articles 10, 12 and 19/1790–1791."

This declaration His Majesty made upon the counsel of that eminent statesman who has managed the affairs of the empire with much wisdom

³ Reference to the War of Austrian Succession when the Hungarian troops fought on the side of the Habsburgs.

even amidst the most adverse of circumstances and who said the following to His Majesty with respect to Hungary:

"If Your Majesty wishes to govern Hungary well and with ease, govern it in accordance with its own constitution."

But we do not wish to prolong these arguments. All we want to stress from the examples of history is that whenever a grave dissatisfaction was manifest in Hungary, and this dissatisfaction awakened distrust and perhaps a desire for separation, it was almost always due to the counsels and endeavors of Austrian statesmen to abrogate the Hungarian constitution, and it was always the conscientious rightfulness and profound discernment of the sovereigns that ultimately remedied the harm and restored confidence and devotion.

Thus history shows us the causes that from time to time have led to the occasional desire for separation (*Sonderzug*) that *Botschafter* accuses us of, while it also shows the surest method, indeed the only one, by which this desire has always been abated. Therefore if we accept Cicero's saying that "*historia est testis temporum, magistra vitae*,"⁴ we must learn from history.

From the events of the past we have learned that in the most adverse circumstances it has been the justice and wisdom of our sovereigns that have helped us out of our troubles, and it was they who saved our constitution from the attacks of others. This is the conviction that must be alive in us. Why does "B." [*Botschafter*] want to tear away this conviction from our bosom by affirming that however much we have secured our constitution with new and more definite laws, however much our sovereigns have guaranteed it in their oaths of coronation diplomas, our laws have nevertheless been violated and our constitution always left by the wayside?

Why does it want to destroy all trust, all hopes for the better, with the threat that the Austrian people under the constitution will not accommodate us, similar to the power that formerly enjoyed unrestricted authority in the Austrian province which did not preserve our constitution?

The Austrian government, the Cisleithanian newspapers and certain statesmen often talk about the need for a peaceful compromise,⁵ a compromise to be achieved to the relief of both parties. Such a compromise can only be founded upon mutual trust. Does "B." really believe that this mutual trust is augmented by asserting that our constitution has not hitherto been respected by the government and will not be spared even by the constitutional Austrian people?

⁴ "History is the witness of times, and teacher of life" (Cicero, *De Oratore*).

⁵ *Kiegyenlítés* (*Ausgleich*, Compromise). The word is used to denote the possible reconciliation between the two political nations; interestingly enough, it is not the word that came to be used later (*Kiegyezés*).

Or if “B.” itself does not believe that all this would augment trust, is it really in its interest to hamper the possibility of a compromise; to sow the seed of distrust amongst the peoples and countries on both sides of the Lajta; to foster confrontation between them as though they were foes, foes who are unwilling to show regard for the rights of the other? Does “B.” consider it a sober, honest and wise policy to wrench from us the hope we have pinned upon the person of our sovereign, and at the same time as aspiring to awaken a desire of separation in the Hungarians, to reproach and accuse the nation for having the selfsame desire?

We have often heard the doctrine that whenever one of two contracting parties fails to heed the clauses of the contract, the other is not obliged to obey them either. This is the doctrine of *Verwirkungstheorie*, which we consider reprehensible both in theory and in practice in the area of public law. But the doctrine advocated by “B.,” namely that when one party has perpetually violated the contract and despite all securities and promises kept acting in contradiction to the contract, is that the other party should no longer have the right to demand its observation and should instead be impelled to transform and even invalidate it unilaterally—this is truly a new and amazingly peculiar theory.

If our ancestors had acted in accordance with this theory under Rudolph before 1608, under Leopold in 1681, under Joseph II in 1781 or under Francis I in 1825, where would the Hungarian constitution be now? But fortunately they had more confidence in their sovereigns, and this confidence sustained the liberty of Hungary.

Botschafter argues that the Hungarian constitution has perpetually been violated for the reason that the interests of the empire as a whole have made it impossible to obey it; so it will be violated again and again unless it is adapted and modified to fit into the imperial constitution. We do not doubt the importance of the empire’s stability. The address of Parliament in 1861 clearly stated that the Hungarian nation does not wish to endanger it by any means.⁶ However, in our opinion the right way to secure the stability of the empire lies not in discarding all solemn treaties, laws and rights, or in mold-

⁶ In 1861, after 12 years of neo-absolutism, the Hungarian Diet was convoked. The two emerging parties differed mainly on the way to address Francis Joseph, which implicitly meant a difference in the vision of restoring constitutional continuity. The moderate camp, seeking to petition the Emperor with a “parliamentary address” asking him to reinstate the 1848 Constitution, was led by Deák. The more radical camp, called the “party of decision,” held that constitutional continuity could be restored simply by a decision of the Parliament.

ing the Hungarian constitution into the pattern that the 26 February Constitution⁷ was molded into; instead, above all keeping in mind the security of the empire, an objective shared by the *Sanctio Pragmatica*,⁸ we should endeavor both to achieve the complete security of the empire and to sustain as far as possible the basic clauses of the Hungarian constitution as well as promoting and fully securing the constitutional liberty of the Cisleithanian countries.

One of our aims is thus the stability of the empire, which we do not wish to subordinate to any other consideration. The other is the sustenance of the constitutionality of Hungary, her rights and her laws, which are solemnly secured already by the *Sanctio Pragmatica*, and from which it would indeed be neither rightful nor expedient to take away any more than what the safeguarding of the empire's stability inevitably requires.

The full constitutional liberty of the Cisleithanian countries can exist in parallel with the Hungarian constitution under a common sovereign and with a joint defense. These two are not at variance with each other; we believe that we can find a place for ourselves alongside each other without wanting to absorb the other.

Finally, looking back to history one more time, we may take the liberty of asking *Botschafter* a question.

If in 1527 the Hungarian nation had not elected Ferdinand I to be her king, would the fate and extent of the Austrian empire have been the same as it has been since his election? Could the empire have been able to stand the test after 1740 the way it did? Would it have been able to withstand the mighty foe that had wiped away most of Germany during the French wars?

If therefore the empire's establishment required Hungary, which elected Ferdinand voluntarily to be her king, isn't it natural that the observance of the conditions of this election was at the same time an essential condition of the empire's real establishment? And Ferdinand was elected to be king of Hungary freely, as he himself declared in Article 2/1527 and in the letter he addressed to the Estates of Hungary on the 29 June 1527. Before his coronation he assured the Estates of the country through his letter issued on the 30 November in 1526 in Vienna that he would preserve the rights and liberties of the country's inhabitants intact. At his coronation he confirmed this guarantee with a solemn oath; and in 1537 in Article 29 he once more referred to this guarantee.

⁷ The February Patent, a letters patent issued by Francis Joseph establishing a bicameral imperial parliament, was adopted as the Constitution of 1861.

⁸ The *Pragmatica Sanctio* (accepted by the Hungarian Parliament of 1722–1723) regulated the succession of the female line to the throne.

All this happened partly before the first establishment of the empire and partly during its establishment. Is it possible to ignore these events now?

The *Sanctio Pragmatica*, without which the empire would probably have broken up after the death of Charles III (or Charles VI), may be regarded as the second, firmer establishment of the empire. In this new and firmer establishment, the unimpaired upholding of the constitution and laws of Hungary was once more stipulated as an explicit condition.

If therefore the empire was and could be established solely on this condition, it would be wrongful to discard it.

For us, just as for the Parliament of 1861, the only possible starting point is the *Sanctio Pragmatica*. The common ruling house, the inseparable and indivisible possession and its natural corollary, a joint defense, are all laid down clearly there. Hungary fulfilled these conditions, she performed her obligations in defense loyally and willingly in the hardest times, and she proved herself ready to perform this obligation even when agitation and war raged and when the war in which joint defense was required was unpopular amongst many of her inhabitants.

We do not mention these facts out of a desire to boast, for the nation was only doing her duty; whatever she did she did in her own interest as well, and the armies of the Cisleithanian countries had similarly defended Hungary for many years. We only spoke of these things to prove through history that our constitutional independence has not impaired in any way the stability of the empire. We do not want to sacrifice this constitutional independence just because certain clauses in the new constitution of the Cisleithanian peoples are at variance with it; but we shall be ever ready to harmonize by legal means our laws with the interests of the empire's stability, and we shall never stand in the way of the liberty or the constitutional development of the Cisleithanian countries.

Translated by Dávid Oláh

ALEKSANDER ŚWIĘTOCHOWSKI: POLITICAL DIRECTIVES

Title: *Wskazania polityczne* (Political directives)

Originally published: *Ognisko: książka zbiorowa wydana dla uczczenia 25 letniej pracy T. T. Jeża*, Warsaw, K. Kowalewski, 1882

Language: Polish

The excerpts used are from Janina Kulczycka-Saloni, *Pozytywizm*, (Warsaw: PZWS, 1971), pp. 235–240.

About the author

Aleksander Świętochowski [1849, Stoczek (in Podlachia, present-day east Poland) – 1938, Gołotczyzna (central Poland)]: politician and writer. Aleksander Świętochowski, like many other adherents of Polish positivism, graduated from *Szkoła Główna*, a short-lived elite Polish high-school in Warsaw. Less typical, however, was his decision to enter the Russian Warsaw University that replaced the *Szkoła Główna* in 1870. He was one of the leaders of the *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (Weekly review), organ of the liberal intelligentsia advocating principles of organic work and the modernization of Polish society. While working for *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, Świętochowski frequented supplementary courses in philosophy at the university in Leipzig. After his failure to enter Galician academic circles, Świętochowski moved back to Warsaw. During the late 1870s and the 1880s, he became one of most innovative Polish playwrights, though gradually limiting his activities to political writings. From 1881 to 1902, he was the editor-in-chief of *Prawda* (Truth), one of the main journals of the young intelligentsia in Russian Poland. Together with other contributors, such as the sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki, Świętochowski maintained a critical dialogue with conservatives from Cracow. He thus tried to stick to his ideas after the introduction of censorship by the Russian authorities. Some of his writings were published anonymously in Galicia. During the 1905–1907 revolution, Świętochowski organized a political party of liberal intellectuals supporting the reformatory attempts of Russian liberals. After the suppression of the revolution, he moved to the village of Gołotczyzna to organize an agricultural school. The education of Polish peasantry was one of his most consequential ideas, as was general social, economic and scientific progress to secure national existence. However, Świętochowski did not sympathize at all with contemporary socialism. In addition, he was one of most aggressive critics of the Church. In his writings published in national-democratic periodicals during the inter-war period, Świętochowski criticized **Józef Piłsudski** and his adher-

ents. Moreover, his interest in the peasantry allied him closely with the radical agrarian movement. Nevertheless, his ideology cannot be equaled with the extremism of modern political movements as it endorses the principles of modernization, social responsibility, and freedom of conscience.

Main works: *Niewinni* [The innocents] (1875); *Helvia* (1876); *Ojciec Makary* [Father Makary] (1876); *Poddanka* [The subject] (1877); *Piękna* [The beautiful] (1878); *O życie* [For life] (1879); *Klemens Boruta* (1880); *Na pogrzebie* [During the funeral] (1881); *Aspazja* (1885); *Aureli Wiszar* (1888); *Strachy Pentelikonu* [The threats of Pentelikon] (1888); *Hymn niemych* [The anthem of mutes] (1888); *Regina* (1899); *Duchy* [Ghosts] (1895–1909).

Context

The article *Wskazania polityczne* is one of Świętochowski's most controversial texts. It can be considered to be an outcome of the disappointment of the Polish intelligentsia after the suppression of the January uprising against Russia (1863–1864). The curtailing of Polish autonomy (to the extent that it was virtually eliminated) and the lack of any possibility of political action within the borders of the Russian Empire forced young, ambitious individuals to look to other means of expressing their discontent. At the same time, the idea of armed uprising lost its appeal for most of the young intelligentsia. The so-called positivists found inspiration in current European philosophical trends and chose to focus on the modernization of Polish society. It was also the period when most prominent writers of this new intellectual group published devastating descriptions of the material and intellectual underdevelopment of Poland. In the political sphere, it was often stated that, instead of continuous attempts to reestablish political independence, the example of the 'peaceful' Czech national movement should be emulated.

It was Świętochowski who openly stated that Poles should end the tradition of insurrections. His appeals to Polish intellectuals to abandon the old slogans of political independence and start working for the modernization of the country were met with contradictory reactions. Some supported Świętochowski, but the so-called 'wide patriotic circles' condemned his text as an act of treason. After the publication of Świętochowski's text, many others endorsed his 'program,' but the question of abandoning the principle of independence was not discussed in public (and in fact could not be discussed under Russian censorship). Thus *Wskazania polityczne*, as an outright rejection of insurrections, uprisings and conspiracies, became, for adherents of modern socialist and nationalist movements, an illustration of narrow-minded, materialist positivism. On the other hand, it was perceived as one of the most

powerful appeals since the Enlightenment to ‘civilizational reunification’ with Europe.

Świętochowski managed to summarize the political ideology of Polish positivism and liberalism within the format of small feuilletons. His ideology had an impact on social criticism articulated by positivist writers such as Bolesław Prus and Eliza Orzeszkowa. They pointed to Polish backwardness and supported the principles of ‘organic work,’ which describes the attempts to stimulate social and economical development of all strata of Polish society and especially to work for the education of lower classes. The nation, understood as a living organism, was expected to function as a perfect collaboration of all its social parts. Despite important similarities (such as abandoning plans for another uprising against Russia), Świętochowski’s points were not identical to **Józef Szujski**’s conservative ideology. Świętochowski advocated social progress, liberal reforms and perceived ‘Westernization’ as social, economical and intellectual modernization, whereas the major representative of Cracow conservatism, Szujski, supported Catholicism, stressed the Latin character of Polish culture and referred to social issues only incidentally. Thus, Świętochowski’s criticism of the *Stańczycy* (the conservative Cracow circle) was categorical, though both Warsaw and Cracow groupings rejected the idea of an armed struggle for national independence.

Among followers of Polish positivist ideology, we come across figures from the inter-war period’s cultural milieu, (the popular writer Stefan Żeromski being the most prominent among them). In the Communist period, positivists were highly esteemed as severe critics of archaic social order, but the solutions they offered for diverse social questions were perceived to be too ‘limited,’ liberal and thus not comparable to the Communist project of modernization. From the late 1950s, the positivists started to gain official recognition by the regime as adherents of social progress. The notions of civilizational progress, opening the ‘window to Europe’ and Westernization were commonly used after 1989 and became an important asset in the legitimization of Western-type modernization in Poland. The legacy of Polish liberal intelligentsia was examined within an academic format by the historian Jerzy Jedlicki and his pupils. In their interpretation (most prominently in the works by Maciej Janowski), Świętochowski and his intellectual allies were identified as the main representatives of Polish liberalism.

MG

Political directives

Disregarding how people are deliberately or unconsciously lured with fairytales of a charmed princess soon to be awoken from her death-like dream and destroy the magical power of her tyrants, providing that we consider the thoughtful and de-fantasized political directives for society, then, in all their scarcity, we shall discover one thread which runs through them all, namely, the idea of regeneration through civilizational development and abandonment of the tradition of armed interventions. Such is the accuracy with which this idea reflects our widely gathered experience that it has currently become a pennant of even the most adversarial parties. The ultramontane side, that is, the Galician *Stańczycy*, so aristocratic and soaked in refined legitimism, are of one mind on this issue with the free-thinking and democratic side of our society. The two fractions are divided by substantial differences in their understanding of this political idea, which nevertheless, from the formal point of view, remains one and the same. [...]

We wish to live a real life and to experience true happiness. And we have learned through painful experience that neither one nor the other can be gained from engaging in war gambling or depending on foreign countries' charity, but can only be achieved through hard, steady and peaceful work. For a nation that still remembers the times of splendor, this sounds like a terrifying sentence, which it must nevertheless serve. Never in our entire history has there been a moment that would require more courage and sacrifice than we are demonstrating nowadays. Yet, undoubtedly, we have become capable of both, for the old tendency in our society to instigate armed conspiracies has been weakened and replaced with the growing trend of working peacefully. Indeed, it is a tendency that has only begun to gain momentum—not yet fully conscious, and still interrupted by the flow of past ideals. Yet, whoever is made impatient or angry by the unhurried pace of this process should verify the clarity of his conscience and grasp the importance of this undertaking. Doubtless, such conscience is not characteristic for those among foreign writers, who are hostile to our nation, and who rush us in this labor with lashes of their evil tongues.

Nowhere is the disparity between our present situation and the tradition of military acts more strikingly visible than in political publications. Let us take into our hands political catechisms written a few dozen years ago and look for solutions to current problems—how useless is their advice! Today's generations will neither be taught by messianic prophecies, legends about the nation's mission, nor by predictions of the near fulfillment of divine plans,

the judgment day for all nations or other extraordinary tales of drowning in the churning waves the pharaoh's army which pursues the chosen nation. The advice we need ought to be different, more realistic. While the old political treatises roared with a war-like atmosphere, rumbled with the sound of battle drums and horns, every word being like a razor's cut and a bullet's swish, the current texts, if we find any, feed us with visions of the land brought under the plough, and with echoes of exhausted ploughmen's calling voices. There we have the images of the eve before the battle, here, the labor of the sowing and harvest. [...]

The well-being of all peoples, as we see it, is not dependent strictly on the nation's strength and political sovereignty, but on its ability to participate in the universal civilization and to develop its own. We all know about nations that are entirely independent but at the same time half-dead, retarded in their progress, and by no means leading a joyous life. If our eyes are to see an unfulfilled ideal of a society, they will not find it in a treacherous country, like a warrior clenched in its armor, but in such a system of relations which permits all individuals to develop naturally, to work peacefully, and to express their desires without restraint. [...]

Notwithstanding the advantages of physical power, the struggle for survival among societies is not merely a matter of serial armed clashes but of the nation's spiritual resources, which in the end always determine victory or defeat. In Europe, there indeed exist independent countries, insignificant from the point of view of the entirety of civilization and born by sheer coincidence, yet, this coincidence, this fancy, or diplomatic ploy that created them, can just as easily bring them to an end—the nations that count in the political calculations are only the enlightened ones. Therefore, our nation should not merely grow in power, strengthen its character, and foster in people the feeling of love for the homeland, but also—inasmuch as it is possible—breathe the fresh breeze of humanity's general progress, feed it to the nation, absorb its creative energy. Until now, we have trusted and lived only in wearying conditions, conditions devoid of health-giving elements—now, as a result, the nation's heart beats too slowly and its mind works too tediously. We ought to open our windows to Europe, to the winds of continental change and allow it to air our sultry home, since just as not all health comes from the inside, not all disease comes from the outside. It is true that we were born and bred in this home, that this home has witnessed our tears of joy and sorrow, the moments of our triumph and failure, and that here lies the treasures of our country's civilization. It is true, yet insofar as these memories and symbols are so truly dear to us, we should not let ourselves to be suffocated

among them, if living for real is what we desire. Like primitive tribes shouting away the solar eclipse, so are we now howling at new ideas which stand in the way of our traditions. Like children trying to brighten the darkness of the house we put up torches on the walls. We sip reluctantly from the springs of pure, unspoiled wisdom, preferring instead to gulp the muddy water from familiar swamps—let us not neglect even the most polluted local mire, but let us first purify its waters.

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

MEHMED BEG KAPETANOVIĆ LJUBUŠAK: WHAT MOHAMMEDANS IN BOSNIA THINK

Title: *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni* (What Mohammedans in Bosnia think)

Originally published: Sarajevo, Spindler and Löschner, 1886

Language: Bosnian

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 4–6, 9, 18–19.

About the author

Mehmed beg Kapetanović Ljubušak [1839, Ljubuški (Herzegovina) – 1902, Sarajevo]: public official and writer. He received his primary education in his hometown and completed his secondary education in Mostar, thereafter continuing with his education in Ljubuški. Kapetanović was appointed a member of a commission under the chairmanship of Cevdet Pasha working to introduce reforms in Herzegovina. For his services, he was awarded with an award of distinction by the Sultan. Between 1865 and 1875 Kapetanović was appointed *kaymakam* (governor) of the town of Stolac, and later served also as the *kaymakam* of towns Ljubuški, Foča and Trebinje. With the 1875 Herzegovina uprising he moved to Sarajevo and two years later was appointed the mayor of Sarajevo. In the same year he got elected to the Ottoman Parliament. After the Austro-Hungarian occupation, Kapetanović's next appointment was to the Sarajevo city council, for he played no significant role in the (armed) resistance to the 1878 occupation. Kapetanović became the first Bosnian Muslim to publish a work in the Latin alphabet in 1883. His ideas and opinions on the condition of the Bosnian Muslims under Austro-Hungarian rule are best illustrated in his pamphlet *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni*, which was published in 1886 in response to an anonymous brochure which attacked Bosnian Muslims. Kapetanović supported the project of *Bosnjastvo*, and it was in this context that the journal *Bošnjak* was founded in 1891. From 1893 to 1898 he served again as the mayor of Sarajevo. His views reflect those of the progressive-minded, urban intellectuals and sections of the ulema (figures such as Mehmed Teufik Azabagić), but they should not be taken to be representative of the majority of the populace.

Main works: *Risale-i ahlak* [Treatise on morals] (1883); *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni* [What Mohammedans in Bosnia think] (1886); *Narodno Blago* [The national wealth] (1887); *Boj pod Banjomlukom 1737* [The Banja Luka battle, 1737] (1888); *Budućnost ili napredak muhamedanaca u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Future or progress of Mohammedans in Bosnia-Herzegovina] (1893).

Context

At the Berlin Congress of 1878, Austria-Hungary was given the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the withdrawal of Ottoman officials and troops, there was a determined but short-lived armed resistance to the occupation. The territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed neither under Austrian nor Hungarian jurisdiction, but were termed as *corpus separatum* and were governed by the Joint Ministry of Finance. The occupation resulted in the severing of links between the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the rest of the Muslim world. Bosnian Muslims no longer belonged to the Muslim *millet* of the Ottoman Empire but had become a Muslim minority under a Christian emperor (the Sultan had only nominal sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina). The reactions of Bosnian Muslims to the new authority varied from armed resistance and massive migrations to the acceptance of an eventual *modus vivendi*. The first wave of migrations followed the 1881 introduction of military service for the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the subsequent debates it generated as to the recruitment of Muslims in a non-Muslim army. An influential Muslim *alim* (religious scholar) Mustafa Hilmi H. Omerović, as well as Mehmed beg Kapetanović Ljubušak, supported Muslim service in the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Habsburg administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the person of Benjamin Kállay (the Joint Finance Minister), pursued the policy known as *Bosnjastvo* (Bosnianism), which had in fact been initiated by the last *vizier* of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The term *Bošnjak* was used for inhabitants belonging to the Muslim faith, but this policy was now aimed to widen its scope and include the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats as well. This was to comprise a new Bosnian national ideology. To this end the journal *Bošnjak* was founded in 1891 by Mehmed beg Kapetanović (himself a pro-Habsburg). The *Bošnjak* was in favor of adopting European culture and saw Austria-Hungary as a vehicle to that end. The publication, which was in the Latin alphabet, also had the aim of countering the Serbian and Croatian nation-building discourses which claimed that the Bosnian Muslims were either Serbs or Croats. The journal proclaimed that what made the *Bošnjaks* different from their neighbors was the local climate, their local customs and religion. Despite the official government backing for the policy of *Bosnjastvo*, it eventually failed.

In 1882, an important development took place for the Bosnian Muslim subjects of the Habsburg Emperor. An Islamic religious administration was established independent of the Porte, save for some symbolic references. This strategic move gained popularity among Bosnian Muslims for now they

had their own spiritual leader that came from among their ranks. For the Monarchy, this move was another step in the process of annexation, which was to be consummated in 1908. In 1886 an anonymous brochure was published which attacked the Bosnian Muslim subjects of the Dual Monarchy, and claimed that no matter how well their country was ruled, Bosnian Muslims would remain disloyal subjects and enemies of the Monarchy. It was this brochure that triggered Kapetanović's response in the form of his pamphlet 'What Mohammedans in Bosnia think.' Kapetanović makes it clear that the future of the Bosnian Muslims was to be shaped under Austro-Hungarian rule. He also claims that the thought of a return to the Ottoman Empire is unrealistic, and that the faith of the Bosnian Muslims is not an inherent obstacle to their progress.

HK

What Mohammedans in Bosnia think

[...] What is the difference between Marko and Mujo (Mustafa) in the nascent Bosnian army today? Are they not both loyally and devotedly serving their present ruler and homeland, and do they not have equal rights? It is not known which one is better and more loyal than the other; why should Mujo be guilty because he was not born as Marko? Every smart and honest man would consider both of them as equals.

Let the author consider the last Serbo-Bulgarian war; were not the Mohammedans serving in the Bulgarian army loyal and brave? They were, indeed, as their decorations testify; they did not look back to their past [...]. The author will see this in the case of the Mohammedans in the Russian army, with the English army and the Indians, with the French and the Algerians—so should the Mohammedans in Bosnia be disloyal subjects and enemies of Austria? The author has got this wrong and entirely misunderstood the issue. The Bošnjak-Mohammedan is solid, correct, and loyal, even if he is not civilized according to the new system.

Religion does not prevent anyone to be truthful and serious. But in fact anyone who fully carries out his religious duties must be a friend, with his heart and soul, to the government under which he enjoys his holy rights without any obstacles. We are surprised at how the author could have written these words and how he could be so unjust in judging religion. [...]

As for the thought and hope of the return of Bosnia to Turkish hands, here everybody knows very well that in the last two centuries, whatever the Turkish government has lost and whatever has been taken from her, she has never

been able to get back. Bosnia can become anything, but Turkish, never again; so why think so foolishly and hope for Bosnia's retreat to previous conditions? With such thoughts, we end up in a more severe state of self-deceit than that experienced by the author of the brochure himself. [...]

We are not asking for partiality, but pay homage and offer to the Catholic and Eastern Greek element respect. Let the government rely whom it wants to rely on, it is her business. For this, we see no need to advise her, as does the author. But if the government would make any exceptions, then it would not conform to that Latin sentence found—if I am not wrong—in the imperial coat of arms: *viribus unitis*! [...]¹

Why would the Mohammedans be unable to progress in business and in the cultural sphere, like all other elements? What is the obstacle to Mohammedan progress? Is it because it is forbidden to drink wine and eat pork, because we can marry four wives, and because we have to give every year 1 out of 40 of our profits as *zekat* (alms-giving). This does not hinder development; it can even be the case that the others might consider these as good practices. Our Qur'an did not forbid anything in which there is more benefit than harm. [...]

Bosnia today is the first case in history whereby there are so many Mohammedans under the rule of a Christian ruler in Europe.

We do not see any difficulty here, but think and hope that with God's help and just rule there can be progress [...].

Our opinion is that all inhabitants in Bosnia can progress well and develop in the field of business so long as the main and ultimate basis of rule in the country is: I. Equality; II. The government being impartial towards all faiths in the country; III. The government recognizing the full equality of all faiths; IV. The government not denying citizen rights because of religion; V. All citizens, regardless of their religion, enjoying the protection of the state. These are the main bases of rule, and who would not be able to enjoy progress under these circumstances! May God grant longevity to this rule!

Translated by Hamza Karčić

¹ "With united force," the motto of the Habsburg Monarchy.

ALEKSA ŠANTIĆ: STAY HERE

Title: *Ostajte ovdje* (Stay here)

Originally published: In the journal *Zora*, I, 1896.

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from *Spirit of Bosnia*, an international interdisciplinary bilingual journal, translated by Amila Čelebić, Vol. I, No. 4, October 2006, pp.1–2.

About the author

Aleksa Šantić [1868, Mostar (Herzegovina) – 1924, Mostar]: poet, publicist and writer of Serb nationality from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was born into a rich merchant family in Mostar. He spent almost his entire life in Mostar, except for short periods spent in Ljubljana (*Ger.* Laibach) as well as in the important Habsburg port of Trieste (*Slov., Cro.* Trst), where he was engaged in commerce as a member of the Serb Orthodox community. After his father's death, his uncle took care of him and his family. One of his sisters, Radojka (Persa) married Aleksa's close friend and peer in the field of culture, Svetozar Ćorović. After graduating from the trade schools of Ljubljana and Trieste, he returned to Mostar. In order to improve the cultural life of his hometown, Šantić became one of the founders, together with Ćorović, of the cultural magazine *Zora* (The Dawn). He also presided over the Serb music association *Gusle* (The Fiddle). Šantić was a very productive poet and writer. He wrote 715 poems, seven theatrical plays and some prose. Many of his writings were of high quality and aimed to criticize or advocate diverse social or cultural issues. He was strongly influenced by Heinrich Heine, whose works he translated. His funeral was attended by citizens of Mostar irrespective of their religion or nationality. He was later deemed by many writers to have been Yugoslavia's greatest poet. In the 1980s a movie entitled *Moj brat Aleksa* (My brother Aleksa) was produced in his memory.

Main works: poems: *Ostajte ovdje* [Stay here] (1896); *Emina* (1903); *Ne vjeruj* [Do not believe] (1905); *Hljeb* [The bread] (1906); *Moja otadžbina* [My fatherland] (1908); theatrical plays: *Pod maglom* [Under the mist] (1907); *Hasanaginica* [Hasanaga's wife] (1910); *Angelia* (1911).

Context

The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a direct outcome of a decision made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Although the religious, cultural and individual rights of the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted official protection, the advent of Austro-Hungarian suzerainty triggered feelings of unease among the Bosnian Muslims. The most significant consequence of the occupation was the migration of Bosnian Muslims to areas still held by the Ottoman Empire (the Balkans, Istanbul and Anatolia). The causes of this migration were manifold: religious, cultural, psychological, political and economic. Among the major causes, for instance, was the massive introduction of cheap European industrial products, which damaged the livelihood of many craftsmen who could not compete with the imported wares. Additionally, the most vocal opponents of the Austro-Hungarian regime among the Bosnian Muslims had to flee to the Ottoman Empire. This migration was constant throughout the period of Habsburg rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878–1918). However, the biggest waves were always closely connected in time and cause to significant events in the history of occupation. The first large wave was in 1878, and the second followed in 1882, after the suppression of the Herzegovinian rebellion against conscription into the Austro-Hungarian army. The third wave was the result of the persecution of the leaders of a Muslim autonomist movement which demanded community control over their religious and educational institutions and respect for the agrarian interests of the Muslim elites. The next large migration movement followed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg Empire in 1908, and the last significant phase of migration occurred in 1912, after the Ottoman Empire lost the First Balkan War.

Migration always involved hardships and disasters for the people involved. The migrants frequently sold their properties for much less than their actual value. Their integration in other Ottoman areas was slow and often unsuccessful. Many people's lives declined in both social and economical terms. The migrants to Macedonia and Salonica as well as Anatolia (particularly Iznik, Bursa, Ankara and Antalya) were decimated by malaria. All these hardships made many Bosnians question the viability of migration. The leader of the Muslim community, *Reis-ul ulema* Azabagić, wrote a treatise against migration which evoked the Shari'a. On the other hand, other religious authorities (*ulema*) claimed that migration was mandatory, grounding their opinion on the fact that being administered by Christians, Bosnia was

not anymore within the 'Abode of Islam' (*Dar-ul islam*), but rather the 'Abode of war' (*Dar-ul harb*). Concomitantly, Serbian and Croatian intellectuals considered the emigration of Bosnian Muslims to be a major loss for the Slavic element in the Balkans. They believed that Bosnian Muslims would eventually discover their supposed Serbian or Croatian national identities. The well-known Serbian geographer and anthropologist **Jovan Cvijić** wrote an article in 1908 which strongly condemned the migration as an anti-Slavic movement and a significant loss for the Slavic race. In addition, the economic destruction of so many people aroused compassion all over the Balkans, accompanied by the delight of the speculators who profited from the plight of the migrants.

Aleksa Šantić was one of the leaders of the Serbian literary and national movement in Mostar at the end of nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth centuries. In this he was followed by his brother-in-law, the writer Svetozar Ćorović, and later by the famous Serbian symbolist poet and die-hard nationalist Jovan Dučić. They turned Mostar into what was called the Serbian Athens. The journal they edited, *Zora*, was considered the best literary journal published in the Serbian language at the time, and was highly praised by one of the most eminent critics of Serbian literature, **Jovan Skerlić**. Šantić's poem 'Stay Here' has to be understood in the context of these views, which were shared by many Slavic intellectuals at the time. It is neither a pure expression of solidarity with the Bosnian Muslims nor a call for the nationalization of Bosnian Muslims and their incorporation into the Serbian national body.

The Slavic Orthodox community in Mostar dates back to the sixteenth century, but it reached its economic peak in the first half of the nineteenth century. The nationalization of the Slavic Orthodox population in Mostar and their adoption of Serbian national identity started in the 1860s, and culminated with the publication of *Zora* in the 1890s. This was a typical example of how a religious community imagined its new national identity. Consequently, Šantić's poem can be read on one level as an expression of a certain national ideology. For him, the Bosnian Muslims were merely Islamized Serbs. Their migration was considered a demographic and racial loss for all Serbs. The poem can also be analyzed in terms of its social vision. Šantić, although coming from a rich merchant family, was sensitive to social themes in literature and was a partisan of the poor and the oppressed. This social dimension had a high and widespread public appeal; many people who did not identify with Šantić's national agenda, such as the Muslims and Catholics, were able to sympathize with his social critique. This was what made the

poem famous among people of various national identities. Among the Bosnian Muslims, the social dimension of the work overruled its nationalist agenda and they accepted it as a poem about them and written by one of them. The same applies to Šantić's so called 'orientalizing' poems dealing with Muslim life, among which is the love song *Emina*, where he expresses his fascination with the unprecedented beauty of the daughter of a Mostar imam. The poem was soon adopted as a folk song, and its tune became immensely popular in the Balkans.

One can say that in his work Šantić stood at the crossroads between the old pre-modern, multi-cultural society of the late Ottoman Balkans, and the new cultural topography of Central Europe informed largely by rising nationalisms. Although an avowed Serbian nationalist, he was unable to detach himself from traditional Balkan urban culture, and thanks to this, he became a paradigmatic figure of Bosnian culture. Even the most ardent Bosniak and Croat nationalists do not dare to propose the removal of Šantić's works from school curricula or literary anthologies. The centuries-old shared world of Mostar depicted by Šantić almost totally vanished during the years of war between 1992 and 1995. Today Mostar is a divided city and its Bosniak and Croat communities are permanently in a state of cold war, while its once-prominent Serb community has almost totally disappeared.

ND

Stay here

Stay here! ... The sun that shines in a foreign place,
Will never warm you like the sun in your own;
The bread has a bitter taste there
Where one has no one, not even a brother.

Who would find a better mother than one's own,
And this land is mother of yours;
Take a look upon the limestones and the field,
Everywhere are the graveyards of your great-grandfathers.

For this country they were noble giants,
Lights who knew how to defend it,
You, too, should stay in this country,
And give the last drop of your blood for it.

As a deserted bough, when the autumn winds
Tear its leaves and slash it with ice;
Your motherland would be without you,
Like a mother crying for her child.

Do not let tears run down her face,
Return her to the world's embrace;
Live in order to be able to die
On her battlefield where glory comes to greet you!

Everybody knows and loves you here,
And nobody will recognize you there;
Even the barren limestones are better here
Than the flowers in the fields of a foreign place.

Everybody shakes your fraternal hand here –
In the foreign land, wormwood blooms for you;
For us, amongst the limestones, everything connects:
Name, language, brotherhood and holy blood.

Stay here! ... The sun that shines in a foreign sky
Will never warm you like the sun in your own –
The bread has a bitter taste there
Where one has no one, not even a brother...

Translated by Amila Čelebić in the *Spirit of Bosnia*, Vol. I, No.4, October 2006, pp. 1–2.

KARL RENNER: STATE AND NATION

Title: *Staat und Nation. Zur österreichischen Nationalitätenfrage* (State and nation. To the Austrian nationality question)

Originally published: Vienna, published under pseudonym Synopticus on the author's own expenses in 1899

Language: German

The excerpts used are from Ephraim Nimni ed., *National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 27–32.

About the author

Karl Renner [1870, Unter-Tannowitz (Cz. Dolní Dunajovice, present-day Czech Republic) – 1950, Vienna]: politician, jurist, sociologist and political columnist. Of peasant stock, he studied law at the University of Vienna and became a research assistant in the library of the *Reichsrat*, the Austrian Parliament, between 1895 and 1907, a position which enabled him to publish under a pseudonym several important studies dealing with the nationality question in Austria and the historical evolution of the institutions of civil law. A member of the moderate wing of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, SDAP*), he was elected a deputy to the *Reichsrat* in 1907. After the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in November 1918 at the end of the First World War, Renner became the first chancellor of the new Austrian Republic. In this position during two successive coalition governments from November 1918 to June 1920, he proved unable to prevent sizable territorial losses to Italy, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. On 10 September, 1919, Renner signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which prohibited Austria's union with Germany, a project he and most of the social democratic leaders supported. He advocated Austria's entry into the League of Nations, a policy of fulfillment of treaty obligations and non-alignment in foreign affairs. The leader of the Social Democratic Party's pragmatic wing during the 1920s, he was one of the foremost leaders of the workers' co-operative movement. He also served as a president of the lower house of Parliament from 1930 to 1933. It was his support—however qualified—of the Nazi *Anschluss* (Annexation) of Austria in 1938 that enabled him to spend the war years in the little Alpine town of Gloggnitz under a tolerant house arrest. With the collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945 and the occupation of Austria by Soviet troops, Renner worked with Soviet authorities to reconstitute the Austrian government, formed a provisional regime and became the first chancellor of the renewed state in April 1945. In Decem-

ber of the same year, the Parliament unanimously elected him President of the republic, a position in which Renner served until his death. Until today Renner belongs to the pantheon of the greatest—albeit not uncontestedly so—modern Austrian statesmen as well as the prominent representatives of Austro-Marxism. He is also credited to be one of the major founding figures of the sociology of law.

Main works: *Staat und Nation* [State and nation] (1899); *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* [The struggle of Austrian nations for the State] (1902); *Die soziale Funktion des Rechtsinstitutes, besonders des Eigentums*, [The social function of the institutions of law, especially that of property] (1904); *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie* [Foundations and aims of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy] (1906); *Österreichs Erneuerung*, 3 vols. [Austria's renewal] (1916–17); *Marxismus, Krieg und Internationale* [Marxism, war and the International] (1917); *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Österreich* [The national self-determination right in respect to Austria] (1918); *An der Wende zweier Zeiten* [At the junction of two eras] (1946); *Nachgelassene Werke*, 3 vols. [Posthumous works] (1952–53); *Das Weltbild der Moderne* [The worldview of modernity] (1954); *Portrait einer Evolution* [Portrait of an evolution] (1970).

Context

As a united and operational political organization the Austrian Social Democratic Party (*SDAP*) emerged at the Hainfeld congress of 1888/89, where Victor Adler managed to persuade hitherto contending factions to accept a common platform. The Hainfeld program remained in force until 1926, reaffirming the fundamental concepts of contemporary Marxism. The failure, however, of the course of economic and social development to bear out the Marxian prognoses inevitably led to demands for a reappraisal of the theoretical approach. This situation gave birth to a group of exceptionally talented theorists and politicians such as Karl Renner, **Otto Bauer**, Max Adler, Gustav Eckstein and Rudolf Hilferding, for whom the name Austro-Marxism was later coined. It became a historically identifiable entity with the founding in 1903 of the Fabian-type society *Zukunft* (Future) that initiated publishing of theoretical socialist journals such as *Marx-Studien* or *Der Kampf* (The struggle) and established a workers' college, the first of its kind in Austria, giving an impetus to an entire system of Austrian socialist education in later years. The first path-breaking studies characterizing the Austro-Marxist theoretical approach, however, had already appeared in the last decade before the turn of the century.

Austrian socialists, like all others, were primarily concerned with the emancipation of the working class, but their day-to-day political work com-

pelled them to acknowledge the overwhelming importance of the nationality issue within the context of the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, being the only supranational party, the social democrats were the only political organization prepared to think out solutions to a problem threatening to tear the whole multinational state apart. It was Karl Renner who first formulated a theoretical solution for the Empire's nationality question in his seminal *Staat und Nation* pamphlet published under a pseudonym in 1899. Seen from a Marxist perspective, nationalism for him was but a transformed class hatred that by creating political tension was blocking natural cultural and economic progress and endangered Austria-Hungary, a state that served well enough the regional requirements of the nations as well as the rising working class. To hinder the animosities that inevitably sprung from the contradictions between national aspirations for sovereignty and the structure of the Empire based on the 'Crown lands system,' the driving force of nationalism was to be confined to the only sphere where it was legitimate, that is, culture and communication. In this sphere, however, the nations were to be legally defined as corporate bodies. Deviating from earlier socialist attempts to grant autonomy to the various national groups within specific territorial units, Renner introduced the idea of personal autonomy based on the experience of a coexistence of various religious communities in a modern state, an idea that thus far had never been fully explored. This meant that the citizen in a multinational state should become a member of an autonomous national association of his co-nationals, irrespective of his domicile. In matters of genuine national interest the citizen was to be subjected to the laws of their own supra-territorial organization instead of the laws of the territorial majority national group.

Even though some of Renner's ideas circulated already at the Brünn (Cz. Brno) congress of the *SDAP* in 1899, the latter's national program was still based on the territorial concept that envisaged setting up minority organizations along rough ethno-geographic boundaries. At the beginning of the new century, however, this stance in social democratic nationality policy was gradually superseded by the concepts elaborated by Renner and his socialist fellow-theorist **Otto Bauer**, who picked up on Renner's ideas in his vastly influential work *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (The nationality question and social democracy) from 1907. The idea of personal autonomy along with the critique of the insistence on 'state rights' and full national sovereignty eminent in national movements has found a considerable echo not only among other socialist theoreticians such as the Czech **Bohumír Šmeral**. However, it never went from the stage of individual support to that of party backing in any political camp outside the *SDAP*, not least due

to the fact that before 1914 social democrats, despite their mass following, would not have been taken seriously as partner in discussion by the ruling classes. The underlying philosophy of the Austro-Marxist proposals ran counter to the rising spirit of integral nationalism, and, as Renner's subtle and sympathetic critic **Oszkár Jászi** put it, the rational doctrine eager to replace the idea of national state by that of 'mere' national rights in a supranational state had little appeal in the emotional setting of the period. Later, a critique influential in the Communist movement seeing the Austro-Marxist approach as a mere subversion of 'bourgeois nationalism' was developed by Lenin and Stalin with their prevalently economic interpretation of nationalism. Nevertheless in the long run the Austro-Marxist approach earned the status of a great 'missed opportunity' for the Empire's political elites to produce a viable solution for its boiling national question, and today it serves as an important precursor of multicultural precepts in globalizing societies.

MK

State and nation. To the Austrian nationality question

[...] In the sense, state and nation are antitheses of the same order as those of state and society. The state is legal territorial domination, the society factual personal association, an antithesis which has played a significant role in the developmental history of human society. The primeval polity is a personal association based on blood relations. The necessity of migration, of nomadic life, does not permit any fixed relationship to a territory. The seditariness required by the state is absent. The great Oriental monarchies and the Roman Empire were the first great examples of territorial power, the first states in the modern sense, the only difference being that the dominant interest group was, at the outset, a nation and not an economic class. The defeated became slaves or *peregrini dediticii*,¹ thus perishing in legal terms, or were absorbed into the state system as citizens, thus merging into the state as a whole. The Roman Empire was replaced by Germanic and Arabian tribal states, which were based on tribal affiliation. Here the phenomenon first emerged of the defeated tribes retaining their legal system and their language, of two peoples distinct in terms of law inhabiting a unitary territory.

¹ *Peregrini dediticii* were a special category of non-citizens in ancient Rome. In general, they were those that belonged to towns that, having initiated a war against Rome, had surrendered unconditionally. They were not protected by community laws and lacked citizenship [Translator's footnote].

However, one tribe alone retained entitlement in the political sphere. The Carolingian Empire initially united many tribes without abolishing, suppressing or confining to a particular territory their national law, language and specificity. The dominant group was an economic class, the great landed proprietors, not a tribe: the Roman provincial retained his national law, even if he lived among Bavarians and Frisians, and the Frank, Alemannic or Chamaver² retained his even if living among Romans. Before dealing with a dispute, the judge would ask him: '*Quo jure vivis?*' Which law do you live by? The party thereupon made a declaration of nationality. The judge then knew according to which body of law he was to judge that party. Here, the so-called personality principle prevailed. Under its rule in the Carolingian Empire, ten nations coexisted not only with different national languages but also with different legal codes.

The modern state replaces this principle with the territorial principle: if you live in my territory, you are subject to my domination, my law and my language! It is the expression of domination, not of equal rights; the domination by the established inhabitants of the newcomers, by the propertied, who is held fast by his property, of the propertyless, who must follow demand where it leads, at the least by the majority of the minority, if not by the settled minority of the majority. From this ensued the territorial struggles of the nation states, and also the territorial policies of the nationalities within the state. For this reason the Young Czechs support *Staatsrecht* for territory of the Crown of St Wenceslas³, because it guarantees them domination of the minorities. For this reason the Young Germans support the independence of the former states of the German Confederation and the exclusion of Galicia and Dalmatia, that is, a Young German form of *Staatsrecht*. The territorial principle can never produce compromise and equal rights; it can only produce struggle and oppression, because its essence is domination. The nation as a whole gains nothing through this domination; as a consequence of internal migrations and the extensive economic contact linking the broadest possible circles of humanity no nation can limit itself to specific, narrowly defined frontiers. All elements that exist outside the confines of the home territory are, as foreigners, without rights. Consistent supporters of *Staatsrecht* must admit that a Czech in Vienna has no right to assert his nationality. The territorial principle implies the reckless abandonment of one's own minori-

² Names of tribes or tribe alliances of Germanic people living in the territory of Roman border in Late Antiquity

³ The Crown dedicated to the Czech patron St Wenceslas symbolizes the 'historical right' to the territory of the medieval Bohemian kingdom.

ties, the reckless domination of foreign minorities to the advantage of the long-established propertied classes. It combines the national concept with patrimonial ideas and thus becomes in many ways anti-national.

On the other hand, within the interaction between sovereign states, within international law, there exists a defense against the territorial principle. The Englishman has the diplomatic protection of his fatherland; he may display English inscriptions on the doors of his business in Prague; he may speak English in the street there if he so pleases. Yet he is a foreigner. However, the German-Austrian in Prague is without rights, for he is on 'Czech soil.' He may not speak German, display German signs; otherwise he faces the threat of mistreatment or looting. If he is looted, against whom should he bring legal action? The Czech people? The Czech people do not constitute a juridical person! It is a curious thing that this nation, which has kept the whole of Austria on tenterhooks for three decades, does not exist at all within the legal system, that it is a metaphysical, transcendental object for the law and the courts. This also applies of course to the Germans with respect to the Czechs, to the Poles with regard to the Ruthenians and so on. In a word, each Austrian nationality is accorded greater protection abroad than within Austria, each foreigner among us greater protection than the native within his own land, because an intra-state existence does not provide a corrective to the territorial principle, because no one is protected by his nation, because a nation can protect no one except by means of reprisals, of revenge. This is not a lawful state of affairs, but one of nascent or open civil war.

From this ensues the necessity of constituting the nationalities, of equipping them with rights and responsibilities, and of declaring that in every part of the empire every member of a nation enjoys—albeit subject to the grading referred to below—the protection of his nation and bears its burdens and obligations. In brief: the personality rather than the territorial principle should form the basis of regulation; the nations should be constituted not as territorial entities but as personal associations, not as states but as peoples, not according to age-old constitutional laws, but according to living national laws. Of course, no people exist without territory, and internal reconstruction cannot be independent of the geographical stratification of the population. If the personality principle forms the constitutive principle which brings about the separation of the nationalities and the union of individuals then the territorial principle will have a significant role to play as an organizational principle.

There are those who will assert from the outset that such a construction is impossible to realize. Nevertheless it is important to keep the following in mind. First, in the Frankish Empire the personality principle was dominant,

not only in the more formal respect of the language, but also in regard to the gamut of private and public law—to an extent which does not appear applicable today—and made possible the coexistence of many nationalities. Second, this system was the legal system applied to all foreigners—the so-called ‘Franks’ in the Orient—and this was with reference not only to language, but also to private and criminal law. And since most people will be impressed neither by the Caroli Magni [Charlemagne] legal order nor by the situation in the Orient, third, in our own and indeed all highly developed states, this principle can be found applied in its purest form in the case of institutions whose almost unshakeable power over minds and whose vitality is doubted by no one: the *religious communities*.

In one and the same parish, two and often three denominations are represented, each of which forms—or at least should form—a corporation under public law and a religious community. Each has its own board, its own property, its own institutions for instruction and charity, conducts state business as a self-administrative entity in its assigned sphere of activity (based on registers) and amalgamates with other communities in territorial terms to form parishes, deaneries and dioceses, etc., with some, such as the Catholic denomination, forming worldwide personal associations without any territorial sovereignty. Here the formula for the problem has been found: ‘Give to the Emperor (the state) what is the Emperor’s, and to God what is God’s!’ Here it has become possible, for example, for three archbishops to reside in Lemberg⁴, a Catholic, a Uniate and a non-Uniate, without them and their subordinates being constantly at loggerheads with one another. To be sure, this was not always the case. When the principle of *cuius regio, illius religio* still applied, that is, the pure territorial principle (a present-day form of which is *cuius regio, illius lingua*), religious discord raged through the land. Through centuries of struggle it finally became clear that the issue was not one of entrusting the church with governmental functions and the state with ecclesiastical functions. Peace was immediately established when territorial sovereignty was removed from the church and cultural sovereignty entrusted to it, when it became solely that which in conceptual terms it solely is: a personal association of those sharing the same belief, just as the nation is a personal association of those sharing a way of thinking and speaking.

This is not to say that the territorial principle is wrong in itself and untenable. On the contrary, it is the formula for nation state formation. As we have already acknowledged, the nation state is the form of state system with the

⁴ Ukr. Lviv, Pol. Lwów.

least internal frictions; it is the inevitable ideal of every nation, or at least of those members who are granted 'active' nationality. It is one of the conceivable ways of solving the national question.

However, it is not a formula for solving the Austrian nationalities question within the framework of the historically given, economically and socially necessary unitary Austrian state. For rather than eliminating national conflicts, the national territorial state produces and heightens them. It does not arbitrate these conflicts by means of law, but decides them by means of force; it facilitates prolongation and victory, but risks loss and destruction. It can never guarantee the peaceful, secure enjoyment of national rights in a multilingual, unitary state under the rule of law. It does not signify the solution of the Austrian problem, but the dissolution of Austria. The example of Hungary teaches us that no bond of international law can hinder the final separation.

However strictly conceptual separation can and must be realized, the reality itself is not necessarily characterized by an irreconcilable opposition: the imminent German-Czech armistice will probably represent a compromise between the two principles. This will be all the more lasting and advantageous the closer it comes to the personality principle. It is impossible on a purely territorial basis.

Austria cannot tolerate any territorial *Staatsrechte*, any such Czech right for the lands of the Crown of St Wenceslas or such a German right for the former lands of the German Confederation; it cannot tolerate a 'state party' or an imposed state language. Just as religious discord flares up when a denomination seeks to play the role of state religion, so too is every state language a perennial source of strife. If the nations were constituted and organized, and national majority rule and repression, as well as national 'baptism' [*Wegtaufen*] through compulsory attendance of a foreign school, were ruled out, then the Slavic peoples, since they are historically and economically forced to live with the Germans, would still have to make use of the only possible means of communication, the German language, wherever they had to understand each other. No law is made requiring humans to mate. They do it anyway.

The internal organization of the nationalities would naturally have to accord with the geographical density of settlement. The co-nationals inhabiting a parish or district would form a national community [*Gemeinde*], i.e. a corporation under public and private law with the power to issue decrees and levy taxes, as well as its own property. A territorially and culturally affiliated number of communities would form a national canton [*Kreis*] with

corporate rights. The totality of the cantons would form the nation. It too would be a legal entity under public and private law.

The administrative implementation of this form of organization would not require great effort or great cost: the receipt of the obligatory declaration of nationality by all citizens of age by the political authorities of first instance, the recording of the declarations in national registers, the identification of the communities and cantons through persons having the confidence of the national groups, the undertaking of elections for the three representative bodies (communal, cantonal and national councils) and their constitution. We would now have the nationalities as such: each for itself, represented according to its internal structure and actual power, each at the same time in a particular region a majority and in another region a minority, which in the interest of national unity it cannot abandon; each incapable of oppressing foreign minorities because the other nationality as a totality will respond with the repression of the former's own minority, and thus prepared in advance to accept compromise with other nations; each nationality occupied with internal consolidation, with the close fusion of the economically differing, opposing classes, concerned about the promotion of its own education system, its national literature and its national art; each master of its members, master of its own resources. Who could doubt that national existence, rather than exhausting itself in the struggle with other nations, would necessarily look inward and deepen?

Nothing can express its own specific effects if it is not regarded purely for what it is. If one wants to solve the nationalities question, one must focus on the nations! One must liberate them from political constellations, from the necessity of political barter, from feudal and clerical influences; one must call upon them as they are to prevent them from disguising themselves with sallow historical masks in order to frighten the others. The living have rights and will safeguard their rights.

If this solution is not chosen, there is only one alternative. There is only a single dilemma: the personality or the territorial principle. One must opt for one or the other. I believe that the problem is more clearly delineated if a sharp distinction is made between the opposing possibilities. The question is not one of centralization or autonomy. The national question defined in terms of the personal association can be resolved in the context of the most strenuous centralization or the most far-reaching autonomy. Legislation can be centralist and administration decentralized. By the same token, it is possible to deal with certain state matters relating to legislation and administration on a unitary level, while differentiating others in the case of each prov-

ince. How one is to make distinctions is dictated by the nature of state objectives and state resources. Here, too, clarity cannot be achieved as long as the centralization question is confused with the nationalities question.

Translated by Joe O'Donnell in *National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics*, Ephraim Nimni ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 27–32.

ZİYA GÖKALP: WHAT IS TURKISM?

Title: *Türkçülük nedir?* (What is Turkism?)

Originally Published: Ankara, Matbuat ve İstihbarat Matbaası, 1923.

Language: Ottoman Turkish

The excerpts used are from Ziya Gökalp, *The principles of Turkism*, translated and annotated by Robert Devereux (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 12–16.

About the author

Ziya Gökalp [1876, Diyarbakır – 1924, Ankara]: sociologist and national activist. Born in the city of Diyarbakır, the administrative and cultural center of eastern Anatolia, Gökalp (born Mehmed Ziya) started his primary education at a local military school. Later, while attending a secular high school in the same city, he also found the chance to improve his knowledge of Arabic and Persian as well as Islamic philosophy through the tutelage of family members. Like many late Ottoman thinkers, Gökalp's ambition was to digest the intellectual heritage of both the European and Ottoman worlds. But while advancing his knowledge of contemporary European philosophy and social theory and rubbing elbows with the progressive minds of the late Ottoman milieu, Gökalp experienced a profound spiritual crisis and attempted suicide in 1894. In 1896 he moved to Istanbul to study veterinary medicine, but dropped out in his final year after being arrested for conspiring against Sultan Abdülhamid II. Upon his release, and after serving briefly in the civil bureaucracy, he then embarked upon an intense publishing career. He took part in Young Turk activities in Anatolia, rising rapidly among the ranks of their organization, the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter the CUP), which was then organizing itself into a party in Salonica. After the Young Turk revolution (1908) and the reinstatement of the constitution after thirty years of absolutist rule, he moved to Salonica and became a member of the central ruling body of the CUP. There, while being exposed to the ideas of Gabriel Tarde, Henri Bergson and, above all, Emile Durkheim, Gökalp's views on nationalism were nourished by a circle of ardent Turkists grouped around the eminent literary figure **Ömer Seyfeddin**. Using 'pure Turkish' pen-names such as 'Demirtaş' and 'Gökalp' (and later adopting the latter as his second name), he published many fervid articles on national revival in the group's journal, the *Genç kalemler* (Young Pens), then a major site for advocating the agenda of linguistic Turkism. With the onset of the Balkan War, Gökalp moved to Istanbul and founded the department of sociology at Istanbul University, while at the same time becoming involved in the activities of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths)

an organization that propagated a pan-Turkist agenda. Between 1912 and 1914 he authored several articles in *Türk yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), a journal published by one of the leading Turkists of the period, **Yusuf Akçura**. Gökâlp pursued a corporatist vision of Ottoman society and strove eagerly to define a consensus of national values and goals. It would not be an exaggeration to label Gökâlp as the primary ideologue of the CUP, whose rule led to the demise of the Empire. In 1919, following the defeat of the Empire and the occupation of its capital by the Allied forces, Gökâlp became a victim of the anti-Unionist ‘witch-hunt,’ being convicted in a war tribunal for participating in Unionist activities (the charges included his sanctioning of the Armenian massacres) and exiled to Malta. Returning in 1921, he first went to Ankara, where, he was received with a cold shoulder by the cadres of the national resistance and then moved to Diyarbakır. Gradually re-establishing his connections with the Kemalist leadership, he took part in the preparation of the program of Mustafa Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (hereafter, the RPP) and became a member of the Parliament in 1923, although he died shortly afterwards. Appropriating many tenets of his nationalist agenda, the Republican establishment acknowledged Gökâlp as the intellectual founder of Turkish nationalism.

Main works: *Kızıl elma* [Crimson apple] (1914); *Yeni hayat* [New life] (1918); *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, muasırlaşmak* [Turkification, Islamization, modernization] (1918); *Türkçülüğün esasları* [The principles of Turkism], (1923); *Türk töresi* [The Turkish custom] (1923); *Türk medeniyeti tarihi* [The history of Turkish civilization] (1925).

Context

Gökâlp is known both as a sociologist and as the leading ideologue of Turkish nationalism. Gökâlp’s central concern was the establishment of Turkish nationalism as a coherent and systematic doctrine that would transcend the intensely conflicting ideological attitudes engendered by the variegated late Ottoman political milieu. Although not an original thinker by any means, Gökâlp was quite creative and adept in eclectically appropriating for his own local purposes conceptual tools and methods from the rich repository of Western philosophy and social sciences. Undergoing a profound intellectual transformation in his Salonica years (then considered to be the center of the Turkist movement), Gökâlp moved away from the supra-national Ottomanist views of his younger years (when he had envisioned the Ottoman Empire to be the new “United States of the East”) and joined the bandwagon of writers who called for an out and out process of social and cultural revival for the Turkish nation. Impassioned by the promises of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, Gökâlp propagated his much celebrated Modernist utopia of *Yeni Hayat* (New Life), prescribing a novel and unique evolutionary path for the nation, at the end of which the Turks, free and economically advanced, would succeed in cultivating a superior civilizational synthesis, thereby

emerging as the privileged ‘new people of the new century’ (hence consummating the Nietzschean ideal of the *Übermensch*).

Gökalp’s nationalist views crystallized in the final decade of the Ottoman Empire, during his Istanbul and Malta years. Amidst the turmoil and uncertainties of these troubled times, he sternly rejected the cosmopolitanist tenets of Ottomanism, which were sustained by the official mouthpieces of the CUP till the dissolution of the Empire. Instead, Gökalp modeled his political and social theory by drawing upon and even reconciling the three rivaling currents of thought in the Ottoman political and intellectual arena: Turkish nationalism, Islamism and modernization (see **Yusuf Akçura**, *Three types of policy*). Between 1912 and 1914, he published several popularly acclaimed articles in the Turkist journal *Türk yurdu* (later to be compiled in book form with the title ‘Turkification, Islamization, Modernization’) in which, addressing issues related to culture, religion, ethnicity and civilization, he aimed to delineate a common and definitive agenda for Turkish nationalism. In his view, nationalism, modernism and Islam did not necessarily involve conflicting interests, but were to be merged in complementary fashion to define the ideal Ottoman (later Turkish) citizen, who declared himself Turkish in identity, Muslim in creed, and was still firmly and comfortably embedded within ‘contemporary’ (read Western) civilization.

Largely inspired by Durkheimian sociology, Gökalp believed that he had found a solution to the riddle of nourishing national culture while succumbing to the necessary and inexorable impact of Western civilization. Domesticating the process of modernization, Gökalp argued, would only be possible by maintaining a clear distinction between culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet*). Culture, in his view, was the domain of relative and subjective judgements, comprising the totality of beliefs, mores and ethical and aesthetic values upheld by a community, which, in turn, informed the common norms and the ‘collective conscience’ of their shared existence. Gökalp’s vision of modern civilization, on the other hand, involved what he held to be objective, absolute and internationally valid truths and certainties of the human mind, such as those dictated by logic, reason, science and technology. It was culture that provided the ideals and objectives most appropriate to each society, while civilization offered the most effective means and the transformative thrust to realize and cherish the ideals. The cultural norms and the collective conscience of a society were understood to work as a vital control mechanism that regulated the inflow and appropriation of demands forced by international civilization (hence the crucial role of a ‘national’ law or economy, for instance, in reformulating and naturalizing the dictates of international law and the global econ-

omy). The process of social and cultural change and innovation prescribed by Gökalp was, therefore, slow, gradual, selective and laced in every step with evolutionary precautions mandated by the collective will.

Gökalp harbored a highly solidarist vision of the nation as a closely knit society indivisibly united by culture. The essential elements of the 'authentic' Turkish national genera were to be found among the common Anatolian folk, unsullied, Gökalp believed, by the corrupting influences of Ottoman elite culture. Sunni Islam, with the daily practices, rituals and moral standards it prescribed, was an essential and indispensable constituent of national identity. But, in contrast to what the Islamists envisioned, Islam was not to be understood as an overriding political force, but only as a deep substratum of national culture, and valued particularly in its unorthodox, Sufi-oriented (hence 'Turkified') renditions as practiced by the Anatolian masses. Although a pan-Islamic union was out of the question for Ziya Gökalp due to wide national divergences in the cultural application of Islam, continuing solidarity among the Islamic nations was still deemed to remain a priority for the Turkish nation state (such a prospect, of course, was never endorsed by the Republican elite).

'The principles of Turkism,' possibly first drafted during the author's exile years in Malta, contains Gökalp's nationalist program in its most distilled and systematized form, as it was more attuned to the realities of the emerging Turkish nation state. In 'What is Turkism,' among the most notable essays in the collection, Gökalp distinguishes between various definitions of the nation, weighing them against his own cultural and linguistic formulation of national unity. He adamantly rejects the pervasive religious definition of the nation as a pan-Islamic *ümme* (*Ar. ummah*), which embraces the entire Muslim community across the world. He is also critical of the patriotism of the land, where all inhabitants of the nation state, regardless of language or creed, are considered to be compatriots (this, he finds alarmingly close to supranational Ottomanist inclusivism). Equally inadmissible are the more individualistic renditions of national identity, which solely privilege personal choice and commitment. According to Gökalp, it is not possible to choose to belong to a national community; one is only born into it, and from the initial moment, one's identity is irrevocably imprinted by the endemic elements (particularly linguistic and religious) of his own specific cultural milieu.

'What is Turkism' is also significant in underscoring the growing distance between Ziya Gökalp and the rising pan-Turkist movement. In his earlier writings, and especially his poetry, dating back to the Balkan Wars and the First World War, Gökalp embellished a visionary image of the land of *Turan*,

which stood for the cultural and spiritual unification of all the Turkic peoples of the world (a vision that comfortably overlapped with many tenets of Hungarian *Turanism*). In his later works, the author was more eager to emphasize the distinct national characteristics of the western *Oghuz* Turks, and only a faint echo of pan-Turkism remains in his writings, invoked as a distant prospect for a loose cultural commonwealth. In the selected essay, Gökarp overtly denounces the expansionist, ethno-racist brand of Turkism as a crude and unsophisticated ideological endeavor. For him, the essential binding element of the nation, above and beyond anything else, is language. It is through the use of a national language in the family and in primary education that common ideals, cultural values and collective religious, moral and aesthetic sensibilities are instilled in the young minds of the nation. In Gökarp's model, nationhood is not inherited through blood ties, but is understood to be actively learned and constructed. It follows, then, that the nation, which Gökarp takes to be the most advanced form of social organization, needs to be vigorously shaped and nourished by adopting institutions which had already developed in the West, such as ethnographic museums or research centers and archives on folk culture, literature and music.

The profound impact of Gökarp's ideas on Republican institutions, aspirations and constructs of identity is unquestionable. His final call in the essay "to recognize as a Turk every individual who says, 'I am a Turk'" is patently echoed in the oft-cited dictum of Atatürk that adorns the walls of many Republican buildings: "Fortunate is the one who says, 'I am a Turk'." The inviting and celebratory tone of the Republican motto is paradoxically inflected by exclusive and repressive undertones that hark back to Gökarp's insistence on religious (Sunni Muslim) and linguistic unity in the formulation of national identity. Still, although the name of Ziya Gökarp is recurrently invoked as the chief progenitor of Kemalist ideology, the eclectic, complex and nuanced character of his ideas demanded an astute and selective process of appropriation, observed both by the Republican elite and by various nationalist factions claiming descent from his ideology. The discrepancies between Gökarp the conscientious sociologist and his cult persona crafted by the Republican revolutionaries must account for the fact that none of the author's works were reprinted in the Latin alphabet of the new Republic until 1939, when 'The Principles of Turkism' was republished for the first time by an ultra-nationalist group. The book, ironically, was banned in 1944, as local fascists were tried by the Turkish government on the eve of the final victory of the Allied forces.

What is Turkism?

Turkism means to exalt the Turkish nation. An understanding of the nature of Turkism, therefore, requires, first of all, a definition of the group that we call a nation. Let us examine the various existing concepts.

1. According to racist Turkists, nation is synonymous with race. However, race is a term properly used only in zoology. All animal species are classified into different types, i.e., races, on the basis of their anatomical characteristics. [...] Anthropology, on the other hand, has divided the inhabitants of Europe into three races on the basis of shape of head and color of hair and eyes: dolicocephalic fair, dolicocephalic brunette, and brachycephalic. No nation in Europe includes only individuals of a single type. Within every nation are to be found persons of all three types, albeit in varying proportions. [...] Although some anthropologists once claimed that there was a relationship between these anatomical types and social traits, scientific criticisms [...] have proved that no such relationship exists. And since race has no relationship to social traits, neither can it have any with nationality, which is the sum total of social characteristics. Therefore, we must seek the meaning of nationality elsewhere.

2. Ethnic Turkists identify the nation with the ethnic group, which may be defined as a group of cognates descended from a common ancestor and free from any admixture of foreign blood. Ancient societies generally claimed to be such pure ethnic groups. However even in prehistoric times, societies were not ethnically pure. [...]

Moreover, sociology holds that individuals enter the world as non-social creatures, that is, they do not bring with them any social consciousness. They are not born with any linguistic, religious, ethical, aesthetic, political, legal or economic values. All of these they acquire later from society through education. In other words, social traits are not transmitted through biologic inheritance but only through education, which means that ethnic origin plays no role whatsoever as regards national character. [...]

3. For the geographic Turkists, a nation is the sum total of persons who inhabit a given geographic area. Thus, for them, there is an Iranian, a Swiss, a Belgian, a British nation. In actuality, however, there are three nations—Persian, Kurdish, Turkish—in Iran and three also—German, French, Italian—in Switzerland, while in Belgium there are the Walloons, who are originally French, and the Flemish, who are originally Germanic. [...] Not only are there sometimes several nations within a given geographic area, but sometimes a single nation is distributed over several areas. The Oghuz Turks,

for example, are today to be found in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarezm¹. Since these groups have a common language and culture, is it correct to consider them separate nations?

4. According to the Ottomanists, the nation included all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was a grave error, for within that amalgam were several nations possessing independent cultures.

5. According to Pan-Islamists, the nation is the totality of Muslims. We use the word community (*ümmet*) for the totality of persons who profess the same religion. Since that is so, the totality of Muslims is a community, whereas a nation, which is a group with a common language and culture only, is something quite different.

6. Individualists define a nation as any society of which a man considers himself a member. But although an individual may consider himself free to join this or that society, he does not really have such a freedom and independence, for the human spirit consists of sentiments and feelings. [...] Every individual belongs to a particular nation by virtue of his feelings. This nation is the society in which the individual lives or has obtained his education, for the individual has absorbed through education all the sentiments of the society in which he lives and he is a reflection of that society. [...] Because of this, it is not within the power of an individual to change his nationality whenever he wishes. For nationality, also, is an external reality. Although a man, because of ignorance, may not know his nationality, he may discover it later by inquiry and study. But he cannot enter this or that nation solely by his own volition as he would join a political party.

What, then, is a nation? What sort of tie do we have that can be superior to, and take precedence over, racial, ethnic, geographic, political and volitional forces? Sociology asserts that this tie is a sharing of education and culture, that is, of sentiments. Man receives his most genuine and most inner sentiments during his primary education. While still in the cradle, he is influenced by his mother tongue through the lullabies he hears [...]. It is through this language that he has absorbed all the religious, ethical and aesthetic sentiments that give existence to his soul. [...]

The great obstacle which prevents us from leaving our own society and joining another is the impossibility of erasing from our soul the education we have received from that society. As a result of this fact, we are forced to remain within our native society.

¹ Historic region in Central Asia along the Amu Darya (ancient Oxus) river, in Modern Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The above sentiments make it clear that a nation is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political or volitional group but one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics, that is to say, who have received the same education [...]. In truth, a man desires more to live with those who share his language and religion than with those who share his blood, for the human personality does not dwell in the physical body but in the soul. Our material virtues may come from our race but our spiritual virtues come from the society in which we have been educated [...]. Therefore, one's pedigree is not to be sought in nationality but only in national education and ideals. [...]

There is a practical conclusion to be drawn from these considerations. There are fellow citizens in our country whose ancestors come from Albania or Arabia sometime in the past. If they have been educated as Turks and have become used to working for the Turkish ideal, we must not set them apart from other citizens. How can we consider as aliens those who have shared not only our blessings but also our misfortunes? Especially, how can we say, "You are not Turks," to those among them who have made great sacrifices and have performed great services for the Turkish nation?

In short, a pedigree should be sought for in horses; race has great importance for animals since their excellences are based on instinct and are hereditary. It is a mistake, however, to ask the pedigree of humans, because race has no influence whatever on social traits. Acceptance of the contrary view would require us to sacrifice a majority of the intellectuals and fighters now living in our country. Since this is inconceivable, the only solution is to recognize as a Turk every individual who says, "I am a Turk," and to punish those, if there be any, who betray the Turkish nation.

Translated by Robert Devereux in Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 12–16.

DRAGA DEJANOVIĆ: TO SERBIAN MOTHERS

Title: *Srpskim majkama* (To Serbian mothers)

Originally published: *Matica*, 1871, 6–7

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from *Pro Femina* No. 13–14, 1998, pp. 174–184.

About the author

Draga Dejanović [1840, Stara Kanjiža (*Hun.* Magyarkanizsa), Vojvodina – 1871, Óbecse (*Srb.* Stari Bečej)]: actress and writer. She was born into an upper middle class family. Her father Živojin Dimitrijević was a lawyer, while her mother Sofia came from the aristocratic Međanski family. Draga attended secondary school in Temesvár (*Rom.* Timișoara), but due to serious health problems she was forced to withdraw from school. Shortly afterwards, the family moved to Óbecse (*Srb.* Stari Bečej). She was briefly married to a teacher named Dejanović. Accompanying her sister to Pest, she met the prominent activists of the ‘United Serbian Youth,’ an event that would significantly influence her future work and life. She was politically engaged in the ‘United Serbian Youth,’ and promoted ideas about the liberation and emancipation of women. She cooperated with young poets and intellectuals who were gathered in the 1860s around the magazine *Preodnica* (Predecessor) in Pest. Draga Dejanović was also an actress, performing in Újvidék (*Srb.* Novi Sad) and in Belgrade. She died during childbirth at the age of 31. Still today she represents an important point of reference for any attempt to write and interpret the history of women’s movements and feminist thought in Serbia. She is appreciated both in feminist academic circles and in the field of feminist and gender oriented activism, with full critical awareness of her specific position between emancipation and nationalism.

Main works: *Emancipacija ženskinja* [The emancipation of women] (1869); *Dve tri reči Srpkinjama* [A few words to Serbian women] (1870); *Srpskim majkama* [To Serbian mothers] (1871).

Context

The end of the 1860s and the beginning of the 1870s were times of particular national and cultural fermentation in Serbia and among the Serbs in Vojvodina. Both in Újvidék, then part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Belgrade, circles of enthusiastic young people, students and intellectuals were organizing themselves, with the aim of promoting Serbian national culture as well as the liberation and unification of all Serbs. Thus on 27 August 1866 in Újvidék, grown out of the alliance of 16 student, high school and cultural groups, the ‘United Serbian Youth’ (*Ujedinjena omladina srpska*, or simply *Omladina*) was established (see **Jevrem Grujić** and **Milovan Janković**, *South Slavs, or the Serbian nation with the Croats and the Bulgarians*). *Omladina* was formed in the wake of the reconstitution of the Habsburg Empire into Austria-Hungary (1867), which was followed by the Hungarian–Croatian Compromise of 1868. The Serbian political elite in Hungary felt that the new political arrangement did not promise a successful solution to the minority question of Slavic peoples, which included the Serbs. Svetozar Miletić was the main political figure opposing the policy of the Hungarian–Croatian Compromise, and was actively engaged both in *Omladina* and in his own political party, the ‘Serbian People’s Freeminded Party’ (*Srpska narodna slobodnoumna stranka*). Miletić and other prominent members of *Omladina* (Vladimir Jovanović, Jevrem Grujić, **Svetozar Marković**) articulated and promoted ideas related to the liberation and unification of all Serbs, therefore creating a political platform that combined liberalism and nationalism. The motto of *Omladina* was *Srbi svi i svuda* (The Serbs—altogether and everywhere), and the organization became the strongest and most influential romantic national movement in the history of modern Serbia. According to **Jovan Skerlić**, *Omladina*’s main goal was to “awaken national life in its many aspects and to teach the people the ways in which life conditions of the Serbian people could be improved.” Nevertheless, *Omladina*’s role was more extensive than that, including a political program that promoted the liberation and unification of all Serbs. What it proposed was a nationalist program that proved to be long-lasting in Serbian political history, even informing the modes of political organization and rising territorial claims at the end of the twentieth century.

Eventually *Omladina* split into conflicting groups with diverse ideological backgrounds and influences (Western liberal democracy versus Russian *narodnik* socialism), holding on to different visions of democracy and its institutions. The line of division was set between the liberalism of Jovanović

and Grujić and the socialism of Marković. Exhausted by internal strife and polemics, *Omladina* was dissolved in 1871. Still, the majority of its prominent figures continued their political work, thus turning *Omladina* into the common original nexus of many subsequent political options and modernist trends. The 'Youth movement' also functioned as a 'nursery' for influential figures in Serbian public life for the 30-odd years following its foundation.

From the very beginning, women found their way into the activities of *Omladina*. Nevertheless, although they were accepted as allies and collaborators, it took time for them to win formal recognition within the organization and gain full membership. This question was debated during several gatherings of *Omladina*, and the key point was whether women were equal to men, and whether women should join the political and cultural activities of *Omladina*. The debate, in which different ideas on women's nature, "natural abilities" and social and cultural roles clashed, ended with a proclamation made at the 'Third Youth Assembly' held in Bečskerek (present-day Zrenjanin, in Vojvodina) in 1868. Article 4 of the organization's statute was reformulated to include women as equal members of the organization. The most persistent supporter of the idea to include women as equal members was Ilija Vučetić who worked for the magazine *Preodnica*, and it is due to his fervent arguments in favor of women's active participation in the work of the organization that their engagement was in the end formally recognized and put into the official documents of *Omladina*. One of the women involved in the activities of *Omladina* was Draga Dejanović. Being influenced by the Serbian student community in Pest and deeply committed to patriotism and the progress of her nation, Draga Dejanović brought into *Omladina* new ideas relating to the emancipation of women. Instead of dwelling on more general ideas related to emancipation, she concretely elaborated on the ways in which women in Vojvodina, the place where she lived and worked, had to act in order to free themselves of social constraints, thus contributing to the advancement of national life. She insisted on what she called "economic emancipation," which would lead to women's independence, saving them from their confinement to domestic roles as wives and mothers. She argued that the emancipation of the Serbian woman was not just a women's issue, but a national one of particular importance. Her most famous articles treated issues of the economic and educational liberation of women, and the relations between womanhood and nationhood. These articles were first delivered as public lectures, and were later published. Dejanović claimed that Serbian mothers were responsible for the upbringing of the children, and thus played a crucial role in the sustenance and symbolic reproduction of the na-

tion. The text 'To Serbian mothers' treats the role of the mother as one of a 'national worker.' Draga Dejanović criticized those women who did not have children, claiming it was their duty to inspire in children's hearts the greatest and deepest national feeling. She elevated national feeling above all other sentiments, including those toward the immediate family. She claimed that it was only thanks to mothers' dedication that the nation had been maintained, and declared that the future of the nation lay in their hands.

Although the text illustrates the fusion of positivist concerns with the romantic glorification of the nation, in the following decades, particularly in the inter-war period, it was interpreted as playing a major part in the founding of feminist thought in Serbia. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the dominant political and social context in which the issue of women's rights was brought up in the second part of nineteenth century determined the limits of the so-called emancipatory activity. It should be underscored that the first and foremost concern governing women's active participation to social and political life was the nation, and that their main role was thought to comprise the shaping and maintenance of the national character. Up to the first decades of the twentieth century, with the establishment of women's alliances and their contact with international women's organizations and suffrage initiatives, the issue of women's rights was dominated by the agenda of equal access to education. This concern was also related to the process of nation-building, whereby women were seen as the nurses of patriots and the healers of the "wounds" the nation suffered in wars "of liberation," as well as being transmitters of both tradition and progress.

IE

To Serbian mothers. A public lecture

Dear sisters! If you allow me, I shall utter but a few additional words on education, women's education to be precise, words without which our mothers could not receive all the attention necessary on this occasion.

A Serbian mother should be like a clear spring, clear because any taint must be removed from its path.

The element of her life is love, but not the tainted love that many of our sisters nurture in their bosom, but love in its most magnificent beauty, love for her progeny, kin and national progress. That love, when perfect, becomes divine in a human being, it becomes a religion!

Love can be expressed just as beautifully in the form of a child's love, a mother's and a sister's, and also the love for one's husband. But above all

these virtues, in all its wonderful majesty, is the love for one's people. A woman who has no love for her people cannot have motherly, sisterly or spousal love. In such a woman love rules not, but bare instinct does!

We must admit, my sisters, that these days part of our upbringing, education and women's dignity has been much neglected.

Our hearts must ache when we look at our young girls, who are as innocent and harmless as little doves, as they embroider their handkerchiefs singing or sit by the loom without anyone to tell them what role they will play in the world. Mothers do not wish to prepare them for the future, to tell them that the future and happiness of our entire people lies on their shoulders.

It is true that women's education must, first of all, focus on domestic life, but let us think: the home is just a tiny part of our entire people. Its happiness relies on one caring woman. We must therefore tend to our nation just as we tend to our homes, for if our people are beset with evil, if our people begin to waste away, it is impossible for our families to remain happy. People and families depend on each other so much so that if one falters, the other will surely fall too.

Members of our families must put up a brave fight against today's worldwide attacks, and are the mothers not those who play the most important part in those families of ours?

A mother who is unable to comprehend or feel anything with her heart beyond her home is a slave and a slave can raise nothing but slaves and ignorant people.

Let us look back on the history of our people. In it one can see that a mother of great spirit raises like children. This example can be seen in the mother of the nine Jugović brothers, Prince Marko's mother, Princess Milica, the mother of Petar Mrkonjić¹ and many others.

A wife or a mother cannot do much to help her people with a sword, but she can do so with her heart, but, this heart must be full of noble love and self-sacrifice. A mother's heart must bind her husband and son tightly to their people, and she herself must safeguard the spirit of her people faithfully. A

¹ All the characters and deeds mentioned in this line belong to the so called Kosovo cycle, consisting of epic poems dedicated to the battle fought between the Serbian and Ottoman armies at Kosovo in 1389. The mothers exemplified are the mothers of the important participants of the battle on the Serbian side, in a legend and in epic poetry pictured as heroes (though historical facts indicate a rather different role of the prince Marko Kraljević). What Draga Dejanović wanted to emphasize by listing these names was that only brave mothers, willing to sacrifice what was the most important to them, their sons, husbands and brothers, can give a great example of bravery that their sons will inevitably follow.

husband, brother and a son must from his wife's heart, his sister's bosom, his mother's arms receive the strength to fulfill any duty to his people with dignity and a forceful will. But where can we find such virtues in our sisters today, when their hearts, which should be filled with true virtue and humanity, that our people's needs require these today, when those hearts are oftentimes utterly devoid of those virtues, or if not exactly devoid, then filled with all sorts of empty wishes, desires for worldly pleasures, flowers and ribbons. We, dear sisters, do not see this; we shall not lament the backwardness of our people into which we ourselves have been leading it.

Our people do not have enough institutions of higher education for women. Women's primary school is all the means we have to learn to read and write, but our mothers must assume the role of higher education. Nature itself makes it their duty to do so.

Our womankind usually thinks that women's education need not be cared for half as much as men's. Our mothers believe that their daughters need not know anything but how to sew, cook, wash and so on, and if they do know anything more then it is too much and unnecessary. Why, there are so many occasions when we can hear a mother say about her daughter: "What does she need all that school and all that education for? My daughter will be neither priest nor lawyer." Such questions are common with our foolish sisters, who are willing to raise and educate their daughters in an unreasonable manner, but they are mistaken in their unreasonable opinions. A girl needs knowledge as much as a boy does, for even if she will become neither priest nor lawyer, a girl must be fortified with knowledge. A girl will in time become a mother. Every mother is the educator of her family, and considering our people's current dire need for education, educational sciences far outweigh both law and theology. Dear sisters! Our sons are not the only ones who belong to our people; so do our daughters, to the same extent, for just as the insignificant linden seed will eventually grow into a shady tree full of sweet-smelling blossoms, so will the heart of a noble and wise woman produce members of a fine family, who are the pride and joy of that family, as well as the treasure and progress of our people, the source of our forthcoming freedom.

Translated by Linda Krstajić, Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

**KALLIROI PARREN:
THE LIFE OF ONE YEAR.
LETTERS FROM AN ATHENIAN TO A
PARISIAN LADY, 1896–97**

Title: *Ζωή ενός έτους. Ἐπιστολαί Ἀθηναίας πρὸς Παρισινήν, 1896–97* (The life of one year. Letters from an Athenian to a Parisian lady 1896–97)

Originally published: Ἀθήνα, ἐκ τοῦ τυπογραφείου Παρασκευᾶ Λεώνη, 1897

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 342–345.

About the author

Kallirot Siganoū–Parren [1861, Rethimnon (the island of Crete) – 1938, Athens]: journalist and activist. She received her primary education in the Nuns' school in Piraeus, and later studied at the *Arsakion school*, a model school for girls in Athens. Upon her graduation, in 1878, she was invited to run the Greek girls' school in Odessa. Two years later, in 1880, she returned to Athens, where she married the Constantinopolitan journalist John Parren, the founder of the Athenian News Agency. Her activity began in 1887, with the publication of the *Ἐφημερίς τῶν Κυριῶν* (Journal of ladies), the first Greek newspaper published by women and targeting women. The first issue sold as many as 7.000 copies in a capital of 65.000 inhabitants. The newspaper was published until 1917, when Parren was exiled by **Eleftherios Venizelos's** government to the island of Hydra due to her pro-monarchical loyalties. As part of her feminist activity, Parren represented Greek women in international conferences for the rights of women in Paris (1889, 1891, 1896 and 1914) and in Chicago (1893). At the same time, she played a prominent role at the creation of charity foundations. Between 1890 and 1896, she founded a Sunday school as well as asylums for poor girls. In 1896, she founded the *Ἐνωσις Ἑλληνίδων* (Greek women's union) and in 1911, the *Λύκειον Ἑλληνίδων* (Lyceum of Greek women), which, even to this day, is a significant center of cultural activity. In 1897, upon Parren's appeal, prime minister Theodoros Deligiannis (1820–1905) approved the acceptance of women into universities. Later, it was due to her intervention that the first female medical doctor was appointed. In 1900, through another appeal, she achieved state protection over children's and women's working conditions. In 1894, she addressed prime minister Harilaos Trikoupi (1832–1896) with the request that women should also be given the right to vote. However, this time her appeals went unheeded and women were not enfranchised until 1951. Apart from her social and

political activity, she devoted much of her time to writing. Kalliroi Parren was the first major figure of the feminist movement in Greece. She managed to incorporate women's claims for emancipation to the nationalist discourse of the time. This activity prepared the conditions for a socially-oriented movement and its eventual detachment from the nationalist discourse, especially in the inter-war period. Parren and her peers are recognized in recent feminist literature as the pioneers of women's emancipation in modern Greek society.

Main works: *Ἡ ἱστορία τῆς γυναικός* [The history of woman] (1889); *Ζωή ενός ἔτους. Ἐπιστολαί Ἀθηναίας πρὸς Παρισινήν, 1896–97* [The life of one year. Letters from an Athenian to a Parisian lady 1896–97] (1897); *Τὰ βιβλία τῆς Αὐγῆς* [The books of the dawn] (1900); *Ἡ χειραφετημένη* [The emancipated] (1900); *Τό νέον συμβόλαιον* [The novel contract] (1901); *Σχολεῖον τῆς Ἀσπασίας* [Aspasia's school] (1909).

Context

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Greek society witnessed an increasing wave of fervent nationalism. Both the proliferation of Bulgarian activity in Ottoman Macedonia and the devastating effect of Harilaos Trikoupi's resignation in 1893, accompanied by bankruptcy in the public finances, led to the emergence of a radicalized nationalist discourse. This discourse mainly exalted the military potential of the nation, while underestimating and denigrating the enemy. At the same time, it saw a direct connection with the heroic achievements of the Greek Revolution (1821–29), the goals of which, allegedly, had not yet been accomplished. These sentiments culminated with the first Olympic Games, which were held in Athens in 1896, after the initiative of Pierre de Coubertin and the guidance of the director of the organizing committee, Dimitrios Vikelas (1835–1908).

Many nationalist societies were created at this period, moved by and articulating the rising nationalist sentiment. The most important was the *Ἐθνική Εταιρεία* (National society) founded in 1888. In 1897, the 'National Society' gathered funds and recruited troops in order to be sent to the island of Crete in support of another in a long series of uprisings. Mobilized by such activities, a large part of the Greek society was eager to be engaged in a war with the Ottomans. The war was finally declared; it lasted for thirty days and resulted in a catastrophe. The bitter defeat of the Greek army and the advance of the Ottomans constituted a traumatic experience, which turned patriotic enthusiasm into a feeling of national disaster.

This 'unfortunate' war, though, gave the opportunity to a group of women, already politically active, to claim a significant role in the public sphere. The 1880s had already witnessed the appearance of a movement for equal rights

for men and women. This movement was supported by educated women of the middle class who developed, as it has been pointed out, a 'feminist' consciousness. This consciousness gained public support in 1887 with the publication of a weekly feminist review, the *Ἐφημερίς τῶν Κυριῶν* (Journal of ladies), edited exclusively by women. The review constituted a forum for debate on female issues and the elaboration of a new female identity.

At the same time, the review supported nationalist activity. During the Greek–Ottoman war of 1897, together with the 'Union of Greek Women,' founded in 1896, again by Kalliroi Parren, the review initiated an international campaign which mobilized a large number of women. Thus, the war of 1897 gave Parren and her peers the opportunity to prove that women should not live in isolation, but could efficiently claim their role in the public sphere. These women shared with men of their class both patriotic ardor and the basic assumptions of nationalist ideology. They utilized the arguments of nationalism in order to be fully integrated into the national body. Moreover, through their activity in fields which had been always denied to them, they would claim for themselves legitimacy in the public domain as they delivered services to the nation. The most efficient way to make the male population share their views was the employment of the well-known metaphor of the nation as a large family which needed the motherly care of women. Thus, women presented their contribution as indispensable. At the same time, appeals to patriotism allowed them to consolidate their networks and establish new ones. This would constitute the basis for the development of the women's movement in the decades to come. The defeat of 1897 rendered their task of rehabilitating the nation even more urgent. In an atmosphere of despair and self-reflection, Parren attributed the military incapacity of men to women's ignorance of how to "raise patriots worthy of their glorious national heritage." Women were now urged to become "better Hellenic mothers of Hellenic men" and to raise their children according to pure Hellenic (that is, ancient Greek) traditions.

In the series of letters written in 1896–97 and published under the title 'The life of one year. Letters from an Athenian to a Parisian lady 1896–97,' Parren sought to reinforce the morale of women who had sought her advice. In her view, Greek women held a large part of the responsibility for the defeat. They were destined to refashion themselves as mothers of Hellenic sons. However, Parren believed that especially those who came to Greece from abroad were not able to give to their offspring a Hellenic national education since they had a cosmopolitan background. They betrayed their nation by demonstrating an attachment to foreign life styles. This attitude proved not

only that the Hellenes were a small nation, but also a diseased one, since they could not develop their own model of education, but always needed to imitate some foreign model. Therefore, Parren concluded that, in order for this diseased nation to become healthy again, to gain some respect and survive, it had to undergo a cultural purification.

Apart from the apparent organicist discourse, very popular in many contemporary accounts, what is striking here is that the Greek nation is described as one among the younger nations, a claim that departs from the widely accepted norm of strong historical continuity. The modernist tenets of such texts have recently attracted the attention of scholars working on women's studies and nationalism as well as feminism.

VK

**The life of one year.
Letters from an Athenian to a Parisian lady, 1896–97**

All of you [women who lived and grew up in foreign but civilized lands and who came to live here either gradually or shortly after the liberation of our country] are very much answerable for the frivolity with which Greek women in general have undertaken our creative work in the well-nigh anti-patriotic upbringing we give our children, who are coddled and frail, speak foreign tongues, are slaves to all things foreign and are taught in foreign ways. Do not knit your brow, I beg you, and do not blush and do not protest and do not prepare to hurl my letters into the waste paper basket. You and all the utterly *Europeanized* Greek women ought to listen to me for a little in order to be convinced that I am not wholly in the wrong and to no longer think that you are wholly without responsibility, wholly without sin regarding the evils, the misfortunes, and the calamities of our Nation.

Your mothers and grandmothers, that is to say, the first who came here immediately following our national independence and who, having lived in civilized, Europeanized, free countries, ought to have constituted an example to be emulated by our uncivilized women, proceeded to do what? What school of education did they create by their private life? What type of upbringing did they present to our women to be emulated? What national life did they create? These supposedly evolved and educated [women], who ought to have known the great history of our recent past and the wonderful battle of the Titans waged by their fathers, proceeded to found their homes on what groundwork of national life? Did they come as Hellenes or as cosmopolitan women? Did they come as patriots or as foreigners, with foreign

principles, foreign ideas, foreign feelings, foreign manners and customs, with a foreign language?

This, of course, was natural because one always familiarizes oneself with one's environment, but what did they do gradually, little by little in order for their mores and their life and their actions and the education of their children to be Hellenic? Did they even love this land? Did they appreciate the virtues of their fraternal people? Did they reinforce the decent seeds which existed within its nature? And if one assumes that at that time, the women here, being uncivilized, could not attract their affection, what did the later generations do, what did contemporary women do, what are the women still living abroad doing?

Do not expect me to tell you. I will let the facts and the numbers speak. Do you know what the Greeks in the cities of Romania numbered during our liberation? How many were to be found in the cities of Russia, how many in Marseille and all the commercial cities of Europe? Thousands; many thousands. And nowadays those in most of these cities number in the hundreds or dozens only. And this is not because a famine, the plague or cholera decimated them, but because, little by little, they changed language and nationality and homeland and became Romanians and Russians and Frenchmen and Englishmen and cosmopolitans!

They changed language. Here is the first injury against our nation. He who easily changes his language, even more easily changes his feelings. And language is propagated, taught, created and formed by us women. Language is the first interpreter of our feelings, of our love, of our tenderness towards our children. It is our strongest tie, after nourishment, which we give them. It is the basis and the groundwork of our national life. It is the be all and end all of the patriotic ideal.

This language, whether it be good or bad, demotic or archaic, scholarly or natural, this valuable ark of our national prestige, this priceless heritage, which is entrusted by the Nation to women, what did women do with it? How did they preserve it and how did they propagate it?

Do I need to say it? Is it not enough for one to listen, not only to Greek families living abroad, but here, in the streets, the squares, the halls, listen to the Greek women and Greek children of so-called high society, and together with them the middle and even the lower classes?

And is there a nation, I wonder, is there a people anywhere in the world which has committed such a great national treason as that which we have committed? Which among us women who have traveled extensively and lived in foreign lands can say that she came across this phenomenon of

speaking foreign languages in even the most cosmopolitan of foreign lands? Did any of us ever hear a French woman deny her language in order to speak English, or English women French, or Italian women German, or German women Russian? Has enslavement to all things foreign nowadays reached the point in any other country which it has reached in ours?

And as for these foreigners, these Europeans, these objects of our admiration and adoration, these heroes of our salons, these civilized, raffiné folk whom we copy in our afternoon habits and our greetings with our elbows turned up and our rough Rs, and our monocles and our children's governesses; with whom did they join forces, whom do they side with today, against whom did they turn the deadly bombshells of their fleets and the murderous weapons and the strategic plans of their generals?

Against us, their admirers, because they felt us to be small and weak; because we have always underestimated ourselves, and they have become used to holding us in contempt; because in our political actions we were proved mostly blundering; because we did not have the strength and the self-confidence which young nations usually have, nations which are well organized and firmly educated and healthily developed, in order to fearlessly confront dangers and to aim at their own elevation and to work towards their future.

And the ones responsible to a large extent, I tell you again, are us women. It is finally time for us to recover, to shed our old selves, to become more Hellenic, and especially to become more the mothers of Hellenic men, true champions of the homeland, men worthy of the name which they bear.

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

MARIA DULĘBIANKA: THE POLITICAL STANCE OF WOMAN

Title: *Polityczne stanowisko kobiety (referat wygłoszony na Zjeździe Kobiet Polskich w Warszawie)* (The political stance of woman – paper delivered at the Polish Women’s Assembly in Warsaw)

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Language: Polish

The excerpts used are from: Aneta Górnicka-Boratyńska, ed., *Chcemy całego życia. Antologia polskich tekstów feministycznych z lat 1870–1939* (Warsaw: Fundacja Res Publica, 1999), pp. 228–245.

About the author

Maria Dulębianka [1861, Cracow – 1919 Lwów (Ukr. Lviv)]: painter, social worker and women rights activist. She was born into a gentry family in Galicia. Dulębianka studied painting (she was a student of Jan Matejko, the most famous Polish historical painter of the second half of the century). She also campaigned for the admission of women into the Cracow Academy of Arts. At the turn of the century, she became a close friend of Maria Konopnicka, a well-known poet. In 1907, Dulębianka launched a campaign for women’s suffrage in Galicia. During the 1908 elections for the Galician Parliament she fervently campaigned for candidacy on the ticket of the Agrarian Party. Women’s suffrage was introduced only after the reestablishment of the Polish statehood in 1918. In 1914 she supported **Józef Piłsudski**’s attempts to set up Polish military units within the Austrian army. During the Polish–Ukrainian war in Eastern Galicia (1918–1919) she supported the Polish defenders of Lviv and organized charity work for Polish prisoners of war on the Ukrainian side of the front. In 1919 she became infected with typhus in one of the prisoners’ camps and died from that disease. As many other activists of the Polish women movement, she remained forgotten till the new wave of feminism in the 1990s started to search for native traditions.

Main works: *Katalog wystawy zbiorowej dzieł śp. Marii Dulębianki* [The catalogue to the exhibition of works by the late Maria Dulębianka] (1919).

Context

The situation of women became an issue of public debate for the first time during the 1863–1864 uprising. The suppression of the uprising, followed by large scale Russian reprisals, caused the social degradation of the small gentry as well as a noticeable decline in the middle-class male population (due to death during the uprising, migration, or exile to distant Asiatic provinces of the Russian Empire). The new conditions forced at least a partial reformulation of the social status of women. Many of them were now forced to work and to penetrate new social domains. From the 1860s on, there emerged several journals which were for, and more importantly edited by women. This activity was also supported by acknowledged ‘national’ women-writers such as Eliza Orzeszkowa and Maria Konopnicka. Their place within the intellectual elite and their contribution to the discourse of modernization was acknowledged. Yet, they did not formulate any agenda concerning the specific place of women in Polish society.

The Polish women’s movement underwent serious changes in the last decades of the nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth centuries. Women played an important role in the generation that followed the ‘positivists’ (see **Aleksander Świątochowski**, *Political directives*). They constituted an important part of the student population at the illegal Polish university (one of them being Maria Skłodowska, later Marie Curie), and also fought for women’s right to admission in Galician universities. In the late nineteenth century, female Polish students (along with their Russian counterparts) gained a considerable presence in Western European universities which had begun to admit female students. Women activists at home appealed for the opening of all types of higher and technical education to women, which would allow them to secure their future. Unofficial feminist groups of various political colors were formed, vividly discussing the social and national role of women. The question raised (also pointed out by Maria Dulębianka in her quoted speech) was the place of the women’s question within the Polish national program.

However, from the 1860s to the 1880s, the Polish women’s movement did not problematize the question of universal suffrage. As a matter of fact, the issue could not be addressed under the conditions of constant martial law in the Russian partition and under the conservative legal system of Austria. The opportunity to raise the question emerged in the aftermath of the 1905–1907 revolution that drove all political groupings in Russia either to legal action or to underground activities. Simultaneously, a campaign was launched for the liberalization of electoral law in Austria. Maria Dulębianka belonged to the

group of feminist activists who pledged for a separate and independent feminist movement, free from any other ideological affiliation, be it nationalist, liberal or socialist. She sharply criticized the 'National Democratic' and the socialist movements in Galicia, while also being engaged in a polemic with Aleksander Świętochowski and other 'positivists' who perceived the independent feminist movement as an obstacle in the creation of the harmonious and progressive society. Dulębianka simply refused what many other Polish female activists before her took for granted: the subordination of women's cause to the national program.

The Polish feminist movement was particularly active in the period before 1918. The new independent Polish state introduced a liberal legal system that gave women all the rights that had been debated through the second half of the nineteenth century. During the 1920s and the 1930s, feminist discourse concentrated on questions that had previously been untouched, such as the liberalization of abortion laws, or sexual education. The post-1945 Polish state confirmed all the rights of women and introduced a typical Soviet campaign for their further emancipation that naturally discredited the whole feminist ideology in the eyes of anti-communist opinion. Thus, it was hard to find a feminist current within the anti-communist opposition. Post-1989 political developments led to the proliferation of conservative ideas and legislative practices concerning women. Under such conditions, a feminist movement reappeared, importing Western standards but also rediscovering the native feminist tradition.

MG

The political stance of woman

There is no doubt that the most significant phenomenon today, in the rapid and all-encompassing evolution of human ideas, is the rising popular awareness of civil equality.

This is the present day's most important victory.

The final testimony to that process will be, or rather is, the woman's achievement of civil awareness. Admittedly, it took a powerful rattle of the chains of oppression to lead women away from passive servitude and into battle. Today that battle is already being fought. Women have finally realized that they too must take a stand on the grand stage of politics. That in order to fulfill their civil obligations, they must be entitled to all civil rights without exception.

And this leads us to the second epic victory of today. Only once we realize that the greatest error of our policy in the past, the error that led to our downfall and deprived us of our power, was to exclude the people considered today the foundation of our nation, can we say with equal conviction that another mistake, just as threatening to our nation's well-being, is to subject women to that same exclusion. The sooner we correct this error and the sooner we stop ignoring and wasting the resources which we do not have in overabundance, the faster will we progress towards the attainment of our national and human ideals. Even if we gain freedom, we shall not be a free nation as long as half of our population is denied its civil rights.

What other nation is better suited to carry the torch of freedom to others if not the one with such a wonderful tradition of free spirit, the one with so many battles fought for its own freedom and the freedom of others, the one to have suffered through so much pain and torture? All those hardships were endured to the same extent by women, and this has endowed them with a special kind of dignity. Polish women were early to develop, to mature and to pass the test of humanity. Thus they can be bolder in their demands for human rights, but they are also more sensitive to each injustice. The slogan: "Equal rights to all men" is a definite improvement on caste-related slogans of yesterday: "Rights to the nobility," "Rights to the bourgeoisie," "Rights to the clergy," but let us not forget the shortcomings and defects of this legitimate claim based on sex. How superior and more democratic, how much more human is the new slogan heard all around and even triumphant in some places: "Equal rights to all!" [...]

As we know, initially the 'National Democratic Party'¹ was strongly prejudiced against the emerging women's rights organizations. Not officially, of course—we were not worthy of that distinction—but in secret; through female members of Parliament we were told, as were you in this very place, that "it is not the time to fight for women's rights when the rights of the entire nation are at stake."

Indeed, no other term in our language is more misleading, unclear, more abused and recklessly interpreted than the idea of what is, and what is not the national struggle or work. Summoned up at every opportunity, however insignificant, even against the most noble of actions, the word becomes a poi-

¹ The National Democratic Party (1897–1919): political party of the nationalist camp established on the initiative of the National League. The ideological leader of the National Democratic Party was Roman Dmowski (one of the founders of the National League in 1893). Members of the party supported the solution to the Polish problem with Russian involvement.

soned arrow, mercilessly striking down work and worker alike. It is no surprise therefore that it was also targeted against the emerging activity of women.

A question arises: is the woman's position outside of her nation? Would her rights not be the rights of her nation? Is she not part of it?

I do not presume any ill will, but there is a basic mistake in this claim, a great misunderstanding, one that I emphasize with all the more insistence, as even women fall prey to it, especially those who tend to be less independent in their thinking and support the 'National Democratic Party' at the same time [...]

How do you tell the work that is in the nation's interest from any other kind? Where does this work end, and some other type of work, which is not "national," begin? If working towards women's liberation is not "national," then working for the liberation of the people, working to improve the situation of the working class, working for the betterment of any class or estate would not be "national," hence not worth the time. And if it is not so, if the struggle for the rights of peasants and workers, the rights of children, the rights of any group of people constitutes work done for the nation, which it clearly does, then so does the struggle for the rights of women, for their liberation. What other way is there to liberate and elevate the people and to liberate women, if not by leading them away from humiliating, centuries-long servitude? How do we empower them to work for the nation, if we deny them the right to work? [...]

To conclude this matter, let me add that the only times when it is not a waste of time—though there really is no time to fight for rights besides the rights of the entire nation—are the times of active revolutions. In those times, however, women become almost more equal than in any other circumstances, and we have seen and are seeing that they often make heroic use of that equality.

Such was the original position of the N.D.² towards us.

Under the influence of the lively women's movement in Galicia in recent years and faced with the threat of many women drifting towards radical parties which support women's political rights, the N.D. started making concessions, even to the point of saying not only that it is not opposed to women being granted political rights, but that it is in fact willing to support them, although obviously not in the form of women's suffrage, as that would make

² National Democratic Party.

little sense to us women, but on the old, tried and proven basis of a curial system. [...]

Despite this seemingly sympathetic attitude of the N.D. towards our political rights movement, the group of women supporting the N.D., despite all our efforts, refused to be persuaded to organize a women's rights association for fear that such an organization be detrimental to the national interest.

On the other hand, in Cracow and Lviv, such organizations were established by more radical groups sympathizing with the 'Social Democratic Party.'

Unfortunately, raised for centuries to be obedient, women still feel the need to obey someone. With very few exceptions, some listen to the N.D., others to the S.D.³ And so they are conducting all their activities, especially those related to electoral reforms, under the auspices of the latter.

We have witnessed a whole host of women's rallies organized to support this reform, during which women merely touched on the issue of their rights, an event that only in passing, while focusing on the demands for equal voting rights for male workers, who, incidentally, despite having been discriminated against in the voting regulations in force at the time, had more rights than women themselves. [...]

The victory of political democratization must become the victory of women's rights, but it can only happen if women fight for equality. Without struggle they will achieve nothing. Without their involvement, the matter of equal rights will never be treated with enough momentum that they can be granted political rights whether they demand them or not [...]

There is also no guarantee that male workers, should they win rights for themselves, will be so willing to share them with women without reservation as women seem to believe will be the case. Note that in countries that introduced popular voting rights for men a long time ago, the women's struggle has not become any easier. We can see that in France, in Germany or even in the majority of the United States, women were denied political rights as long as they failed to fight for them with enough tenacity.

Such were the motives of the women who chose this particular tactic when rallying for the electoral reform in Galicia [...]. The S.D. cares primarily for the interests of male workers. Women's interests, unless strongly bound with their own, are of little concern to them, and despite all declarations to the

³ Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia and Tessen Silesia, formed in 1890, restructured in 1899. In 1919, the PPSD merged with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Its main political leaders were Ignacy Daszyński and Jędrzej Moraczewski.

contrary, the S.D. does not strive for women's political rights, assuming, as do socialists in other countries, that being conservative by nature, when given voting rights, women would be a negative influence on the progressive movement.

They are right, but only to a certain extent. First and foremost, there is no doubt that working class women, i.e. the vast majority of women, having gained voting rights, will be behind the working class man all the way. And although there are, admittedly, a lot of conservative, reactionary groups among women, they are no more numerous than those made up of men of all social classes, especially among the peasants, as well as the workers. Yet no one from the 'Social Democratic Party' wishes to deny their voting rights based on that fact. A rule is a rule. Either you follow it, or you don't. [...]

The idea of nationality is useful, but not in the hands of small-time ideology dealers, peddling it like devotional objects at the walls of the Sanctuary in Częstochowa. Watching all that, as Diderot once called on his contemporaries—"Open your minds to enlarge your concept of God, for as it is now, it could make Him repugnant"—so we feel like calling, "Enlarge your concept of nationality, for as it is now, it could make nationality repugnant." [...]

How should we proceed? [...]

We, the Poles, have a duty and reason to love our homeland more than a Frenchman loves France, a Swede loves Sweden or an Englishman loves England. But the more we love it, the more we want it to be great and noble and free, the more carefully we need to protect it from being flawed. Let there be no harm in this land to anyone, and let there be justice for all. Let there be equal law to everyone and privilege to no one. [...]

We, women, must work to bring closer that psychological moment when human affairs are no longer governed by national or class egoisms, but by more noble motives of honor and justice. Protect not only the interests of the nation, but protect even more fervently its virtue, honor and righteousness while remembering that out of the two evils there is more dignity for a nation in suffering than in doing harm. [...]

It would be impossible to discuss individual social matters here, so I will only mention that in class struggle the weak and the oppressed must find in us their unreserved defenders. Even though our principal cause is equal rights for women as the citizens oppressed the most by the political and social system of today, we hold equally dear the cause of liberation for peasants and workers from all material and moral oppression. Proponents of equality and brotherhood, let us support everything that works towards the eradication of

all estate and class differences between people and towards making our nation a group of equal citizens working in different professions, according to their talents and preferences.

Today all parties often fight against the privileges of their opponents only to win those same privileges for those who support them. And so, the 'People's Party,'⁴ incidentally the most appealing in its ideology and tactics, says to peasants: "now you must seize the power of government, now you deserve to be the leaders of this nation," i.e. it tells them that they are now to be privileged. The S.D. says to the workers: now you will come to the fore, as the head of the nation, and the intelligentsia, as camp followers, will follow behind" (quoted verbatim from speeches of party leaders). The N.D. says: "We are Poland," the rest are not Poles, they are half-Poles, if not straightforward enemies of the nation.

This is the state of the struggle against privileges today.

Each of those parties, while claiming all virtues and successes for itself, ascribes all that is wrong to those outside of its ranks [...]

Abnormal relationships produce abnormal people, thus it is not against people but against abnormal relationships that we must fight. We do not fight any person, party or opponent for the sake of resistance alone. On the contrary, let us give credit wherever it is due, but fight to the end everything that gets in the way of progress and justice ruling human relationships.

Therefore, let us put all our energy into fighting capitalism as the prime cause of all social abnormalities and in particular the cause of the oppression of the working class. The present capitalist system humiliates and degrades work by turning it into its humble servant and becoming its autocratic master. [...]

Let us fight militarism as the greatest failure of nations, ruining them economically and morally, and constituting the greatest constraint on civilization as a whole.

No matter if those fighting for the liberation of the people want to combine freedom with militarism. If German socialists cheer for the army, if French socialists reject all anti-military words, thoughts and acts, if even our 'People's Party' declares itself the enemy of anti-militarism, then we, the women, when we are elected to Parliaments, must fight against militarism.

But before militarism and capitalism, our first enemy, all the greater because it is so close and common, is every harm done, every incident of op-

⁴ *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, formed in 1895. Its main intellectual and political activist was Wincenty Witos.

pression, untruth and lawlessness, and it is against those enemies that we must struggle and prevail.

With those tasks in mind, let us organize quickly, in harmony and unity. Let us not be divided by petty problems and disputes, but rather be united by our goals.

Remembering these words: “the first step to liberation from captivity is to dare to be free. The first step to victory is to learn one’s own strength.”

Let us dare to be free, let us learn our strength!

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

TARNOVO CONSTITUTION

Title: *Конституция на Българското княжество* (Constitution of the Bulgarian Principality)

Originally published: Voted on 16 April 1879

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from the anthology: Veselin Metodiev and Lachezar Stoyanov eds., *Български конституции и конституционни проекти* (Sofia: Изд. Д-р Петър Берон, 1990), pp. 25–28.

Context

The modern Bulgarian state was founded in the aftermath of the 1877–1878 Russian–Ottoman war. The Treaty of San Stefano, signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire, declared the creation of a large Bulgarian state which included Macedonia and Thrace. The unwillingness of the other European powers (Austria-Hungary in particular) to accept the creation of a large Russian-dominated state in Europe resulted in the Berlin Congress of 1878, in accordance with which Macedonia and Thrace remained Ottoman provinces. A smaller Bulgarian principality in the north was granted political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The ephemeral Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia was created in the south, with Plovdiv (*Tur.* Filibe, *Gr.* Filippoupolis) as its administrative center. Eastern Rumelia was annexed by the Bulgarian principality in 1885. Even though the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte remained nominal throughout the period of autonomy, in the wake of the Young Turk constitutional movement of 1908, Bulgaria was eventually declared an independent kingdom by Prince Ferdinand.

In 1879, in Veliko Tarnovo, the medieval capital of Bulgaria, a Constituent Assembly (*Grand National Assembly*) was convened, with the purpose of establishing the main state institutions and drawing up a constitution for the new state. The preliminary agenda of the deputies (leading figures of the period of ‘National Revival’) essentially relied on the Russian proposal entitled the ‘Pro-

ject for the Organic Charter of the Bulgarian principality.’ This project took as its model the Prussian constitution of 1850, on which the Serbian constitution of 1869 had also been based. The Prussian constitution mirrored the European constitutional monarchic model in the period after 1848. First was the formation of a constitutional commission which produced the ‘Report of the Commission on the Basic Principles of the Constitution of the Bulgarian Principality.’ In the initial project, elements from the Belgian constitution were also introduced, which had also served as a model for the Romanian and the Greek constitutions.

The parliamentary debate took this report as its starting point. The two rival groups reproduced, in a sense, the main opposition factions of the 1870s: the ‘old’ and the ‘young,’ the conservatives and the liberals. The leaders of the conservative trend were Dimitar Grekov, Konstantin Stoilov and Grigor Nachevich; the liberals’ figureheads, on the other hand, were Dragan Tzankov, Petko Slaveykov, Petko Karavelov and Stefan Stambolov.

The etatism permeating the text was the focal point of the liberals’ critique, which defended the freedom of the nation as opposed to the state power celebrated in the conservative ‘Report.’ This was, for instance, Petko Slaveykov’s position, in which he claimed that the ‘Report’ portrayed the Bulgarian people as too immature for freedom. This attitude revealed the populist basis of the liberals’ ideology. In other words, even in the liberal camp, the concept of the nation remained privileged over that of the citizen. It should be emphasized, though, that the final result of the work of the Grand National Assembly did not reflect the rhetoric of these populist claims. In the end, the Tarnovo Constitution devised a framework for modern liberal political values. Although it was seemingly underestimated during the discussions, the ‘citizen’ became the key notion of the document, and in this sense the Tarnovo Constitution represented a rupture with the populist rhetoric of the ‘Revival’ period. However, the liberals’ attempt to transform the constitutional monarchy promoted by the ‘Report’ into a parliamentary monarchy was not entirely successful as the monarch was endowed with extensive prerogatives.¹

The Constitution stipulated separation of powers, even though the autonomy of the judiciary power was not guaranteed. The monarch was endowed with extensive legislative and executive prerogatives, and, as a result, the German nobleman Alexander Battenberg was elected the Prince of Bulgaria. The Con-

¹ This transition was analyzed in detail in the first chapter of Ivan Elenkov’s influential book *Родно и дясно* [Populism and Right Wing] (Sofia: LiK, 1998).

stitution also established a universal manhood suffrage (the voting age limit being 21), a one-chamber system, strong municipal government and guaranteed civic freedoms. The Tarnovo Constitution was de facto suspended by the military coup in 1934, resulting in the personal regime of king Boris III. The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, voted by the 6th Grand National Assembly, replaced the Tarnovo Constitution in December 1947.

Bulgarian political and historical literature perceives the Tarnovo Constitution as one of the most liberal European constitutions of the time. This is the reason why the Tarnovo Constitution became not only a basic institutional text, but also an ideological symbol of political modernity in the newly established state. Even decades after its suspension in 1934, especially after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, it continued to be one of the legitimating symbols of the Bulgarian liberal project.

BM

Constitution of the Bulgarian Principality

Chapter XII: regarding the citizens of the Bulgarian Principality

Part I

General Principles

[...]

54. All who were born in Bulgaria and never became foreign citizens shall be considered citizens of the Bulgarian Principality.

55. Foreigners may become Bulgarian citizens as regulated by the National Assembly.

56. Every subject of the Principality can renounce his citizenship after having completed his military service and fulfilled his other obligations to the state according to laws to be elaborated.

57. All Bulgarian citizens are equal before the law. The division of estates in Bulgaria is impermissible.

58. No aristocratic titles, or other distinctions or decorations may exist in the Bulgarian Principality.

59. The Prince is allowed to grant titles of distinction in times of war and for military men only.

60. Political rights should benefit only the citizens of the Bulgarian Principality, while civil rights should benefit all residents of the Principality.

61. Nobody in the Bulgarian principality may buy or sell human beings.

Every slave, of whatever gender, creed or nationality, becomes free on entering Bulgarian territory.

62. Legislation on public development and law enforcement is equally binding for all residents of Bulgaria.

63. Bulgarian laws govern all real estate in the Principality, even if they have foreign ownership.

64. In all other cases, the status of foreign citizens is regulated by specific laws.

Part II

Regarding State and Public Service

65. Only Bulgarian citizens may take positions in state and public service and in the military.

66. Foreign citizens may also be employed in such positions, but only with the explicit permission of the National Assembly.

Part III

Regarding Property Rights

67. The rights of property are inviolable.

68. The compulsory cession of ownership can only take place for the benefit of the state or the public and with a prior equivalent payment. The regulations for such a cession shall be determined by a special law. [...]

Part VI

Regarding Inviolability of the Individual, Inviolability of the Home and Inviolability of Correspondence

73. Nobody may be punished without a verdict by an appropriate court.

74. Arrests and house searches may only be made according to the rule of law.

75. Nobody may receive a punishment that has not been determined by the law. All torture is forbidden, whatever the charge is. The same applies for the confiscation of property.

76. Should any developments threaten public security, the Prince may suspend articles 74 and 75 in the whole Principality or in specific regions, but only after receiving confirmation for such an injunction from the First National Assembly.

77. Private letters and private telegraph messages are considered secret and inviolable.

Part VII

Regarding National Education

78. Primary education is compulsory for all citizens of the Bulgarian Principality

Part VIII

Regarding the Freedom of the Press

79. The Press is free. No censure is admissible. When the writer is known and living in the Principality, the publisher, printer and distributor will not be held responsible for any liabilities.

80. The Holy Scriptures, liturgical books and writings of dogmatic content intended for use in Orthodox churches, as well as bible class textbooks for Orthodox schools, will need to be sanctioned by the Holy Synod.

81. Press-related crimes are to be persecuted according to common juridical ordinance.

Part IX

Regarding the Freedom of Assembly and Association

82. The citizens of the Bulgarian Principality have the right to assemble in a peaceful and unarmed manner, to discuss any issue without asking for prior permission. Outdoor assemblies should fully abide by police rules.

83. Bulgarian citizens have the right to form associations without needing any prior permission, as long as the means and ends of those associations are not to disrupt the state and social order and do not offend the religion and morals of the state.

Part X

Regarding the Right to Petition

84. Every Bulgarian citizen has the right to present the appropriate authorities with petitions, signed by one or collectively by many persons. Lawfully established institutions can present petitions through their representatives.

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

PERA TODOROVIĆ: SPEECH AT THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE'S RADICAL PARTY IN KRAGUJEVAC

Title: Speech of Pera Todorović at the assembly of the People's Radical Party in Kragujevac (1882)

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from Slobodan Jovanović, *Влада Милана Обреновића* (Belgrade: Геца Кон, 1926–1927), pp. 155–156.

About the author

Pera Todorovic [1852, Vodice (near Smederevo, east Serbia) – 1907, Belgrade]: politician and journalist. He was born into a well-off family. He first attended a secondary school in Kragujevac, later resuming his education at the gymnasium in Belgrade. He later studied in Pest and Zurich, where he met Russian revolutionaries and was influenced by socialist ideas, especially through the *narodnik* populist movement. In Zurich, he also met students from Serbia, such as **Nikola Pašić**, Pera Velimirović and Laza Paču, with whom he would collaborate, first under the socialist movement led by **Svetozar Marković**, and later in the People's Radical Party. Todorović became a member of the socialist movement during the 1870s, and his exposure to Marković's ideas marked the first period of his adult life and work (1870–1881). After Marković's premature death in 1875, Todorović became one of the leading figures in the movement. He was the founder and editor of many 'progressive' socialist newspapers from the beginning of the 1870s onwards, including the first socialist newspaper in Serbia *Rad* (Work), and also *Oslobodjenje* (Liberation) and *Javnost* (The public). Apart from journalistic activity in support of socialist ideas, he actively participated in the event called *Crvena zastava* (Red flag), a celebration in honor of the independent candidates who had triumphed in the Kragujevac local elections. He was then put on trial for participating in the event. His speech in the court became one of the main examples of his oratorical mastery, for which he became renowned. Todorović managed to escape the sentence of nine months in prison by volunteering to fight in the Serbian–Ottoman war of 1876. After the end of the war, still trying to escape his prison sentence, Todorović went first to Zimony (*Srb.* Zemun) and then to Újvidék (*Srb.* Novi Sad) in Vojvodina. In Újvidék he continued his literary and journalistic work. In the autumn of 1878 he launched the newspaper *Straža* (Guardian), with the explicit aim to sustain, solidify and extend the movement based on the ideas of Svetozar Marković. Nevertheless, the radicalism of his socialist ideas proved to be unbearable for the authorities, and just a year later, he

was expelled from Újvidék and forced to emigrate to Paris. From 1881 onwards he was involved in the political activities of the People's Radical Party. After the collapse of *Timočka buna* (Timok revolt), a peasant revolt provoked by the disarming of the population, the entire executive board of the Party was arrested and imprisoned, being accused of instigating the revolt. Todorović was amongst those arrested, and was sentenced to death. It is reckoned that he made a deal with the King to publicly support the government of the Progressive Party in exchange for his release from prison. Although many of his political friends later testified that his gesture was actually helping to keep the Radical Party alive, he was expelled from the Radical Party in 1886. This marked the beginning of the third period in his life and work (1886–1907), during which he acted independently, mostly through writings in the journals and newspapers that he energetically continued to publish. Todorović became one of the most fervent critics of the political activity of the Radical Party, particularly after it seized power in 1889. From 1903 to 1904 he issued the journal *Ogledalo* (The mirror), in which he offered a detailed view of the events and important figures in the period between 1870 and 1903. Todorović is remembered as a main ideologue of the People's Radical Party, and a significant professional interest by historians and politicians in his role as an ardent promoter of his party policy emerged at the end of the twentieth century.

Main works: *Dnevnik jednog dobrovoljca* [Diary of a volunteer] (1876); *Smrt Karadjordjeva* [Death of Karadjordje] (1891); *Hajdučija* [Brigandry] (1897).

Context

Regular parliamentary life in Serbia began with the 1869 Constitution which made possible the gradual establishment of a modern political system in the country. The following decade was a formative one in Serbian political history; a period when political positions and ideologies of various groups were defined. Nevertheless, the conditions for the foundation of political parties in the modern sense were created only ten years later, after the 1876–1878 wars and the fall of the liberal cabinet of Jovan Ristić in 1880. The People's Radical Party was the first officially registered party that was organized after the formal constitution of political parties in 1881. The radicals were the longest lasting and most popular political party in nineteenth-century Serbia. Its ideological origins could be traced to the socialist program of **Svetozar Marković**, from whom its founders, leaders and ideologists **Nikola Pašić**, Pera Todorović, and Pera Velimirović inherited the ideas of the people's state and people's sovereignty. They declared these ideas in the Parliament, where they acted as the opposition to the governments of the Liberals and Progressives (*Naprednjaci*) respectively. In the history of political organization in Serbia, the Radicals became known for their staunch populism, which informed not only their ideology but also their organization and

overall style of political expression. The agenda of the party, they argued, was to grow out of the people's concerns and be spelled out in a simple manner, so that it would be comprehended by the peasants.

This is the speech Pera Todorović, the main ideologist of the Radical Party, delivered at the first rally of the party in Kragujevac in 1882. This event brought together, for the first time, supporters of the Radicals from the whole country, numbering between 350 and 500 in total. At the meeting, which lasted for three days, the leader of the party, Nikola Pašić, delivered the opening speech, but, for several reasons, it was Pera Todorović's address that came to be considered a historical landmark. Firstly, it describes the initial establishment of political parties in Serbia. The Radicals were the first to use the possibility of formally organizing a political party, and their establishment was legally acknowledged in 1881. The rally in 1882 represents the final step in the process of their organization, for the top leadership of the party was elected there.

The Radical Party rally, during which this speech was delivered, opened a new chapter in the political history of Serbia. With a program characterized by anti-Western and anti-modernist attitudes, the party would turn out to be the strongest and longest-lasting political organization in Serbian history. Furthermore, the event itself and particularly the way in which Todorović addressed the public marked the birth of a completely new mode of political organization in Serbia. In contrast to the elitist approach of the Liberals, this new approach included mass rallies as well as a wide network of party clubs in small towns and villages throughout Serbia. The historical importance of the Radical Party's approach lay in organizing the peasants as a political force for the first time in Serbian history. Their widely branched but strictly hierarchical organization and their popular agitation campaigns represented the first attempt to accommodate European institutions and the principles of modern political mobilization to a patriarchal, peasant milieu.

This new approach to politics and political organization demanded a new discourse. Todorović, a journalist by profession and an acknowledged master of the Serbian language, proved to be the right person to produce such a discourse. In the summer of 1881, he traveled around Serbia, visiting 42 settlements, speaking about the aims of the Radical Party and about the basic premises of modern political organization. The speech he gave in Kragujevac is considered to be a superb example of this new rhetoric. Easily understandable, full of local, folk idioms, the speech touched upon all the important questions of modern political organization. Pera Todorović initiated a style of political communication that was marked by a personalized rendition of po-

litical conflicts and demagoguery. An anti-intellectualist trend dominated the 'Radical' political discourse during his presence in the party. The Radical Party's strong reliance on the peasantry guaranteed an absolute majority in the Parliament and a wide popular following. Thanks to the Radical Party, the peasantry achieved two important and interconnected goals: it became politically organized and became part of the system of political representation via the Parliament. The 'Radicals' successfully articulated the interests of the peasants: local self-governance, tax reform, and the replacement of the regular army with national militia. It should be noted, however, that the discourse in favor of the peasantry did not actually become part of the Party's policy, but remained merely on the level of political rhetoric.

An important moment in the transformation of the Radicals' organization was the so-called 'Timok riot' (*Timočka buna*) of 1883, which was a major setback for the activities of the party and even jeopardized its survival. The 'Timok riot' was a popular, peasant revolt, provoked by the King's attempt to disarm the peasantry as part of the ongoing reform in the army. It took place mainly in Eastern Serbia, then the poorest part of the country, where the majority of the people had voted for the 'Radicals' during the 1883 elections. This was a period of political instability, caused by King Milan Obrenović's denial of the fact that the People's Radical Party had won the majority of seats in the Parliament. Disregarding the election results, he entrusted Jovan Ristić with the task of forming the new government. The National Assembly was opened and then suspended by a state decree. The Radicals were exceptionally popular among the peasants and they tried to capitalize politically on the peasant revolt against the state. The revolt was brutally suppressed, and the King used the opportunity to square accounts with the Radicals. Many of their leaders were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and some of them were even sentenced to death, while the leader of the party, Nikola Pašić, fled the country. Todorović sent King Milan several letters explaining the ideology of the Radicals and assuring him that they did not wish to destabilize the state. The King, thereafter, ordered all imprisoned party members to be released. According to Latinka Perović's study of the life and ideas of Todorović, his imprisonment and the events that preceded it contributed significantly to the change in his political views, which in turn led to his marginalization from the party that he had founded.

Speech at the assembly of the People's Radical Party in Kragujevac

Let us now consider the article which says that “every Serbian citizen who is of age has the right to vote.” This is an important thing, brothers. You know how the village mayor is elected here. A man is required to be paying the full tax, the principal. Only then when one is fulfilling his civic duties, as tax paying, is one entitled to vote for the village mayor. I have heard Garašanin say that he would also like this to be made a legal requirement when it comes to electing representatives for the assembly. And it is not only Garašanin who thinks so. There are other people in our nation who measure a man's rights by his purse. The bigger your purse is, the greater your rights become. He who owns no estate has no rights. But, you see, he does have duties. When it comes to defending the borders, people do not say, “you are but a poor man, you had no rights in your community, you weren't allowed to go to the polls, so you'd better stay at home now. You don't have to go to the battlefield.” No, instead you are to march, be you rich or poor! And, surely, the poor fill up the first battle lines, and the rich might or might not come after them. (The crowd exclaims: “By God, that's right!”). If a poor man's poverty does not impede him from dying for the state, it should be no obstacle when he is to enjoy certain civic rights in the state. A man's head comes at a great price, because, as we know, every man only has one. He, therefore, who lays down his head for the motherland, he gives a lot. This price redeems all. This is why citizens who are expected to die for the motherland should in no way be deprived of their civic rights on the pretext that they are unable to pay a certain amount to the state. All things considered, *wealth* must never be the measure and gauge of a citizen's civic rights in a country, if the intention is for there to be real order and prosperity in such a state. Participation in state affairs must never be determined according to how large someone's purse is, so that he who is richer should have the right to handle state affairs and he who is poor should have no say in any public business. To prevent the poor from participating in state affairs, because they are poor, would mean stifling the very voice of those who suffer most under the burden of the unfavorable institutions of the state and are, therefore, the ones with the greatest interest in working at fixing everything which is bulky and cumbersome for the citizens of a state. It would, therefore, mean stifling the voice of those who are, by virtue of their very position, forced to be the initiators of necessary social transformation and repair. The Radical Party doesn't want that. The Radical Party says, “It is precisely because of my poverty that I am entitled to and I wish to participate in state affairs with

threefold intensity. Precisely because I'm poor, I feel and am hurt more by every burden and injustice imposed by the state, as I am forced to shoulder them with my bare and feeble back. And when something bothers and hurts me (the speaker pats the back of his own head), I am entitled to seek a remedy for my ailments and predicaments, if we want there to be unity and adherence to the law in the country." For every citizen, be he rich or poor has the full right to say, "If you want me to respect you and heed the law, you need to seek my opinion as to who is to write it, because it also concerns me." And not like this: a few of them, wealthy men and gentlemen, sit down at a table and dash away a pile of acts this high (the speaker indicates height with his hand), and you poor people just bend your heads down, hitch yourselves up and haul the burden which has been loaded. We won't have it this way anymore. (Clapping and loud approval). This is why the Radical Party has made it its policy to extend the right to vote to all Serbian citizens of age, irrespective of whether they are rich or poor and of who pays what to the state. So that everybody should pay to the state whatever he can, in accordance with his circumstances, so that the state would be prevented from trading in its citizens' civic rights and treating these rights like merchandise, to be sold at will. Civic rights are not smoked ham from Užice, there for the state to dispense with at twenty *paras*, so that whoever pays more should get a thicker slice. (Acceptance and approval). Every man, be he rich or poor, is entitled to *all* civic rights existing in his country by virtue of his very birth, as long as he shoulders his civic responsibilities to the extent that his circumstances allow. This is what the Radical Party considers to be right and good. (The crowd exclaim: 'long live! That's right!').

Translated by Linda Krstajić, Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

STJEPAN RADIĆ: SPEECH AT THE NIGHT ASSEMBLY OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 24 NOVEMBER, 1918

Title: *Govor na noćnoj sjednici Narodnog vijeća dana 24. studenoga 1918*
(Speech at the night assembly of the national council on 24 November, 1918).

Originally published: *Dom*, on 25 and 31 March, 1920

Language: Croatian

The excerpts used are from Stjepan Radić, *Politički spisi; autobiografije, članci, govori, rasprave*, ed. by Zvonimir Kolundžić, (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971), pp. 323–327, 332–335.

About the author

Stjepan Radić [1871, Trebarjevo Desno (central Croatia) – 1928, Zagreb]: politician and political theorist. Between 1895 and 1896, he studied at the Prague University, where he endorsed **Tomáš Masaryk**'s political and social thought. Due to his anti-dualist activities, though, he was forced to abandon his studies in Austria–Hungary. In 1899, he graduated from the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes* in Paris. In 1904, together with his brother Antun, he founded the *Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka* (Croatian People's Peasant Party), acting as its representative at the Croatian Parliament between 1904 and 1918. He became famous for his fervent support of agrarianism as the solution to both the social and the national questions, themes that he elaborated in his theoretical writings. In 1918, he was singled out as the most prominent critic of the monarchy in the newly founded 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' and the foundation of a new centralist South Slavic state. He was imprisoned for these beliefs between 1919 and 1920. At the same time, the *Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka* (HPSS) grew to be the strongest Croatian interwar political force. In 1923, he traveled to Paris, London and Moscow, advocating the federal reconstitution of Yugoslavia, and he even played a major role in the integration of his party into the Peasant International, for which he was again imprisoned during 1924 and 1925. In 1925, Radić finally recognized the regime, and participated in the government as the minister of education between 1925 and 1927. In 1927, together with representatives of the Croatian Serbs, he formed an anti-regime coalition called *Seljačko-demokratska koalicija* (Peasant-democratic coalition). This political act was probably the reason for the assassination attempt against Radić and other Coalition deputies in the National Assembly in Belgrade in July 1928. Radić died two months later in Zagreb as a result of the injuries he suffered during the attack. In socialist

Yugoslavia, Radić's agrarian political thought was interpreted as closely related to the socialist one. However, his canonization was only completed in the 1990s, when he was considered to have achieved Croatian national integration, and was thus labeled as the most important Croatian politician of the twentieth century.

Main works: *Slovanská politika v Habsburské monarchii* [Slavic politics under the Habsburg monarchy] (1902); *Moderna kolonizacija i Slaveni* [Modern colonization and the Slavs] (1904); *Češki narod na početku XX. stoljeća* [Czech nation at the beginning of the twentieth century] (1910); *Uzničke uspomene*, 3 vols. [Memories from prison] (1929).

Context

As the World War came to an end in the autumn of 1918, almost all South Slavic parties, influenced by Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' and the Entente decision to dismantle Austria-Hungary, started to push openly for a policy of south Slavic unification outside the Monarchy. As the Empire entered the process of final disintegration, South Slavic activists coordinated with the pro-Yugoslav Serb and Croat political émigrés (the 'Yugoslav Committee'), and founded the 'National Council of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,' which, in late October, proclaimed the independent *Država Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba* (State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, also known as the SHS). Although it was envisioned as a transitional step towards unification with Serbia on the basis of equality, the state was fiercely contested by the 'Croat-Serb Coalition' (HSK), which represented the main political force in Croatia. The Coalition had previously opposed any kind of transitional unification, advocating instead unconditional unification with Serbia (see **Franjo Supilo**, *The Memorandum to Sir Edward Grey*).

However, the new state was not recognized by the Entente. The threat of an Italian occupation of Istria and Dalmatia according to the stipulations of the Treaty of London, peasant rebellions, the activities of the *Zeleni kadar* (Green cadre), along with the presence of Austro-Hungarian army deserters influenced by Bolshevism, were factors that pushed the 'State of the SHS' towards a centralist unification with Serbia in the *Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) on 1 December 1918.

Until early 1918, Stjepan Radić adhered to the Austro-Slavist project, strongly opposing the south Slav unification advocated by the majority of Croatian and Croatian Serb parties in the HSK. Envisioning Croatian political emancipation through an alliance with the Western Slavs, Radić devel-

oped his program with regard to both national and social agendas. Considering the national question, Radić refused the doctrine of the Croatian historical state right, while adopting **Tomáš G. Masaryk's** natural right doctrine. Hence, he recognized Croatian Serbs as a distinct political entity. However, for him, as for Frano Supilo, the latter had the duty to contribute to Croatian political emancipation. This was envisioned primarily as the emancipation of the peasantry, which constituted the majority of the population. This became known as the doctrine of agrarianism, which emphasized the model of 'peasant democracy' as a mixture of political democratization and economic corporatism, expressed in the historical Slav economic kinship units called *zadruga*, and involving the subsequent active social role of the state. Thus, Radić strongly opposed not only the unitary Yugoslavism of the HSK and the 'realist' pro-dualist politics, but also the 'corrupted bourgeois' politics entailing the abandonment of the peasantry. However, by early 1918, Radić was forced to adopt the idea of south Slavic federation due to the unfolding disintegration of the Monarchy. Simultaneously, under the influence of the Russian Revolution and Wilson's doctrine of national self-determination, Radić began to emphasize the notion of republicanism as the key to national emancipation and the promotion of the rights of peasantry.

The republican discourse of Croatian autonomy in Yugoslavia was most eloquently expressed by Radić in his famous speech at the National Council session on 24 November 1918. He delivered this speech in a chaotic atmosphere the day before the Council delegation rushed to Belgrade to accomplish the process of unification. Radić started by contesting the HSK's unitary principle of *Narodno jedinstvo* (Croat-Serb national unity), which conflicted with his notion of *Narodno jedinstvo* as an alliance of already nationally emancipated South Slavic nations. Although Radić asserted the ethnic identity of the South Slavs, he advocated that their historical and cultural traditions made them "finished" nations, which would never mix in the new Yugoslav nation. However, he called for the "fraternal" cooperation between Croats and Serbs as the only means to both Croatian and Serbian national emancipation, that is to say, the emancipation of their peasantry. Hence, he refused the project of the unitary south Slav Monarchy, regarding both the Croatian and the Serbian political elites as an embodiment of the 'old regime' (representing "militarism, capitalism, bureaucratism and clericalism"), which would be imposed by the Belgrade government in the shape of Serbian hegemony within the new state. Opposing this notion, Radić launched his version of republicanism as an implementation of individual rights as well as national self-determination, with the final goal of land reform which would

cede land to the peasantry. He especially praised revolutionary Russia, believing that it liberated the “Slavic republican spirit,” which he already defined in his Austro-Slavist project as an expression of human freedom (see **Stjepan Radić**, *Slavic politics under the Habsburg Monarchy*). Subsequently, he hoped that Russia would now inspire the same republican spirit in the smaller Slavic nations, thus delivering them freedom, as he expressed in his articles from the spring of 1918. It is also interesting that in the excerpt presented here, in order to harmonize his republican claims with the preservation of Croatian political autonomy, Radić reinterpreted the Croatian historical state right tradition from a republican viewpoint, thus transfiguring it, under Masaryk’s influence, from a claim based on feudal statehood to one based on national emancipation. As he merged the Croatian state right discourse with agrarianism, the former became inseparable from the claimed republicanism of Croatian peasantry as the fundamental expression of national self-determination. Thus, Radić denounced the attitude of the National Council that defined the tradition of Croatian statehood as a remnant of the past, and pushed for unconditional unification with Serbia. Equally, in the following years, Radić refused to recognize the act of unification, and continued advocating his republican program elaborated in the ‘Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia’ of 1921. This ideological standpoint, which opposed Yugoslav interwar centralism and advocated Croatian national emancipation, made Radić the indisputable Croatian political leader of the interwar period.

In socialist Yugoslavia, Radić’s National Council speech was praised as one of the most important texts opposing the ‘hegemonic’ foundation of interwar Yugoslavia, with a special emphasis on his republican observations. However, its full canonization took place only in the 1990s, when it was reinterpreted as an indisputable claim for Croatian independence despite Radić’s subsequent shift towards accepting the incorporation of Croatia into Yugoslavia, extorted, presumably, only by political contingency. As such, it was considered as representing the sole voice of reason within an atmosphere of political immaturity among the Croatian political elites, eventually drowning the idea of Croatian statehood within a multitude of anti-Croatian national projects (the Austrian and Yugoslav). Consequently, in Croatian historiography, the speech is extolled as the most significant political document of the twentieth century.

**Speech at the night assembly of the National Council
on 24 November, 1918**

Gentlemen,

We have already heard a significant number of speakers. Alas, all but representative Hrvoj¹ have spoken as if this is not the hall of the Croatian National Parliament, as if this is not the same *Croatian line of defense, and I daresay the shrine*, from which bold and wise words have been uttered for centuries in order to defend righteousness and rights for a better future of the *Croatian people and all Slavic peoples*. Moreover, not only have the speakers forgotten to mention Croatia and the Croats, but it seems that they are competing to *erase and destroy Croatia*, to subdue us, the Croats, and then to trample us underfoot. But the major mistake and the unforgivable sin lies in the fact that all these speakers have learnt nothing from the war, as if they *do not see the people*, as if they have not heard about the people which is exactly why they talk *in opposition to what our people want and need*.

Gentlemen!

You all preach big words: national oneness—a single and uniform state, one kingdom under the dynasty of Karađorđević.² And you think that it is enough to say that we, the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, are one people because we speak *one language*, which is why we must be in one centralized state, moreover, in one kingdom, and that only *this type* of oneness, this linguistic and political unity under the dynasty of Karađorđević can save us and make us happy.

How shallow, how empty and how unjustifiable your words are!

As regards the linguistic national oneness, *we are actually all Slavs according to our language*. Ask hundreds of our soldiers and our prisoners of war who have fought in Galicia, Ukraine, Poland, Russia, Dobrudja, Slovakia and Serbia. They will all tell you that in all of these countries one and the same Slavic nation lives—or better to say, suffers. *However, you do not even want to hear about Slavism, let alone total Yugoslavism*. You are all blown away by your amazing rebus, the Kingdom of the SHS, *which means nothing*

¹ Dragutin Hrvoj (1875–1941), politician and lawyer.

² The dynasty that ruled Serbia (1903–1918) and Yugoslavia (1918–1945).

to our hearts and minds, and then you are surprised to hear that the Italians call your rebus (a riddle of a kind) a comedy. Are there any other examples in history where the name of the people is written in an abbreviated form? You can abbreviate the name of a profession, service, party and organization, and even a *state*, but you cannot abbreviate the name of a *people*, as you cannot abbreviate the *surname of an individual*, let alone the name implying several peoples, and especially not in such a dishonest manner. The SHS used to signify the *Slovenes*, Croats and Serbs: now it stands for the *Serbs*, Croats and Slovenes! God knows what it will stand for in future!

Gentlemen!

Your work in the National Council is neither democratic nor constitutional, *neither righteous* nor wise!

You are no democrats because you do not care for all that this atrocious war has brought upon our people, especially upon our peasants.

You completely neglect the fact that all our people, especially the Croatian peasants, have come to *hate militarism from the bottom of their hearts* to an extent which is hard to imagine or describe.

You care so little for this people's opinions and convictions that you say and write that people do not want to join the army due to cowardice and fear.

You do not believe that our peasant was in a state of slumber before the war and that *the said war has relentlessly shaken him, woken him up and made a man out of him.*

You do not see at all what courage and wisdom it takes for over a hundred thousand Croatian peasants to leave the front, one after another, not wishing to return there; some of them have joined the "green cadre," others have used all available means, money and friends, and fraud, just to avoid risking their lives for the sake of defending the king and homeland whenever the foreign master commands it.

You, gentlemen, do not care at all that our peasant, and especially the Croatian peasant, does not want to hear anything about the king or emperor, or about a state *that is being forced upon him*. Our peasant has matured to the extent that he knows that the state and homeland is about righteousness and freedom, wealth and education. And today, when the gendarmerie beats the hell out of him and when you force him to side with you in order to defend us, as it were, from the Italians, our peasant claims or at least thinks that you are exactly what the Hungarian and German oppressors have been. And do you know why? Because each and every one of our men knows what the rep-

representative Hrvoj proved to you in a simple but indisputable manner when he said this morning: “Either the entire Triple Entente³ stands by Italy—in which case *we cannot help ourselves on our own*, or Italy is working on its own accord—in which case we will rise against it *by virtue of our right*. But in neither case shall a uniform state, the royal government in Belgrade or anybody else, be of any help to us.”

You yourself, gentlemen, know that well; you know that neither Italy nor the Entente powers will act according to the wishes the government in Belgrade. You know very well that where *there is no rule of the whole people*, there can be no influence of one government and one person.

Even though you are well aware of it, you knowingly and willingly lie when you say that our people will be destroyed or will suffer immensely unless we quickly form a centralist kingdom and one centralist royal government.

Hence, you frighten our people like small children and think that you will win us over for the benefit of your own politics. Maybe it is the Slovenes you want, I cannot tell; maybe you will immediately win over the Serbs as well; *but I do know that you will not win over the Croats to your cause* because the whole Croatian peasant folk is against your centralism as it is against your militarism, and is for the republic as well as for a national agreement with the Serbs. Moreover, if you try to force your centralism upon us, this is what will happen. We, the Croats, will say openly, clearly and transparently: “Well, if the Serbs really want to have such a centralist state and government, may they receive God’s blessing; but we, the Croats, want no political entity but a federal republic.”

Gentlemen, I have elaborated on several occasions at the meetings of this Central Committee⁴ about the manner in which the war has made republicans out of our peasants, and that it is totally wrong to believe that I am, as it were, to “blame” for having, as it were, misled the peasants. I have honestly told you that I was very surprised when, at the first meeting of the Central Committee during the war, on 27 July 1918, I noticed that *all peasants were decisively and enthusiastically pro-republic*. And even before the meeting, when I was entering [the hall], they greeted me with cries, “Long live the first republican!” They obviously had in mind my recent parliamentary speech in which I had managed to prove that the system of the Croatian *ban*

³ United Kingdom, France and Russia. The term seized to be used when Italy joined the Entente.

⁴ The Central Committee of the National Council had the role of the Council’s provisional government.

is totally republican and that the Croatian *Banovina*⁵ means the same as the Croatian republic, and the Croatian *ban* actually means a specific kind of president of the republic.

However, you did not believe or cared for it as you do not believe or care for it now. And this is all because *democracy is an empty word for you*; because you do not even dream to pursue its meaning which implies that *the people must be consulted first in any matter of grave importance*, that all state affairs must be pursued according to the will and need of the people, in other words, *that our country must be governed according to the will and needs of the peasant majority and not according to an autocracy of an insignificant aristocratic minority*.

Gentlemen!

I will finish with what you have mostly been talking and writing about, but what you actually do not consider and what you care the least for: I will finish with national oneness. There are many among you who know well that I have publicly and openly, decisively and courageously, defended our national oneness—the oneness of all South Slavs, and most of all the Croats and Serbs—I did so more than 20 years ago when one risked one's life or could have easily ended up behind bars for it. There are many amongst you who know explicitly that I risked my life and the lives of my wife and children in September 1902 when I spoke and acted publicly against the destruction of Serbian property in Zagreb by those who were bitter and furious because of that unimaginable insult published recklessly in the Belgrade newspaper *Književni glasnik* and reprinted insanelly in the Zagreb journal *Srbobran*, that our fight must last until the total destruction of one or the other.⁶ I have only extended and deepened my opinion on the national oneness since then; I have extended it to include all the Slavs and deepened it so that I can tell you now, after this terrible war, while it is not too late: Gentlemen! *Do not speak just empty words about national oneness*. Do not talk and write that our common language represents a strong and sufficient connection for our people. It is high time you realize that *nationality is something much deeper and wider than the national language itself*. Do try to realize that nationality counts, especially after this war in which millions of peasants, work-

⁵ *Banovina* here means the autonomous Croatian unit, governed by a *ban*.

⁶ *Srbobran* was the main turn-of-the-century political organ of Croatian Serbs. The article Radić mentions was published in the context of the political alliance of Croatian Serbs with the pro-Hungarian Croatian government.

ers and citizens participated on the front line as well as at home as part of the war economy, that from now on *nationality counts only insofar as it defends and develops humanity*, or in other words, only in so far as nationality enables the people to earn more and live in better harmony. It is high time you realize once and for all that *the era of the old aristocratic rule of militarism, capitalism, bureaucracy and clericalism is forever gone*.

Most of all, our people do not want to hear another word about militarism and bureaucracy—about bureaucratic force and autocracy. All our peoples, especially our Croatian people, want, wish, seek and demand that everyone feels new freedom and righteousness on his own skin, *at home, in his village, in his municipality, in his region*. To make it work, *first, you have to remove at once all old oppressors and all old and invalid laws and regulations; second, you must give the people a chance for self-regulation and self-government*. If you do not give them this chance and acknowledge these rights, *the people will make it happen and earn this right without you and despite you*.

Gentlemen!

It is not too late! *Do not put your head in the lion's mouth!* Do not accept a uniform government with the Kingdom of Serbia, because, if anything else, what we have before us is just a single telegram in the name of the Kingdom of Serbia and it stands for something completely different from what you want. Do not act in a manner in which eventually we will have to say that you, the Slovenes, and you, the Serbs from Vojvodina and the Bosnians, and you, our Croatian Dalmatians, and most of all, you, our domestic Croatian Serbs, have gathered today only to commit a conspiracy against the people, most of all, against Croatia and the Croats. At least try to understand that this matter is so crucial and fateful that it is important to call the meeting of the whole National Council, and, naturally, the Croatian Parliament. According to your present proposal, you have concluded that 28 members are to be dispatched immediately for Belgrade in the name of the Central Committee, and since there are no other members left on the Central Committee, it is obvious that it will be concluded that the Committee has dispatched itself and authorized itself to adopt the uniform government with the Kingdom of Serbia when it is obvious that the Committee has no such authority and right.

Gentlemen!

The whole world accepts and acknowledges the right to national self-determination. We owe our liberation to the right to self-determination alone. In terms of international affairs, this right applies to all three nations—the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs—in the sense of determining our state borders *with those of foreign nations*, but this right also applies to our three nations, and especially to us, the Croats in Croatia, *in terms of establishing and governing our common state.*

We, the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs, are three brothers and *not one person*. Each brother should be asked individually. There are no Serbs from Serbia here, and you already know how we, the Croats from Croatia, are represented here. Nothing and nobody is pursuing you, unless it is your bad conscience that forces you to complete your deed as soon as possible, the deed you know the Croatian people are against, which is why you wish to carry it out as soon as possible and ostensibly strengthen it against Croatian will.

Gentlemen!

The most terrible thing, the greatest sin and the greatest political error is to present one's own native people with a done deal, in other words, to govern according to the will of the aristocratic minority without the people and against the people. If you do not believe my words, may you live long enough—though this will not be very long—to see the Croatian people *blow you away* with their republican and humane consciousness just when you think that the people have calmed down and that you have mounted it properly.

Long live the republic!

Long live Croatia!

Translated by Iva Polak

JOSIP VILFAN: THE SPEECH IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT

Title: *Govor poslanca Drja Wilfana v italijanski zbornici* (The speech of the parliamentarian Vilfan in the Italian Parliament)

Originally published: *Edinost*, 26 June, 1921

Language: Slovene

The text used is from Egon Pelikan, *Josip Vilfan v parlamentu; Discorsi parlamentari dell'on. Josip Vilfan* (Trst/Trieste: Krožek za družbena vprašanja Virgil Šček/Circolo per gli studi sociali Virgil Šček, 1997), pp. 105–124.

About the author

Josip Vilfan (Wilfan) [1878, Trieste (*Cro., Slov.* Trst) – 1955, Belgrade]: lawyer and politician. His political life began in 1906, when he became the secretary of the political society *Edinost* (Unity) in Trieste, becoming its president four years later. In 1908, he started a law firm in Trieste, and a year later became a member of the Trieste municipal council. In 1918, he was engaged in the public debate on the fate of Trieste, advocating its annexation to the new Yugoslav state. After the war, he advocated the annexation of the entire Primorska (*It.* Litorale) region to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and later also defended the political and cultural cohabitation of the Slovenes and the Italians in the Julijska krajina region (*It.* Venezia Giulia). In 1921 and 1924, he was elected to the Italian Parliament. He made several unsuccessful appeals to Benito Mussolini. In 1926 he was arrested twice, and on the second occasion released on Mussolini's order. Vilfan also joined the activity of the Inter-parliamentary Union which addressed the issues of the minorities at the European level. At the congresses of this organization, he reported to a European audience on the situation of the Slovenian minority in Julijska krajina. In 1925 he was among the founding members of the Congress of European Nationalities. In 1928 he moved to Vienna, and in 1939 to Belgrade. Between 1945 and 1947 he was a member of the Institute for International Affairs attached to the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. After the end of the Second World War he no longer made public appearances. Contemporary experts in Slovenia consider Vilfan one of the most important figures from the Primorska region in modern Slovenia, and a pioneer of European minority policy. Vilfan's political activity coincided with the post-war period of extreme political tensions between Italy and Yugoslavia, when the Slovenes in Italy were deprived of national organizations and institutions. Consequently, it is not surprising that many historical studies treat Vilfan as a guardian of the Slovenian national survival and proof of the "Slovenian tenacity" in the Primorska region.

Main works: *Die Organisierung der Volksgemeinschaft* [The organization of the people's unity] (1932); *The Congress of European Nationalities and the Peace Problem* (1936).

Context

After the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the region of Primorska (*It. Litorale*) was occupied by the Italian army. Italy, a member of the Entente Powers, obtained the right to occupy this territory by signing the secret Treaty of London in 1915. According to the 1910 census, the Slovenes and the Croats made up 50 percent of the Primorska population. In 1920, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (established in 1918) and the Italian Kingdom signed the Treaty of Rapallo, which was regarded as a success of Italian diplomacy. By this treaty, more than one fourth of the Slovenian ethnic territory was annexed to Italy, so approximately 500,000 Slovenes and Croats became a minority in Italy. For the Slovenes, and Vilfan personally, the Treaty of Rapallo was a great disappointment.

From the period immediately preceding the First World War, the political life in the Primorska region was characterized by a marked contrast between the Italian community on the one hand, and the Slovenian and Croatian communities on the other. The Italians were the majority in Trieste and in the towns along the western coast of Istria, while the Slovenes mainly made up the agrarian population. Accordingly, the issue of the relationship between the Slovenians and Croats on the one hand, and the Italian population on the other was also the issue of the relationship between rural and urban areas.

The Treaty of Rapallo did not take into account the proposals by the US President Woodrow Wilson, who advocated separation along distinct ethnic lines. The Yugoslav side was in favor of the so-called 'Wilsonian principles,' but the Italians insisted on keeping the strategic border running across Mount Snežnik (*It. Monte Nevoso* or *Monte Albio*), a mountain that had been inscribed as a symbol of national victory in the collective memory of Italians. However, although the Treaty satisfied Italy's political demands as regards its northern border, ever since the annexation of this territory, the representatives of the Italian government looked upon the Slovenes and the Croats with mistrust. The persecution of nationally conscious Slovenian priests became widespread, and moreover this practice was institutionalized as state policy after the victory of the Fascist party. Owing to the political, economic and military inferiority of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1929), all Yugoslav governments backed down in the

face of repressive Italian policies in Julijska krajina. Such circumstances prompted the Slovenian and Croatian political parties in Italy to unite within the *Politično društvo Enotnost* (Political association Unity) in August 1919, which was presided by Josip Vilfan. In 1921, *Enotnost* established the *Jugoslovanska narodna stranka* (Yugoslav people's party), which nominated Vilfan as its representative to the Italian Parliament.

At the parliamentary elections in 1924, the Fascist party won 60% of votes in Julijska krajina (Venezia-Giulia), compared to the 11% won by the Slovenian party. The Slovenian parliamentary candidates were Josip Vilfan and Engelbert Besednjak. From the autumn of 1925 to April 1926, the Fascist party implemented country-wide laws overruling the Parliament and introducing dictatorship. From 1925, Vilfan increasingly dedicated himself to the advocacy of the interests of the Slovenian and Croatian minority within the Congress of European Nationalities, a pan-European body representing the interests of the minorities that emerged after the First World War. More than thirty national minorities sent their representatives to the first session of the Congress held in October 1925 in Geneva. From that time on, the representative of the Slovenian minority in the Parliament in Rome was Besednjak, who soon also joined the Congress of European Nationalities.

Vilfan's interests included the definition of the nation, relations among the majority, the minority and the state, a uniform minority law in Europe, as well as a common Slovenian cultural space. He developed the idea of the uniqueness of the nation as a cultural, historical and linguistic phenomenon. He championed a dignified stance based on the principle of the defense of the citizen's rights and the constitutional order, while cherishing the vision of a more humane united Europe. In other words, Vilfan's ideas transcended the predominant political discourse, thus earning many admirers. But there were also many of those who did not comprehend his vision at this early stage. In 1934, at the session of the Congress of European Nationalities, he advocated the principle of cultural autonomy as clearly distinct from the notion of political sovereignty. He argued that three main criteria were central to achieving cultural autonomy: an agreement on the protection of minorities that would be backed by international guarantees, bilateral agreements between the states, and legislation in the individual states.

Vilfan's attitude towards the Slovenian national issue and the emergence of Yugoslavia integrated a number of viewpoints elaborated by the Slovenian liberals and the Christian Socialists of the Primorska region. He was convinced that the annexation of Julijska krajina to the Slovenian lands could be achieved only by a powerful Yugoslav state. Vilfan's Yugoslavism, much

like that of Anton Korošec, the leader of the largest political party in Slovenia between the two World Wars, was based on the realistic assessment of the political situation in Europe at that time. Although Vilfan had conflicts with the Ljubljana liberals who were in favor of a united Yugoslav nation, he was nevertheless diplomatic in expressing his opposition to the complete cultural amalgamation of the Yugoslav nations.

In the autumn of 1928, Vilfan had his last meeting with Mussolini, who "listened to him without saying a word." The period of his parliamentary struggle for the (minority) rights of the Slovenes in Italy had ended. Several days after the meeting he left the country for Vienna. His efforts in the Parliament during the 1920s prolonged the agony of the Slovenian political and cultural organizations in Fascist Italy, but also compelled the Italian government to articulate its assimilatory goals. During the early 1930s, the Slovenes in Italy began to form terrorist anti-Fascist organizations.

Vilfan's participation in public life came to an end in 1938 when the Congress of European Nationalities was dissolved. After the Second World War, he no longer appeared in public, so it is difficult to assess his influence on the shaping of the minority policy in socialist Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, as he acted as a member of the 'Institute for International Affairs' in Belgrade until 1947, we can justifiably assume that he contributed to the definition of the Italian-Yugoslavian border that was outlined in 1947, when Italy signed an agreement with the Allied forces, and western Slovenia was included in Yugoslavia.

MR

The speech of the parliamentarian Vilfan in the Italian Parliament

My honorable colleagues! I must first communicate a statement which is analogous to that of the representative of the German community; this is a formal statement by the group of Yugoslav delegates elected in the new provinces. Their statement is as follows: the Yugoslav delegates have [...] the right to use their language when performing their functions and particularly when they speak in the Chamber. That right exists and there is no need for an explicit acknowledgement, because it is a precondition and a consequence of the most elementary freedom of members of Parliament and voters, and because the use of that language is the most direct and the most justified expression of their unsuppressed national awareness and honor. This right also exists because Article 62 of the Constitution explicitly recognizes it to the

speakers of French, the members of Parliament and senators who belong to the provinces where that language is in use, so by inevitable analogy it must also be considered valid with regard to the Yugoslav language and representatives of lands where that language is in use and which were annexed to the Kingdom only after the passing of the Constitution. [...]

My honorable colleagues! I must admit that I feel a little shy as I speak in this chamber for the first time as a representative of the Yugoslav people who have been annexed to the Kingdom. Our situation is most delicate. We belong to a nation that eventually established its own nation-state only recently. We share with this nation our origins, language, emotions and traditions, and we cannot conceal this natural and inseparable unity. On the other hand, we know that we have become the citizens of the Italian Kingdom. There exists a conflict between the duties of a citizen in the political sense and the ethical feeling of national affiliation. We will endeavor to resolve this conflict, and it is our opinion that if we openly express our national sentiment here and our understanding of nationality and nationalism, it is precisely in the Italian Parliament where we will find people who will understand us.

For us, the state is not the supreme reality; for us, the supreme reality is the nation, and let me repeat this, the nation in its ethnic and historical sense. We agree on that point. I wish to emphasize that we are nationalists only in this respect, but not the kind of nationalists who in this hall take pride in that name. The kind of nationalism I reject from the bottom of my heart is actually not nationalism, nor love for one's own nation, but imperialism; it is hatred, not love. We have nothing in common with that kind of nationalism, and we emphasize this because we know that particularly our compatriots of Italian nationality living in the provinces now annexed will always accuse us of imperialist nationalism. I repudiate it and oppose it explicitly, on behalf of my colleagues and all of our people.

Therefore, although we feel that we are at variance with the Italian state inasmuch as it annexed us against our will and our aspirations, we do not feel at variance with the Italian nation, which we do not hate. This I can state with clear conscience and I appeal to them to acknowledge it: the Slovenes and the Croats who have been annexed to Italy do not hate the Italian nation.

I welcome this first opportunity when a representative of the Yugoslav people no longer needs to speak with commissaries, *carabinieri*, or even the ministers or heads of offices, but can finally communicate with the elected sons of the Italian people. I'm convinced that by speaking directly, openly and honestly we will be able to at least respect each other if we cannot love each other.

We demand primarily the right to speak freely and openheartedly, to open to you our souls and voice our national feelings, maladies, regrets and the feeling of offense. If we want to meet and understand each other, there is no other way but to be candid; perhaps diplomats will take other paths, but we, the sons of modern times, democratic as the Yugoslav masses are, recognize just one possible road, the road of open communication [...].

Translated by Olga Vuković

ALEXANDROS PAPANASTASIOU: THE REPUBLICAN MANIFESTO

Title: *Τό Δημοκρατικό μανιφέστο* (The republican manifesto)

Originally published: in the newspapers *Ελεύθερος Τύπος* and *Πατρίς*, 12 February 1922

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from *Ἀλέξανδρου Παπαναστασίου, Πολιτικά Κείμενα μελέτες-λόγοι-άρθρα* (Ἀθήνα: Μπάυρον, 1976), pp. 297–299.

About the author

Alexandros Papanastasiou [1876, Tripoli (the Peloponnese) – 1936, Athens]: politician and political theorist. He studied law in Athens and political economy and philosophy in Berlin. There, he was influenced by the concept of the protectionist state elaborated by German political scientists. When he returned to Athens, in 1907, he became involved in politics. In 1908, together with his colleagues Constantinos Triantafyllopoulos, Alexandros Mylonas and Panagiotis Aravantinos founded the *Κοινωνιολογική Εταιρεία* (Sociological society). He was in favor of the expropriation of large land properties in Thessaly, much of which belonged to wealthy Ottoman Greeks, and the distribution of the land to the peasantry. In 1910, he was elected deputy on the ticket of **Eleftherios Venizelos**'s Liberal Party. In Parliament he founded a group called *Κοινωνιολόγοι* (Sociologists) which became the left wing of the party and which soon founded its own party, the *Λαϊκό Κόμμα* (People's party). In 1911, he co-founded the *Εταιρεία Κοινωνικῶν και Πολιτικῶν Ἐπιστημῶν* (Social and political sciences association). In 1916, following the National Schism between Venizelists and Royalists, he left Athens to escape persecution by the royalist government and joined the revolutionary regime set up by Venizelos in Salonica (*Gr.* Thessaloniki, *Tur.* Selanik, *Bg.* Solun). After Venizelos's return to Athens in 1917, he was offered significant government posts. It was also through his initiative that the University of Thessaloniki was founded in 1925. This university, which was to be renamed the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, was intended to be a liberal institution, an alternative to the conservative University of Athens. In February 1922, Papanastasiou published, together with his comrades, 'The republican manifesto.' Following the publication, he was persecuted and jailed on the island of Aigina. He was released immediately after the collapse of the war front in Western Asia Minor and the departure of King Constantine following the turmoil ensuing from the defeat. Papanastasiou aimed at the abolition of the monarchical regime and the establish-

ment of a republic in Greece. Thus, he reorganized the People's Party, which had been renamed *Δημοκρατική Ένωση* (Republican union). After the 1923 elections and the removal of King George II, the successor of King Constantine, he became prime minister. In 1924, the first Hellenic Republic was promulgated. In 1928, Papanastasiou declined Venizelos's proposal to participate in his new cabinet. Instead, he initiated a project for collaboration between the Balkan nations. In 1929, he chaired the first conference of the Balkan Union, created through his own initiative. Papanastasiou's heritage flourished and his own contribution was acknowledged especially among the adherents of social democracy. In 1965, a foundation with his name was created with the aim of becoming a center for political debate. Among its founders, there were prominent members of the socialist PASOK government, which has ruled the country for extended periods over the last thirty years.

Main works: *Ἡ Τουρκική Ἐπανάσταση* [The Turkish revolution] (1908); *Ὁ ἐθνικισμός. Κοινωνιολογική μελέτη* [Nationalism. A sociological study] (1916); *Δημοκρατία καί ἐκλογικόν σύστημα* [Democracy and the electoral system] (1923); *La politique sociale de la Grèce* (1932); *Vers l'union balkanique. Les Conférences balkaniques. Athènes 5–12 octobre 1930. Istanbul et Ankara 19–26 octobre 1931. Bucarest 22–27 octobre 1932. Salonique 5–11 novembre 1933* (1934); *Ἡ ἀγροτική ἀποκατάσταση τῶν προσφύγων* [The agrarian rehabilitation of the refugees] (with M. N. Notaras) (1934).

Context

Monarchy was introduced to Greece as soon as it was declared an independent state. The arrival of King Otto (1815–1867) in Greece in 1832 and the establishment of an absolutist monarchic regime, relying on political and military figures from Bavaria, marked the beginning of a period called *Βαυαροκρατία* (Bavarian domination). The demand was widespread for the introduction of a representative regime which would balance royal authority. In 1840, Otto's refusal to respond to the conditions set by the liberal anglophile politician Alexandros Mavrokordatos (1791–1865) led to a military uprising on 3 September 1843, the summoning of a National Assembly in 1844 and the proclamation of the first Constitution, which was expected to provide the basis for reconciliation between the King on the one hand and provincial landlords and military leaders on the other. Otto, however, maintained his ambiguous and erratic stance, which led to his dethronement in 1862. The following two years are known as a period of *μεταπολίτευση* (change of polity), when a National Assembly, summoned in 1863, drafted a new more liberal constitution. Eventually the throne was offered to the Danish prince George of Glücksburg. The young prince was nominated King of Hellenes, with the demand that the constitution should be suspended. Moreover, the King always reserved the right, after the elections, to offer the man-

date for the formation of a government to anyone he deemed appropriate, whether he had achieved majority in the Parliament or not. George I's favoritism often caused parliamentary crisis since appointed governments could not be sure that a vote of confidence would pass. Finally, in 1874, two anonymous articles entitled *Τίς πταίει* (Who is to blame) and *Παρελθόν και ένεστώς* (Past and present), published in the newspaper *Καιροί* (Times), declared that the principle of *δεδηλωμένη* (parliamentary majority) should be implemented in Greek politics. The articles provoked a fierce reaction. The author Harilaos Trikoupis (1832–1896) was immediately jailed, but soon released by a royal edict. A year later, Trikoupis was given by George I the mandate to form a government and lead the country to the first free elections ever.

The political heritage of Mavrokordatos and Trikoupis was taken up by **Eleftherios Venizelos**, who clashed with King Constantine I, George I's son. The issue at stake now regarded the involvement of the throne in international affairs. In November 1920, under the circumstances of the prolonged Asia Minor Campaign and the social crisis the 'national schism' had instigated, Venizelos was defeated in the elections and Constantine returned from his exile. Despite the fact that the royalists had criticized the prolonged military involvement of the nation, they resumed the military operations. However, the Great Powers had begun to change sides and offered their support to the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, Mustafa Kemal. Despite the atmosphere of optimism the government wished to cultivate, fear had replaced enthusiasm and the catastrophe was imminent.

Within these circumstances, together with a group of supporters, Alexandros Papanastasiou published 'The republican manifesto.' The title of the text is ambiguous, since in Greek, the term *δημοκρατία* is used to translate both 'democracy' and 'republic.' Yet, the content of the text leaves no doubt. According to the author, the Greek army liberated the enslaved brothers as well as the Muslims themselves from tyrannical Sultanate rule. After centuries of slavery, the light of freedom and civilization was again spread all over the region. If Turkish rule were to return, this would mean the annihilation of the national rights of Hellenism in the area. However, he argued that it was the Greek domestic policy which had generated such a negative outcome. He claimed that all Great Powers had supported Greece's efforts while Venizelos governed the country. Ever since the return of Constantine, though, Greece was abandoned by the Allies and sunk into isolation. According to Papanastasiou, this proved that the Monarchy had always pursued its royal agendas even when they were detrimental to the national interest. This

could change only with the abolishment of the Monarchy and the implementation of “people’s will.”

This was the first time that a republican claim was so openly pronounced in Greece. Indeed, two years later, in 1924, following the trauma of defeat and the deportation of more than one million Greek-Orthodox from Asia Minor and Thrace, the Monarchy was abolished and a Republic was proclaimed. The first Hellenic Republic survived through a period of turmoil until 1935, when again a royalist government conducted a manipulated plebiscite, which opened the way for the return of George II, Constantine’s eldest son and the establishment a year later of a dictatorial regime led by **Ioannis Metaxas**.

The period which followed was marked by anti-communist and anti-republican regimes, which suppressed democratic rights on many occasions. It was only in 1963 that a party with a more democratic agenda, the *Ένωσις Κέντρου* (Union of the centre) managed to win the elections. Although the ‘Union of the centre’ did not abandon the anticommunist discourse altogether, it took very serious steps towards the democratization of Greek society. It was now the turn of Georgios Papandreou (1888–1968), an old and experienced politician, to clash with the royal house. The young Constantine II, who became king after his father Paul’s death, did not allow the elected government to have power over the army. In 1964, faced with the King’s firm attitude, prime minister Papandreou resigned. This development brought the country to a period of political instability and social unrest, which eventually resulted in the abolishment of democracy and the establishment of the colonels’ junta in 1967.

However, the royal house did not survive the junta either. The royal family left the country after the King tried to regain power through an abortive counter-coup. Democracy was restored in Greece in 1974, but the Monarchy was not. Instead, a Republic was declared once again. Constantinos Karamanlis (1907–1998), a leader of the right wing much inspired by French Republicanism in his self-exile in Paris, returned to Greece in glory and carried out a new plebiscite for the regime. This time, a clear 70% voted in favor of the republic, signaling the end of the regime question in Greece and the beginning of the second Hellenic Republic, which has proved to be the calmest and most prosperous period in the history of the modern Greek state.

VK

The republican manifesto

[...] But things changed radically after 22 November, 1920.

The allied Great Powers, seeing the way in which the ruling parties were aiming to resolve the issue of the king, officially declared that:

“They do not wish to intervene in Greece’s internal matters, but they are forced to declare publicly that the restitution to the throne of Greece of a ruler whose non law-abiding attitude and behavior towards the Allies¹ during the war became, for them, a source of difficulties and serious losses, could not be viewed by them but as a sanction by Greece of the hostile acts of King Constantine. This fact would create a new situation, unpropitious to the relations between Greece and the Allies, and in this event the three Governments declare that they reserve for themselves full freedom of action in order to regulate this situation.”

The extreme seriousness of such a declaration, regardless of whether the Allies’ claims against the King were groundless or not, was concealed from the people by the ruling parties and, through the staging of the referendum of 22 November, 1920, shifted to the entire Greek nation the responsibility for King Constantine’s reinstatement, with which no politician who cares about his country should have allowed himself to side, following the Allied victory against Germany.

Thus, a regime was created in our land which did not enjoy the trust of the Allies, especially since the parties themselves, by virtue of their servile behavior since 1915, succeeded in portraying King Constantine as amassing the most powerful and stable political force in the land, a force which imposed itself even on the clearly-expressed popular will which differed so much from his.

Since then, national disasters have been accumulating. Greece fell from the envious position it held at the side of the Allies. Any economic aid on their part was cut off. The King, having returned, was not recognized. However, Kemal² was recognized as legal and the Government of Ankara as representing Turkey. The Sèvres Treaty was abandoned, and not only were we left all alone to impose peace on the Turks, but we have been limited by the Allies in our military action.

The Allied Forces are concluding agreements with the Turks, facilitating their military reinforcement and supporting their most absurd demands.

¹ The term throughout the text refers to the Entente coalition.

² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938): leader of the Turkish nationalist movement and first president of the Turkish Republic.

In addition, though having been adjudicated to Greece through an international enactment, Northern Epirus³ has been ceded by the same Allied Powers to Albania. The obligation undertaken to restore the Dodecanese has been breached without protest. Finally, even after bloody but successful struggles by our army, not only is no mention any longer made of respecting the treaty with Turkey, but the aim on all sides is our removal from Asia Minor, while at the same time there is support among the Allies, in violation of the principle which has been in force for a century concerning the lands liberated from Turkey, for the full restoration of Turkish domination and administration in the liberated sections of Asia Minor and recently also of Eastern Thrace, which will lead next to the loss of Macedonia as well. Today, our national claims which have been ratified by treaties are portrayed as irredentist by the same allied mouths which formerly proclaimed that the preservation of the Turkish conquest in Thrace and Western Asia Minor goes against the law, the idea of national freedom and humanitarianism. In every place, where we once received a warm and friendly welcome and undivided support, now, regarding all our issues, we meet with disfavor and enmity.

Things have reached such a point, that, while for four months the Government has been begging for the intervention of the Allies towards peace, a treaty which, albeit from afar, satisfies our demands and which could at the same time be imposed upon the Turks by the Allies proved impossible.

Only by the utter destruction of our national rights does it appear that an allied agreement would be achievable.

In consequence, we are inevitably led to perpetuate the military situation, in total isolation and with the indirect and even direct support of the Turks by the old friends and protectors of Greece, our erstwhile fellow warriors and allies.

This disaster came about and is being perpetuated because the governors responsible concealed the truth from the people, placing above national salvation the personal interests of the Monarchy, behind which there hides base partisan self-interest.

But it is time, even at this last moment, for us to recover, for the lies to be abandoned, for the true interest of the Nation to assert itself. It is time for us all to rise above any partisan malice, any partisan ambitions.

It is of the utmost importance for any personal interest of the Monarchy's to submit resignedly to the national interest. Demagogic idolatry and byzan-

³ The term, used as such even today, signifies the historic Hellenic right on the region.

tinism must end. The issue here is the existence of the Nation, of our army, sacrificed so heroically for the life of the working people, whose burdens are ever increasing. Greece is the creation of the spirit, of the toil and struggles of its children. It is not a royal fiefdom and it can never be tolerated for even its smallest part to be sacrificed for the personal interests of the Monarchy.

Despite the yearning to return to a peaceful life, it is not possible for Greece to accept that Turkish administration be imposed anew on the sections of Asia Minor annexed by virtue of the Sèvres Treaty. Out of the ashes of the Turkish conquest, Hellenic life has sprouted and flowered, producing wealth, building cities, disseminating education, creating civilization; it is a life which is incarnated in a million human beings, which possess the most powerful national conscience and will, and all this under the cruel pressure and persecution by the most barbarous of conquerors. By this it is rendered clear to which ethnicity these places necessarily belong, for reasons both geographical and racial, and as it is attested by history, while [the existence of] small local majorities of other ethnicities, which were born of the most destructive conquest and thanks to which they are preserved, proves nothing.

This Hellenic life, therefore, we cannot hand back to the Turks, after three years of living free, even for reasons merely of philanthropy.

The Turks proved themselves incapable of creating their own superior civilization or to accept the civilization of the nations which they conquered. Their domination was always supported by the most savage violence and by the hampering of progress of the enslaved, whose economic, moral and spiritual elevation has always been and continues to be drowned in blood and plundering. Therefore, we know very well what is in store for the Hellenism of Asia Minor should it be surrendered back to the Turks. And if the list of martyrs of our Race's past lies in our distant memory, the clamor can still be heard of the persecution, the slaughter, the torture and the plundering which have been systematically committed since 1913 against our fellow nationals in Asia Minor and Thrace at the command of this State, as always, as well as of the tragic fate of the Armenians. We are not so naïve as to believe in the protection of minorities entrusted to whatever authorities in the environment of a Turkish administration. For the same reasons, to which must be added an increase of the dangers to the security of the State and the preservation of peace, which are more directly threatened by a greater expansion once again of the Turks in Thrace, it is not possible for Greece to accept even the slightest discussion of any concessions on our part in Thrace.

In order to guard these legal national demands of ours, we require the undivided contribution of the old protectors, friends and allies of Greece.

There is nothing dividing the Nation from them. Even though Governments, imposed on the land against the popular will, happened, in the past, to impede Greece for some time from continuing its time-honored policy, [the fact remains that], after two wars and an exhausting mobilization, Hellenism carried out a revolution in order to become involved in the war on the side of its old friends and put all its forces behind the common struggle for justice, which it continues to this day with supreme sacrifices.

And since on the part of the Allies there is mistrust expressed towards us because of the way in which the issue of the Monarchy was resolved, and the reinstatement of Greece to its position of an ally by any other way has proved glaringly impossible, it is imperative to fashion the Monarchy in such a way, that the trust of the Allies will be immediately regained.

It is a lie that this necessarily constitutes an intervention in the governing of this land or a reduction of its independence. Since the Nation is in need of the aid of the Allied forces and it is determined to march into the future at their side as in the past, this same Nation, driven by the awareness of its supreme interests, freely and voluntarily will express, in a manner excluding all contest and hesitation, its sincere intention in this regard.

However, should the Government, despite all the accumulating disasters and not caring about the fall of Greece from its allied position, continue to place the personal interest of the Monarchy above general salvation, there will follow a prevalence of the belief that the institution of the Monarchy, which the Greek people have accepted and preserved as a champion of its national rights, and a national binding tie and symbol, is an agent of national disasters, contributing not to the cohesiveness but to the fragmentation of the Nation. This is a belief which began to take root a few years ago, when the will of the Nation towards the regulation of its external policy according to its traditions, feelings and interests was thwarted. According to this belief, we can clearly see that the Nation will naturally regulate its own actions, being worthy both of greater respect and a better fate."

In the name of the Republican Liberals.

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

FAIK KONITZA: THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN ALBANIA

Title: *Kriza politike në Shqipëri* (The political crisis in Albania)

Originally published: in the weekly *Dielli*, 7 April 1923.

Language: Albanian

The text used is from the collected works of Faik Konica: *Vepra*, V. III., ed. by N. Jorgaqi and Botimet Dudaj (Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese Naim Frashëri, 2001), pp. 276–279.

About the author

Faik Konitza (Faik Salko also known as **Faik Bey Konica**) [1875 (or 1876), Konitza (*Alb.* Konica, present-day northern Greece) – 1942, Washington D.C.]: politician, thinker, writer and editor. He was the descendant of a prominent Ottoman Albanian family that also included the mother of Ali Pasha of Tepelen. He first learned Arabic from private tutors. Afterwards, he joined the Jesuit School in Shkodra (*It.* Scutari, *Srb.* Skadar) where he spent one year. He attended the Greek school in his native town for another year. Finally Konitza was enrolled in the well-known Galatasaray Lyceum in Istanbul, a state institution where education was conducted by French instructors. In 1890 he went to France for advanced studies. There, he attended the *Collège de Lisieux* for two years, and after that the *Lycée de Carcassonne*. In 1895 he graduated from the University of Dijon and later that year moved to Paris, where he attended courses in medieval French literature. He completed his formal education at Harvard University. From 1897, mostly with the financial support of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, Konitza published the monthly review *Albania* in Brussels, written both in Albanian and French. This review became one of the most important propaganda instruments during the period of the Albanian ‘awakening movement.’ After five years in Brussels, Konitza moved to London where he continued publishing *Albania* from 1902 until late 1909. During his stay there, Konitza became a close friend of the French poet Guillaume Apollinaire. Later, he moved to the USA, where he directed the Albanian weekly *Dielli* (Sun), and after that, in 1911, he started publishing the newspaper entitled *The Trumpet of Croya*. In 1912, together with the Orthodox Bishop Theofan Stilian Noli (better known as Fan Noli) and other Albanian activists, he founded the *Vatra Pan-Albanian Federation of America*, which, in the following years, was to play a major role in defending the independence and the territorial integrity of the new Albanian state. By the end of 1912, after the proclamation of Albanian independence, Konitza returned

to Europe and, in 1913, visited Albania. He was disappointed with what he saw, but nevertheless remained there during the six-month reign of Prince Wilhelm zu Wied, from March to September 1914. He spent the years of the First World War in Vienna, together with Ahmet Zogolli, the future monarch of Albania bearing the title King Zogu. After the war, Konitza moved first to Rome, and later, in 1921, to Boston, to assume the leadership of the *Vatra Federation*. From 1926 until 1939, he was the General Consul of Albania (after 1928, the Kingdom of Albania) in Washington. After the invasion of Albania by fascist Italy on 7 April 1939, he decided to remain in Washington and died there in 1942. Konitza is considered to be one of the most important figures in Albanian culture, journalism and politics. The review *Albania* was one of the most significant achievements in the history of Albanian publishing.

Main works: *Nën hien e hurmave, Prralla t'Arabisë* [In the shadows of the date palms, tales from Arabia] (1924); *Doktor Gjëlpera zbulon rrënjët e dramës së Mamurrasit* [Dr. Needle discovers the sources of drama in Mamurras] (1924); *Shqipëria si m'u duk* [Albania, as I saw it] (1929); *Albania: The rock garden of South-Eastern Europe and other essays* (1957, Albanian edition in 1993); *Vepra* [Selected works], 6 vols. (2001).

Context

Albania's position in the international arena became stronger following the withdrawal of Italian forces from the Vlora (*It. Valona*) region during the summer of 1920, and the failed intervention of Yugoslav forces in the September of the same year. Territorial partition (based mainly on the London Treaty of 1915) was no longer the threat it had been in the aftermath of the First World War. The Versailles Treaty recognized an Albanian state with territories as they had been established in 1913. On 5 December 1920, the Albanian government issued a new electoral law and by the spring of the next year, following the first general elections in the country, a Parliament, called the National Council, was instituted in Albania for the first time.

Political antagonisms between different interest groups were present from the very beginning of the existence of the new legislature. The situation deteriorated due to the activities of the head of the Mirdita region, Gjon Marka Gjoni, who, supported by the Yugoslav authorities, tried to organize a revolt against the central government. In 1918, the *Komiteti për Mbrojtjen e Kosovës* (Committee for the defense of Kosovo) (KMK) was founded in Shkodra, an institution that quickly developed both in Albania and Kosovo. Several members of the Parliament, and even of the government, were members of the KMK, which only intensified the already tense relations between Albania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Consecutive Albanian governments during 1921 did not contribute towards a process of normalization in the country. Finally, by the end of December, Ahmet Zogu

(who had changed his name from the Turkish sounding 'Zogolli' to the more Albanian sounding 'Zogu'), the chief commander of the military forces in the north of the country, entered Tirana and formed a new government, in which he served as the Minister of Internal Affairs. His adversaries and especially the members of the 'Committee for the defense of Kosovo' were quickly banned from politics. In March 1922, a new rebellion was organized, but the government forces once again succeeded in suppressing it. It seemed that Zogu's power would go unchallenged for some years to come, but the economic situation deteriorated and resentment against Zogu became more and more evident.

Within this context, the representative of the *Vatra Federation* in Albania, bishop Fan Noli, emerged as a central political figure. It was obvious at this point that the leadership of the federation was well informed about the changes in Albania. In the pages of his journal *Dielli*, Faik Konitza referred to all main events of the time. He criticized the authoritarian policies of Ahmet Zogu, and proposed new measures for the consolidation of the new state and for the settlement of international and domestic problems. Konitza became famous for his aggressive and polemical style. Throughout this period, he published detailed and critical accounts of political and economic life, attacking several politicians, most of whom were his former friends. Konitza strongly supported the activity of democratic politicians such as Fan Noli and Stavro Vinjau. He played a crucial role in keeping the Albanian diaspora in the USA informed about Albanian affairs. Nevertheless, the lack of direct contact with the country sometimes led to certain discrepancies in his articles.

The text presented here is representative of this particular historical conjuncture. Writing about the political situation in Albania, Konitza underlines the main drawbacks of Albanian politics: corruption on the one hand, and, the total ignorance of those involved on the other. For him the only way for the country's improvement was the implementation of radical social and political reforms. However, it needs to be emphasized that Konitza was not as radical in his claims as other politicians who were in clear opposition to Zogu's policy and advocated revolution as the only solution. Rather than his ideas, it was Konitza's style and rhetoric—calling the most important politicians "thieves," "ruffians" or "clowns"—that had a strong and lasting impact.

Konitza supported the so-called 'Democratic Revolution' of June 1924 as well as Fan Noli's cabinet. Soon, though, he started criticizing even his own old friends for their policies, or, in his words, the lack thereof. The Noli government fell in December 1924 following Ahmet Zogu's counter-coup, who

was supported not only by his domestic contingents, but also by Yugoslav and White Russian forces. Soon afterwards, in the spring of 1925, Konitza reached a compromise with Ahmet Zogu and even entered the diplomatic service of the new republic, soon to become the Kingdom of Albania. This act was regarded as pure treason by his former friends, who were now scattered throughout Europe. However, Konitza argued that he made such a choice in order to bring an end to the anarchy, as he wrote later “for the good of the country.” Nevertheless, his action left a lasting impression, and when the communists came to power in 1945, Konitza was labeled a reactionary thinker and publicist. Even so, there is still a fierce debate today concerning his role as politician, literary critic and publicist. Still, there is no doubt that Faik Konitza was one of the most prominent figures in Albanian political life of the first half of the twentieth century.

RH

The political crisis in Albania

The party that has seized power in Albania has never had the vote of confidence of the Albanian nation, although it had the vote of confidence of the Serbian state. For some, there may have been some hopes and some illusions, but nowadays they have all been blown away by the wind. The Parliament does not represent the will of the nation. The MPs themselves have the courage to admit it. The present government is not the government of Albania—it is the government of a Parliament without any authority. The case of Vlora, where only one vote went to the government’s candidate, is a rather obvious expression of the general feeling. This is hardly an isolated instance; such signs abound and it seems that everyone can see them apart from the government in question which refuses to recognize.

Nevertheless, the so-called ministers refuse to leave their chairs, holding on to their briefcases. They do not want to give up. But could they resign without inflicting danger on themselves? They know perfectly well that with the crimes they have committed—such as stealing from the state treasury, robbing the land of simple peasants, jailing innocent people, torturing, castrating and even hanging innocent prisoners—they can hardly expect something better than the trial and the noose or hard labor in the quarries. And there’s the rub: the government has no power to stay, but is afraid to go. What will be the end of this question? If they hold on to their functions by force and refuse to dissolve the Parliament as a condition for organizing the elections for a new, true Parliament, the ministers will not be considered

“ministers” any more, but insurgent enemies of the state and nation. Therefore we cannot really talk about an uprising, because it is our pseudo-cabinet who started it.

Is it right to risk the life and security of a nation by leaving it in the hands of a band of unscrupulous criminals? Who are the people who govern today’s Albania? Just a group of thieves who have stolen, murdered, and spied for the enemies of Albania—and may even still be doing so today. Is it possible to open the doors of the Sing-Sing prison¹ and give its prisoners the authority to govern America? No way! And yet this happened in Albania. Had the bandits who took power here been living in America, they would have already paid a visit to the electric-chair or the ‘Tombs’ of Sing-Sing.

One of the most bitter fruits of this incredible story is that the Albanian Christians, who played a noble part in the struggle for liberation, began to doubt and loose their faith in the idea of an Albanian state. These brothers are forgetting that thousands of Muslim peasants are suffering with them, people who have nothing in common with the crimes of the governmental clique. Their withdrawal, however, does not end this poverty, but on the contrary, it paves the road for the criminal clique to continue and weaken those who disagree.

Only the united efforts of all good elements will allow us to achieve our goals, to overthrow these bandits and lay the foundations of a new government from the people to the people, and for the people.

Translated by Rigels Halili

¹ Konica refers to the famous prison in New York.

HALİDE EDİB: THE TURKISH ORDEAL

Title: *The Turkish ordeal*

Originally published: New York, The Century Co., 1928

Language: English

The excerpts used are from the original edition, pp. i; 30–33, 407.

About the author

Halide Edib (Adıvar) [1882, Istanbul – 1964, Istanbul]: writer, journalist and political activist. Halide Edib was among the most prolific writers of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, as well as being the most prominent female public figure of the Turkish independence struggle. Born in Istanbul to a well-to-do family, she was the first Muslim-Turkish woman to graduate from the American College for Girls in Üsküdar (1901). Her career as a writer and social activist started amidst the optimism and euphoria of the Young Turk revolution, with the prospects of freedom and equality ushered in by the 1908 constitution. Close to the inner circle of the ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter the CUP), Halide Edib became a regular columnist in the newspaper *Tanin* (The voice), edited by the pro-revolutionary activist and ardent nationalist Hüseyin Cahid and the eminent poet **Tevfik Fikret**. She also published articles in several journals, addressing issues related to the advancement of the Ottoman nation, with particular emphasis on the emancipation of women. Heavily inspired by the nationalist ideas of **Ziya Gökalp**, Halide Edib defended the full participation of women in social and political life as part of a new period of national resurgence. She was also active in founding many women's organizations, the most significant being the *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti* (Society for the advancement of women). Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Halide Edib emerged as a major public figure, delivering fervent speeches in nationalistic gatherings that attracted hundreds of thousands of spectators in Istanbul. At this time, Edib was a vocal advocate of the American mandate, which, she believed, was the only benign alternative for countering the destructive effects of European imperialism and for preserving the long term autonomy and territorial integrity of the Empire. In 1920, convinced in the cause of armed resistance, Edib and her husband Dr. Adnan fled to Anatolia to join the independence movement led by Mustafa Kemal. An active member of the resistance's inner circle in Ankara, Edib joined the war as a soldier (with the rank of corporal), a journalist (she was among the founders of the Anatolian News Agency) and writer (her nation-

alist novels on the independence war enjoyed wide popularity and were translated into several languages). Following the establishment of the Republic, Edib and her husband were increasingly alienated by the absolutist ruling apparatus of Mustafa Kemal. They left Turkey in 1925, and lived in self-imposed exile in London and Paris until the death of the Turkish leader in 1938. During her years in exile, the author published her memoirs in English, where she glorified the Turkish struggle for independence. Upon her return to Turkey, Halide Edib (assuming the surname Adıvar) started chairing the Department of English Language and Literature at Istanbul University. In 1942, her novel *Sinekli bakkal* (The fly-plagued grocer) won the Republican People's Party novel award, indicative of her belated recognition by the ruling establishment. Although official historiography imparts a fairly ambivalent portrayal of Halide Edib, both as a hero and an outcast, her national romances have always been cherished as the most prominent literary narratives of the Turkish War of Independence.

Main works: *Yeni Turan* [The new Turan] (1913); *Ateşten gömlek* [Shirt of fire] (1922); *Vurun kahpeye* [Thrash the harlot] (1923); *Memoirs of Halidé Edib* (1926); *The Turkish ordeal: Being the further memoirs of Halide Edib* (1928); *Sinekli bakkal* [The fly-plagued grocer] (1936); *Inside India* (1937); *Türk'ün ateşle imtihanı* [The Turkish ordeal] (1962); *Mor salkımlı ev* [The house in wisterias] (1963).

Context

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Halide Edib maintained a critical distance from the authoritarian apparatus of Mustafa Kemal's single party rule. Edib and her husband left Turkey in 1925, after Dr. Adnan's involvement in the short lived opposition experiment initiated by the Turkish leader himself through the founding of the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party). In 1927, when Mustafa Kemal delivered his definitive account of the Turkish independence struggle in his momentous *Nutuk* (the Speech), he deliberately excluded Halide Edib from the authorized cast of national heroes and denounced her for being a pro-mandate conspirator.

Halide Edib wrote her memoirs in English during her exile years in London. The first volume of her autobiography, entitled the *Memoirs of Halidé Edib*, was published in 1926, and recounts the author's 'Ottoman years,' concluding with the dissolution of the empire after the First World War. The second volume, published two years later with the title *The Turkish ordeal: Being the further memoirs of Halide Edib*, incorporates the author's personal account of the Turkish War of Independence. Based on notes taken while on the front, *The Turkish ordeal* evinces the sentiments of a self-justifying revolutionary-in-exile, ostracized by the new regime, yet still impassioned by the

gripping memories of its moment of birth. Providing an alternative account of the Turkish revolution, the memoir is clearly intended as a response to the official founding narrative propounded in Mustafa Kemal's 'Speech.' Here, sedulously avoiding any reference to her earlier pro-mandate leanings, Halide Edib portrays herself as an outstanding epic hero, formed in the hotbed of a breath-taking national struggle.

Halide Edib's autobiography demonstrates a marked effort to convey the inner conflicts of a perceptive intellectual enmeshed in the traumas, disillusion and eruptive passions of a time of tumultuous and violent change. In the case of the war in which she wholeheartedly participated, Edib's personal sentiments are often mired between the elative mood prompted by the martial glory of national struggle as well as a deep sense of grief and revulsion felt in the face of collective human suffering inflicted by military aggression. Her declared final position on war is that of an outright pacifist, praising "universal brotherhood" and condemning military violence as an intolerable defect of human nature (except in the case of national self-defense). As for the Republican revolution, although she was a sincere admirer of Mustafa Kemal as an anti-imperialist hero and national savior, Edib was, still, disconcerted by his sheer will to control, his uncompromising curtness and undue use of violence, questioning whether "all changes [were] smeared with so much blood in history." She was also quite wary of the official tendency to generate an overbearing leader cult around the image of Mustafa Kemal. In the end, the memoirs reveal an often subdued yet tangible and acrid critique of the oppressive and antidemocratic measures enforced by the nationalist leader. In the final section of the book, Edib states that the 'second ordeal' that the Turkish nation had to contend with was the struggle to promote personal freedom and establish democracy in the new Republic.

It is Halide Edib's contention that her memoirs constitute an honest and 'faithful record' of the war years, providing a full 'human documentary' of the independence struggle. Thus, in order to maintain the effect of objective reportage, Edib employs several strategies of distancing, such as choosing to write in English, or, at times, switching to the third person singular in the midst of the autobiographical narrative. The change in person occurs most notably in the context of outstanding and liminal experiences recounted by the author, as in the case of her much celebrated public speech in Sultanahmet square she delivered in May 1919 in the wake of the Greek occupation of Izmir to a crowd of hundreds of thousands. The use of the third person narrative, in its evident self-glorifying tone, is nevertheless portrayed by the author as the manifestation of a state of personal self-effacement demanded

by her commitment to the national cause. In associating the birth of her own mature self (amidst the collective, self-annihilating activism of the national struggle) with the birth of the Turkish nation, Halide Edib stands as a perfect representative of a new generation of female patriots and professionals in Turkey whose identities and feminist demands were fully circumscribed by the broader agenda of national solidarity and development. In fact, since the establishment of the Young Turk regime following the 1908 revolution, the image of the 'new woman' (modern, urbane, patriotic and proper) had played a crucial symbolic role in the definition of a progressive Turkish nationhood. In this conjuncture, the new public role and identity of the Turkish woman remained firmly linked to the overarching project of nation building and secularization—the development of an autonomous women's movement, thereby, being impeded by the patriarchal weight of a collectively endorsed 'state feminism.' Thus, although she was highly critical of the early Republican regime as a liberal and a democrat, Halide Edib was still eager to assume the role of the 'model woman' whose public persona (as soldier, nurse, journalist, writer and mother) was fully dedicated to the supreme cause of the nation state.

Halide Edib was recognized as the most prominent chronicler of the Turkish national struggle by a wide English-speaking readership around the world, her memoirs constituting a major authoritative source on the emergence of modern Turkey. In Turkey, despite her personal conflicts with the Republican establishment, she remained a popularly acclaimed author, although she did not attempt to publish her memoirs in Turkish until the 1960s. Even when she translated *The Turkish ordeal* into Turkish in 1962, Edib chose to edit out most of the critical remarks on the policies and personality of Mustafa Kemal, thereby, of her own accord, assimilating her autobiography into the standard template of Republican nationalism. Halide Edib's critique of the Kemalist foundation narrative remains embedded only in the English version of her memoirs, while to this day, Mustafa Kemal's 'Speech' serves as an unassailable model for official Turkish historiography of the Independence War.

AE

The Turkish ordeal

Dedicated to the youth of the nations represented in the Turkish ordeal

My story is simple. It does not aim at a moral. But I pray that the future Youth who will read it may tear away the Veil behind which they slew each other and were slain... recognize their likeness in the eyes of their brothers... grip each other's hands... and on the old Ruins of Hatred and Desolation erect a New World of Brotherhood and Peace. [...]

These months [following the First World War] were months of almost continuous public speaking for me. But the meeting of the revolution was to be in Sultan Ahmed [square], the Friday after. And whenever people speak in Turkey about the Meeting they mean the one at Sultan Ahmed on June 6, 1919. [...]

As I set foot on the tribune I knew that one of the rare, one of the very rare, moments of my life had come to me. I was galvanized in every atom of my being by a force which at any other time would have killed me, but which at that crisis gave me the power to experience—to know—the quintessence of the suffering and desire of those two hundred thousand souls.

I believe that the Halidé of Sultan Ahmed is not the ordinary, everyday Halidé. The humblest sometimes can be the incarnation of some great ideal and of some great nation. That particular Halidé was very much alive, palpitating with the message of Turkish hearts, a message which prophesied the great tragedy of the coming years. [...] Halidé's voice could not have been heard beyond a certain area, I am sure. She must have seemed a mere speck to those human bunches above and to the human sea below. But there was a profound and almost uncanny silence as she began to speak. Each one seemed to listen to his own internal voice. And Halidé was perhaps nothing more than a sensitive medium which was articulating the wordless message of the Day.

She began by pointing out that years of glory and beauty looked down from the minarets, and when she said this she was appealing to their sense of continuity in history [...].

[The rest of the speech, as reconstructed by the author with reference to newspaper reports on the event, is included as a footnote to the main text:]

Brethren, Sons, Countrymen!¹

From the tops of the minarets nigh against the heaven, seven hundred years of glory are watching this new tragedy of Ottoman history. I invoke the

¹ Woman is included in the word brethren in Turkish.

souls of our great ancestors who had so often passed in precession in this very square. I raise my head before the just wrath of those invincible hearts and say:

I am an unfortunate daughter of Islam and an unfortunate mother of the equally heroic but more ill-fated generation of my own day. I bow to the spirits of our ancestors and declare, in the name of the new Turkish nation present here, that the disarmed Turkish nation of to-day still possesses your invincible hearts; We trust in Allah and in our rights.

Listen, brethren and sons, hear the sentence the world has passed on you.

The aggressive policy of the allied powers of Europe has been applied during the last generation to the land of Turkey always unjustly, sometimes even treacherously. The European powers would have found a way to send armies of conquest to the stars and the moon had they known that Moslems and Turks inhabited those heavenly bodies. [...]

But the day will come when a greater court of justice will try those who have deprived the nations of their natural rights. That court will be composed of the very same nations whose governments are now against us. Those peoples will condemn their own governments then for having been unjust to other nations in their name, for there is an eternal sense of what is right in the heart of every individual, and nations are made up of individuals. [...] Governments are our enemies, peoples are our friends, and the just revolt of our hearts our strength.

The day is not far off when all nations will get their rights. When that day comes, take your banners and come and visit the graves of your brethren who have fought and have fallen for the glorious end.

Now swear and repeat with me:

“The sublime emotion which we cherish in our hearts will last till the proclamation of the rights of the peoples!” [...]

When she repeated the sentence—which became afterward something like a national slogan—“The peoples are our friends, the governments our enemies,” she was expressing the proper sentiment of a Moslem nation, highly conscious of its democratic principles. When she was asking them to take the sacred oath, which they were to swear three times, that they would be true to the principles of justice and humanity, and that they would not bow down to brute force on any condition, she was formulating that moral characteristic without which no people can survive in the human family of the new world which is to come. [...]

Epilogue

My nation has earned her independence by an ordeal which will stand out as one of the hardest and noblest in the world's history. But she has another ordeal to pass through before she can attain an ideal now a half century old: for the realization of this ideal lonely individuals have given their lives on the scaffolds; died in chains; have pined in exile, carrying ever in their hearts the vision of a blessed land ... Theirs is a lonely fight and it is called the Ordeal for Freedom.

All through the ordeal for independence the Turkish people itself has been the supreme hero—the Turkish people has honored Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its symbol. For this reason Mustafa Kemal Pasha will have a pedestal in the heart of every true Turk, even among those who have been irretrievably wronged by him.

Yet in the unending struggle for freedom there can be no real individual symbol, no dictator. There will only be the sum total of a people's sacrifice to bear witness to the guarding of their liberties. The independent Turkish nation will share its ordeal with many independent nations of the world.

EDVARD BENEŠ: CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

Title: *Czechoslovakia's Struggle for Freedom*

Originally published: London, The Dalhousie Review, 1941

Language: English

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 1–16.

About the author

Edvard Beneš [1884, Kožlany (near Rakovník, west Bohemia) – 1948, Sezimovo Ústí (south Bohemia)]: politician and sociologist. He came from a farming family. He studied sociology, economics and law at Prague, Paris, Berlin and Dijon. At an early age he became a follower of **Tomáš G. Masaryk** and adopted his political and social philosophy, including a deep suspicion of liberalism and political parties. In 1915, he joined Masaryk in organizing the anti-Austrian resistance in exile, was a co-founder of the Czechoslovak National Council and was, together with the Slovak Milan R. Štefánik, its main representative in Paris. Immediately after the declaration of an independent Czechoslovakia in 1918, Beneš became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he kept until 1935, when he became the second president of Czechoslovakia, taking over from Masaryk. From 1923 to 1935, he was a member of the reformist, nationalist Czechoslovak National Socialist Party founded in 1897. Beneš was the principal creator of the Czechoslovak interwar alliance system based on a military pact with France and on the Little Entente with Romania and Yugoslavia. This system, shaped by the Versailles peace settlement and the League of Nations, started to break down in the mid-1930s. Shortly after the Munich Agreement and the German occupation of the borderlands in September 1938, Beneš went into exile again. In 1939, he started to organize the 'second resistance movement.' In 1940, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile was formed in London with President Beneš leading the effort for the annulment of the Munich 'Diktat.' In 1943, he concluded a new treaty with the Soviet Union, which, it was hoped, would be the basic guarantee of postwar Czechoslovak security. Later, he negotiated an agreement on the postwar political system with Czech and Slovak Communist exiles in Moscow. His name is also connected with the presidential decrees (commonly called the 'Beneš Decrees') enabling the expulsion of millions of Sudeten Germans and hundreds of thousands of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia immediately after the war. Beneš was re-elected president in 1946 but was not in a position to thwart the Communist take-over in February 1948. After the fall of the Communist dictatorship in

late 1989, Beneš became a matter of intellectual controversy not only in the Czech Republic, but also abroad, especially with regard to the Beneš Decrees. He remains one of the most tragic and contested figures of modern Czech history.

Main works: *Problémy nové Evropy a zahraniční politika československá* [Problems of the new Europe and Czechoslovak foreign policy] (1924); *Světová válka a naše revoluce*, 3 vols. [The world war and our revolution] (1927–1928); *Francie a nová Evropa* [France and the new Europe] (1932); *Boj o mír a bezpečnost státu* [The fight for peace and state security] (1934); *Demokracie dnes a zítra* [Democracy today and tomorrow] (1942); *Úvahy o slovanství* [Essays on Slavdom] (1944); *Šest let exilu a druhé světové války* [Six years of exile and the Second World War] (1945); *Paměti* [Memoirs] (1947); *Mnichovské dny* [The Munich days] (1955).

Context

In the 1930s, as a consequence of the Great Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany, both the internal situation and international position of Czechoslovakia deteriorated. The alliance system built by Beneš in the previous decade based on treaties with France and, after 1934, with the USSR as well as the Little Entente, failed to ward off growing German pressure, which culminated in the Munich Agreement of September 1938. The four Great Powers—Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain—made Czechoslovakia cede large border areas with a German-speaking majority to Germany, but guaranteed the independence of the rest of the country. As a result of this agreement, Beneš resigned from presidency and went into exile. Later, in mid-March 1939, Nazi Germany occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The Slovaks then declared their independence, and Carpathian Ruthenia was annexed by Hungary. This made it possible for Beneš to claim that the Munich Agreement was invalid and revoke his resignation from the presidency, something the Western powers were hesitant to recognize at this point. In 1940, Beneš set up a provisional Czechoslovak government in London and led a campaign for the rectification of the Munich agreement. The British government and French National Committee also declared the Munich Agreement invalid, which, from a legal point of view, opened the way to a renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic in its pre-war territorial form, even though the claim of Czech lawyers about the nullity of the agreement from the beginning remained contested.

Between September 1938 and the beginning of the Second World War, Beneš wrote the first two chapters of his most important book from the war years, ‘Democracy today and tomorrow.’ Originally, it comprised his lecture

notes for a course he gave at the University of Chicago, where as a visiting professor he taught from February to June 1939. In this work he presents his views on the intellectual and political development of democracy in Europe from the Middle Ages to recent times. This was published as a book in New York in September 1939. At the end of 1940, Beneš began to write a third part devoted to the future arrangement of Europe and Czechoslovakia. Along with this part, written in Czech, the whole book was, in its final Czech-language version, published in London in 1942. Like Masaryk, Beneš was convinced of the general progress of democratic principles in modern history and also stressed the social question as an integral part of this process. He was a socialist of reformist conviction refusing every truly revolutionary alternative. In recent times, according to his view, there were two challenges to Western rationality, the legacy of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution: Communist collectivism and the racist revolution of Nazism. Beneš was convinced, nevertheless, that the intellectual predominance of Western rationality would ultimately triumph. In contrast to his earlier works, however, there was a noticeable shift towards the left in his wartime writings. The experience of the Munich 'Diktat' and the fall of the first Czechoslovak Republic played a crucial role in his thought. Even though his 'politics of the atonement of Munich' by no means meant a refusal of parliamentary democracy, he did not spare the latter criticism. The activity of president Beneš and his government-in-exile during the war was based on a dual theory. On the one hand, it advocated a continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic in terms of international status and the democratic character of the state. On the other hand, it stipulated a 'revolutionary' change in the internal structure of the Republic, especially in spheres of social life and economy, for which he proposed a program for a democratic welfare state. At the level of domestic policy, Beneš proposed strengthening the role of government and restricting the power of political parties, also reducing their number to three: left, right and center. In international politics he was convinced of the necessity of cooperation between the Communist East and the capitalist West and their gradual convergence. He sincerely believed that the emergence of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union had led to the abandonment of its collectivist zeal and police oppression, which contributed towards the development of a more democratic society.

The article *Czechoslovakia's Struggle for Freedom* was published in October 1941 in order to expound and advertise the political position of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile at the time, and drew its ideas mostly from 'Democracy today and tomorrow.' However improvised and transient,

the article sketches the picture of inter-war Czechoslovakia promoted by the government-in-exile in an effort to counter-balance its negative image in German pre-Munich propaganda. It also outlines Beneš's vague vision of the future domestic political and social arrangement and international order, including possible 'population transfers' under international supervision. Noteworthy is Beneš's insistence on the concept of the Czechoslovak nation as a political nation composed of two branches, Czechs and Slovaks, a concept that at this time was hardly acceptable either inside or outside the country, particularly among Slovaks.

During the short-lived democratic regime in postwar Czechoslovakia (May 1945 to February 1948), 'Democracy today and tomorrow,' the most theoretical of Beneš's works, was reprinted six times. Despite its étatist tendencies—a common phenomenon in most of Europe at the time—it still serves as an example of genuine democratic thinking. In the Czechoslovak circumstances of the late 1940s, it was perceived as an alternative to the Communist collectivist model of society. After the Communist take-over in February 1948, the book was prohibited along with the other works by Masaryk, Beneš and other prominent Czechoslovak inter-war democrats, though their survival in private libraries helped to preserve the memory of the inter-war democracy. After the changes of late 1989, this book, together with Beneš's other writings, has been mostly perceived as a historical document rather than a primary source on democratic theory.

MK

Czechoslovakia's struggle for freedom

[...] The Czechoslovak nation is one of these nations which in this war can either ensure their recently won independence for all time or can lose everything. It is one of the nations which re-entered the ranks of independent States at the conclusion of the last World War. It did not receive its independence in 1918 merely as a gift from heaven, but conquered it by the toilsome endeavors of many decades. Although in the Thirty Years War it had lost not only its independence but also its political, economic and cultural elite which perished in exile or on the execution block, it was able in the 19th century, after almost two hundred years of complete degeneration, to recreate a cultural life of a European level, to organize itself in the political struggle for the re-attainment of its independence, and also to prepare itself in the economic sense for the tasks in store for independent nations.

During the World War it also played a valuable part in the attainment of the ultimate victory of the Allies. Through its active and passive resistance, it disintegrated the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from within, and from its military volunteers an Army of 150,000 Legionaries was formed abroad which actively intervened in the fighting in France, in Italy and especially in Russia. [...]

How did the liberated Czechoslovak nation use its freedom? I think it is universally acknowledged that the young Czechoslovak Republic during these twenty years gave a splendid proof of its right to exist, and that it could have been envied by more than one much older State. The spirit of T. G. Masaryk, the Liberator and later President of the State, soared above the nation's struggle for liberation during the World War, as well as above the internal and external life of the Republic, and impressed upon it the stamp of profound spirituality, moral sincerity, and at the same time of a sense for concrete requirements. T. G. Masaryk was able in his philosophy and in his activity to harmonize an understanding for the actuality of life with a profound and uncompromising moral sense. He was a democrat of a deep social conviction; he could seek and find compromises in concrete political practice, but he knew when and in what things to insist unshakenly on his principles. The State which owed to him its origin and seventeen years of happy development sought to act in order to be worthy of him.

It was a democratic State which until the end was able to maintain its democratic régime, even when it was already surrounded on all sides by dictatorships and semi-dictatorships; it was administered by governments in which, from the very beginning, all the productive elements of the nation were represented. It succeeded in solving painlessly and in a peaceful fashion problems which elsewhere led to revolutions or showed themselves to be insoluble—e.g. the Land Reform or the Capital levy. It was in the forefront of social progress; it was the first of the industrial States to ratify the Washington Convention on the eight-hour working day; it introduced a social insurance system from which other States took their example, paid holidays for workers, the participation of factory committees in the internal administration of industrial enterprises, etc. It had inherited more than two-thirds of the industry of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and succeeded in finding new markets for its industry and in ensuring an unheard-of prosperity for its population, a prosperity which continued until the world economic crisis. The State was hard hit by this crisis, but its internal order was not shaken. It was one of the first States to begin to move again towards economic prosperity after 1934 and in 1938; at the time when the new great European crisis overwhelmed it, production was again in full

swing, and there were only about one hundred thousand unemployed out of a population of fifteen millions.

Similarly fruitful progress was seen in the cultural sphere. Despite the rigorous economy the Republic exercised in its administration of the nation's finances, it never saved money at the expenses of schools or of education in general. [...]

In its foreign policy, Czechoslovakia was one of the foremost pillars of the League of Nations. It strove for collective security; it had an active part in the elaboration of the Pact of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the Geneva Protocol of 1934; it was represented at Locarno; it was one of the first States to sign the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 which outlawed war. [...]

Above all, however, it maintained democratic equality with regard to all the language minorities in the country. Czechoslovakia was not a linguistically uniform State. The innumerable language and nationality migrations in Central Europe brought about the situation that none of the Central European States is, in the linguistic respect, so uniform as the States of Western Europe or America, and that frontiers could nowhere be precisely drawn according to the language spoken by the inhabitants. This was prevented by geographical, economic and strategic reasons, but not the least important obstacle is the fact that the population is often linguistically mixed, that minorities live in towns surrounded by a countryside which speaks the language of the majority. Czechoslovakia also had her linguistic minorities. Of the fifteen million inhabitants, roughly ten millions were Czechoslovaks, 3,232,000 had German as their mother tongue, 692,000 Hungarian, 550,000 Ruthene. In addition, the Republic had some 80,000 Poles within its borders, and of the 357,000 citizens of Jewish religion 187,000 declared themselves to belong to the Jewish nationality. [...]

I shall not go into details. I shall merely say—and the precise researches carried out by the minority section of the League of Nations can prove this—that the minorities in Czechoslovakia had the number of schools of all types to which they had a right according to their number, and in certain sections even a larger number than that to which they were entitled; that they had their press, their theatre, their broadcasts, and in general a richly developed cultural life, that they played an important part in economic life and enjoyed complete political equality of rights. From 1926–1938 the German minority was represented by number of ministers in successive governments of the Republic.

There is no one to-day who still believes that Hitler's demand for the incorporation of the Sudeten territory in the Reich was dictated by the need to

protect the Germans from Czechoslovak oppression. To-day, it is clear to all that the disintegration and then the occupation of Czechoslovakia were simply a necessity for Hitler in his plans for the conquest of the world. [...]

What is our program in this war, and what is our aim? Like the other participants in the Allied war against Hitler, we have our specifically Czechoslovak aims as well as our European and world aims. Our national aim is, in the first place, the restoration of the State independence of the Czechoslovak Republic. In this respect we uphold the principle of continuity. Nothing that has been imposed upon us since Munich do we consider to be valid in law. [...] This does not mean that we desire as our war aim a mere return to the *status quo* of September, 1938. For the whole world this war is at the same time a revolution, and Europe will issue from it much changed. But refusing *a priori* to accept any dictate of any kind, we wish to agree on our frontiers with our neighbors in a friendly fashion, and in this the ethnographic, economic, as well as strategic integrity of our State territory must be maintained. Changes in detail are possible, as it will certainly be possible to obtain frontiers corresponding to our requirements and to those of our neighbors. But as we do not desire to dictate to others, so we shall not admit that they should dictate to us.

With regard to the internal conditions of our State, we also insist on the principle of continuity combined with the principle of progress. It is not necessary for us to change anything absolutely essential in the political structure of our State. It was a democratic structure which in its detailed aspects corresponded well to the conditions of our country and on the whole acquitted itself very well. Changes in this connection should rather affect political practice than the system itself. We suffered from a hypertrophy of political parties; it is probable that in our restored State the nation will concentrate its political forces into a number of large parties after the English and American models. But this development will be the result of the experiences which in the meantime the nation will have gained at home and abroad.

It is also probable that in the administration of the State—again following the English and American models—a broad decentralization will be carried out. The centralist system which was a necessity in the first years of the Republic bore within itself great dangers. Already before Munich it had been corrected by a number of reforms; after the war, further modifications will certainly be made. The commune and the country will certainly have to be equipped with a sufficient measure of self-administration for the central State administration not to suffer from bureaucracy, and so that each citizen shall be able to make the most direct decision on the administration of his own

affairs. This would also have the advantage of contributing to a solution of the Slovak question, the difficulties of which were in part the result of administrative obstacles.

It is also probable that certain changes will be carried out in the nationality composition of the State. I do not speak of the total settlement of the relationship of the Czechoslovak majority to the minorities, more particularly the Germans; on the one hand I should not like to prejudice the decision of the nation at home in this matter, and on the other hand, the German problem in Central Europe is in certain of its aspects a whole which will have to be solved on an international basis. As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, we shall consider all loyal citizens of the State as equal without distinction of origin, religion or language in the restored Republic. But no one will be able to reproach us if we see to it that no one shall again be exposed to a fate similar to that of our citizens in 1938 and 1939. We shall punish the traitors who served Hitler as instrument for the disintegration of our State; we shall see to it that the security of the State should never again be menaced by any irredentists; it may be that we shall—if this principle will be applied in the other countries—carry out to a certain extent an emigration and exchange of the non-Czech speaking population. We must not forget that Hitler himself has transferred German minorities throughout Europe in the name of the unification of the German nation. [...]

It seems also natural to me that it will not be possible permanently to guarantee political democracy without democracy in the economic and social relations among nations, and among individuals within each nation. Certainly international trade, the access of all nations to raw material resources, the international validity of the chief social laws, etc., will be better and more purposefully organized than after the last war. But I lay still greater stress on what Anthony Eden has called the 'social security' of every member of the nation and in which he sees one of the fundamental war aims of fighting democracy. In an orderly and organized society it must be made possible for every member to express himself in accordance with his abilities and decently to maintain himself and his family. As long as this condition is not fulfilled, society will not cease to be undermined by the dissatisfaction of the socially oppressed classes, and political democracy will be in constant danger. The access to higher and highest education will also have to be democratized and made possible for all in accordance with their talents and not with the principles of wealth or origin.

All these problems are being eagerly discussed here in Great Britain and elsewhere. It is comprehensible that a small nation like our own will not

have the decisive word to say in the final settlement of these fundamental questions of the post-war organization of the world. But within the measure of the powers of our nation and State we shall endeavor to make this organization as perfect and as just as possible. Many times in history we have been predecessors far in advance of our time. Our Hussites, the predecessors of the Reformation, bore in mind the ideal of a Christian 'community of God,' and they endeavored to realize it in the primitive social forms of the 15th century. In the same century our national King, George of Podebrady,¹ made the first attempt at the constitution of a sort of League of Nations. By this I only wish to prove that nothing in our spiritual and political tradition is opposed to the great plans of reform which are now being born from the suffering of the present war.

¹ George of Podebrady (1420–1471): Bohemian nobleman who was elected King of Bohemia by the estates in 1458. He proposed a Christian League as a peace alliance among the European states that was meant, among other things, to serve as bulwark against Turkish expansion. In 1462–64, his emissary, Leo of Rozmítal, promoted the idea at various European courts but ultimately with no results.

TOMÁŠ G. MASARYK: THE CZECH QUESTION

Title: *Česká otázka: snahy a tužby národního obrození* (The Czech question: The endeavors and yearnings of the national revival)

Originally published: Prague, Čas, 1895

Language: Czech

The excerpts used are from: G. J. Kovtun ed. *The Spirit of Thomas G. Masaryk (1850–1937). An Anthology*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 61–66, 79–84.

About the author

Tomáš G. Masaryk [1850, Hodonín (*Ger.* Göding, south Moravia) – 1937, Lány (near Prague)]: the founder and first president of Czechoslovakia, sociologist, philosopher and politician. He was born into a family with a mixed ethnic and linguistic background. He attended the German gymnasium in Brno (*Ger.* Brünn) and later the Academic Gymnasium in Vienna, earning his living as a tutor. In 1876, he graduated from the departments of philosophy and classical philology at the University of Vienna. He spent a year in Leipzig, where he met his future wife Charlotte Garrigue, the daughter of a rich American entrepreneur. They married a year later in the USA and shortly afterwards Masaryk defended his *Habilitation* thesis about suicide as a modern phenomenon. He was appointed professor of philosophy at Prague in 1882, when the university was split into Czech and German parts. He taught history of philosophy, logic, ethics and an introduction to psychology and sociology. His *Weltanschauung* was formed by Protestantism, a strong adherence to scientific principles, a concern about the crisis of modernity and the emphasis on the ethical-psychological aspects of social processes. He played an important role in the campaign against the Forged Manuscripts in the 1880s, and later against antisemitic prejudices during the notorious trial of Leopold Hilsner for a blood-libel in 1899–1900, when he achieved a reversal of the indictment. He edited the journals *Athenaeum* (first published in 1883) and later *Čas* (Time). He was elected to the *Reichsrat* as a deputy of the liberal nationalist Young Czech Party in 1891, though he resigned in 1893. In 1900, Masaryk established a new political organization, the Czech Popular Party (known as the 'Realist Party'), which never attracted mass support but had important influence among the intelligentsia. In 1907, he re-entered the *Reichsrat* as a deputy for the party with considerable support from the Czech social democrats. Masaryk was highly critical of Austrian foreign policy, especially the alliance with Germany and

the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and defended the Southern Slavs, who were accused of high treason in the 'Trial of Zagreb' in 1909 (see **Heinrich Friedjung**, *The struggle for supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866*). After the outbreak of the First World War, Masaryk, together with a young **Edvard Beneš** and Milan R. Štefánik, a Slovak, established in Paris the National Council of Czechs and Slovaks and helped to form the Czechoslovak military units in Russia and France. Finally, through the efforts of the exile resistance movement under his leadership, the idea of an independent Czechoslovak state was endorsed first by the American President, Woodrow Wilson, and later by the other Allies. Masaryk served as the first president of Czechoslovakia, from 1918 to 1935, and became a symbol of the democratic republican ideals, which were suppressed during the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and by the Communist dictatorship. Masaryk is considered the founding father of Czechoslovak democracy and is the most appreciated modern Czech political figure.

Main works: *Der Selbstmord als soziale Massenerscheinung der modernen Zivilisation* [Suicide as a mass social phenomenon of modern civilization] (1881); *Základové konkrétní logiky* [The foundations of concrete logic] (1885); *Česká otázka* [The Czech question] (1895); *Naše nynější krize* [Our present crisis] (1895); *Jan Hus* (1896); *Karel Havlíček* (1896); *Moderní člověk a náboženství* [The modern man and religion] (1898); *Otázka sociální* [The social question] (1898); *Problém malého národa* [The problem of a small nation] (1905); *Palackého idea národa českého* [Palacký's idea of the Czech nation] (1913); *Russland und Europa* [Russia and Europe] (1913); *Nová Evropa. Stanovisko slovanské* [New Europe. The Slav standpoint] (1918); *Světová revoluce* [The world revolution] (1925); *Hovory s T. G. Masarykem* [published in English as *President Masaryk tells his story*] (an interview with Masaryk done by Karel Čapek, 1928).

Context

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a time of great social and economic upheaval and consequently of political turmoil in the entire Habsburg Empire. The process of the fundamental restructuring of the political sphere in Bohemia and the growing Czech–German national antagonism led to the radicalization and strengthening of nationalist clashes. At the same time, it initiated a critical reappraisal of the hitherto established political ideologies and national mythologies. In the Czech case, the latter was symbolized by the provocative 1886 essay 'Our two questions' by Hubert G. Schauer, which expressed in new terms the old existential dilemma of the Czech national movement. The issue at stake was whether the Czech national project was in itself worthwhile and brought significant cultural contributions to world history or whether it should be abandoned and blended in the stronger and culturally more developed German culture. In the same year, Tomáš G. Masaryk, as professor *extraordinarius* at the University of Prague,

was among the initiators of a controversy over the ancient manuscripts supposedly written in the ninth and thirteenth centuries. For more than five decades, the forgeries, 'discovered' in 1817, were considered by most Czech patriots—**František Palacký** included—to be the most precious jewels of medieval national literature. A prominent philologist, Jan Gebauer, together with a leading historian, Jaroslav Goll, supported by Masaryk, gathered overwhelming evidence against the alleged authenticity of the two manuscripts and thus—in the name of scholarly truth—put in doubt the prevailing image of ancient Czech history.

Masaryk became a controversial public figure in this ground-breaking clash over Czech history and, together with Schauer and Goll, he was heavily attacked by the nationalist press. With several other young intellectuals, he formed a politically active group that called themselves the 'Realists.' In 1891, Masaryk joined the liberal Young Czech Party together with his Realist friends Josef Kaizl and **Karel Kramář**. He was elected to the Austrian Parliament, but resigned two years later after many disagreements with the party. During the 1890s, he turned his attention definitively to national problems and wrote several books on principal political, social and cultural questions of contemporary Czech society from a historical and sociological perspective. The agenda common to all of his writings was to challenge the 'noisy patriotism' of the 'Young Czechs' and to shape national politics on modern, self-reflective and philosophically informed principles. The most influential of these works in terms of identity politics was *Česká otázka*, an attempt at a broader philosophical reflection on the Czech national revival of the nineteenth century.

The book contained his principal statements on the main trends of Czech history. Adopting Palacký's philosophy of history, Masaryk added his concept of humanism or *Humanität* as a basic moral fundamental of modern politics, a contemporary version of the Christian transcendental anchorage deemed relevant for both the individual and the nation. From this perspective, he understood Czech history as an evolution of moral and religious ideals which found its best expression in the fifteenth century 'Czech Reformation' (Hussitism) and appeared again in "our Second Reformation," that is, the national revival of the nineteenth century. From the historical point of view, the Czech question appeared to Masaryk as a religious rather than a national one, which in modern times also turns into a social question. In this respect Masaryk highlights the political legacy of **Karel Havlíček** and his practical political philosophy, "more progressive, more democratic and more down-to-earth," than that of Palacký. It is no coincidence that Masaryk had a

liking for the Social Democrats who supported his candidacy for the *Reichsrat* in 1907, even though he—unlike his wife Charlotte—never joined their party, mainly as a matter of principle. In his search to identify the spiritual sources of national history and his endorsement of the Platonic vision of the metaphysical order of ideas, Masaryk’s standpoint had a certain conservative and anti-liberal flavor. The following extracts show his interpretation of the Czech national revival and how, through this interpretation, he articulated his ‘realist’ political program.

Masaryk did not design this work as a historical analysis, but, as an essay on the contemporary situation and as a draft of political philosophy, where history was “only significant as corroboration of current sociological observations.” The strong presentism in this historical thinking and his views on Czech history were challenged soon after the book came out, at first by the prominent liberal politician and economist, Josef Kaizl. A former friend of Masaryk’s, Kaizl not only opposed his critique of contemporary liberalism, but reproached him for using an ahistorical method and for imposing his constructed vision of historical philosophy at the expense of empirical historical facts. Later, ‘The Czech question’ provided an impetus to the so-called “dispute over the meaning of Czech history” from the 1890s to the 1930s, a crucial and expansive cultural debate in which many of the leading Czech intellectuals took part. In the 1890s, Masaryk’s conception of Czech history played a critical role in social theory and political debate. However, as a historical narrative, it was repudiated by the leading positivist historical school of Jaroslav Goll (see **Josef Pekař**, *The meaning of Czech history*). After the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic and its sanctification, as it were, by history, the book became a genuine expression of republican activism and an inevitable part of moderate Czech nationalist ideology. Even though his historical philosophy lost much of its relevance during the twentieth century, the political spirit Masaryk embodied is still invoked and referred to in current Czech public political debates.

MK

The Czech question

Enlightened, humanity philosophy was in perfect accord with our yearning for progress and education. German philosophy and science thus repaid an old debt. The Czech Reformation movement had spilled over onto German soil and had fertilized it for the growth of new ideas. Thousands upon thou-

sands of Czech exiles, the finest flower of a suppressed people, enriched German blood and German spirit. In its turn, the German philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries repaid its debt to the Czech people and helped our awakeners rouse the nation from its long torpor. In a sense, the German, English, and French Enlightenment was a development and elaboration of the leading ideas of the Czech Reformation.

Czech thinkers after Kollár continued to derive their basic concepts from German philosophy. Palacký was indebted to Kant, Havlíček to Bolzano, Augustin Smetana¹ and many others to Hegel, and more recently Herbart exerted a key influence.

In addition to philosophy and science, predominantly adopted from Germany, the study of history played a crucial part in the reestablishment of a national culture from the very beginning of our struggle. It was essential for our awakeners to learn the history of their own people, the role of the Czech people in human development had to be clearly defined.

Once again, a philosophical underpinning was necessary, and this was formulated most clearly by Kollár, utilising Herder's philosophy of history. Before Palacký gave us a Czech history, we had a philosophy of world history, naturally once again adopted from the Germans. Palacký's history of the Czechs was preceded by Šafařík's work on Slavic antiquities. Our national consciousness thus gradually progressed from broad interest in abstract humanity to a sharper focus on Slavdom and finally on our own nation—as represented by the progression from Kollár to Šafařík and finally Palacký. [...]

Our awakening, set in motion by the European movements of enlightenment and libertarianism, did not at once assume a consciously national form. At this time, particularly in Bohemia, nationality and language could not be regarded as concepts of central cultural significance. Europe had just gone through a social upheaval and a prolonged, materially and spiritually exhausting counterreformation. Under such conditions, fundamental religious and philosophical questions stood in the foreground. This is why the liberties granted by Joseph II and endorsed by the general trend of European thought had such great significance for Dobrovský as well as for our entire people. In view of the crucial importance that the period of reformation had in Czech history, religious freedom was especially significant and welcome to the Czechs. Religious liberty—even though still incomplete—was followed by national and linguistic liberation, in the same way that the reformation was

¹ Augustin Smetana (1814-1851): Czech philosopher.

followed by a strengthening of national consciousness and enhanced linguistic development.

At first, language and nationality were perceived merely as necessary tools of enlightenment. It was only later that the perfection of language and intensification of national awareness came to be regarded as valuable in their own right, as goals worthy of special political commitment.

The Czech movement that began in the latter part of the eighteenth century, in common with similar movements throughout Europe, was basically progressive, enlightened, and free-thinking in the true sense of the word. Josephinism was the official expression for this ideology in the Austrian lands.

Dobrovský, the leading figure of our revival, was himself a Josephinist as well as a Freemason. Freemasonry was especially strong among the intellectuals. It is no accident that Dobrovský's first scholarly publication was concerned with combating superstition. He demonstrated that a fragment of the Gospel of St Mark, donated by Charles IV to the metropolitan cathedral, was not written by Mark himself. Anyone even slightly acquainted with Dobrovský's writings knows that the entire thrust of his thinking and scholarly work was marked by a passionate, enthusiastic, and thorough love of freedom. This was the source of his exemplary open-mindedness and his broad world outlook, without which his historical and literary work would have had considerably less influence. Dobrovský is not sufficiently well understood from this philosophy viewpoint. In some ways, he was too robust a spirit even for our awakeners, who found it difficult to free themselves from habitual modes of thought. Dobrovský's writings came alive only through the strength of his mind.

It is characteristic of Dobrovský that—like Kollár—he was a freethinking priest. [...] This is understandable, for in those days the clergy was still the major group of the intelligentsia, perhaps the only one; for this reason its contribution to our national movement was significant and beneficial. This contribution looms even larger when we recall that the pulpit was virtually the only school in which the mother tongue was taught.

This free thinking in Bohemia naturally had its roots in the Czech reformation, in the tradition of the Hussites and the Brethren. Our awakeners had resumed the development at the point where reaction had interrupted it. As soon as the small group of Brethren still remaining in Bohemia was granted tolerance, Komenský's *Labyrint světa* (The Labyrinth of the World) was among the first books to be published. The nature of the revival is clearly evident even in such details.

As we pointed out before, it is no coincidence that the first and the greatest among the leaders of the new Czech literary movement—in addition to the freethinking Dobrovský—were descendants of Bohemian Brethren and their Protestant followers: Kollár, Šafařík, Palacký. These men were defenders of the liberty of conscience and of other noble traditions inherited from the Reformation, traditions that survived the onslaught of counterreformation Catholicism. Dobrovský, Kollár, Šafařík, Palacký, all proclaimed the ideals of humanity. Palacký revealed to us the true grandeur of our past as practiced by the Bohemian Brethren. [...]

And now let us face the heart of the matter.

All the significance of our history is encompassed in this imperative: let us fulfill our humanist goals through moral and intellectual excellence. We must understand with our minds and hearts that pure humanism must not be merely a slogan of national revival but that the striving of Dobrovský, Kollár, and Havlíček must become the striving of one and all, that humanism as a goal and national programme must consistently determine our national tactics.

How are we going to survive as an independent nation? Our history as well as current developments are forcing us to come to a clear understanding of this question: how can a small nation survive and remain independent?

This question tormented our awakeners. It disturbed Dobrovský. All of Kollár's labor was directed toward finding the means of overcoming our inherent smallness. Palacký transposed Kollár's solutions from the realm of culture to that of politics. And of course Palacký could answer the question of how a small nation can survive no more satisfactorily than Kollár; after all, politics, like all practical sciences, depends upon theoretical principles. But if humanism is the ultimate aim of all our thought, it must also be the ultimate goal of our political activity. We will achieve humanism only through humanistic means—enlightened heads and warm hearts.

Reminders of our numerous historical battles for existence—the uprising ending with the defeat on the White Mountain, our decline, our revival during the French Revolution and eighteenth-century enlightenment, the revolution of 1848, the Polish uprising—all this impels the thoughtful Czech to ponder: violence or nonviolence, the sword or the plough, blood or sweat, death or life?

Not with violence but with love, not with the sword but with the plough, not with blood but with work, not with death but with life—that is the answer of our Czech genius, the meaning of our history and the heritage of our great ancestors.

That is our great task. We are on the right path. Palacký was still preoccupied by the past, and this gave his politics a conservative character. But Havlíček had already admonished us to turn to the living present and to derive our national strength from a firm grasp of reality. In theory, Palacký admitted as much but Havlíček was more thorough and energetic in living up to this principle. His commitment to this principle became evident during his dispute with Kollár. One lively Slavic lad, said Havlíček, is worth more than all the old Slavic divinities who were or will be dug up, cast or will be cast. Havlíček expressed everything in these words; our own lives are more important for future generations, and far nearer, than the lives of our misty ancestors.

This attitude is relevant not only to politics but also to our entire individual and national existence. It is the philosophical basis of an outlook that may be called 'realism.' I tried to formulate it in an abstract and scholarly way in my *Konkrétní logika* (Concrete Logic). The central imperative of this philosophical approach may be put this way: always strive to understand everything in its concrete reality, by going to its core. The first intellectual requirement is to understand things as they are, rather than to analyze processes of change and development. Naturally, the quality of any phenomenon is affected by its evolution, but attention must not be focused exclusively on historical change per se. Historicism often has an unwholesome effect even on individual personal character. A person lost in the stream of continual change becomes vague and indecisive in responding to the needs of everyday life.

The past should be subordinated to the present, although the past of course illuminates the present. For example, through a careful study of Kollár we can see our entire past in a meaningful way—the perspective of the present makes the past significant. Ever since I have begun to think about the Czech question, I have tried to focus on our actual life and our actual circumstances. Our history and ancient monuments were only significant to me as corroboration of current sociological observations. I have tried to follow my own path in these studies; I turned to others, mainly Havlíček and Palacký, only when I needed confirmation of my own findings. In contrast, historical empiricism has no such anchor in present reality; at best, it seeks to derive its convictions from the past and portrays reality as a mosaic of quotations from authorities of the past.

The two approaches just discussed apply to all intellectual work. The so-called historical influence may be nothing more than a mechanical acceptance of certain historical facts—or it may be a living force that flows organically from meticulous observation and analysis. Otherwise, history is not a teacher but merely a policeman.

The Czech question and the social question

Through a natural process of evolution, we have progressed from a Kollárian concept of humanism, taken in a one-sided, nationalistic sense, to a broader humanism with a greater social emphasis. I have tried to show that the social question was a central one in all the areas of our thought and work—in politics, literature, art, science, and philosophy. This development followed its natural course until today when the social question is in the very foreground of the Czech question. But the social problem of our nation leads us back to the fifteenth century, for it was then that we first attempted to solve it and we did a poor job. We must now expiate the year 1487.² If we fail to find a just solution to social demands, if we do not proceed in the spirit of our historic ideals, in the spirit of universal human ideals, if we turn from love to violence—then we will return to our grave never to be resurrected again.

The social question is not merely the problem involving workers, just as 1487 was not merely a problem involving peasants. The social question is not concerned with a particular class or caste, but it affects all of us. Yielding to the pressure of workers and granting universal suffrage constitutes only a partial and negative approach to the problem; the problem must be solved totally and positively, and this means that heads must become more enlightened, hearts must become warmer; it means that spirit must triumph over matter and narrow self-interest must be transcended.

The social question involves a decision between morality and immorality, between violence and effective humanism. As far as the reproach of internationalism levelled against the workers is concerned, I have come to the conclusion that our bourgeois class is no more 'national' than our labour class—rather less so, in fact. The accusations are baseless. In any case, as long as our writers and journalists continue to ignore the intellectual needs of workers, they have no right to level any reproaches whatever. A poor man barely earning his bread by the sweat of his brow can hardly afford to subscribe to a newspaper costing twenty-five florins or to buy expensive books and magazines. This is quite aside from the content—which is often such as to leave the worker's intellectual hunger unappeased.

² Referring to Palacký's vague formulation, Masaryk understood 1487 as the beginning of the aristocratic oligarchy based on a new serfdom and thus the final legal defeat of Hussite democratism. The modern historiography of Masaryk's time dismissed this very date as rather insignificant.

With regard to fundamental principles, I have stated several times that I reject the philosophic and sociologic basis of the social democratic programme. Socialist philosophy has developed from 'classical' philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This was the origin of the materialistic framework that so-called historical materialism accepted as the philosophical foundation of socialism. In questions dealing with an overall outlook on the world and the ultimate concerns of men, there can, of course, be no compromise. It is not my habit to speak lightly of such matters and to abandon my faith to the mercy of our liberalism and clericalism. I therefore simply repeat that I am decisively opposed to the materialistic view of the world. Nevertheless, I have learned to be tolerant, and I know that a materialist is not necessarily an evil man, nor is an antimaterialist a good one. I have had numerous occasions to observe that the philosophical and theological opponents of materialism are far from admirable persons, when judged by their deeds and lives rather than by their creed and words. If we antimaterialists truly lived in an antimaterialist way, the workers and the social democrats would be forced into the opposite camp.

I therefore make a distinction between the demands and practical political programmes of social democracy and its philosophical foundations; I try to differentiate between the justified demands of our downtrodden labor and the alien philosophy that was foisted upon it by our unjust society and our apathy.

On the whole, I find the specific political and social demands made by our workers to be justified, and I have always felt a moral duty to support these demands with all the means at my command. I am not an expert in economics, and I hesitate to make definite statements in this area. However, I think I can say that the critique made by Marx and other socialist thinkers is justified and generally correct, although the underlying theoretical concepts have no greater intrinsic value than other honest, carefully elaborated theories.

I can understand why social democrats have turned Marx into an untouchable authority, but I am not pleased by this attitude. In any case, I know perfectly well that I have no reason or right to oppose demands for justice or equality, no matter from whom such demands may come or from what principle they originate. "Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone?" And stones are exactly what we are giving our workers day by day—literary, philosophical, theological, political stones.

Since I see the solution to the social question primarily in terms of moral regeneration, I do not share the view that has been adopted in this matter by the clerical party, although I concede that the clerical concept in this case is

superior to that adopted by the liberals. Our clerical leaders, too, have understood the significance of the social question and they have surpassed both the Old Czechs and Young Czechs in this regard. Under the stimulus of a perceptive political leader on the papal throne, Czech Catholics are beginning to follow the road taken by progressive Catholicism in Germany and France.

If we are to fulfill the ideals of our ancestors and national awakeners, the ideals of universal world humanism so indefatigably proclaimed by Kollár, all segments of our nation must join in dedicated effort. Our aristocracy, in particular, has a great duty to perform; it is surely unnecessary to point out that it is our aristocracy, above all, who must expiate the year 1487.

But we must not wait for our nobles to take the lead. We all have our tasks to perform, new and old, duties continually growing in scope and number. We must begin at once to help answer the Czech question, and we must continue to answer it—individually and as a nation—every day anew.

Originally translated by Peter Kussi in ed. Rene Wellek, *The meaning of Czech History* by Thomas Masaryk (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1974). The excerpts used are from G. J. Kovtun ed. *The Spirit of Thomas G. Masaryk (1850–1937). An Anthology* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 61–66, 79–84.

HEINRICH FRIEDJUNG: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN GERMANY, 1859–1866

Title: *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859 bis 1866* (The struggle for supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866)

Originally published: Stuttgart–Berlin, J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, vol. I in 1897, vol. II in 1898

Language: German

The excerpts used are from the English edition: Heinrich Friedjung, *The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866*, translated by A. J. P. Taylor and W. L. McElwee, (London: Macmillan and Co. limited, 1935), pp. 302–312.

About the author

Heinrich Friedjung [1851, Roschtin (Cz. Roštín, Moravia) – 1920, Vienna]: historian and politician. Friedjung was the son of a Jewish tradesman. After studying history and German language in Prague, Vienna and Berlin he became a teacher at the Viennese *Handelsakademie* (academy of commerce) (1873–1879). He was subsequently relegated for his criticism towards the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* and pro-German sympathies. At the end of the 1870s, he entered the German national movement and worked together with Georg Schönerer. He was one of the authors of the 'Linz Program,' the political program of the German National Party (*Deutschnationale Partei*) of Schönerer drafted in 1882. From 1883 to 1886 Friedjung edited the *Deutsche Wochenschrift* (German weekly), and between 1886 and 1887 the *Deutsche Zeitung* (German gazette), the newspapers of the German National Party. The increase of antisemitism in Schönerer's nationalism led to the exclusion of Friedjung from the party. His attempts to create his own nationalist *Deutsche Volkspartei* (German People's Party) failed. From 1891 to 1895 he was a member of the Viennese city council. Starting in 1895, Friedjung worked predominantly as a historian, winning considerable reputation for his studies in recent history. Friedjung based his research on interviews with important political and military figures, and used his connections with the Austrian foreign ministry. He was closely affiliated with the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary between the years 1906 and 1912, Baron Aloys Lexa von Aehrenthal, whose 'aggressive' foreign policy resulted in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. In 1909 Aehrenthal offered Friedjung some Serbian documents, supposedly submitted to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade by a Serbian ministerial official, so that he could write about the 'Greater Serbia'

movement. Purportedly, the dangers invoked in the text supported the argument for an Austrian aggression against Serbia, which was to be realized in a matter of weeks. Friedjung's text (*Aktenstücke zur großserbischen Bewegung in Österreich-Ungarn*) was an attack on the Serbian representatives of Austria-Hungary and the Serbian government in the first place. Because of this text, some leaders of the Serbian national movement, represented by **Tomáš G. Masaryk** and Josef Maria Baernreither, sued Friedjung in 1909, and were able to prove that the documents he used were forged. This process, and mostly the accusation of using false documents, destroyed Friedjung's reputation. He began publishing again during the First World War, advocating the close cooperation of German Austria with the German Reich. However, his impact on Austrian politics was never as strong as in the late 1870s. His Jewish origin formally excluded him from the dominant group of Austrian-German nationalists, and heavily handicapped his later reception.

Main works: *Der Ausgleich mit Ungarn. Politische Studie über das Verhältniß Oesterreichs zu Ungarn und Deutschland* [Compromise with Hungary. Political studies on the Austrian attitude towards Hungary and Germany] (1877); *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859–1866* [The struggle for supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866] (1897–1898); *Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik* [The Crimean war and Austrian politics] (1907); *Österreich von 1848–1860* [Austria, 1848–1860] (1908–1912); *Aktenstücke zur großserbischen Bewegung in Österreich-Ungarn* [Documents on the Greater Serbian movement in Austria-Hungary] (1909); *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1884–1914* [Age of imperialism, 1884–1914] (1919–1922).

Context

During the 1860s, Austria was continuously modifying its political system. The liberal reforms were competing with the conservative stance, and centralism clashed with federalist tendencies. After the defeat at Königgrätz (Cz. Hradec Kralové), the weakened monarchy finally established the constitutional framework that remained valid till the end of its existence. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 was followed by the liberal constitution in the December of the same year. The Parliament (*Reichsrat*) ratified the budget and controlled the governments of the non-Hungarian subordinates of the Monarchy. Further liberal reforms were accompanied by an economical growth that was unprecedented in the history of Austria. However, in 1873, Austria was hit by the international crisis of the early 1870s which, in effect, weakened the position of the Liberals. In 1879, with the beginning of Czech political activism, the German liberal majority was broken. After the resignation of prime-minister Adolf Auersperg in 1879 and the emergence of a new government headed by Eduard Taaffe, the political situation in Austria was completely transformed. The new conservative government was supported by the clerical, Czech and Polish members of the Parliament.

The main preoccupation of Taafée and the subsequent conservative government of Kazimierz Badeni was to reach a compromise between the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia. Recent developments had situated the Slavic nationalities in a privileged position, due to their higher birth rates and increasing migration to the predominantly German-speaking cities and regions. The government's policy addressed these facts. By giving some rights to the Slavic nations—such as the division of the German university of Prague into German and Czech parts—the Germans were gradually losing their dominant position. This process culminated in 1897, when Badeni issued his language decrees, which acknowledged the Czech language as one of the official languages in Bohemia and Moravia. The decree demanded that the state officials of the province were to be given three years to master both German and Czech. The Germans of the monarchy considered themselves in danger, and Badeni was forced to resign under the violent manifestations of the Viennese mob.

On a more intellectual level, two alternative programs were envisaged by the Austrian Germans in order to ameliorate their loss of status. The first was to renew German supremacy in Austria. The second was to unify, in a more or less formal manner, the German regions of the monarchy with the German Empire. One of the most influential, though rather elitist, groups within this debate was the Pan-Germanic movement, which promoted a clearly anti-Austrian political program. Already in 1882, some of its most prominent members formulated the 'Linz Program' which postulated a closer union with Germany, and the separation of the most non-German provinces (Galicia and Bukovina) from the *Cisleithania*. Friedjung was among the authors of the 'Linz Program' and propagated its main arguments in numerous historical works. In *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859 bis 1866*, Friedjung did not support the dissolution of the monarchy openly, but pointed at the necessity of satisfying the political needs of Austrian Germans, who—unlike the other Austrian nationalities—could choose from among two loyalties: to the Habsburg monarchy or to the German state.

The first volume of Friedjung's account on the political conflicts of recent history deals with the unsuccessful attempt of the Austrian monarchy to strengthen its position in Germany between 1859 and 1866. Step by step, Prussia replaced Austria's dominant position in Germany. The short Austro-Prussian war of 1866 is the subject of the second volume. Friedjung describes Austria's political and military defeat and her separation from Germany. His criticism is directed on the backwardness of the Austrian state, unable to act and committing the mistake of underestimating the nationality

question, which, on the other hand, was used by Bismarck in his German policy. Friedjung militantly defends Ludwig von Benedek, the commander of the Austrian army, and points, rather, at the more general sources of the defeat, without sparing criticism for the members of the Habsburg dynasty. In the end, both in his résumé and in his interviews with the political and military leaders of 1866, Friedjung suggests that the separation of Austria and Germany was not eternal. Prussia's idea in the 1860s (and thereafter) to conceive of Germany in the form of a smaller and a bigger union, which had been rejected by Austria, was still a possibility in the 1890s. Friedjung interpreted the dual alliance between Austria and Germany in 1879 as the first step to a larger union with Germany.

Although Friedjung himself was probably the most influential Austrian historian of the late nineteenth century, his accounts of recent history did not initiate any new political debates. The book received positive reactions from the German readers (it was published in Germany), and was proclaimed by the Peter-Wilhelm-Müller-Stiftung in 1903 to be one of the most formidable works in recent history. In ideological terms, Friedjung reproduced the main tenets of the nationalists' stance. His book purported that the support of the Austrian Germans for the monarchy was not to be taken for granted; that it was the Germans who paid the price for the survival and stabilization of Austria after 1866; and that the ruling cadres of the state had to be more sympathetic towards Germans, as they still bore the main burden of the state's expenses and contributed to its flourishing. Understandably, Friedjung's historical works were not translated into the other languages of the monarchy. However, Friedjung became an object of harsh criticism from non-German politicians in the *Cisleithania* after the publication of his report on the high treason of Serb and Croat politicians in Austria in 1909—even if the statements by **Masaryk** were directed against the Austrian foreign ministry, rather than against Friedjung personally. As a co-founder of the program of German nationalism in Austria, and as an agent of aggressive Austrian foreign policy against Serbia, Friedjung's role was solely the formulation of political ideas, while he lacked the pragmatic perspective of a leader.

Ironically, the democratization of the Habsburg monarchy abruptly destroyed Friedjung's political hopes. The first democratic elections in 1907 were a disaster for the German nationalists. The main political actors of the new Parliament were the Christian-Social and the Social-Democratic parties, both vehemently supporting the existing Austrian state. Moreover, the national compromises in Moravia (1905), Bukovina (1910), and Galicia (1914) seemed to initiate a new political atmosphere whereby the restoration of

German domination in the monarchy would not be possible. German irredentism was thus not as big a threat for the future of Austria as it was perceived by Friedjung and other German nationalists. In the end it was not the Czech–German conflict that led to the dissolution of the monarchy.

Friedjung’s legacy was shaped by the growing antisemitism of the pan-German movement. During the First World War he was a fervent supporter of the German *Mitteuropa*-project, and in the following years he publicized the ideas he propagated in ‘The struggle for supremacy in Germany,’ aiming at a closer union between Austria and Germany. Due to his Jewish origin (among other reasons) he was never acknowledged as an intellectual supporter of the *Anschluss*. His main works ceased to be published in the early 1920s. However, as a historian, Friedjung is respected for his innovative mode of integrating personal interviews into his rendition of contemporary events.

MG

The struggle for supremacy in Germany 1859–1866

The verdict of history had been delivered and Austria had been defeated in the struggle with Prussia for supremacy in Germany. Austria had to pay for the suppression of all independence of thought ever since the Counter-Reformation. The system of Metternich and Francis had sapped the will and energy of the people and had produced a pleasure-loving generation which shrank from any great effort. By the time of the Revolution of 1848 all energy had departed from the very system of government. [...]

The leading men of 1866 had all grown up in the ideas of Metternich and the Restoration. They disputed the right of the peoples to control their own destinies; they underestimated the forces of nationality; they regarded treaties and legitimate rights not only as the sources of positive law, but even as the bases of historic development. They supported the system of the Holy Alliance and so committed themselves to a sinking cause. [...]

It is understandable that the War of 1866 left a feeling of bitterness in Austria and a desire for revenge. It seemed inconceivable that the long line of German Emperors of the House of Habsburg was at an end for ever; [...]

The great majority of the German Austrians greeted the German victories of 1870 with enthusiasm; the most embittered Austrian patriots were silenced after the battles of Wörth and Metz, and the Emperor wisely determined that the cry of revenge should never be revived.

The freedom from prejudice with which Francis Joseph concluded the alliance with Prussia and Italy, with the very powers who had robbed him of his dynastic inheritance, is without a parallel in history. He broke further with the traditions of the old Austria by terminating the Concordat with the Pope and establishing liberal institutions in both Austria and Hungary. The rising generation may have already forgotten what progress the empire owes to these changes; but their elders still remember with what contempt Austrian learning and education was regarded by cultured Europe. The army benefited most of all from this revival of intellectual activities. [...] Equally beneficial was the effect of the change on the Austrian finances. Those who experienced the three national bankruptcies of 1811, 1815, and 1867, never dreamt that the budget would be completely balanced scarcely a generation later.¹ This was partly due to the changed position of Austria in Germany and Italy. She had no longer to defend the Rhine against France, guard her northern frontier against a jealous neighbor, and at the same time keep army ready in Italy. The compromise with Hungary, although disadvantageous to Austria in its financial provisions, greatly strengthened her foreign policy; for the proud and patriotic Hungarians, who had served the empire unwillingly in 1859 and 1866, now became the chief supporters of its position as a great power. The division of forces, which had previously crippled the empire, was replaced by a concentration of policy directed towards the east, and as a result the empire was not really weakened by the defeats of 1859 and 1866.

But someone had to pay the price and the real sufferers by the defeat of 1866 were the Germans of Austria; they lost their political centre of gravity and have never recovered it. Once their gaze, when they wished to comprehend the policy of the empire, was limited only by the far horizon of Frankfurt, Milan, Constantinople, and Buda-Pest, the loss of their predominance in Germany, Italy, and Hungary confined their interests to petty questions of domestic policy, and the Government confidently assumed that their power was broken. But when Badeni acted as if the rights of Germans had been already partitioned among the other races of the Monarchy, the Germany Austrians forcibly reminded the Government that they were in a different position from the Slavs and Magyars, who must of necessity regard Austria as their home. The Germans, as partners in a great national culture, have another alternative open to them, as soon as they cease to be attached to Austria

¹ Julian Dunajewski (1821–1907): in the years 1880–1891 the Austrian minister of finance responsible for reforming the Austrian taxation system and balancing the state budget.

by their free choice and by the loyalty they have manifested for hundreds of years. Nothing could have been more foolish than to provoke such a train of thought in a people which has no desire to probe anew into the foundations of its political and national existence, but is anxious only to live and die in its hereditary connection with the dynasty and the Monarchy.

Taafee had already set out to increase the power of the Crown by encouraging the divisions among the German Austrians and the conflict between the nationalities, and for years this policy seemed to be successful; but it was destroyed by the mobs which swept through the streets of Vienna, Prague, and Graz, immediately before and after the fall of Badeni. It was made manifest that a policy which endangered the internal peace of the empire would in the end shake the very foundations of monarchical authority.

Austria-Hungary is, however, an empire whose destiny will always be determined by its foreign policy; and this depends primarily on relations with Germany, relations which can hardly be finally settled by the alliance of 1879: history points to a closer connection between the two countries and Bismarck himself said that the exclusion of Austria from Germany would only be the prelude to a closer union of the German race. Bismarck engineered the War of 1866 because he wanted to deprive the old Imperial House of the Imperial throne, but he sternly rejected the suggestion of seizing any part of the Austrian Empire. [...]

In July 1866, immediately after the battle of Königgrätz, Bismarck considered whether he should not offer Austria peace on the basis of the creation of a German Confederation, comprehending the Northern Federation, Austria, and the southern states. Circumstances were unfavorable to such an ambitious plan and Bismarck decided to content himself with uniting North Germany. But the idea was always present in his mind and in 1879 he proposed to Andrassy² that the alliance should be made a fundamental law by submitting it to the Parliaments of the two countries and incorporating it in their Constitutions. What he proposed was "a constitutional alliance against a coalition" which "should be brought into existence by the co-operation of all the constitutional elements, and be dissoluble only by the same co-operation, that is, with the consent of the Emperor, The Federal Council, and the Parliament in Germany, and of the Monarch and the two representative assemblies in Austria. An alliance so guaranteed would have been the logical conclusion of the movement for German unification, but the leading statesmen of Austria-

² Gyula Andrassy (1823–1890), the first constitutional Hungarian premier and minister of foreign affairs of the Monarchy between 1871 and 1879.

Hungary were not yet ready for a revival of the old national connection, and the idea will still need many years to mature. Bismarck gave one last glimpse of his hopes for the German people in the first speech from the throne which he drafted for William II and which was delivered on June 25, 1888: "I am loyal to the alliance with Austria with German fidelity, not merely because it is in existence, but because I regard this defensive alliance as a pillar of the European balance of power and, what is more, as a legacy of German history, welcomed to-day by the public opinion of the entire German race, and in consonance with the traditions of international law, which were of uncontested validity until 1866."

Until 1888 the Prussian statesmen had carefully avoided reviving the memory of the times before 1866, when they spoke of Austria-Hungary. But William II had not fought at Königgrätz like his father and grandfather: he could refer to the old German Confederation without reopening the wounds of 1866.

When the generation of the German civil war has been gathered to its fathers, the day will come for their heirs to realize the legacy of German history.

Translated by A. J. P. Taylor and W. L. McElwee in Heinrich Friedjung, *The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866*, (London, Macmillan and Co. limited, 1935), pp. 302–312.

YUSUF AKÇURA: THREE TYPES OF POLICY

Title: *Üç tarz-ı siyaset* (Three types of policy)

Originally published: Cairo, 1904, in numbers 24 (14 April); 26 (28 April); and 27 (5 May) of the newspaper *Türk*.

Language: Ottoman Turkish

The excerpts used are from the 1991 reprint published by the Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, pp. 19–24, 31–35.

About the author

Yusuf Akçura (Akçuraoğlu Yusuf or Yusuf Akchurin) [1876, Simbirsk (Russia) – 1935, Ankara]: historian, political theorist and activist. He was born to an upper-bourgeois family of Volga Tatars in Simbirsk, the home town of Lenin. Upon the death of his father, he was taken to Istanbul at the age of seven. Following his elementary education, Akçura was enrolled in the Military Academy, the seedbed of rising Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. In 1896, under the oppressive rule of Abdülhamid II, he was exiled to Trablusgarb (Tripoli) in Ottoman Libya for being involved in the clandestine Young Turk movement. He managed to flee to Paris in 1899, where he studied political science and history close to figures such as Albert Sorel and Émile Boutmy. He also linked up with the Young Turk exiles in Paris and published nationalist and pan-Turkist articles in the group's newspapers. In 1903 he returned to Russia, and was thereafter involved simultaneously in two different political movements in two separate countries. He played a leading role in the shaping of the nationalist agenda pursued by the Turkic peoples of Russia, who strove to secure political rights and achieve cultural autonomy within a nascent representative system in Russia. At the same time, he remained a prolific figure among the Young Turk circles, publishing profusely on the political and cultural significance of national identity in the Ottoman context. Akçura came back to Istanbul in 1908, in the wake of the Young Turk revolution, and was the driving force behind the 'Turkish Hearth' movement that served as the fulcrum of Turkish nationalism in the 1910s and 1920s. He founded and directed the most important Turkist journal of the time, *Türk yurdu* (Turkish homeland), in which, along with other Turkic exiles from Russia, he attempted to instill a consciousness about the cultural unity of all Turkic peoples of the world. He was also a founder, along with **Ziya Gökalp** and **Halide Edib**, of the *Halka Doğru* (Towards the people) movement (1912), which pursued a populist agenda, striving to inculcate the national idea among the Anatolian masses.

Akçura never became a member of the Committee of Union and Progress due to the Young Turk regime's continuing adherence (till the end of the Balkan Wars) to the 'Ottomanist' cause, which prescribed the incorporation of different ethno-religious communities under the idea of a common Ottoman nationhood. Following the Ottoman defeat in the First World War, Akçura was immediately embraced by the national resistance movement in Anatolia, due to the careful distance he had maintained from the Unionists. Upon the founding of the Republic, he became a member of the Turkish Parliament, and in the 1930s, worked as a professor of Turkish history at Istanbul University. In 1932, he was appointed as the first president of the Turkish Historical Society, hence playing a paradigmatic role in the shaping of the official narrative of 'national history' in Republican Turkey. Although a major fountainhead of Turkish nationalism at its moment of emergence, Akçura does not occupy as prominent a position in the Turkish national pantheon as, for instance, Ziya Gökalp. This was largely due to his abiding reputation as the architect of 'pan-Turkism,' a political movement that was marginalized by the Republican regime and appropriated by the extreme right.

Main works: *Üç tarz-ı siyaset* [Three types of policy] (1904); *Türk, Cermen ve İslavların münasebat-ı tarihiyeleri* [Historical relationships between the Turks, Germans and Slavs] (1914); *Şark meselesine ait tarih notları* [Historical notes on the Eastern Question] (1920); *Muasır Avrupa'da siyasi ve içtimai fikirler ve fikri cereyanlar* [Political and social thought and intellectual currents in contemporary Europe] (1923); *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dağılma devri* [The Ottoman Empire's period of disintegration] (1934).

Context

Yusuf Akçura composed 'Three types of policy' as a long article upon his return to his homeland in Russia, following a highly formative period of study in Paris. At this point, as a political exile who was not permitted to return to Istanbul, he was actively involved in promoting the cultural and political rights of the Turkic peoples of Russia, while maintaining contact with Young Turk groups in Istanbul, Paris and Cairo who strove to overthrow the regime of Abdülhamid II and reinstate the 1876 constitution. The article was sent to the newspaper *Türk* (Turk), published in Cairo by liberal Ottoman exiles. *Türk*, the first publication to use this ethnic designation as a title, was not an overt advocate of nationalist or Young Turk agendas, but, professedly, adopted the aim of correcting the negative European stereotypes about the Ottoman Turks. Akçura's choice of *Türk* as the venue for the publication of his article was a strategic and critical gesture, as he was quite affronted by the absence of the greater, non-Ottoman Turkish world in the intellectual agenda of the publishers. Published anonymously in 1904, the article was conceived as a response to the Ottomanist and cosmopolitan propensities of

the Young Turks, and must be considered the earliest manifesto of Turkish nationalism.

'Three types of policy' was the first systematic attempt to articulate and historicize the competing late Ottoman political strategies of reform and survival. Akçura identifies three distinct and alternative agendas devised by the Ottomans in their struggle to maintain the unity of the imperial conglomerate: the supra-national idea of the 'Ottoman nation'; the idea of a pan-Islamic union based on the dynastic Ottoman claim to the title of the caliph, the spiritual leader of all Muslims; and the nascent idea of a Turkish nation based on ethnic identity. With unemotional ease and remarkable pragmatic efficiency, Akçura lays down the strategic advantages and shortcomings of each policy. The first option, 'Ottomanism,' rooted in the *Tanzimat* reforms and adopted by the Young Turk opposition, is ruled out straight away for being profoundly unrealistic in an age of burgeoning ethnic nationalisms. Akçura claims that the French liberal model of nationality, appropriated by the reforming Ottoman elite and predicated upon principles of 'conscious individual will,' freedom and equality, had long been outdated and was already revised by the German model of nationality based on 'race' (*ırk*). For Akçura, the real debate concerns the latter two alternatives which present comparable challenges and advantages. The policy of pan-Islamism, he argues, with its rooted cultural foundations and global ambitions, has nevertheless to contend with the fact that the majority of the Muslim populations of the world are controlled by forceful colonial powers. The idea of a "Turkish political nation" based on ethnicity, Akçura confirms, is radically new and unprecedented, "never before conceived in any Turkish state in history." Although he celebrates the rise of the ethnically homogenous nation state as the apogee of historical evolution in the Western world, he still acknowledges that nationalism does not exist as an innate or historically rooted phenomenon, but needs to be actively undertaken as a broad political and cultural enterprise. This, he submits, is a particular challenge in the Ottoman domain, where, with the exception of a small and incipient scholarly community, the Turkish inhabitants lack the most basic notions of national history and identity.

Although Akçura makes an effort to maintain a neutral distance *vis-à-vis* the two policy alternatives, his preferences are, nevertheless, distinctly revealed throughout the article. Discussing the strategy of "Turkish unity," for instance, he alludes to the gradual confinement of religion within the personal sphere in an increasingly secular world. The survival and regeneration of religion in the modern world, he contends, is entirely dependent upon its subordination to the national cause. While severely lacking in a shared sense

of identity and national unity, most Turks, Akçura affirms, are Muslims; hence the possibility of using Islam as a cohesive tool, and of transforming it with respect to the broader and progressive outlook of the national cause.

Akçura approaches the question of Turkish nationalism with the sharp insights and impassive outlook of an outsider. Equipped with the experiences and predispositions of a non-Ottoman Turk from Russia, he was the first intellectual to propose a radical and challenging alternative to the existing paradigms of identity in the Ottoman domain. Motivated by the political and cultural struggle of the Turkic peoples against Russian hegemony, and informed by their incipient search for national identity, Akçura made a revolutionary leap in the context of Ottoman political thought and called attention to the significance of Turkish nationalism as a viable political strategy. What he proposed to his Ottoman readers in 'Three types of policy' was a novel and daring geopolitical agenda that would entirely transfigure the rehearsed regional roles and perspectives of the Ottoman state. Anticipating the further contraction of imperial territories in Southeast Europe, Akçura maintained that a shift in the center of gravity of the Empire towards the north-east would become inevitable. What this entailed, of course, was the cultivation of an expansionist policy in Asia, demanding the unification of all Turkic groups under Ottoman leadership, and thereby constituting a new 'axis of power' in the world.

That this conjecture would imply a significant loss of territory for the Empire (especially in the Balkans, its heart and soul) and would require the assimilation or annihilation of ethnic groups coexisting with the Turks in Anatolia, made it anathema to the standard Ottoman reader at the turn of the twentieth century. For most Ottomans, a national identity based on Turkish ethnicity seemed as distant a prospect as the utopian ideal of *Turan*. Upon its initial publication, Akçura's article had a limited but quite negative impact among the Young Turk community in Cairo. The editor of *Türk* called it an "irrational literary exercise," attempting to separate and amplify the ethnic component of a unified Ottoman and Islamic identity. The second publication, again from Cairo, reached a broader audience, especially among the Turkic groups in Russia. The real impact, however, came with the third edition, which was printed in Istanbul in 1911, upon the loss of the last African territories of the Empire in a war with Italy, and on the eve of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The loss of the remaining Balkan territories as a result of these wars constituted a watershed for the upsurge of Turkish nationalism, as the dominant rhetoric of "preserving the Empire," upheld by generations of Ottoman reformers, ceased to make much sense any more. At this junc-

ture, Akçura's article enjoyed great popular appeal and became a central point of reference for a growing number of young nationalist activists in the Ottoman world. With a truncated empire resting entirely on Asian soil, and with waves of Balkan refugees fleeing into Anatolia, political Turkism, and even the pan-Turkist utopia, offered to many young and disillusioned Ottomans a sense of hope for the future and compensation for lost lands. It was also after 1913, following the acute trauma of the Balkan Wars, that the official position of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (patently 'Ottomanist' up to that point) verged on embracing the nationalist agenda of the Turkists. It is no coincidence, for instance, that following the final collapse of the Empire at the end of the First World War, Enver Paşa, a member of the Unionist 'Triumvirate' leadership, was killed on the Afghan border while futilely leading his local Turkic 'resistance' fighters against the Soviet Red Army.

Never a ground-breaking theorist, Yusuf Akçura was, nevertheless, a far-sighted strategist whose ideas played a definitive role in the shaping of Turkish nationalism during and after the demise of the Empire. Although the pan-Turkic vision was categorically and officially rejected during the Republican era, still, a strong consciousness about 'racial' and cultural links with the Central Asian 'motherland' was maintained and cultivated, especially by right wing governments. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this national 'affection' turned into an appetite, albeit with limited impact, for growing cultural influence.

AE

Three types of policy

Three distinct political prospects were conceived and pursued in the Ottoman lands since the rise of a Western-inspired yearning for progress and empowerment: the first was to assemble an Ottoman nation by uniting and representing the various nations subordinate to the Ottoman government. The second was to unite all Muslims politically under the administration of the government in question by taking advantage of the Caliphal right inherited by the Ottoman dynasty (this is what the Europeans call "Pan-Islamism"). The third is to form a political Turkish nation based on ethnicity.

So far, the first two options have had a profound impact on the general policies of the Ottoman state. The latter, on the other hand, can only be encountered in the works of certain writers. [...]

The official policy of forging an Ottoman nation was initiated at the time of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839). The sultan's well-known dictum [is quite illustrative of the new agenda]: "I would like to observe the religious differences of my subjects only when they enter their mosques, their synagogues or their churches." It was only natural that this policy gained acclaim and was deemed an applicable alternative in the Ottoman lands in the context of the early and mid-nineteenth century. At that time, with the lasting impact of the French Revolution, conceptions of nationality were informed by the French doctrine advocating conscientious choice as the basis of national [identity], rather than lineage and race. Sultan Mahmud and his followers were deluded by this doctrine, about which they had only superficial knowledge. Thus, they believed in the possibility of blending and consolidating the ethnically and religiously diverse subjects of the state by means of freedom, equality, security and mutual respect. [...] When the criterion of nationality was reinterpreted by the Germans in a more realistic manner on the basis of ethnicity, the empire of Napoleon [III] crumbled with the war of 1870–1871, and from that moment onward, the political vision that was the *Ottoman nation* lost its only source of support. [...]

With the failure of the policy of Ottoman nationality, the policy of Islam arrived on the scene. This idea, identified as Pan-Islamism by the Europeans, was instigated by the Young Ottoman party, which, to some extent, participated in the policy of forging an Ottoman nation. Many Young Ottoman poets and officials who started out by championing the "motherland" and "Ottomanism" [...] later came to adopt a standpoint founded on Islam [...]. Hence, taking advantage of the existing religious unanimity, they made every effort to unite all Islamic constituents, first those in the Ottoman domains and later in the entire globe, regardless of their ethnic differences. They recognized the need to unite all Muslims as one nation, following the dictum memorized by all Muslim children: "nation and religion are one." [...]

The contemporary sultan [Abdülhamid II] attempted to employ the title Caliph, instead of traditional titles such as Sultan and Padishah. Religion and Islam acquired a greater role in his overall policy [...]. Envoys were sent to inner Africa and the land of China, which are home to large Muslim communities. The Hijaz *Hamidiye* Railway [linking Damascus to Medina] was built as a most potent instrument of the [Islamist] policy. Yet, with this political doctrine, the Ottoman establishment was reverting to the form of the theocratic state that the *Tanzimat* strove to abandon. [...]

The idea of creating a Turkish political nationality based on ethnicity is very recent. I do not believe that such an idea ever existed in the Ottoman

state or in any of the Turkish states in history [...]. [But] it is certain that recently there has emerged a circle in Istanbul, a scientific rather than a political one, which advocates the idea of a Turkish nationality. Increasing contacts between Ottomans and Germans, and the Turkish youth's increasing familiarity with German studies on history and language must have played a crucial role in the emergence of this circle. Because, instead of the insubstantial and declamatory political rhetoric espoused by the French-devotees, this young circle adheres to solid knowledge, discreetly, patiently and rigorously achieved. [...]

I do not know whether there are supporters of the idea [of Turkism] outside of Istanbul, in other parts of the Ottoman realm. Yet the policy of Turkism, similar to that of Islamism, is universal; it is not circumscribed by the Ottoman borders. Thus, one also needs to consider other parts of the world inhabited by Turks. I presume that the idea of unifying the Turks exists ambiguously in Russia, inhabited by a large number of Turks [...]. In any case, the idea of creating a political nation based on ethnicity is too recent and not quite pervasive. [...]

Now, let us consider which one of the three policies is beneficial and applicable [...]. Constituting an Ottoman nation is the only solution for preserving the Ottoman state within its current boundaries. But, does the actual potency of the Ottoman state rest upon the preservation of its present geographical form? [...] The crucial question [in this regard] is whether any prospect of amalgamation is feasible for religiously and ethnically diverse communities that have never ceased fighting. As discussed above, this experiment ended in failure. [...]

Now, let us consider the value and feasibility of the policy of an Islamic Union for the Ottoman state. With the implementation of this policy, religious hatred and enmity will intensify among Ottoman subjects, which will entail the loss of territories largely inhabited by non-Muslims, and hence, the eventual weakening of the Ottoman state. Besides, the Turks will be divided by religious disparity, and ethnic fraternity will be ravaged by religious strife.

Yet, in spite of all these shortcomings, all Muslims living under Ottoman sovereignty, and therefore the Turks, will be joined together [...] as a strong community, the community of Islam, more tightly knit than a [diverse] Ottoman nation. More important is [the long term prospect] of a powerful alliance among all Muslims [around the world], and the inauguration of a formidable union based on religion, which could survive among the great entities to be formed by the union of Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Slavic, Latin or even the Yellow races. [...]

Although the new laws ordained by some Muslim states deviate from the *sharia*, their fundamentals are still linked to Islamic precepts. Arabic is still the only language of religion. Moreover, it is the scientific and literary language for the Muslims of various regions [...]. In sum, one could argue that Islamic civilization continues to exist in its former unity. [...]

One could confidently assert that Islam is still quite powerful. The internal obstacles to be encountered in applying the policy of Islamic unity upon this basis will be tolerable. Yet the external obstacles are going to be overwhelming. On the one hand, all Islamic states are under the influence of Christian states. On the other hand, with a few exceptions, all Christian states possess Muslim subjects [in their colonies].

As it is against their interests, [the Christian states] will do everything to prevent their Muslim subjects' allegiance to external political centers and to a universal ideal that might yield significant results in the future. Moreover, they could very well enforce this strategy with the power and influence they hold over the Islamic states. Therefore, they will be able to resist, perhaps even successfully, the attempts of the foremost Islamic power, the Ottoman state, to implement the policy of Islamic union.

Let us now consider the benefits of the policy of Turkish unity. The Turks of the Ottoman realm will bond firmly with religious as well as ethnic ties. Some Muslim elements [of Ottoman society] who are not Turks originally, but have been Turkified to a certain extent, will further identify with Turkishness. And it will also be possible to Turkify those who have never considered themselves Turks.

But the real benefit [of this policy] is that it will facilitate the union of all Turks dispersed in eastern Europe and in a large part of Asia, who share a single race, language, similar customs and for a majority, a single religion. Thus, it will enable the formation of a great political nation on a par with other large nationalities. The Ottoman state, as the strongest and most modernized among the Turkish communities, will play the most significant role within this alliance. In a distant future, a vision evoked by recent events, a Turkish universe will emerge between the universes of the white and the yellow races. Within this middle-world, the Ottoman state will assume the task the Japanese envisioned for themselves in the realm of the yellow race. [...]

The internal complications involving the implementation of the policy of Turkish unification are greater than those linked to the Islamic policy. Although there is an increasing awareness among the Turks about the nationality question, this, as mentioned before, is a fairly recent development. Conceptions of Turkishness, Turkish literature, and visions of Turkish unification

must be perceived as newborn children. The Turkish cause lacks the organizational capacity and the ardent and vivacious mentality of Islam; in short, it lacks the materials and the groundwork needed to constitute a solid union. Today, most Turks suffer from a state of historical amnesia.

One should not forget, though, that the majority of the Turks who will conceivably unite in our time belong to the Islamic faith. For this reason, Islam could be considered an important factor in shaping a broad Turkish nationality. There are those who portray religion as an agent in their attempt to define nationality. If Islam were to have a [real] function in the unification of the Turks, it is necessary for it to undergo change [from inside] in such a manner as to accommodate the birth of nations, as Christianity has done recently. This change is all but imperative. In our age, the prevalent [nationalistic] currents are based on ethnicity. Religions, in and of themselves, are gradually losing their political significance and power. They are becoming more personal than social. Freedom of [religious] choice is replacing religious solidarity in societies [...]. Thus religion is able to maintain its social and political influence only by supporting and serving ethnicity. [...]

The following conclusions can be derived from the foregoing deliberations: although it carries certain benefits for the Ottoman state, [the idea of] constructing an Ottoman nation is entirely impracticable. The policies of Islamic or Turkish unification involve an equal amount of benefits and drawbacks for the Ottoman state. In terms of their implementation, again, the shortcomings and merits of the two options are comparable.

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

JOVAN CVIJIĆ: ON NATIONAL WORK

Title: *O nacionalnom radu* (On national work)

Originally published: *Srpski književni glasnik*, 1907, vol. XVIII, No. 5, pp. 355–362.

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from Jovan Cvijić, *Govori i članci*, (Belgrade: Napredak, 1921), pp. 51–71.

About the author

Jovan Cvijić [1865, Loznica (west Serbia) – 1927, Belgrade]: geographer. He studied natural sciences and mathematics at the *Velika škola* in Belgrade, the first high school, later university, in Serbia. He continued his advanced studies in physical geography and geology at the University of Vienna (1889–1893), where he defended his doctoral dissertation. Between 1888 and 1925, he conducted intensive fieldwork in the Balkans, researching the geology, “geomorphology,” geography and anthropology of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. He was the founder of the discipline of anthropogeography in Serbia, and, starting from 1905, the first professor at the Department of Ethnology at the School of Philosophy in Belgrade University. During his lifetime, he became the rector of the university twice and was a founding member and long-time president of the ‘Serbian Geographic Society,’ a president of the Serbian Royal Academy, and a member of many foreign academies and associations. Jovan Cvijić was one of the most authoritative and internationally recognized Serbian scientists of the period. His scientific authority rested on the fact that his main research method was based on first-hand observation and intensive fieldwork. He tried to relate different psychological types to geomorphological profiles, pointing to the close relation of cultural forms (housing, clothing, organization of space and social organization) and ethno-psychological characteristics to the environment. His major anthropogeographic work, ‘The Balkan Peninsula and Southern-Slavic countries’ (based on the Cvijić’s public lectures at the Sorbone, published in 1916 under the title *La péninsule balkanique. Géographie humaine*, and later complemented with the study of the physical and social typology of the South Slavs, to be published in Serbian in 1922), won him the fame of being the founder of ethno-psychology in Serbia—a discipline subjected to ideological criticism in communist Yugoslavia. As a member of the Governmental Commission, established at the beginning of the First World War, he took active part in the peace

negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, justifying Serbian territorial claims with the results of his anthropogeographical research. During the second half of the twentieth century, his work came under closer scrutiny, and his presumed nationalist biases became an object of criticism. The question was whether, and if so, to what degree, his work legitimized the Serbian politics of the time, thus helping to promote the idea of Greater Serbia. Today, his ideas are still kept alive in many public forums, especially on the Internet, where conflicting views on his role in the construction of national policy and national identity are expressed.

Main works: *Morphologische und glaciale Studien aus Bosnien, der Herzegovina und Montenegro* 3 vols. [Morphological and glacial studies in and from Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro] (1900–1901); *La péninsule balkanique, géographie humaine* (1918); *Govori i članci* 2 vols. [Speeches and articles] (1921); *Geomorfologija (Knjiga druga)* [Geomorphology (second book)] (1926).

Context

The text is a published version of the public lecture that Cvijić delivered to the 'Serbian Sisters' Circle' of the National Women's Organization on 18 February 1907. It represents an intellectual fusion of science and patriotism, so characteristic of both that period and the following decade. The 'Serbian Sisters' Circle' was a charitable patriotic organization that nourished patriarchal values, including the heroic image of Serbian men. This was an idealistic view which upheld the importance and inevitability of patriotic duties towards "the fatherland." Seven years after Cvijić gave this speech, he found an opportunity to prove his national loyalty and fervent patriotism.

At the beginning of the First World War, he was appointed a member of a government commission aimed to prove and justify Serbian war claims in scientific terms. **Nikola Pašić**, the prime minister at the time, argued in favor of expanding Serbian territories as much as possible, for he thought that only a large state would provide the long-lasting protection of Serbian interests. Although Cvijić was closer to the Yugoslav orientation and did not completely agree with Pašić, he nevertheless remained part of the scientific team. The text illustrates the intellectual atmosphere of the time, when a significant number of eminent scientists supported national and political claims. Cvijić's argumentation, articulated both in this text and at the Paris Peace Conference, relied on the method of collecting ethnographic data, through which he tried to demonstrate the principle of territorial unity and shared national characteristics such as origin, language, tradition and political organization. In the quoted lecture, Cvijić uses demographic, geographic and cultural arguments both to draw the borders of the Serbian nation and to describe the present

position of the Serbian people in different parts of what he considered to be the Serbian ethnic territories. Furthermore, the author advocates Serbia's central place in the Balkans and beyond, both from a strategic and political point of view, but also in view of its economic, communicational and cultural predominance in the area. This way, it becomes possible for Cvijić to promote the creation of a Greater Serbia as something that "naturally" ensues from the country's unique location within the regional and the continental center-periphery constellations, and, at the same time, as an arrangement that would be advantageous for Western Europe. Here, geography rather than history comes to underwrite the historical destiny, political role, and strategic importance of the Serbian state.

In the period between 1915 and 1919, Cvijić published nine books in French and English, providing scholarly, mostly ethnographical, arguments to support the territorial claims of the new Yugoslav state. His concepts of the Balkan psychic types, varieties and social character has been echoed in the interwar debates on the Yugoslav "national character" presented in the work of **Vladimir Dvorniković**. These ideas became more prominent particularly at the end of the twentieth century, when Cvijić was re-discovered, in order to culturally legitimize the political claims of nationalistic circles for the territorial expansion of Serbia.

IE

On national work

Looking at our country as a whole on the map of Europe, the first thing that usually comes to mind and is in many ways accurate, is that it has a difficult geographical position. It would be more accurate to say that Serbia has both an important geographical position and an important ethnographical position and its position may therefore, according to the circumstances, be either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. But that position is constantly a serious matter, and the people inhabiting the country should have considerable abilities and be able to sustain and make use of the favorable aspect of its geographical position.

Serbia is situated in the central part of the northern Balkan Peninsula. Furthermore, it has a northern border facing Central Europe which is completely open. The shortest and easiest communication routes linking Europe, particularly Central Europe, that is to say Germany and Austria, with Asia and the Suez Canal pass through Serbia.

What is more, Serbia is located in a central position in the ethnographical area of the Serbian nation, large parts of which lie in Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

Its contacts with Central Europe are far stronger and more diverse than those of Bulgaria and Romania, which lie on more peripheral positions in the Balkans and around the Danube. Bulgaria has no borders with Europe and, while Romania does have such borders, they are not, due to the Carpathians, as open to Europe as are those of Serbia.

Leaving aside the minor national-political consequences stemming from these characteristics of geographical and ethnographical position, let us take a look at only the two major consequences:

Our country, that is the territory it covers today, is oriented toward having its liveliest economic links with Central Europe. However, I do not think that Serbia, thanks to its geographical position, is inevitably and solely linked to Central Europe. I shall explain this a little later. Besides economic links, our country is oriented toward spiritual and cultural links with Europe, particularly Central Europe, more than any other Balkan country. In this respect, we are in a particularly advantageous position, and we have already enjoyed considerable cultural benefit from it.

However, due to the fact that we are a free state and are situated in the central ethnographical area of the Serbian nation, which is for the greater part under the control of two neighboring states, we are a dangerous country from a national-political point of view. Furthermore, Central Europe has economic and economic-political interests in the Balkans as a result of natural developments and natural necessities. Besides this, the route through Serbia to Salonica is the most natural route to the Suez and further to Asia Minor and Central Asia. On account of our ethnographical position and importance, we are therefore a threat to Austria-Hungary and, on account of our central geographical position and the Morava-Vardar communications route, we sit like an obstacle to the whole of Central Europe, and that is why the conflict of interests between Serbia and Central Europe arises.

But it is actually because of our important geographical position and because of the above-mentioned difficulties that we can also count on some advantageous aspects of our geographical position. Those advantageous aspects are all the stronger because many of our own people live outside of Serbia. In recent years, due to the new grouping of European powers and to other reasons, it has become clear that we have common interests with Western European states and that we can find even more. Western Europe needs a bulwark in the central part of the Balkan Peninsula against the economic-

political aspirations of Central Europe and against its advance towards Salonica. It is clear that Turkey cannot be that bulwark.¹ Turkey's integrity had been preserved earlier too on account of Russia, and not because of Central Europe, whose aspirations were not clear until recently. It is now known that the Balkan Peninsula should be protected from Central Europe, and that is why small Danube states have gained in importance for Western European policies. This is particularly true in the case of Serbia due to its geographical and ethnographical importance. There can, therefore, be no doubt that we can identify our national interests with those of Western Europe or that we can succeed in turning our national issues into European issues.

Furthermore, on account of the diverse national interests that we have in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary, we are not compelled to conduct a unilateral policy with Bulgaria alone, although constant contacts should be sought with Bulgaria in order to find the basic principles for a true agreement and for the creation of a Slav block in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula. Due, however, to the above-mentioned reasons, we can also find common interests, contacts and bases for friendly dialogue with other Danube and Balkan states and nations. We have happily started to emerge from a "magnificent isolation" which even England could not endure.

Although we are a landlocked country, we are not in the same geographical position as Switzerland. Such frequently heard comparisons are not accurate. We firstly have the freely navigable Danube and, via it, we have access to the Black Sea; Switzerland does not have such a river. Furthermore, we are only a day away from Salonica. When we are ensured transit, the Salonica maritime link is of exceptional importance to us. In this case we are in a more favorable position than both Romania and Bulgaria, from which it takes days to pass through the enclosed Black Sea, through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and only then to reach the Aegean Sea, which is open to the world. Of extreme importance to Serbia is a Danube-Adriatic railway, which could end at Scutari or Bar and to which the interests of some big countries are also linked, despite the well-known opposition²; such a railway would also be of national importance to us. I have put all this forward in order to demonstrate that our geographical position does not make us dependent ex-

¹ At one time, England counted on Bulgaria for being that bulwark against Russia; it then helped Bulgaria considerably, and it is mainly thanks to England's help that Eastern Rumelia was ceded to Bulgaria [Author's footnote].

² Cvijić refers to the Austro-Hungarian plans aiming at creating a rail connection from Vienna to the Aegean (the so-called Sanjak railway) which would avoid Serbian territory.

clusively on Central Europe. Furthermore, the Mediterranean countries, to which we have access through the aforementioned communications links, had, until the construction of the Suez Canal, become somewhat of a back-water and been outside the great world communications routes. They have, however, now gained in strength and become extremely great consumer forces. If difficulties still remain for those communications and export directions for Serbia, human energy can overcome even far greater difficulties than those. But all reasonable people know that the most important direction for our economic movement must not remain unused, that direction which our geographical position orients us primarily, that is the direction of movement towards Central Europe.

We should strive to show readiness to bring our economic interests in line with those of Central Europe, particularly Austria-Hungary. This should, of course, be done on a fair basis that is acceptable to us. The economic aspect of our geographical position would thus be made easier.

Our country also has diverse internal characteristics, which stem from the particular ethnographic composition of the population and from the country's ethnographic and geographical position.

Ethnographically speaking, Serbia is made up of the western parts of the Serbian nation, the nation of the Dinaric system, and, with new territories, it has entered into the zone of the Morava-Vardar basin population. It comprises, therefore, national parts of different dialects and, to a certain extent, different psychological characteristics. They are linked in Serbia, made equal and feel as a whole. And, in this aspect too, Serbia fulfils the condition of a Serbian land that should be a national center. It has anticipated the difficulties of a greater Serbia and virtually resolved the problem by joining two national parts, which are to some extent different but, nonetheless, not as different as those between northern and southern Germans or northern and southern Italians. But certain instincts have been retained, on account of which southern regions tend more toward Macedonia, while western regions tend toward Bosnia. I am of the opinion that these differences are not so great as to represent a cause of political weakness for Serbia. I therefore do not think that they will be able to have an impact on the unity of national-political feeling and thought.

Furthermore, from an ethnographic point of view, Serbia has received more than any other Balkan country. Its population originates from all its regions. Besides, other Balkan Slav populations are represented in it, but they have merged, adapted to one another and are virtually form one psychological group. All Serbian lands are represented very strongly amongst the intel-

ligentsia in Serbia too. On account of its geographic position, important communication routes, its European borders and links between Europe and the East, Serbia has received many different views, ideas and customs. These have been supplemented by immigrants from all Serbian lands, including, for the most part, their greatest minds. There has been the clashing, interweaving and merging of these different capabilities and predispositions. And therefore, in addition to other causes, a spiritual and moral seething and churning is still underway in Serbia, and a vast amount of vital energy of various types and values is evolving. There is more such seething and churning in Belgrade than in any other major capital. Like all spiritual friction and interweaving, this cannot but lead to major results in many directions. The only thing that is not clear is the extent of the influence on Serbia's political power. If all those intellectual and spiritual forces were to merge into one entity, then Serbia would not lose anything of its simplicity of thought and feeling; its political strength as a whole would thus be strengthened. It seems to me that such a merger has not been completed in many cases.

Translated by Linda Krstajić, Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

ISMAIL QEMALI: MEMORANDUM SENT TO LORD EDWARD GREY

Title: *Memorandum presented to Lord Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs and President-in-Chief of the Conference of Ambassadors of the Great Powers in London*

Originally published: Originally written in 1913 as a private memorandum

Language: French

The text used is from Ismail Qemali, *Përmbledhje dokumentesh*, ed. by T. Hoxha, (Tirana: Sh.B “8 Nëntori,” 1982), pp. 232–235.

About the author

Ismail Qemali bej Vlora (also known as **Ismail Kemal Pasha**) [1844, Vlora, (*It.* Valona, present-day west Albania) – 1919, Rome]: politician and publicist. He was born into a noble family and received his primary education in his native town of Vlora. Like many other Albanians, after graduating from the ‘Zosimea School’ in Janina (*Gr.* Ioannina, *Tur.* Yanya) in 1859, he moved to Istanbul, where he began his career in the Ottoman administration. He served as a counselor to Midhat Pasha during the preparation of the Ottoman constitution of 1876. Soon he became one of the main activists of Albanian nationalism in Istanbul. He joined the ‘Albanian Committee of Istanbul’ and published several articles demanding the implementation of decentralizing reforms, which was for him the only way to save the Ottoman Empire from its final demise. By the end of the 1890s, he became one of the leaders of the Albanian movement. On 28 April 1900, fearing persecution due to his political activity, he escaped from Istanbul with his family, fleeing first to Athens, and then to Rome, London, and finally Brussels. It was during this period that he formulated his program, the main postulate of which was the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans. According to Ismail Qemali, this would allow Albanians to fully implement highly needed educational and economic reforms. Simultaneously, he published several articles in the European and Albanian press. Following the changes implemented as a result of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, he was elected deputy of the region of Berat and became one of the leaders of the liberal opposition in the new Ottoman Parliament (see **Prince Sabahaddin**, *A second account on Individual Initiative and Decentralization*). Ismail Qemali was one of the leaders of the Albanian uprisings of 1910–1912. He directed the proceedings of the assembly gathered in Vlora, which resulted in the proclamation of Albanian independence on 28 November 1912. He was elected Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first

Albanian Government (4 December 1912–1 January 1914). After the fall of his government, he spent several years in Europe, mostly in Italy, where he died in 1919.

Main works: *Kujtime* [Memories] (1917).

Context

The aggravation of the situation in the Balkans and the outbreak of the first Balkan War in 1912 entirely changed the political priorities of the Albanian movement. The defeat of the Ottoman army, the advance of the Serbian army into Kosovo, and inside Albania to Elbasan, the occupation of Shkodra (*It.* Scutari, *Srb.* Skadar) by the Montenegrin army, and finally the Greek army's occupation of territories in the Epirus and Macedonia were seen by Albanian activists as an effort to divide what they perceived as Albanian lands—a turn of events that was reminiscent of the Eastern Crisis of 1878–1881. Hence, on 28 November 1912, the assembly of the Albanian delegates gathered in Vlorë decided to declare the full independence of the new Albanian state. A week later, a new government was founded with Ismail Qemali as its Prime Minister.

For a long time, Ottoman and European circles treated Ismail Qemali as a moderate politician. His political program was not as radical as **Sami Frashëri's** as it hardly ever mentioned full independence. Ismail Qemali rather concentrated on issues of cultural and economic autonomy. Even during the general uprising in northern Albania and Kosovo against the rule of the Young Turks, his request was for the establishment of Albania as an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire. This request frequently appeared in different documents of the time, the most complete and most important being the *Memorandumi i Gërçes* (Gërçe memorandum), written jointly by Ismail Qemali and Luigj Gurakuqi. Ismail Qemali, as Abdyl Frashëri before him, was conscious of the necessity of an external ally for the Albanian movement. He first tried to strike an alliance with Greece in their common struggle against the 'Slavic and Turkish threat.' But Athens had rather different aspirations for the future of the Albanian lands, especially those in the south, envisioning their incorporation to the Greek state. Qemali turned then his attention to Italy, but with the outbreak of the first Balkan War, there was no time for undertaking any concrete steps. After the proclamation of independence, moreover, the priorities of the Albanian national movement changed radically.

From the very beginning, the activity of Qemali's government focused mostly on foreign affairs. The main concern was the international recognition

of the new state and its territorial integrity. The government in Vlora followed the line of earlier political programs which demanded the geographical composition of an independent Albania to be that of the four former Ottoman provinces inhabited mainly by Albanians. This postulate was firmly opposed by Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, which in accordance with their national and political programs aimed for the expansion of their respective territories. The participants at the Conference of Great Powers Ambassadors, held in London from November 1912 to August 1913 focused mainly on the issue of the future Albanian frontiers. As had happened earlier during the Congress of Berlin, Albanian national organizations within the country and Albanian communities of the diaspora sent letters, memoranda and other documents to the London conference in support of Albanian demands.

The memorandum presented to Lord Edward Grey, who presided over the London Conference of Ambassadors, was one of the most important attempts undertaken by the Vlora government to present the Albanian view concerning the final arrangement of territorial disputes. The text included the widely known postulates regarding the historical circumstances and the future organization of the Albanian state. The authors of the memorandum put an emphasis on the geographical shape of this state. They claimed that the 'natural' Albanian territories comprised the following areas: north, to the town of Pejë (*Srb.* Peć, *Tur.* İpek), Prishtina (*Srb.* Priština); east, to Shkup (*Tur.* Üsküb, *Mac.* Skopje); south-east, to Manastir (*Gr.* Monastiri, *Mac.* Bitola); south, to Janina and down to the southernmost point of Preveza (*Tur.* Preveze). The comparison with the earlier demands to unify the four former provinces (*vilayets*) of Shkodra, Janina, Kosovo and Manastir into one Albanian *vilayet* reveals clearly that there were several important changes, since the district (*sancak*) of Novi Pazar and other lands to the east of Skopje and south of Preveza were left out of the visualized state territory. It should also be noted that the rhetoric and nature of argumentation had changed. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the legitimacy for such territorial claims in the diverse Albanian political programs was sought in the historical past. In support of the Albanian claims, the memorandum argued that any alternative territorial arrangement different from the one proposed would jeopardize the economic, social and political existence of the new Albanian state. Therefore, from a rather romantic, past-oriented attitude, the Albanian national movement shifted gradually towards a more state-oriented, modernist one.

The decision of the London Conference did not fulfill the Albanian demands. A compromise was achieved between the French-Russian proposals

on the one hand, and, on the other, ideas supported by Austria-Hungary and Italy. Albania was recognized within its present borders (although some slight corrections did take place in 1924–25) and as such the borders of the Albanian state were confirmed by the Protocol of Florence, signed on 17 December 1913. In nationalist Albanian historiography, this symbolizes the partition of the nation into three parts; Kosovo was annexed by Serbia, Çamëria (*Gr. Tsamouria*) was annexed by Greece, and the remaining part became the state of Albania, frequently called by nationalists ‘Londonese-Albania.’ It was at this point that a new phase of the so-called Albanian Question emerged, namely the quest for the unification of ethnic Albanian populations into one state. This issue strongly influenced the relations with neighboring countries during the entire twentieth century.

During the communist era the division of Albanian lands was interpreted as a direct result of the imperialistic policies of the Great Powers (although it was Austria-Hungary who *de jure* had made possible the existence of the new Albania) and neighboring countries. Both in the historiography of Albania and Kosovo such statements still remain unchallenged. However, the resolution of the Kosovo issue will possibly initiate a rather critical approach towards modern Albanian history. As for the text of the memorandum, it has been referred to by Albanian historians as one of the most important diplomatic efforts undertaken by Ismail Qemali’s government in order to influence the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors and to achieve a satisfactory solution in establishing the territorial boundaries of the newly founded Albanian state.

RH

**Memorandum presented to Lord Edward Grey,
British Minister of Foreign Affairs and
President-in-Chief of the Conference of Ambassadors
of the Great Powers in London**

We, the signatories of this document and representatives of the Temporary Government of Albania, have the honor to present to the Conference of Ambassadors of the Great Powers in London the Albanian perspective on the recognition of Albanian legal claims.

It is already a historically accepted fact that the Albanian nation forms the most compact, homogenous and important ethnic group in the entire Balkan Peninsula. Its race and language, its customs and its character set it apart

from other neighboring nations and give it the kind of individuality that helps Albanians oppose the efforts for their assimilation.

Albania could not follow Western nations in their admirable progress and civilization; the reasons for this backwardness should be sought among the unfavorable conditions of its development. But the energy with which Albanians tried to preserve their national character, as well as their obstinate patience in working towards their independence are sufficient proofs of their good will and ability to enjoy the path of civilization and enrichment together with other small nations.

The history of the Albanian nation is full of bloody battles in defense of its integrity. Throughout its existence, Albania has never entirely relinquished its independence. At different moments in its history Albania became part of several foreign states, but always the ideal of freedom remained untouchable and the occupation was only superficial. Therefore now, when important events are taking place in Balkan Peninsula, and the Balkan issue is raised once again, Albania feels entitled to claim here before other European states that besides the right to exist, it should also enjoy the right to progress in order and peace.

Of course it would be a bad expression of the Albanian national sentiment if we did not immediately share our deep gratefulness toward the Great Powers for supporting Albania's full independence.

The Albanian nation has suffered greatly under foreign occupation. We believe that it deserves to follow the Western nations, hoping that they will assist our country which seeks nothing but improvement.

Albania is resolute in its decision to become a factor for bringing balance and peace to the Balkan Peninsula. This, however, would be impossible without the full homogeneity of the Albanian nation (which has been jealously preserved for such a long time) within a political organism that is just, stable and enduring. This organism could only be sustained by full and absolute independence as this is the sole factor that can guarantee the elimination of any future obstacle that could ensue from the relics of foreign occupations.

We are convinced the Balkan Allies would not deny that their joined efforts in some aspects follow in the steps of the Albanian uprising and that their successes are also a result of the Albanian quest for freedom, a quest performed with courage and valor through continuous uprisings. If there is a need to show sacrifices, suffering and poverty as a condition for every mature nation to achieve the legitimate right to govern itself, Albanians could mention the barbarous treatment they have had to endure until recently.

Today, when the final solution for the Balkan question is widely presented, the Albanian nation will not support an empire that has partially sacrificed its rights and is building its future on uncertain ground. At the same time, the idea to “give the Balkans to the Balkan people” could be not conceived without just and humanitarian rules. It is therefore impossible to build full peace on the peninsula unless each political entity enjoys independence within its geographical and ethnographical borders. The seeds of discord and disorder will always be present when land inhabited primarily by an Albanian population is subjugated by a foreign state.

By expressing the point of view of the Albanian nation, which is represented almost entirely by our Temporary Government, we are not offering the Great Powers any ready solution. Knowing our rights yet honestly striving to help the European governments to find a fair and stable solution, acknowledging the discordances, yet inspired by the desire to maintain positive policies towards our Balkan neighbors, we declare that peace and calm will be implemented only when the Albanian nation enjoys a homogenous political configuration. For this reason the Albanian nation demands an Albanian state to be built within its natural boundaries; and we are convinced that the European Great Powers will show their understanding and will rigorously respect these general principles.

The frontiers that we demand are these: following a demarcation line starting from the present frontier with the Kingdom of Montenegro and including all hinterlands, the towns of Peja, Mitrovica, Shkup until Metchova, plus the territory inside today's frontier as far south as Preveza. Demanding the demarcation of frontiers following this line, the Albanian nation expresses its wish to keep good and stable relations with its neighbors. Besides the ethnic, geographical and historical arguments supporting this rational solution of the frontiers issue, we feel obliged to add that any contingent truncation of the natural borders of Albania will only make its normal functioning impossible as the country will be unable to profit from its natural resources on the path of its development.

And finally, the abovementioned regions are mainly inhabited by Albanian population.

The delimitation of the frontiers will be entrusted to a special mixed commission. This commission will act disinterestedly, and thus will calm the neighbors of the future Albanian state.

The Albanian nation has already proven its merits and its ability to make free judgment in political issues. It has always valued its national interests higher than the religious considerations that have been the source for so

many problems and disputes among neighboring nations. The best proof is the traditionally respectful attitude to the Vlach people, which is rewarded today by the agreement with the Vlachs to live and work within the new Albanian state.

The Albanian nation is convinced that in resolving today's conflict, the Great Powers will take into consideration the demands presented in this memorandum and will not turn a blind eye to the pertinent claims of a nation that is small but worthy of a better future, a nation that has suffered in the past, but has always kept its faith in the future.

It is for this future that Albania wants the guaranties of the Great Powers, so that it can become a partner in cooperation and development and maintain a place among the civilized nations.

London, 2 January 1913.

Presented by the delegates of the Albanian Temporary Government

Rasih Dino

Mehmet Konica

Filip Noga

Translated by Rigels Halili

IVAN CANKAR: THE SLOVENES AND THE YUGOSLAVS

Title: *Slovenci in Jugoslovani* (The Slovenes and the Yugoslavs)

Originally published: a lecture at the social-democratic society *Vzajemnost*, 12 April, 1913, published in the social democrats' bulletin, *Zarja*, 15–17 April, 1913

Language: Slovene

The excerpts used are from Ivan Cankar, *Izbrana dela* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1973), pp. 314–326.

About the author

Ivan Cankar [1876, Vrhnika (*Ger.* Laibach Altober, present-day Slovenia) – 1918, Ljubljana (*Ger.* Laibach)]: story writer, playwright, poet and essayist. He was the eighth child in a broken family. His father was a tailor who abandoned his trade after a garment shop was opened in Vrhnika, and moved to Bosnia, forsaking his family. Despite the hardships endured by his family, the extraordinarily intelligent Ivan received generous support for his schooling from the noblemen of Vrhnika. After graduating from secondary school in 1896, he went to Vienna, where he initially pursued technical studies, but soon shifted to Slavic studies. In 1907, following the introduction of universal suffrage for parliamentary elections, he was nominated by the Slovenian Social Democrats as a candidate, but was not elected. An intellectual with an independent mind, Cankar adopted a critical attitude towards the expressly pro-Serbian radical circles, particularly the Ljubljana group of secondary school students who, during 1912 and 1913, published the paper *Preporod* (Revival). Before the First World War, the *Preporod* group was the only political movement in Slovenia that took an anti-Austrian stance and advocated the establishment of a Yugoslav state outside the Austrian monarchy. Their political views were rejected not only by all political parties, but also by the majority of eminent Slovenian intellectuals. Similarly, Ivan Cankar's views were not widely shared, although he was far from being pro-Serbian. As a consequence of the lecture presented here, the *Vzajemnost* (Mutuality) society was dissolved, while Cankar was sentenced to one week in prison. This, as he himself argued, had turned him into a martyr. In August 1914 he was again imprisoned until October for supporting the Yugoslav idea. He died on 11 December, 1918, as a result of an accident. Ivan Cankar was the most renowned representative of modern Slovenian literature. He had renounced realism, the dominant trend in Slovenian literature of the time, countering it with the neo-romantic princi-

ple of subjective narration. He argued for the critical role of literature in social issues, while his own social views, influenced by Nietzsche’s philosophy, were frequently anarchistic. Cankar’s story *Hlapec Jernej in njegova pravica* (Bailiff Jernej and his justice) has been translated into all major world languages. His thoughts on Yugoslav and Slovenian nationhood and related issues were essential for the shaping of political trends in Slovenia between the two World Wars. During his life, his work was viewed as being substandard, ideologically problematic and socially detrimental, but after his death, the blame turned into categorical praise, and he was perceived as a folk visionary and a prophet.

Main works: *Erotika* [Eroticism] (1899); *Za narodov blagor* [For the welfare of the people] (1901); *Kralj na Betajnovi* [The king of Betajnova] (1902); *Na klancu* [On the slope] (1902); *Hiša Marije Pomočnice* [The ward of Our Lady of Mercy] (1904); *Martin Kačur* (1906); *Hlapec Jernej in njegova pravica* [Bailiff Jernej and his justice] (1907); *Pohujšanje v dolini Šentflorjanski* [The scandal in the valley of St. Florian] (1908); *Hlapci* [Servants] (1910).

Context

At the time of the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, the Yugoslav idea enjoyed massive support from eminent public figures in Slovenia. Those rare individuals who expressed doubts about the political ties with “Balkan Serbia”—such as the politician Ivan Šušteršič, the leader of the Slovenian People’s Party until 1917—were subdued by a common pro-Yugoslav feeling that was infused with the imperative to make radical changes. However, at the time of Cankar’s lecture, the atmosphere was quite different. Before the First World War, Slovenian politics was primarily dominated by the national issue. The tense national relations within the monarchy during the late nineteenth century compelled the Slovenian political parties to modernize and re-articulate their national demands. These, however, remained modest: the conservative and the liberal party called for linguistic equality and the establishment of Slovenian cultural and educational institutions, and the policies pursued by the social democrats did not have a greater emancipatory potential. In contrast to Cankar, social democrats argued that the national issue was not a political question but a cultural one, and that national autonomy was to be defined as the right of every individual to decide to which nation he or she wished to belong. Therefore, although the Yugoslav cause had been an integral part of Slovenian politics ever since the end of the nineteenth century, the movement it stimulated was not uniform. Its activity varied from region to region and over time, and it mainly involved intellectuals who were members of the middle class more actively concerned with the national issue.

In 1908, the most influential political party at the time, the conservative Slovenian People's Party, presented what came to be known as a tripartite program for the reorganization of Austria-Hungary. One year later, the representatives of Slovenian social democracy drew up the 'Tivoli Resolution' in which they demanded the unification of all Yugoslavs (within the monarchy) into a unitary, autonomous national entity with a common language. Ivan Cankar opposed the plan and was the first among the eminent public figures in Slovenia to articulate the idea that Austria-Hungary was not the only possible administrative framework for the preservation of Slovenian national individuality.

In the period preceding the First World War, it was the Balkan Wars and related Austrian foreign policies that disconcerted the Slovenian intellectuals. In their search for political orientation many of them turned to Ivan Cankar. He eventually decided to deliver a lecture at the *Mestni dom* (Municipal house) in Ljubljana, which at that time was the main venue for public events in the capital. On Saturday, 12 April, 1913, Cankar appeared before an audience of around 250 people to deliver the lecture entitled 'The Slovenes and the Yugoslavs.' The event was organized by the social democratic educational society *Splošna delavska zveza Vzajemnost za Kranjsko*. Cankar sharply criticized the policy of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy which backed the independence of Albania in order to prevent Serbia from gaining access to the sea. Moreover, he spoke about the Slovenes' stance on the idea of Yugoslavia and was critical toward Yugoslav integralism, but openly expressed support for a prospective "federal Yugoslav republic."

Cankar was a determined supporter of the Yugoslav idea, but envisaged Slovenia's accession to the new Yugoslav state as a political deal and not a cultural issue. Three years after his death, in 1921, this romantically articulated idea found its political expression in an autonomist declaration signed by 43 Slovenian intellectuals which paved the ground for the mass autonomist movement in Slovenia. The signatories demanded, among other things, autonomy for the already fragmented lands inhabited by the Slovenians. During that same year, the demand for the autonomous cultural development of Slovenia became the main focus of the largest political party in Slovenia, the Slovenian People's Party, which politicized the issue by petitioning for the legislative autonomy of Slovenia within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The autonomist stance remained the dominant element of Slovenian politics until the Second World War, and it was legally and formally implemented within the framework of a federal socialist Yugoslavia after the Second World War.

The Slovenes and the Yugoslavs

Before I explain my modest thoughts about the so-called Yugoslav issue, insofar as it concerns us, Slovenes, I must say something that would otherwise be self-evident, but at the present time it has to be particularly emphasized. I declare that I do not speak in the name of any political party, and even less so in the name of the entire nation, but humbly in my own name. Such a statement is necessary because during the recent weeks and months I noticed that certain high-handed individuals spoke in the name of the whole nation, which has certainly not appointed them to speak on its behalf. Perhaps not many of you will agree with me, but everyone has the right to his own reason and judgment, and everyone has the right, and, moreover, the duty, to say what he thinks. In our part of the world and at the present time in particular, this is somewhat dangerous. [...]

The victories of the Balkan countries swiftly brought the Yugoslav problem to the forefront of Europe's attention. In fact, Europe has only now become aware of this problem which was announced to the world by Serbian and Bulgarian guns. It is unfortunate that it had to be announced in such a way. We Slovenes openly rejoice at the brilliant advance of our southern brothers. But this joy turned sour at the thought that their advance came at the cost of rivers of young blood. No rational and honest young man can help being filled with ire at the thought that this horrible bloodshed would not have been necessary if Europe, with its miserable diplomacy, were what it claims to be, but what it has never been and, sadly, will probably never be—the guardian of culture and civilization. Ever since the Congress of Berlin, meaning for more than 30 years now, Europe has reared and fed at the expense of its own peoples a pack of idle counts and barons whose task is to ponder over the situation of the Balkan Peninsula. Even if they continued to ponder it for another thirty years, nothing would change. To the Serbs and Bulgarians, such an approach to resolving their vital question seemed a bit too protracted and too boring, so they simply solved it themselves at Lozengrad¹ and Kumanovo.²

As you know from the daily newspapers, such a solution to the Balkan problem did not go down well with European diplomats, and particularly not so with Austrian ones. Diplomacy feeds off problems, and if problems are

¹ The battle at Lozengrad (*Tur.* Kirklareli) was fought between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire on 24 October 1912.

² The battle at Kumanovo (in Ottoman Macedonia) was fought between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire on 23–24 October 1912.

resolved just like that and without diplomacy, what, then, are our dear Berchtolds³ left with to do? We could see, and can still watch, how everything that crawls and walks around the Vienna Ballplatz and its environs foams with rage. Someone observing this from a distance would find it detestable and ridiculous at the same time. Until now, Austrian diplomacy has been like a toothless, nagging old hag sitting in her chimney corner and saying the rosary. But all of a sudden, this hag flew into rage, jumped from her chimney corner and began to brandish the rosary to the surprise and ridicule of all of its neighbors. For us Slovenes this is by no means merely a detestable and ridiculous comedy; we are too painfully involved to be able to laugh. If someone has failed to notice it earlier, he must have recognized by now that we are not solely Slovenes, and even less so solely Austrians, but rather we are an extremity of a large family that inhabits the territories stretching from the Julian Alps to the Aegean Sea. When the first shot was fired in the Balkans, its echo could be heard in the most remote of our villages. People who never ever cared about politics now paused to watch the great drama, not only with interest, but also with compassion in their hearts. Something was awakened in us all, something similar to the yearning of a prisoner. And something else stirred within us, something that is becoming ever more important and valuable—the glow of that strength, self-confidence and life that burst forth in the southern parts and fell upon the Slovenian lands as well. The weak man saw that his brother was strong and began to have trust in himself and in his own future. How strange the expression of this trust can be, I shall explain a bit later.

When the guns announced the grand Yugoslav night, our darling official Austria was reminded of the Yugoslav problem and set down to resolving it in its own fashion. First, it imprisoned some people in Carniola, Styria, and Dalmatia for high treason, then had several Serbian students beaten at the Vienna Graben, and finally declared paper war on Serbia and Montenegro. For Count Berchtold, the Yugoslav problem has thus been solved, but for other ordinary people it remained as unresolved and complex as it had ever been. Someone possessing natural, peasant logic, someone who knows nothing of diplomacy, politics and the state attorney, would not find the Yugoslav problem complicated at all, and moreover, would not think of it as a problem. Such a man would say: “If these four nations think that they are akin to each other and that their life would be the easiest and the best if they were united,

³ Leopold graf Berchtold (1863–1942): Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister at the outbreak of the First World War.

let their wish become reality, let them, in the name of God, form the federal republic of Yugoslavia!" [...] This most natural resolution of the Yugoslav question has until now appeared as a utopia to us all, and perhaps it is a utopia. The obstacles are so big and numerous that they appear insurmountable to us. However, utopias have always demonstrated a strange propensity to become reality. Around 1850, Heinrich Heine, who definitely was not a foolish man, called united Germany a "winter tale." In 1856, the great thinker, philosopher and historian, Max Stirner, made much fun of student-idealists who dreamed of a Greater Germany. Fifteen years later in Versailles, Wilhelm I was crowned German emperor. I give this example only to show that utopias should be treated with caution. And speaking of historical memories, let me mention something else. Just a few moments earlier I amused you at the expense of official Austria and its diplomacy, but now I'd like to ask for its forgiveness. History teaches us that the foolishness of Austrian diplomacy has always been a blessing for European nations. If there were no Austrian diplomats, the birth of Greater Germany and Greater Italy would probably have been seriously delayed. They are again eagerly active and perhaps they will succeed, given time, in making the Yugoslav utopia come true. Everything takes place according to the principles of Hegel's dialectics: when stupidity reaches its peak, it turns into wisdom. If some English statesman sat in Vienna instead of Count Berchtold, he would have forced the Austrian and Hungarian potentates, immediately following the first Serbian victory, to grant to the Yugoslavs on this side of the yellow-black fence⁴ the rights they are entitled to. [...] Yet Austro-Hungarian statesmen act quite the opposite, and therefore they are even wiser. With all their might they push towards separation their most loyal, acknowledged and combat-tried patriots, that is, the Slovenes and the Croats. Man is made to look instinctively, unaware, in the direction of light when left in the dark. Mother Austria would act wisely if it allowed some light into the house, so that her children would no longer feel the need to look out through the window. Or, to stay with the example, instead of so doing it strives and tries hard to extinguish the light that still shines outside, while chasing the children away from the window. [...]

For official Austria, which is an exponent of German imperialism, the Yugoslavs are simply stumbling blocks on its way. It cannot move them, to the last man, to Canada or South America, so it obstructs their political, economic and cultural development wherever possible and as much as possible. Indeed, it is a bit strange that the state should hate a large part of its own citizens; how-

⁴ This is an allusion to the Austrian flag of the time.

ever, this oddity is happening: Parliament without rights in Bosnia; Cuvaj's absolutism in Croatia⁵; proceedings for high treason in Dalmatia; forceful Germanization in Slovenia. That is the Yugoslav policy of official Austria. However, Count Berchtold's ideals are not also our ideals. I have already clearly stated what that distant goal is, one that dwells in all hearts, a goal that is natural and will be achieved, despite all and everyone, much like everything that is propelled by a natural drive comes true. I say "a distant goal," because the obstacles on the path leading to the achievement of that goal are today still insurmountable, at least seemingly so. The Yugoslav tribes are scattered among five and a half countries. Within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy itself, we are carved up into miniscule pieces, so to say. The political contacts among these pieces are almost made impossible. One could say that in political respect, despite having one scepter and one anthem, Zagreb is almost further away from Ljubljana than Paris is from Madrid. An enormous effort and enduring patience is needed to remedy what history and malevolent politics perverted. Over the past few years we have begun to seek paths to establish political contacts among at least those bits of the Yugoslav body that are condemned to life within the monarchy. To my mind, we have now really found the only way that is possible and appropriate—it is the way that brings closer kindred political parties in individual countries [...]

As you have seen, I have treated the Yugoslav problem for what it is: as an exclusively political problem; a problem of a fragmented tribe which cannot gain recognition until it unites into a whole. That is all there is to it! For me, there is no Yugoslav question in the cultural or linguistic sense. Perhaps it did exist at some time in the past, but it was resolved when the Yugoslav tribe split into the four nations with four completely independent cultural lives. We are brothers by blood, and nephews at least by language, but in terms of culture, which is a result of several hundred years of education, we are much more alien to each other than our farmer from Gorenjska is alien to his Tyrolian counterpart, or our vinedresser from Goriška to the one from Friuli. Whether the blame is on history, or on someone else—I, who have established this fact, I am certainly not to be blamed for this. It is dangerous today to state explicitly such banal truths. [...]

For the time being, it is sufficient if we all assert our Yugoslavianism by memorizing the old Serbian saying: *Uzdaj se use i u svoje kljuse!*⁶ Even the

⁵ Cankar refers to Slavko Cuvaj de Ivanska (1851–1930), a ban of Croatia during 1912–1913.

⁶ Trust only yourself.

most hoarse Illyrians would acknowledge this much: if at some point in the future the Yugoslav nations become united—and it is not only my burning desire but also my strong conviction that such a union will be realized—then that union cannot be executed in any other way but as a union of equal nations with equal rights. This simple thought points us to the field which we must plough and where we must sow seeds, not only for ourselves, but for pan-Yugoslavianism as well. This field is our beautiful Slovenian field. Under the Austrian master, in our prison and in poverty, and oppressed by many troubles, we raised our culture to such a level that it is our beauty and joy. It is an expression that our nation's power does not lag a bit behind the power that was demonstrated outside Lozengrad and Kumanovo. We should strive to achieve inner health and power and to be at least intellectually rich (if not in other respects), so that at some point in the future we do not have to ask our brothers for charity, but that we can bring them gifts; or, even better, that our brothers come to us to receive gifts, even before we offer these to them. Our Illyrians, enthusiastic to the point of dizziness, have not only overlooked Slovenian culture (at any rate they've never learnt to speak Slovene), Trubar,⁷ Prešeren⁸ and Levstik,⁹ but they also brushed aside themselves, their name and their homeland. [...] Their conduct has become a delirium by now. Thank God that they are not many, they could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand [...]

There is another thing which leaves one in two minds whether to laugh at it or cry over it. It is the question of the Yugoslav language, one which is not posed by Austrian diplomats, the masters of foolishness, but by enthusiastic people who have no knowledge of any language. We can already feel the harsh consequences of this issue—our papers present such a sloppy Slovene that even a retired post office clerk feels revolted. I have respect for radicalism, which has always been a nice virtue of the youth. However, if that radicalism requires that Slovenian should fall only because Odrin¹⁰ and Bitolj¹¹ have fallen, then I gratefully reject that radicalism [...]. And I find most repulsive, yes, repulsive, those people who without cause or reason connect the Slovene language with the Yugoslav political issue. They are offering it just

⁷ Primož Trubar (1508–1586): Slovenian protestant priest, writer, and translator.

⁸ France Prešeren (1800–1849): Slovenian poet.

⁹ Fran Levstik (1831–1887): Slovenian poet, dramatist, and linguist.

¹⁰ Edirne (*Gr.* Adrianoupolis), in present-day Turkey, was occupied by the Bulgarian army during the First Balkan War.

¹¹ Bitola (*Gr.* Monastiri, *Tur.* Manastır,) in present-day Republic of Macedonia, was occupied by the Serbian army during the First Balkan War.

like that, throwing it across the border, without even asking who would be prepared to pay more. I have not yet met a Croat who would come to us to offer his Croatian. But here, it is different! We are so fed up with our culture that we find it redundant and would happily throw it over the fence. (Cultural scandal!)

I have said what I think is urgent and useful, if we want to achieve our Slovenian, cultural goal, and our Yugoslav, political, goal. Let everyone do what they can; I have done so!

Translated by Olga Vuković

FRANO SUPILO: THE MEMORANDUM TO SIR EDWARD GREY, 7 JANUARY, 1915

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About the author

Franjo Supilo [1870, Cavtat, near Dubrovnik – 1917, London]: journalist and politician. Born into a poor craftsman family, he started his political career in the ethnic Croatian party *Stranka Prava* (Party of Rights), acting as the editor of the local party newspaper *Crvena Hrvatska* (Red Croatia) (1890–1899). After he took over the editing of the main party journal *Novi list* (The new newspaper) in 1900, he joined the pro-Yugoslav fraction of the party and aimed to harmonize Croatian and Serbian politics in Croatia through the resolutions of Fiume and Zara that he drafted: *Riječka* (1903) and *Zadarska rezolucija* (1905). Together with Ante Trumbić, he established the movement of the ‘Politics of the New Course’ and founded the *Hrvatsko-Srpska koalicija* (Croato-Serb coalition) in 1906. After the legal persecution of Serb politicians in the Monarchy following the ‘Annexation Crisis’ of 1908 and 1909 (the so called ‘High-treason and **Friedjung** Processes’), he withdrew from the Coalition, unsatisfied with its compromising attitude towards the regime. He acted as the editor of *Novi list* until the outbreak of the First World War. In 1914 he fled to Italy with other prominent advocates of Yugoslavism, forming the ‘Yugoslav Committee’ with the purpose of lobbying in the Entente countries for south Slavic unification. He spent the war years moving between London, Paris, Rome and Petrograd, fervently advocating the Yugoslav project. Discontented with its conciliatory stance towards the Serbian government, he left the Committee in 1916, continuing his individual political action. Exhausted psychically and mentally, he died in a sanatorium in London in 1917. Supilo’s political work started to be canonized in socialist Yugoslavia, especially during times of debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s about the reconstitution of Yugoslavia. He was unreservedly canonized in the 1990s, when his political thought was reinterpreted to be exclusively Croatian, having a Yugoslav framework only due to historical circumstances.

Main works: *Le procès de Friedjung-Reichspost et de la Coalition Croato-Serbe, Lettre de Frano Supilo* (1910); *Otvoreno pismo svojim izbornicima* [Open letter to my voters] (1910); *Politika u Hrvatskoj* [Politics in Croatia] (1911).

Context

The emergence of German expansionist policies at the turn of the century, coupled by Hungarian political and economic expansion, led to a new shift in Croatian politics which had been dominated by the anti-dualist and the anti-Yugoslav project of Croatian political autonomy advocated by the *Stranka Prava*. A major faction of the party turned towards the centralist, pro-German politics of archduke Franz Ferdinand, while a minority endorsed the politics of Serbo-Croatian cooperation as the only way to achieve political emancipation. The latter group gathered Croat and Serbian political parties in Croatia under the banner of the HSK (Croat–Serb Coalition) in 1906. Inspired by the anti-dualist politics of the ‘Independence Party’ in Hungary (the so called ‘crisis of dualism’), and by the accession of the pro-Yugoslav Karađorđević dynasty to the Serbian throne following the downfall of the pro-Austrian Obrenovićs (1903), the two most prominent HSK members, Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo, launched the ‘Politics of the New Course.’ This movement refuted the Austro-Slavist project advocated by **Stjepan Radić**, envisioning, instead, an alliance against Germany, which would bring together Croats, Hungarian anti-dualists, Dalmatian Italians and Serbia. It was also based on the *Narodno jedinstvo* principle of the ethnic sameness of Croats and Serbs, which would additionally support the emergence of an independent South Slavic state as the ultimate goal. However, the ‘Politics of a New Course’ soon collapsed due to the failure of Hungarian anti-dualist politics and the Italian unwillingness to participate in it. Moreover, the HSK started to cooperate with the Hungarian pro-dualist government in the 1910s after adopting the idea of Serbia’s primacy in the process of south Slavic unification. This was an idea propagated by the Croatian Serbs in opposition to Supilo’s notion of equal roles for the Croats and Serbs. Finally, Supilo’s politics met similar obstacles during the First World War, when, in an effort to convince the Entente to support the project of South Slavic unification, he formed the ‘Yugoslav Committee’ in Italy with other prominent Croatian advocates of Yugoslavism. However, Russia intended to enhance its influence in the Balkans through Serbia’s territorial expansion, while France and England pushed for the preservation of Austria-Hungary and for the partition

of Croatian territories between Italy and Serbia as stipulated by the Treaty of London in 1915. Moreover, Supilo's insistence on Croatian statehood again brought him into conflict with Serbian politics, especially after the Treaty of London made it obvious that the primary goal of Serbia in the war was territorial expansion. The establishment of Yugoslavia in this context seemed only a remote prospect. Disappointed by the mild opposition of the 'Yugoslav Committee' to Serbia, Supilo left the organization in 1916, and shortly before his death started to advocate the independence of Croatia as the last resort to preserve Croatian statehood.

The 'Memorandum to Sir Edward Grey' from January 1915 represents Supilo's most elaborate appeal for the establishment of a South Slavic state within a broader south-central European alliance against German expansionism. This approach reversed the Croatian historical *antemurale christianitatis* discourse towards a notion of the defense of the East against German expansionism. In this memorandum, Supilo mostly focuses on Italian-Croat relations and the question of the preservation of Austria-Hungary, labeled as the two greatest obstacles for the establishment of an independent South Slavic state. He addresses these questions to Gray, as England was the most fervent advocate of the preservation of Austria-Hungary, supporting, at the same time, Italian claims on Dalmatia and Istria as the price for Italy's joining the Entente. Italy maintained its claims on these provinces by employing the discourse of historical and cultural influence. Supilo opposes these claims by emphasizing the strategic importance of South Slavic territorial integrity for the efficiency of the envisioned south Slavic-Italian alliance against Germany. He also rejects specific Italian visions regarding a prospective cooperation. Here, Supilo was inspired by the nineteenth century Croatian project of an Italian-Croatian alliance against Viennese absolutism, rooted in Giuseppe Mazzini's ideas with respect to the Slavs. These ideas had spurred Croatian enthusiasm for the *Risorgimento* as a model for South Slavic unification. Informed by the tradition of the *Risorgimento*, Supilo proposes the ethnic principle as a road map, thus justifying Croatian claims to the Slav dominated eastern Adriatic coast. Moreover, Supilo emphasizes in his later writings the importance of Italian support for Croatian territorial unity, perceived as a crucial element in Serbo-Croatian disputes over the constitution of a future South Slavic state. In the memorandum presented here, Supilo appeals to the British for help in resolving these disputes, due to the general belief among Croatian Yugoslavists that the multinational Great Britain had a much better understanding of south Slavic cultural differences than centralist France or despotic Russia. Since Serbia had declared in 1914 that the unifica-

tion of the south Slavs was its ultimate aim, Supilo only alludes to Serbo-Croatian disputes, elaborating on them in subsequent memoranda to Grey following the implementation of the Treaty of London, from September 1915 to January 1917. In these memoranda, Supilo argues for a gradual process leading to unification, where initially Croatian and Serb political statehood would be preserved to prevent political disputes between the two ethnicities. He claims that Serbian domination would lead to the political subjugation of Croatia, a kind of domination not very different from that imposed by Austria-Hungary. Therefore, he maintains that he would consent to the incorporation of Croatia into Serbia only if Serbia “abandoned its Orthodox exclusivism and refashioned itself into a real Piedmont of the South Slavs.” Elsewhere, Supilo advocates the establishment of an independent ‘rump’ Croatia, which would stay outside the territories partitioned between Italy and Serbia as stipulated by the Treaty of London. Slovenia would also be incorporated into such a state, since, due to his adherence to the ideology of *Stranka Prava*, Supilo considers Slovenians to be part of the Croatian political nation. In the memorandum presented here, Supilo tries to reinforce his notion of an independent South Slavic state by rejecting even a federalized Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as he deems such an entity to be only subservient to German imperialism. As it turned out, Supilo also hoped that the dismantling of Austria-Hungary under the Treaty of London would be reassessed, thus allowing for the implementation of the principle of nationalities, which would enable the incorporation of the ethnic Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian territories into one state. However, Supilo’s plans failed after the war, as Italy secured its territorial expansion in Istria and parts of Dalmatia in 1921. This was followed by the establishment of Yugoslavia as a unitary state, which was subsequently drawn by France, together with Czechoslovakia and Romania, into the Little Entente, formed as a safeguard against possible Austrian and Hungarian attempts to revise the interwar Versailles system.

During the interwar period, Supilo’s Yugoslav idea was incorporated into the official canon of integral Yugoslavism as a marginal element. His ideas were revived in socialist Yugoslavia, when **Miroslav Krleža** interpreted the latter’s political activity during the war as the “only morally astute voice against the *Realpolitik*,” as well as the symbol of the self-confidence of a small nation. Later, Supilo’s memoranda to Sir Edward Grey were appropriated by the ‘Croatian Spring’ reformist movement in the 1960s and 1970s as a historical reference to justify their claim for a more autonomous Croatia within Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, the memoranda were reinterpreted by proponents of a new ‘nation-building’ historiography which claimed that the

Croats compromised their independence as an outcome of the historical circumstances privileging a unitary Yugoslav state.

SD

The memorandum to Sir Edward Grey, 7 January, 1915

[...] A glance at the map shows that these Southern Slavs stand as the chief natural obstacle across the path of the Germanic "*Drang nach Osten*," the great political concept that links Hamburg and Berlin with Vienna and Budapest, crosses the Balkans and Asia Minor and extends thence towards Baghdad, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It is on this ground that, for so many years and decades the Southern Slavs have been exposed to the attacks of an unscrupulous Germanic policy which has left no means untried to divide, stupefy and morally poison them, in order to open for itself a road through them, or over them if need be, by annihilation.

The successive waves of the German attack supported by the strength of the Magyars constantly, during the second half of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, against the Southern Slav barrier. We Southern Slavs have held out as best we could, determined neither to be swept away nor to serve German purposes. Hard necessity and our very position as an anti-German breakwater should, however, render us an element of common utility to all those States and peoples that have had, have and may to withstand German aspirations. It is therefore in our own interest, and also in the interest of those states and peoples, that the natural Southern Slav barrier should be consolidated and fortified as to offer effective resistance to the Germanic invasion which, though beaten back today, will return tomorrow with redoubled intensity and methodical persistence.

It is therefore a question of helping us to build on solid foundations our national unity and freedom, and to form the 12,700,000 Southern Slavs into an organized, well-coordinated and independent State.

For us Southern Slavs this question is one of honor, of national consciousness, of very existence. For other States and peoples that have to combat Teutonic pretensions it is a question of moral, political and economic importance.

On this point I need scarcely insist. But, in addressing Your Excellency as the representative of the foreign policy of Great Britain, I would venture to draw Your Excellency's attention to some questions of detail that, according to the way in which they are handled, may greatly facilitate, or impede, the future work in the South-East of Europe.

First among these questions is that of the relationship, between the Southern Slavs and Italy.

In regard to the Southern Slavs Italy cherishes aspirations of which some are well—and others ill-founded. Her well-founded aspirations are those which are in accordance with the racial feelings of the majority of the population in certain regions; the others may properly be termed ill-founded when they exceed the limits of the majority and are used as a basis for Italian national claims in regard to those Southern Slavs who have long employed and still employ the Italian language of education and culture. Italy would lose nothing of her own were she to restrict her national program in this direction to the acquisition of the elements really of her own race. She would, on the contrary, gain, inasmuch as we Southern Slavs, especially on the Adriatic coast, are predisposed towards the Italian spirit and inclined to open all our gates to the Italian language—as an element of Italian civilization and culture and as our natural ally against the pernicious influence of the so-called German “*Kultur*.”

On the other hand, the very necessity of things and the exigencies of our respective geographical positions, ought to lead Italy to form with the Southern Slavs of the Adriatic, not merely a platonic friendship but an alliance which would greatly strengthen both her and us in our joint defense against the German menace. Unluckily, few Italians perceive and fewer still feel our common need. They regard us mostly as barbarians—unworthy to treat with them, although we have, shown, and when free and united will show still better, that the best sons of our people are able duly to bear their part in the work of civilization. But there remain prejudices and antipathies against which the two parties in question may, if unaided, contend in vain.

In this difficult position the only influence that could be brought to bear with unquestioned authority and likelihood of success, is that of England. The work for urging the Southern Slavs and Italians along the road towards a broad understanding deserves British attention even when it is viewed exclusively in the light of British interests.

The second issue of importance concerns the union or rather the fusion of the different Southern Slav elements.

As has been observed, our adversaries have long striven with forces greatly superior to our own, to apply against us—the system “*Divide et Impera*” and to sow among our people hatred and division. They have achieved little; and, indeed, the reaction against their policy has been strong and beneficent, particularly among our younger generations. Nevertheless there remain influences ready, when opportunity offers, to spin into strong threads of intrigue the strands of our diversity of creed and tradition.

Yet our very diversities may be fruitful of good if they are rightly dealt with. Since nearly one-half of the Southern Slavs are Western and the other half Eastern in civilization, they might prove a new and useful factor in the relationship between East and West, between Roman Catholicism and Greek Oriental Orthodoxy. It is in this work of fusing minds and civilizations that England could lend us moral and political aid, supplying impulse or restraint as need might arise. Such British influence upon our people is greatly to be desired. It might prevent much evil and do great good; it would be gratefully welcomed by the overwhelming majority of our cultivated men. This is a matter of vital importance for the future of our nation. Would that I could find words to rivet upon it Your Excellency's attention.

The fusion of the different elements of our national spirit would, however, be much impeded, were districts and provinces to be sacrificed—and condemned to definitive denationalization—in which the great majority of the population is unquestionably Slav. Our adversaries would immediately make capital out of such a sacrifice and use it to weaken the position of Serbia in regard to the Catholic Croats and Slovenes, and the position of the latter in regard to Serbia. Austria-Hungary, it is true, holds us in bondage; but, composed, as is the Habsburg Monarchy, of peoples of so many tongues and races, it has not hitherto been able to efface our ethnic individuality. We have been in bondage but have remained alive. Were a part of our own race to be cut away and handed over to a State racially unified, it would not only be condemned to death, but the dying fragment would serve our enemies as a potent means of impeding the moral unification of the remainder.

But, in order to promote complete union, it is above all necessary that the Allied Great Powers and Serbia should make every effort to vindicate the principle in the eyes of even the lowest and least educated strata of our rural population that this war is not a war of conquest but of redemption and liberation...

The third question for consideration consists of the "national (i.e. racial) autonomy" promised and to be promised to the Slavs of the Monarchy by the Austro-Hungarian authorities in agreement with Germany; as also the suggestions of peace already thrown out here and there. In regard to these promises of "national autonomy" I have irrefutable proofs. They were made during the recent conferences between Counts Berchtold,¹ Tisza² and Stürgkh³

¹ Leopold von Berchtold (1863–1942): Austro-Hungarian foreign minister in the years 1912–1915.

² István Tisza (1861–1918): prime minister of Hungary between 1913–1917.

³ Karl von Stürgkh (1859–1916): prime-minister of Austria between 1911–1916.

and sundry Slav politicians who remain in Austria-Hungary. Their object, as of the suggestions of peace, is to secure Austro-German-Magyar rule in future as in the past over the 35,000,000 Slavs; 28,000,000 Catholic and 7,000,000 Orthodox, who have hitherto inhabited Austro-German lands.

The German race, even though vanquished, will not be destroyed; no civilized man can wish that it should be.

But the German race, though vanquished, will ever weigh like a nightmare upon Europe and will not be cured of its pretensions, unless it is reduced to its true terms and limits by having wrested from its grasp these 35,000,000 Slavs who, against their will, have lent weight and strength to the unbridled militarism of Germany. The palliative of Slav "autonomies" under the German yoke, suggested by Austria-Hungary in agreement with Germany, cannot remedy the evil but can only prolong it and render it finally incurable. The Germans with patient and diligent tenacity will quickly recover from their defeats now suffered, and will assuredly be careful not again to be guilty of the lack of diplomatic foresight which left them isolated in the civilized world and abandoned even by those upon whom they might have reckoned.

For all these reasons the complete liberation of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary and Germany becomes indispensable to the peace of non-militarist Europe; and, above all, the liberation and the union of the Southern Slavs, and the creation of an understanding between them and Italy. This union and this understanding would mean the definitive closing of the gate of the East to the great dream of the world-conquest cherished by German Imperialism.

Herein lies the great and reciprocal interest of us Southern Slavs and of England who, by ensuring the redemption of our people, would assure our and her own weal.

Translated by Henry Wickham Steed in Dragovan Šepić, ed., *Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila*, (Belgrade: SANU, 1967), letter no. 18, pp. 40–44.

ELEFThERIOS VENIZELOS: THE PROGRAM OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY

Title: *Τό πρόγραμμα τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς αὐτοῦ πολιτικῆς* (The program of his foreign policy)

Originally published: Appendix to the newspaper *Πατρίς* (Motherland), Athens, 1915

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from the original.

About the author

Eleftherios Venizelos: [1864, Mournies (the island of Crete) – 1936, Paris]: the most prominent Greek politician of the twentieth century. He was born to a well-off merchant family. He completed his secondary education in Chania (*Tur.* Hania) in Crete. His father reluctantly sent him to study at the School of Law in Athens, from which young Eleftherios graduated in 1866 and returned to Crete. He was immediately involved in politics and soon elected deputy in the Parliament of what was then the autonomous Cretan polity under Ottoman suzerainty where he demonstrated his rhetoric mastery and political instinct. In 1905, he was the leading figure of the Therissos uprising, the most important among a series of similar revolts, fueled by the conflict between Christians and Muslims. In September 1908, following the Young Turk revolution, the Cretan Congress unilaterally declared the annexation of the Cretan polity to the Hellenic Kingdom. In the newly established cabinet, Venizelos participated as a foreign minister. Finally, in April 1910, he was elected president of the Congress and thus prime minister. In August 1910, following the ‘Goudi movement’ in Athens, he was invited by the ‘Military League,’ the secret society behind the coup, to take over as a prime minister of the Hellenic Kingdom. After the successful Balkan Wars in 1912–1913 his popularity increased immensely. The rivalry, however, and the eventual break with King Constantine, led Greek society to extremely high tension. In August 1920, with the Sèvres Treaty, Venizelos accomplished his vision of a Greece that extended between ‘two continents and five seas.’ However, on his way back to Greece, royalist officers attacked him at the Lyon train station. He survived the attempted murder and returned to Greece, where he dissolved the Parliament and proclaimed elections for 1 November. However, his Liberal Party was defeated and Venizelos was not even elected as a deputy, upon which, he decided to quit politics and leave for Paris. He returned when he was asked by the leaders of the military coup following the Asia Minor defeat, in September 1922 (see

Alexandros Papanastasiou, *The republican manifesto*) to lead the Greek delegation to the negotiations at the Lausanne conference. He returned to politics in July 1928, after the Republic had been declared and after the Liberal Party had been divided. In the election of 19 August 1928, Venizelos achieved an overwhelming majority and governed until 1932. During this period, unlike the period between 1910 and 1915, he pursued an extremely anti-popular policy, demonstrated mainly by the new labor legislation. At the same time, in 1930, he signed a pact of friendship with the Turkish prime minister, İsmet İnönü, thus initiating a period of peace between the two countries. In 1935, after a series of failed military coups, he attempted to take over power, relying upon his supporters in the army. After he failed, he was forced to leave for Paris, where he died a year later. Venizelos's impact on Greek political life was immense. The term *βενιζελισμός* (Venizelism), used to describe his domestic policy, was identified with bourgeois modernization supported by state interventionism. In ideological terms, it is significant to stress that the split between Venizelists and Royalists formed an ideological cleavage which influenced Greek political life until well after the Second World War. Moreover, many Venizelist officers and civilians joined the *Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο* (National liberation front), which during the Second World War gradually developed into a communist movement. Thus, the ensuing conflict between communists and royalists reproduced, to some extent, the previous political rivalry. In 2000, Venizelos was proclaimed by the Greek public the Greek politician of the century.

Main works: *La politique de la Grèce: ouvrage contenant les discours prononcés par l'homme d'état aux séances historiques du Parlement hellénique (octobre et novembre 1915): le traité Greco-Serbe, le péril Bulgare, la Grèce, l'entente et les puissances centrales, l'expédition des Dardanelles, la politique intérieure* (1916); *Ἡ Ἑλληνοτουρκική συμφωνία καὶ ἀποζημιώσεις: Δύο ἱστορικαὶ ἀγορεύσεις τοῦ Πρωθυπουργοῦ κ. Βενιζέλου* [The Greco-Turkish treaty and compensation for the refugees: two historic speeches by Prime Minister Venizelos] (1930); *Ποιοὶ οἱ ὑπεύθυνοι διὰ τὴν Μικρασιατικὴν Καταστροφὴν: τὰ ἱ ἀπώτερα αἷτια τῶν σημερινῶν οἰκονομικῶν μας δυσχερειῶν: τρεῖς ἱστορικαὶ ἀγορεύσεις* [Who are responsible for the Asia Minor disaster: The ulterior causes of our current economic woes: three historic speeches] (1932); *Ἡ Κρητικὴ ἐπανάστασις τοῦ 1889*, [The Cretan revolution of 1889] (1971), *Τὸ βαλκανικὸν σύμφωνον καὶ ἡ ἑλληνικὴ ἐξωτερικὴ πολιτικὴ 1928–1934* [The Balkan pact and Greek foreign policy] (1974).

Context

In August 1909, a group of middle ranking army officers gathered around a society called *Στρατιωτικός Σύνδεσμος* (Military league) organized a military movement in Goudi, a suburb of Athens. The officers revolted, aiming to put an end to political stagnancy and decrease the involvement of the royal family in the army. Since they did not claim power for themselves and since no politician of the old regime could form a viable government, the 'League' invited Eleftherios Venizelos, the prime minister of the Cretan polity who was already famous in Greece, to take over. Venizelos suggested that the

only way out was the formation of a new cabinet and the introduction of constitutional reforms. King George I, not without hesitation, accepted his suggestion. The elections took place in August 1910 and Venizelos was elected deputy for Athens. He soon received the mandate and opted for new elections, which would give him a majority in Parliament. In fact, the old parties did not participate in these elections and Venizelos achieved overwhelming majority. This new Parliament, in 1911, introduced a series of reforms in the administration, education, labor and other areas which created conditions for the modernization of public life.

However, Venizelos's major concern was to enhance Greek involvement in the so-called 'Eastern Question.' During the previous crisis, in 1877–78, Greece had proved incapable of taking any serious action at a time when all neighboring nations, the Bulgarians in particular, took great advantage of the opportunity to improve their position in the region. At the Berlin Congress, the autonomy of Bulgaria and Montenegro was promulgated, Romania and Serbia became independent, but Greece had achieved nothing. Venizelos approached the other Christian Balkan states with a proposal for common action against the Ottoman Empire. The policy of an alliance between Balkan states dated back to the 1860s, but then it was limited to defense agreements signed between Greece and Serbia. These agreements dictated common action against the Ottoman Empire and consequent distribution of any conquered lands. However, when during the Serbian–Ottoman war of 1875, King Milan asked for a Greek contribution, Koumoundouros' government did not consider itself bound by the agreement. In the 1880s and 1890s, a different kind of Balkan coalition was sought through the activity of the association *Ἀνατολική Ὁμοσπονδία* (Eastern Federation), founded in Athens in 1884. The association developed into the most important champion of Balkan unity. Yet, under the political circumstances of the end of nineteenth century such a 'utopian' plan could not appeal to the broader masses. However, by the early 1910s, Serbia and Bulgaria had already signed a pact for common action. In September 1912, Venizelos signed a similar pact with Serbia. Thus, on 30 September, Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire. On 1 October, during the opening ceremony of the Parliament, the deputies from Crete were welcomed with enthusiasm. The declaration of war immediately triggered popular enthusiasm since the eagerness to compensate for the defeat of 1897 at the hands of the Ottomans was widespread. In the two Balkan Wars which followed, Venizelos's policy proved successful. On 28 June 1913, the treaty signed in Bucharest between Bulgaria and the rest of the Balkan states satisfied all Greek claims in Macedonia, Epirus, the Aegean islands and Crete.

Despite certain disagreements, Venizelos and Constantine, who succeeded his father George I in 1913 when the latter was murdered in Salonica were on very good terms. However, the outbreak of the First World War was to change their relation dramatically. When Greece was asked by the allies to contribute to the siege of the Dardanelles in 1915, Venizelos and Constantine held conflicting positions. Constantine was pro-German. After all, his wife Sofia was Kaiser Wilhelm II's sister. He insisted on keeping Greece out of the war, in neutrality, which eventually would facilitate the plans of the Central Powers. Venizelos, on the other hand, considered this war as an opportunity for the fulfillment of Greek irredentist plans, and since he was pro-British, he insisted that Greece should enter the war on the side of the allies. Venizelos resigned, but, in the elections of 31 May 1915, the Liberal Party again achieved a majority. Due to the King's firm refusal however, Venizelos had to resign again. The crisis ensued has been described as the *Ἐθνικός Διχασμός* (National schism).

It is under these circumstances that Venizelos gave his speech to the Parliament. He accused his opponents of political inconsistency. On the one hand, they considered the expansion of the Greek state necessary, but on the other hand, they reproached the leader of the Liberals for the alliance with the other Balkan countries during the Balkan Wars. If they abstained from the war, in the long run this would help the Ottoman Empire survive and would reinforce the hegemony of Bulgaria. This would be disastrous for the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, the so-called unredeemed brothers who were already being persecuted. Venizelos, whose party, in his view, represented the 'New Greece' (*Νέα Ἑλλάς*), accused his opponents of representing the old political world and of not daring to cope with the complexities of the new conditions. He believed that the struggle among nations was inspired by noble aspirations and that it was the fulfillment of the natural restoration. In other words, Greek irredentist policies do not violate any other nation's rights, as they are firmly grounded on abundant historical justification. This is why, sacrifices were necessary on the part of the people. The task was the creation of a 'Greater Greece' (*Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς*) which would be able to survive economically and politically, protect its citizens and make them proud of their nationality.

The Liberal Party did not participate in the December 1915 elections, and the majority in the new Parliament turned out to be overwhelmingly pro-royalist. Venizelos fled to Salonica where he formed a revolutionary cabinet known as the *Ἐθνική Ἀμύνα* (National defense). Allied troops, which had already disembarked in Salonica, moved to Athens and forced the pro-

royalist Skouloudis government to resign. Thus, on 29 May 1917, Constantine fled the country and was succeeded by his son, Alexander I. Venizelos arrived few days later and Greece entered the war on the side of the Allies.

Venizelos's vision for the creation of a Greece that would extend across 'two continents and five seas' was a radical version of the old 'Great Idea' that had dominated Greek politics throughout the nineteenth century (see **Ioannis Kolettis**, *Of this great idea*) and was accomplished after the end of the war and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. With the Sèvres treaty, signed on 10 August 1920, Greece was given not only Western and Eastern Thrace but also a large zone around Izmir, in the county of Aydın (*Gr.* Aydini), where the Greek army would operate as a transitional regime until a plebiscite would be held five years later to indicate which country this area would be annexed to. By May 1919, Greek forces had already disembarked in Izmir. This marked the beginning of a new war between the Greek army and Turkish national resistance forces organized by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The war ended with a bitter Greek defeat and the consequent exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Devastation was inflicted upon the Greek populations of Asia Minor who, if they were lucky to survive the war, had to abandon their territories where, in many cases, an uninterrupted presence of Orthodox culture could be traced back a couple of millennia. The refugees managed to integrate into Greek society only after decades of hardships and discriminations. Despite the Ankara pact of 1930 that actually put an end to their hopes and expectations of returning to their homes, they were so much attached to the charisma of the 'national leader,' which was how they saw Venizelos, that they did not hold him responsible for their calamities, since already from November 1920 he was not any more in power. However, what has been described in public memory and in the relevant literature as the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe' cannot be only explained by the incapacity of the Royalist cabinets and the military genius of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. An entire policy should be held accountable, namely from irredentist dreams that led to such an unprecedented suffering. As recent literature has shown, Venizelos not only served this policy consistently, but also profited from its appeal to the public.

VK

The program of his foreign policy

A microhelladic policy

And if you were to further tell me that it would be possible for this state to be indifferent both to its national aspirations and to its obligations and that it is possible, by betraying all these, for it to exist and to exist as a self-sufficient state, limiting itself within its former borders, if that is what you were saying, I would still understand you. But since that is not what you are saying and since you consider necessary the development of the state in order for its borders to coincide with the borders of its national domination, not only for moral and sentimental reasons, but for reasons of politics and economics, you will allow me to consider your policy incomprehensible, when you dare, even today, after the events which have transpired, to censure me for joining forces with Bulgaria and Serbia, in order for Greece to extend its borders to the Nestos.¹ But difficulties have come about today, and it is probable that these difficulties would not have occurred had our borders not extended that far, and it is probable, should our borders extend further, that we shall encounter more difficulties, for, the greater the interests of the state, the more natural it is for them to adjoin the interests of others and to cause friction, and thus you censure me because, having extended Greece's borders, I am the cause of these difficulties; in that case, your policy is *microhelladic*, if I may call it so, and that being the case it would be better for us to ask all neighboring countries what they want us to give them and have them sign a deed of settlement, while we limit ourselves henceforth to the remaining state, following this settlement, to be able to live in this minor state without distractions!

And you will allow me once again, Gentlemen, to tell you, that I find myself before a phenomenon which has manifested itself repeatedly in this very chamber during the past five years. We have the old world of Greece represented by the new Government; we have the new, post-revolutionary world represented by the Liberal Party. The old ideology, represented by the current Government, is the one which thought that Greece could not create an army of more than 60,000; the one which thought that Greece must not ally itself with anyone towards the realization of its national claims; the one which had limitless as well as vague and nebulous aspirations regarding these national

¹ Nestos river (*Tur.* Karasu) forms today the physical border between two Greek provinces, eastern Macedonia and western Thrace.

claims, in order for its actual preparation to be in inverse proportion to the magnitude of its claims. We did not know then how far our national claims may extend; many times we spread them out so much that those among our politicians who were content with our borders extending to the north as far as Kroussovo² were labeled as betraying Greece's rights. Participating in this Government is the Greek politician who was accused of betraying Greece's rights because he took care, poor fellow, in the regulating and the understanding of Macedonian affairs, to leave out, besides the other two provinces, the province of Kosovo. It is, therefore, natural, when Greece is faced again today by issues comparable to those of 1912, that we should find ourselves at opposite poles of political thought. Now, as you did then, you do not wish for a war together with allies. Today you say: "Let this cup pass from me." And when I tell you that this cup will not pass definitively, but entirely temporarily, in order to return again so that you may drink of it to the last drop, you say to us: "*You* are to blame, *you*, who led us as far as the Nestos!" (Applause.) Do you not think, therefore, Gentlemen, that the new Greece has the right to say to the old Greece: "Gentlemen, it is your obligation, faced once again with such great and complicated difficulties, to step aside and leave the country to the new Greece, which has the spiritual fortitude to confront these new circumstances?" (Prolonged applause.)

The cession of Cyprus

[...] The significance this would have for the future shaping of the Kingdom of Greece each of you comprehends.

And do not think, Gentlemen, that, by virtue of your policy today, we are simply rejecting all these potential demands of Greece's for the sake of not waging an inevitable war against Bulgaria at this time. We are rejecting them not only in the present time, but we are rendering it impossible for a future realization of these national dreams. By virtue of your policy, not only will we not dash all Bulgarian dreams of hegemony in the Balkans and limit her to where her national mass gives her the right to live together with the other people of the Balkan Peninsula, not only do we render impossible at present the definitive termination of the struggle which, as I have said on other occasions, has been waged for the past 13 centuries between ourselves and Bulgaria, but we are in danger, by virtue of your policy—which, without it being

² The old settlement of Ano Kervilion (*Mac.* Krushevo), in present-day Republic of Macedonia.

your intention, serves the interests of the other European alliance—to render possible the preservation of the Ottoman Empire after the war. You will allow me to say that one must be blind not to see what will take place from then on, should the Ottoman Empire emerge from the war unscathed. The uprooting of Hellenism, which began in April of 1914, will be absolute and irreversible. The entire national structure which exists within the Ottoman Empire and which is not a creation merely of recent centuries but is indigenous, coming into existence much earlier—by a millennium—than the Ottoman conquest, this entire structure will be swept away completely, sending all those millions of the Greek element here, to the free Greece. The events leading up to the European war will convince you of which will be the fate of Hellenism in Turkey, should that country survive it.

The government assumes a heavy responsibility

[...] It is quite natural, Gentlemen, given the ideas behind the actions of the old political world of Greece, which today holds the majority of the Government seats, it is quite natural, I say, for it not to be able to adapt to the new state of things, not to be able to adapt to the large and colossal problems which have been emerging from the time during which Greece, having ceased to be small, extended its borders and occupied a position in the Mediterranean which was not only extremely imposing but also extremely enviable, and as such, extremely dangerous. How dare you, with those old ideas, to take on the responsibility of the policy you have carved out, indeed distancing yourselves from the traditional policy of this old political world of Greece, a world which knew that it is impossible for the prosperity of Greek affairs to be in contrast to the Powers that rule the sea? How is it possible, I repeat, today, having such ideas, to wish to impose them, against the repeatedly expressed opinion of the National Representation, against the very results of the recent past, which you did not hesitate, with the sincerity which distinguishes you, fellow citizen, again this very evening to denounce and to clearly state that, deep down, you think that we would be better off if we were within our old borders, those of before 1912? [...]

Epilogue. We will create a Greater Greece

Regrettably, after the triumphant wars, we were not given time to develop our new country and organize this enlarged Greece according, as far as possible, to the model of a new state, and thus supply the people with all those

advantages and all those benefits which could originate from the expansion of our borders. This truly unfortunate nation has, until now, seen nothing other than the sacrifices which it suffered for the expansion of the state's borders and had the moral satisfaction that it liberated its brothers, and the national satisfaction that it belongs to a state which is larger than it was before; however, from a material point of view, from the point of view strictly of economic interests, it has yet to see how it has benefited from this expansion of the state. It is natural, therefore, that today, all we have to present before the people are, once again, the required sacrifices, but sacrifices which will, Gentlemen, and it is my firm belief—inasmuch as there may exist among people such beliefs regarding such matters—it is my firm belief and my political opinion that these sacrifices will lead to the creation of a great and powerful Greece, which will not constitute an expansion of the state by conquest, but a natural return to the borders within which Hellenism was active from prehistoric times. We will create a Greece which will be greater and strong and rich, capable of developing within its borders a vital industry, capable, by the interests it will represent, of entering into trade treaties with other states under the best possible conditions, and capable of protecting the Greek citizen, wherever he may be in the world, as is the case with the great and powerful states, while at the same time, not suffer persecution and not suffer the lack of any protection, as the subjects of the present-day Greek state suffer today.

When you take account of all this, Gentlemen, you will understand why I said a little earlier that I am in the grip, and not only I, but the entire Liberal Party, of the most forbidding melancholy, for, by your government, you are leading Greece, unwittingly, but surely, to disaster, for you will make the country go to war out of necessity, under the harshest terms and under the most adverse conditions, and you will lose this opportunity to create a greater and powerful Greece, an opportunity which is only given to a nation once every millennium. (Prolonged applause both from the chamber and the galleries.)

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

ANTON STRASHIMIROV: BOOK OF THE BULGARIANS

Title: *Книга за българите* (Book of the Bulgarians)

Originally published: Sofia, Печатница на Военния журнал, 1918

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from the edition *Книга за българите* (Sofia: Сибия, 1995), pp. 161–167.

About the author

Anton Strashimirov [1872, Varna – 1937, Sofia]: writer, essayist and political activist. After the premature death of his father during Strashimirov's youth, he led the life of a vagabond. Later, however, he began working as a teacher in eastern Bulgaria. In 1895 he left for Switzerland, where he was influenced by the work of writers such as Ibsen, Strindberg and Maeterlinck. In the late 1890s he became a follower of Jane Sandanski, one of the most important paramilitary leaders of the Macedonian movement. Later he joined the liberal Young Democratic Party of Naycho Tzanov. He was three times elected deputy (1902, 1911 and 1929). In 1901, he became the editor of *Наш Живот* (Our life); then, in 1902, he became the co-editor of *Демократически преглед* (Democratic review). During the First World War, he adopted a pro-German and nationalistic position only to become a radical critic of his previous allies immediately after the end of the war. After the outbreak of political terrorism following the 1923 peasant revolt instigated by the communist party, he was one of the leading and most fervent critics of Alexander Tzankov's right-wing authoritarian regime. In this period he actively contributed to the radical left-wing magazine *Пламък* (The flame), edited by the leading avant-garde poet Geo Milev, who was assassinated by the secret police in 1925. Strashimirov's most famous literary work, the novel *Хоро* (The dance), one of the chef-d'oeuvres of Bulgarian expressionism and avant-garde literature, deals primarily with the violent period in question. A figure with multiple identities and often controversial ideas, he was the author of some ultra-nationalistic and pro-German papers and essays, while producing some of the most radically leftist texts (in both political and artistic terms) in Bulgarian literature during the first half of the twentieth century.

Main works: *Вампир* [Vampire] (1902); *Книга за българите* [Book of the Bulgarians] (1918); *Змей* [The dragon] (1919); *Нашият народ* [Our people] (1923); *Хоро* [The dance] (1926).

Context

The ‘Macedonian question’ became the quintessential element of Bulgarian nationalism after 1878. The political emancipation of Macedonia, which remained in the Ottoman Empire according to the decisions of the Berlin Congress, and its incorporation into the autonomous Bulgarian principality were the ultimate aims of Bulgarian foreign policy. In the next century, Macedonia became the main point of contention among Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek nationalisms. In 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece signed an alliance and declared war on the Ottoman Empire (the First Balkan War). As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman troops, Bulgaria gained a large part of Macedonia and most of Thrace. This ephemeral victory was perceived as an accomplishment of the Bulgarian national project and provoked enormous patriotic enthusiasm. However, the First Balkan War was immediately followed by the Second Balkan War, in which an alliance against Bulgaria was formed between Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Romania and the Ottoman Empire. This time Bulgaria was defeated. Southern Macedonia was captured by Greece, north-western Macedonia by Serbia, and southern Dobrudja by Romania. The Bulgarian position in the First World War was to a large extent determined by this painful defeat. Both the Entente and the Central powers promised territorial gains to Bulgaria. The Central Powers offered the Serbian part of Macedonia, and, eventually, in 1915, Bulgaria entered the war on their side. The same year, Bulgarian troops occupied Macedonia. The occupation did not last long, though. In September 1918 the Entente troops started an offensive. On 29 September, Bulgaria signed an armistice. On 3 October, King Ferdinand abdicated. On 27 November 1919, the Treaty of Neuilly was signed, according to which Bulgaria had to cede all occupied territories in Macedonia and Western Thrace to Greece, and several border regions to Serbia. Many refugees from Macedonia and Western Thrace flooded into Bulgaria.

The ‘Book of the Bulgarians,’ published in the period of Strashimirov’s nationalistic sentiments, constitutes an elaborate essay in national characterology, which, in a period of the war, has obvious political implications. The genre of national characterology (*народопсихология*) had an important impact on the debate on the national identity in Bulgaria since the late nineteenth century. Many influential intellectuals from the first half of the twentieth century, including **Boyan Penev**, Konstantin Petkanov, Konstantin Galabov and **Ivan Hadzhijski**, participated in the debate. In the typical case, the national characterology creates a homogeneous national type, or stereo-

type. Nevertheless, Bulgarian national characterology has a tendency to conceive the 'Bulgarian type' as a heterogeneous construction or synthesis of different principles. Boyan Penev, for instance, saw in the Bulgarian a synthesis of the positive features of the large European nations. From this perspective, Strashimirov's point of view is peculiar. He stressed the internal heterogeneity of the Bulgarian people, composed by regional types (if not ethnic sub-groups) with pronounced, and often incompatible features: Mysians, Thracians, Shops, Macedonians and Rupians. The emphasis on the diversity of Bulgarian types was a common element in the ethnography of the nineteenth century, which even took into consideration physical differences. However, in Strashimirov, this exploration of differences is put into a powerful ideological framework. In the period of modern nation-state building, the heterogeneity of the Bulgarians turned out to be an important problem which needed to be solved by the imposition of a strong national culture. This need was especially pressing after the national catastrophe in the Second Balkan War, which was considered to mark the failure of the Bulgarian unification project. In the context of the First World War, when Bulgarian troops reoccupied Macedonia, Strashimirov's characterology had one crucial ideological dimension: it provided an argument that the Macedonians were not simply one of the Bulgarian regional types, but in fact the most 'exemplary.'

The final chapter of the book, 'Pro Domo Sua,' could be seen as a representative sample for the Bulgarian nationalist view on Macedonia. The concrete purpose of the text is to answer and oppose Serbia's war-time claims over the Macedonian legacy, something which unavoidably acquires the character of military propaganda. The chapter recounts a conversation with the Austrian humorist Roda Roda, during which Strashimirov presents arguments in favor of the thesis that the Macedonians are one of the most important components of the Bulgarian cultural, political and military elite. To the Serbian claims that their own political leaders (Nikola Pašić for instance) were Macedonian Serbs, Strashimirov answers by using genealogical and historical arguments, that they included not only Macedonian Bulgarians, but also 'simple' Bulgarians (since Pašić's family originated not from Tetovo but from Teteven in Central Bulgaria), hence symbolically assimilating the 'enemy.'

With its nationalist intensity Strashimirov's essay was close to the emerging late-modernist tendencies of 'national ontology' (see **Dimo Kyorchev**, *Our Sorrows*). However, it was far from its metaphysical longing for the transcendent 'soul of the motherland.' Nevertheless, 'national ontology' de-

veloped as a real genre in its own right, gradually dominating the public debate on national characterology. During the communist regime, the genre of national characterology was fully discredited, together with the nationalist claims over Macedonia. Quite symptomatically though, it reemerged in the late 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of the late nationalist turn of the communist regime and the reintroduction of the national question into public debate. The interest in the reflexive potential of the genre of national characterology was stimulated in the years after communism by the anthology *Защо сме такава?* (Why are we like that?), edited by Ivan Elenkov and Rumén Daskalov (1994).

BM

Book of the Bulgarians

Pro Domo Sua

The great German humorist, the well-known Mr. Roda Roda,¹ took me aside, fixed me with his laughing eyes and whispered:

"Now tell me, for goodness's sake, how much of the population of Macedonia is Serbian?"

I chuckled; the good writer had grinned as if he intended to tell me the funniest of his impressions of our country. But my involuntary laughter set the tone of our conversation.

"What's the joke?" he laughed back.

"There are no Serbs in Macedonia, mister, none at all," I answered.

"Oh really? Except, perhaps, Prime Minister Pašić,² who comes from Tetovo in Macedonia?"

I had never before heard the legend that Pašić was from Tetovo. I spread the map of the Balkans in front of the humorist and showed him Teteven—right in the middle of Bulgaria, in Stara Planina.³

¹ Alexander Roda Roda (pen name of Sándor Friedrich Ladislaus Rosenfeld, 1872–1945): Austrian author and humorist. Son of a Jewish landowner, he grew up in Zdenči, Slavonia, and consequently he most likely was well-informed about the ethnic heterogeneity of Macedonia. Strashimirov was either unaware of Roda Roda's nationality and origin or deliberately "Germanized" him in order to maximize the effect of his anecdote.

² Nikola P. Pašić (1845–1926): Serbian politician, leader of the People's Radical Party. He was perhaps the most important political figure of the modern Serbian state and served several times as a prime minister of Serbia as well as of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

“Tetovo and Teteven sound similar, right?” I laughed once more. “The Serbs are joking, my friend. In the first years of the last century the Russian armies pulled out a hundred thousand Bulgarians from the Vidin region to populate their South Tartar provinces.⁴ The then depopulated Vidin attracted settlers from the densely populated Troyan Mountain (from in and around Teteven). They took the whole Koula and Zajčar districts. And Wallachians, whom the Turkish landowners attracted from the Carpathians, peopled the depopulated Vidin and Negotin districts. Here, around Negotin, the pashas also brought a dozen Serb villages from behind the Kopaonik Mountain. These Serbs are the only ones in Moravia. One of these villages is in Bulgaria—Brackevtsi. To this day the population on both sides of the Timok regards this village as Serbian and never marries with its people...”

“OK, right, but how about Pašić?”

“His parents come from Teteven in Stara Planina, not from Tetovo in the Shar Mountain. Pašić himself was born in Golemi Izvor, near Zajčar and doesn’t hide the fact that he’s Bulgarian. When Zajčar rose in the 1880s, Pašić escaped to Bulgaria, settled in Vidin and went to Teteven, where he found his relatives...”

“Nein... Now that’s a good joke!” laughed the good-natured humorist in his turn. “So the Serbs are good American journalists,” he chuckled. “Lie, and there’ll always be someone to take the bait!”

“There have to be,” I retorted. “There are no Macedonian-born Serb notables, just because there are really no Serbs in Macedonia.”

“That sounds interesting.” The German sobered and sat with his notebook at the table. “Would you please tell me something... non-professorial, something so vivid that would make truth burst forth like... you know, like laughter!”

“Well, that’s something only you can do! I will give you the raw material. Now write. Among the Slavonic tribes we are what Swedes are for the German world; we boast Simeon the Great in our past. Like them again, we alone among the Slavs put the definite article behind nouns and adjectives. Maybe that’s why Bulgarians, wherever they may live, search for Bulgaria and come back to it. [...] A whole group of lawyers, engineers, architects, financiers and many more state and municipal officials in Bulgaria were born

³ Teteven was one of the important economic and cultural centers in the central part of the Balkan Mountains (*Bg.* Stara Planina) since the mid-eighteenth century, when the town experienced its ‘golden age’.

⁴ The author is referring to the annexation of the Crimean Khanate by the Russian Empire in 1783.

in Macedonia. To count them, we would have to resort to help from our Department of Statistics..."

"Please don't," the humorist jumped. "My notebook is full. It seems that all educated people in Bulgaria were born in Macedonia?"

"Not all, but the better half, yes. As the most mountainous of all Bulgarian regions, Macedonia gives birth to the shrewdest Bulgarians. From time out of mind, they've been traveling 'round the world, looking for a livelihood, educating the nation. The Bulgarian national movement, the Bulgarian schools, literature and printing, all started in Macedonia (Ohrid, Skopje, Doiran, Tikvesh, Tetovo). [...] You wanted something non-professorial, right? Here's some more: half a century ago, when there was no Bulgarian state, some Serbian teachers went to Macedonia. But finding no Serbs there, they became Bulgarian, took part in Bulgarian uprisings and their grandchildren are now among our writers and professors..."

"Aye, how odd!" The German was astounded, but then he cut a comic face and whispered, "This can be checked, can't it?"

"Fortunately, yes. These people are alive, they are here, in Sofia..."

"Aye, aye... But then... did the Serbs never succeed in tearing anyone from Macedonia?"

"Never. We beat them at Slivnitsa,⁵ so they sought revenge in the cultural field: they attracted to Belgrade University forty graduates from Bulgarian high schools in Macedonia. They attracted them with state scholarships, but only after allowing them to declare themselves Bulgarian in the heart of Belgrade. Yet this only lasted a year. The next year the professors in Belgrade ordered their Bulgarian students to declare themselves Serbs or leave the university. So the whole group of forty students left Belgrade en masse and came to Sofia." [...]

The two nations—the Serb and the Bulgarian—are so alien to each other that after three decades of systematic propaganda in Macedonia, the Serbs have no Macedonian-born officers in their army. I do not doubt that this is due to the higher mental culture of the Bulgarians—our people are older and their historical experiences have left denser and more lasting attitudes. The Bulgarian is disparaging, even proud towards the Serb, without hating him, whereas we hate the Greeks but as soon as we fall among them we learn their ways and are assimilated. Yet I couldn't explain this essence to my interlocutor—the great German writer: I was wary of sounding immodest. [...]

My colleague was no longer laughing. Instead, he said quietly:

⁵ The author refers to the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885.

“After all this there’s but one thing that puzzles me: if the better part of the educated people in Bulgaria are Macedonians, how come they haven’t organized themselves and voiced a declaration to the people of Europe?

I was surprised: this had never occurred to any of us ... perhaps because our educated people do not feel Mysian, Thracian or Macedonian. So I said:

“Only the Serbs argue about Macedonia! And that’s why we beat them. Otherwise nobody here feels different, nobody is a Mysian, a Thracian or a Macedonian, so there’s no way the Macedonians in particular can come out to defend their region!”

“Yes, sure, but it’s one thing to hear that from the Macedonians, and another to hear it from you!”

“Oh yes?” I bent down to the ear of the good German. “But, my dear colleague, I am from Macedonia, too!”

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

PROGRAM OF THE YUGOSLAV MUSLIM ORGANIZATION

Title: *Program Jugoslovenske Muslimanske Oragnizacije* (Program of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization)

Originally published: In the newspaper *Pravda*, number 2, 25 February 1919

Language: Bosnian

The excerpts used are from Atif Purivatra, *Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* (Sarajevo: "Svjetlost," 1974), pp. 596–599.

Context

The year 1918 was a turning point in the economic and social life of Bosnian Muslims, as it marked the official end of the old sharecropping land tenure system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This system was frequently, but erroneously, described as feudalism in an effort to justify the deprivation of Bosnian Muslims of their land property rights during the land reform of 1919. However, the agrarian question in Bosnia and in the Balkans was also a national and a political one. The large estates were not actually the dominant type of property in this system. Muslims around 1918 were typically small landholders with a dozen sharecroppers working the land. There were a number of genuine *latifundia* (large estates) indeed, but these were the exception. In 1918 around 60,000 families of these small landowners, living off almost insignificant land rents, found themselves deprived of their property rights and income. This became a difficult social question, with the loss of income leading to poverty and social pathologies.

The *Jugoslavenska Muslimanska Organizacija* (Yugoslavian Muslim Organization, JMO) emerged in February 1919, out of the merging of local Muslim organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The party had its own political magazine called *Vrijeme* (Time). The JMO acted as the political representative of these devastated people and raised the question of compensation

as an important agenda for the entire Bosnian Muslim population. Many negotiations and agreements concerning the agrarian question were brokered with the Serbian political establishment. The JMO was prepared for concessions with Belgrade in exchange for at least partial compensation to Bosnian Muslim landowners. Their insistence on this question also earned them the reputation of being the true defenders of Bosnian Muslim interest.

The first leader of the party was the mufti of Tuzla, Ibrahim Maglajlić. In the first parliamentary elections the JMO won the largest number of votes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gaining 24 seats in the Parliament. The most prominent member of the party was its later leader, Mehmed Spaho, who achieved to pass the article 135 of the Yugoslav constitution, where it was clearly stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain within its existing borders. With the suspicious death of Spaho in 1939, the party was almost dissolved, and the Second World War brought its final demise. The death of Spaho was never investigated, nor was the JMO restored. After the fall of communism and the introduction of the multi-party system, none of the parties representing the Bosnian Muslims claimed the heritage of the JMO.

The 'Program of the JMO' was announced in February 1919 and amended in 1922. This program addressed a whole set of questions and principles, among which were constitutional, economic, educational, judicial and religious issues. The JMO was a party of Bosnian Muslims, with the intention to spread its influence elsewhere in Yugoslavia where Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds lived (Kosovo, Macedonia, Sanjak, Montenegro and Serbia); however, this influence was felt predominantly in Bosnia. The party opted for a democratic constitutional monarchy protected by the Karadorđević dynasty ruling in the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' (SHS). The JMO supported parliamentarianism because it was regarded as the most viable form of control over the centralist intensions of the dynasty and the Serbian political establishment. This was highly significant since Yugoslav political life between the years 1919 and 1921 was dominated by the constitutional question. The constitution was accepted only in 1921. It was a centralist constitution reconfirming Serbian predominance in the state and was considered to be detrimental by a considerable number of Croat and Bosnian Muslim politicians.

The JMO was not a religious party. Still, it raised specific issues connected to Islam and Islamic institutions as part of its agenda, as a party willing to genuinely represent Bosnian Muslims could not have avoided these issues. On the question of nationality and equality of ethnic groups and communities, the JMO subscribed to the principle of early Yugoslavism,

which maintained that there was one people with three so called “tribal” names (Yugoslavs were either Serbs or Croats or Slovenes). It was within this context that they approached the national question of the Bosnian Muslims. For them, the Bosnian Muslims carried all attributes of a national tribe, except national awareness. The JMO considered the Bosnians to be patriots, devoted to their nation and willing to preserve their language. In this context, the JMO denounced an aggressive process for the ‘nationalization’ of Bosnian Muslims. They claimed that a gradual cultural transformation would make Bosnian Muslims conscious of their true national identity. However, they did not specify what that true national identity was. On that matter, Bosnian Muslims and their political leadership remained conspicuously silent. Such concerns also played themselves out in constitutional debates. The JMO mandated constitutional equality for Islam, Islamic manners and customs, and demanded that these guarantees be fulfilled at the same level as constitutional freedom, private property and other constitutionally guaranteed liberties. This was not only a result of ideological scheming, but also an expression of contemporary realities. The triumphant Serbian nationalism treated Muslims and their institutions everywhere in the manner of a *reconquista*. There were numerous assaults on Muslim institutions and individuals.

After the question of constitutional rights, the most important item in the political agenda of the JMO was the economic improvement of Bosnian and other Muslims. Being aware of their economical and political weakness, the Bosnian political elite upheld the JMO as their only safeguard against Serbian and Croatian national designs to incorporate Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims into their respective national bodies. The party’s strategies appealed to the Bosnian Muslim masses and they regarded the JMO as a true defender of their interests and traditions.

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Program of the Yugoslav Muslim organization (JMO)

1. Fundamental principles

The fundamental principles of our politics are: democracy and constitutionalism, justice and liberty, equality and tolerance. We accept the national and state unity of the state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (SHS), and the constitutional monarchic state form under the national dynasty of the house of Karađorđević. Until the final agreement on the constitution, we accept the position expressed in the address of the national council in Za-

greb¹, and in the reply of the Regent to it, and then we ask the government to obey these principles. The state council, which will be the genuine expression of the people's will, should be convened immediately.

We accept the position of the full equality of the free people, and we stress the fact that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina never estranged themselves from their motherland, from their nation, from their language. They keep all signs of pure nationalism, and the only thing they are not aware of is the name of that people. Consequently, as far as the question of our nationalizing is concerned, our position is that it is a field of cultural endeavor, and not at all a matter of daily politics. The work in this regard should be grounded in tolerance and care, peace and evolution. Therefore we are against any rigidity and passionate take and especially against the forced endorsement of any of the national names. We will bring people closer and not divide them. We hold Yugoslavism to be the best model for coming closer and achieving unity.

2. The constitutional question

We accept the government's being fully accountable to the national assembly, which is the expression of the people's sovereignty, as well as being the outcome of elections based on general, equal, direct, secret and proportional voting for all bodies which are elected.

We ask that the state constitution should be passed expressly by the national assembly elected according to the aforementioned principle with a two-thirds majority of the vote. Equally we ask the constitution to be changed by the Grand National Assembly with a two-thirds majority of the vote. The ruler takes an oath on the constitution promulgated or changed in this way, and he has no right to sanction, change or suspend the constitution.

We ask the libertarian protection of faith, Islamic customs and conscience, the sanctity of personal freedom and private possession, freedom of work and action, freedom of movement, assembly and organizing, freedom of speech and press, and respect for the privacy of the house and of the mail.

We ask that in the constitution the unconditional granting of the equality of Islam with Christianity and other faiths should be stressed. We ask a constitu-

¹ The National Council was formed in Zagreb at the end of September 1918, and took temporary control of the new state (the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). It was decided that each province would have one representative for every 100,000 citizens. Hence, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 18 representatives. The Muslim populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a total of 6 seats.

tional guarantee for the non-conditional protection of the Muslim community to enjoy its endowments, hereditary and other properties, we ask full autonomy in our religious endowments and educational matters. We ask our connection with the Caliphate to be assured and regulated in a way that we possess equally free connections with it as the Catholics have with the Holy See.

We ask for the constitutional guarantee that the institution of the *sharia* courts will stay intact as state offices for adjudicating according to the rules of the *sharia* in their established sphere of action. That sphere of action should be broadened to give the *sharia* courts the right to adjudicate in all family matters concerning Muslims. They should be assigned to take care of Muslim orphans and they should keep the birth and death registers as well as marriage and divorce records for Muslims, so that these records will be accepted as public records. Furthermore, we ask the competence of the *sharia* courts in all endowment matters in which a *sharia* decision is necessary. We ask that these courts be given executive powers in all their decisions and judgments in order to secure the authority of the judge. The *sharia* judges should be given the direct punitive authority over the parts involved.

3. *Economic policy*

We ask for equal freedom of enterprise and profit for all citizens at the entire territory of the SHS state. The curtailing of the freedom of enterprise and profit is allowed only out of public concern, and therefore free work in crafts and commerce can be restricted by an earlier concession only if it is expressed in the law. The full freedom of competition in the field of enterprise must not be undermined by privileges. Economic and entrepreneurial privileges as well as concessions for the exploitation of resources in our state can be granted only in a constitutional way. Consequently, all existing economic and entrepreneurial privileges and all concessions for the exploitation of state forests and mines which have been granted must be revised in accordance with the constitution. The beneficiaries and holders of such monopolies can only be the state of SHS.

As far as agrarian relations in the countryside are concerned, we stress: all agricultural land is either free property or it is under the sharecropping arrangement. Free property is either small peasant property or large *begluk*² property. This free small peasant property today is predominantly burdened with debts, and it seems there is no way that this burden will be relieved soon only by the economic means of the owners of these small properties. We

² Mostly medium size estates rented to peasants.

consider this burdening of this free peasant property an obstacle to the successful development of agriculture to an extent equal to the sharecropping relations on sharecropper's lands. Therefore, we ask that in parallel with the abolishment of sharecropping, this small peasant property should be relieved from the burden of agricultural tax.

Each peasant has to be given as much land as it is necessary for his survival. Where necessary, the amount of land distributed to each individual should be identical. In order for peasant property to be relieved from the burden of agricultural tax so that it can be preserved in the future, a law should be passed establishing the minimum property size which will not be transferable or allowed to be burdened with any fee. The general economic interest necessitates preventing large estates, but where these exist as free property, they should be kept as they are. Then, while the abolishment of sharecropping applied to the previous owners of the land, if economic concern mandates it, the unification of their free property into a large estate should be guaranteed. In cases where the owner of the land does not own enough free property, and he wants to farm by his own hands, he should be granted enough land for survival purposes. Until the sharecropping question is resolved, the earlier legal relation between owner and sharecropper and the legal protection of that relation on both sides should stay in action. We will dedicate special care to supporting and improving our brothers in villages and cities by establishing peasant and craftsman corporations.

The working class should be protected by a special law from the capitalist exploitation of their employers. We ask especially for the introduction of compulsory security for workers in case of sickness, accident, inability to work or old age, and we also ask the assurance of support money for the widows and orphans of workers.

4. Educational policy

We ask for the highest possible increase in the budget for public education and the introduction of practical reforms in public education. Elementary education is obligatory for all children of both sexes. The educational curriculum for elementary, secondary and higher state schools should be introduced according to the most current methods. In elementary and secondary schools, the teaching of religion will be mandatory. We ask for the opening of vocational schools and courses teaching practical tasks in order that their students receive training to be able to become economically independent as soon as possible. Society and state should use all their power to fight illiter-

acy and they should invest the necessary funds for this purpose. The same applies to the establishment of homes and shelters for war and other orphans. State institutions should be opened for neglected, morally corrupt and ill-guided children and youth, and since attending these institutions will be mandatory, acceptance into these institutions can only be a result of a full court decision and the right of attorney.

5. Judiciary

We ask for the full independence of judges and the jury from all political and press incriminations, for a concerted fight against usury and for the protection of minors.

6. Military

We ask for the stipulations of Islam to be respected in the military, in particular that Muslim soldiers should not be burdened with heavy duties during the month of Ramadan. Furthermore, we ask prohibition of the involvement of all military personnel in politics and of their holding both civil and military posts at the same time.

7. Public health

We will pay special attention to public health and hygiene, with the stress being on fighting alcoholism.

8. The religious and educational autonomy

We will demand that our autonomous statute be revised immediately.

9. The relations with other Muslims of Yugoslavia

We will invite Muslims from other Yugoslav countries to join our organization.

10. Paying of indemnities

All indemnities which are owed to Muslims from the war period, in particular from the time of the change in regime, should be soon and fully paid.

Translated by Nihad Dostović

JÁN LAJČIAK: THE SLOVAK AS A NATIONAL INDIVIDUALITY

Title: *Slovák ako národné individuum* (The Slovak as a national individuality)

Originally published: In *Slovensko a kultúra*, ed. by Samuel Štefan Osuský, Bratislava, Slov. Ev. a v. Theol. Akademia, 1920

Language: Slovak

The excerpts used are from the re-edition Ján Lajčiak, *Slovensko a kultúra*, ed. by Borislav Petřík and Kveta Dašková (Bratislava: Q 111, 1994), pp. 67–72.

About the author

Ján Lajčiak [1875, Pribylina (*Hun.* Pribilina) – 1918 Vyšná Boca (*Hun.* Királyboca) near Liptovský Mikuláš (*Hun.* Liptószentmiklós)]: Lutheran priest, philosopher, theologian, orientalist and translator. He studied theology in Prešov (*Hun.* Eperjes) and Erlangen between 1898 and 1899. While in Erlangen he also started his studies on philosophy and oriental languages. Between 1900 and 1902, Lajčiak moved to Leipzig, where he attended lectures in Semitic studies and Semitic epigraphy and learned several languages (Syriac, Ethiopian, and Arabic). He received a doctorate for his study entitled *Die Plural und Dualendungen am semitischen Nomen*. From 1904 until 1905, Lajčiak continued his studies in Paris at the Faculty of Protestant theology at the Sorbonne, where he obtained a second doctorate in theology for his study *Ezechiel, sa personne et son enseignement*. Upon his return to Slovakia his critical liberal views on society, confessional issues and national life were met with strong opposition among the conservative Slovak national intelligentsia as well as the Church circles. He was ostracized by the Slovak cultural elite. In 1906, he became a priest in the small mountain village of Vyšná Boca, where he served until his death. Here Lajčiak started to work on his unfinished *opus magnum*, *Slovensko a kultúra* (Slovakia and culture), a broad sociological analysis of Slovak cultural life. As the author of this book Lajčiak has been appreciated in Slovak expert sociological circles. His philological and philosophical work has been re-evaluated after 1989; nevertheless, Lajčiak as a historical figure is still far from being accepted into a broader Slovak cultural canon.

Main works: *Die Plural- und Dualendungen am semitischen Nomen* [The plural and dual endings in Semitic nouns] (1902); *Ezechiel, sa personne et son enseignement* (1905); *Slovensko a kultúra* [Slovakia and culture] (1920).

Context

In turn-of-the-century Hungary Magyarization policies towards non-Magyar nationalities reached their climax. Not long after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the three Slovak-speaking grammar schools, along with the national cultural institution the *Matica slovenská*, were closed down and became the first victims of the new approach of central Hungarian authorities pursuing the policy of the linguistic unification of the state. The key question of the contemporary Hungarian political discourse became how to turn Hungarian society, with more than half of its population being non-Magyar, into a unified, ‘organic’ nation-state. Subsequently, towards the end of the century the assimilation policies spread to various levels of public and political life. In the realm of education Magyarization culminated in the ‘Apponyi School Law of 1907’ which allowed only one lesson a week in elementary schools for teaching the mother tongue. These measures in education, along with the fact that increasingly only voluntary Magyarization opened the way to a professional career and higher social status in Hungary, led to the so-called denationalizing (*odnarodnovanie*) of its own cultural elite as feared by Slovak nationalists. The reaction of the major Slovak political force, the National Party, placed greater stress on the implementation of the 1868 Act on Nationalities that, indeed, introduced Hungarian as the only official language but allowed for all other constitutional freedoms for the nationalities. Later, they sought closer cooperation with Romanian, Serb and other non-Magyar political representatives in the Hungarian Diet that led in the end to the creation of the Central Club of the Nationalities Party in 1912. The younger generation of Slovak intellectuals, though critical of the conservative leaders of the Slovak National Party, were looking for other ways to counter the assimilatory pressure of Hungarian modernization and what they felt to be a torpidity of Slovak national life. They proposed various solutions such as social and cultural education among the broader strata of Slovak society, ‘petit work’ and grass-roots national agitation.

Another sort of response was a thorough analysis of the nation’s current situation by using the instruments of modern science. One of the best examples in this respect is the unfinished manuscript ‘Slovakia and Culture,’ a tentative comprehensive sociological analysis by Ján Lajčiak. The book clearly shows the theoretical inspiration that he drew during his studies in Germany such as the *Völkerpsychologie* of Wilhelm Wundt or social Darwinism. The Spencerian idea of social evolution, Lajčiak hoped, would help dispel the torpidity and conservatism of Slovak life. Another crucial idea was

the concept of culture that Lajčiak took up from Karl Lamprecht as a notion that unified human history, a key-stone of all creativity giving meaning to all of the material and spiritual efforts of every individual and the whole nation. For Lajčiak these two notions, evolution and culture, were clearly superior to other ideas such as the nation, language and Slavdom, which represented only partial needs of the society but which, nevertheless, still prevailed in the current Slovak concerns. Lastly, under the influence of the sociologist Ludwik Gumpłowicz, Lajčiak interprets the dialectic of ideas and needs in connection with respective social conditions. In contrast to Gumpłowicz's determinism and collectivism, however, Lajčiak ascribed a greater role in the creation of new ideas to subjective factors, to the "powerful culture-formative individualities." Apart from his scientific inspirations, one can trace in Lajčiak's writing the strong impact of Protestant moral philosophy. His main aim was to analyze the specific model of Slovak culture in order to shape various fields of everyday life, "since the development of culture gives value to life and meaning to its efforts."

In his elaboration on various forms of Slovak life, Lajčiak harshly criticized the religious fundamentalism and patriarchal order that in his view generated only masses of passive and abashed people that could easily be manipulated. Additionally, he also pictured the other downsides of Slovak reality such as poverty, alcoholism, Magyarization and mass emigration. He saw the positive turns with the younger generation of 'petit work' activists, the Prague-educated adherents of **Tomáš G. Masaryk** with their positivist evolutionist program. He also observed the signs of evolution in the works of Slovak female realist writers such as Terézie Vansová, Ľudmila Riznerová-Podjavorinská, Elena Maróthy-Šoltésová or Božena Slančíková Timrava, authors often expressing contemporary feminist and socialist ideas. In the sub-chapter 'Slovak as a National Individuality' presented below, Lajčiak displays the strong influence of Spencer's view that society consists of individuals who create the "permanence of the relations." Hence, it is the individual subject and its constitution where the 'character' of the national whole originates. In this respect, the book refers to the initial descriptions of the Slovak national character as articulated in Slovak *belles-lettres* by authors such as Božena Slančíková Timrava or Albert Škarvan.

Lajčiak's unfinished book was posthumously prepared for printing by Samuel Štefan Osuský in 1920, but it proved to be an uneasy legacy for the Slovak intelligentsia at the time. One of the founders of modern sociology in Slovakia, Anton Štefánek, was rather critical of Lajčiak's work, which he considered to be hypercritical and overly concerned with the downsides of

Slovak public life. In contrast, another sociologist, Alexander Hirner, described Lajčiak's ‘Slovakia and Culture’ as the “first scientific approach to the reality of Slovak life.” Certainly, the book was not only one of the pioneering works in Slovak sociological thought, but also one of the first modern critical analyses of Slovak national identity. In the literary canon Lajčiak is treated as someone very close to the intellectual groups around the critical reviews *Hlas* (Voice) and *Prúdy* (Streams) (see **Bohdan Pavlů**, *Progressivism and Conservatism in Slovakia*). Even more than those groups, however, Lajčiak remained an outsider voice in mainstream Slovak culture despite the fact that the re-edition of ‘Slovakia and Culture’ in 1994 became a kind of cultural event.

PL–MK

The Slovak as a national individuality

In the previous chapter, I analyzed the principles governing the development of Slovak cultural life. I emphasized that cultural life cannot be described in a few short words, and that each form of cultural life covers a measureless variety of its manifestations.

We should also keep this principle in mind when we analyze the national character of a Slovak.

Our approach would be mistaken and embarrassment would soon follow if we were to limit our analysis of the national character of a Slovak only to certain static psychological schemes. Human characters vary much in real life, and hence it is not possible to meet two people who are completely the same. This principle should be emphasized in order to avoid the application of certain static rules on the classification of Slovaks.

The most trivial classifications say: this Slovak is a patriot and that one is a *Magyaron*.¹ The two-category classification is overly simplistic in evaluating people's attitudes. We should admit that the two-category classification, which aims to purify and refine Slovak national awareness, is partially justified, but fails to take into consideration psychological principles, and the countless stages leading from the character of the pure Slovak to that of the *Magyaron*. Observing the national character of a Slovak, we must strictly keep this principle in mind. If we fail to do so, we will not be able to under-

¹ ‘Magyaron’: a term with strong negative connotations used by Slovak patriots for those ethnic Slovaks who have accepted Hungarian language and culture at the expense of their own Slovak heritage.

stand the soul of the Slovak nation or the soul of the Slovak as an individual at all.

The *Národní hlásník*² revue published an interesting article dealing with the definitions of different Slovak characters. This article does not provide a thorough classification of the national characters of Slovaks, even though the author admits that the Slovak nation embraces a large variety of national characters. The published classification is incomplete and is not based on the psychological analysis of the Slovak national character.

Let us deal with this issue in more detail. [...]

Ideas are basic factors determining the nature of different national characters. Observing different Slovak characters, we have to take into account the ideas having an impact on the development of Slovak national life. The conclusions stated in the previous chapter clearly show that Slovak national life is under the significant influence of a wide range of ideas. The days of patriarchal order, when people were united due to the enforcement of uniform attitudes are gone, and the attitudes of people, who had previously shared the same ideas, have become alienated from one another. [...]

Until recently, religious ideas played the most significant role in the lives of Slovaks, and people followed nothing but the church's regulations.

National ideas represent the second factor having a significant influence on Slovak national life. Slovaks can be divided into five categories pursuant to the national ideas governing their lives: 1. pure Slovaks, 2. immature Slovaks, 3. schizophrenic Slovaks, 4. Slovak *Magyarons* and 5. Magyarized Slovaks.

I am fully aware that such categorization is far from being perfect, but I think it is necessary to develop some system to be used for the purposes of scientific study in this field. Observing the situation in Slovakia, its struggles and desires, its failures and suffering, we can find the above mentioned categories of Slovaks throughout the country. Readers able to enter into the psychological causalities of the Slovak soul and to reasonably assess the spiritual life of the nation will understand that national life implies many different types of Slovaks.

² Journal of the Slovak National Party published between 1868 and 1914, first as monthly and later as a weekly.

1. Pure Slovaks

Pure Slovaks represent the type of national character, which is rarely found in Slovakia, I must say. General experience has shown that a large number of national leaders in Slovakia, upon whom thousands of people pinned their faith, passed themselves off as national martyrs who struggled for the holy national ideas, who were imprisoned for their convictions, who were even ready to lay down their lives for their ideas, who were respected as unbreakable fighters for the idea of the Slovak nation—and yet who suddenly disclaimed or suppressed their national awareness, or directly crossed over to the adversary. Such cases are dreadful and they greatly damage the Slovak national efforts.

Taking such experiences into account, we might ask whether there is a man in Slovakia, who meets the pure-Slovak requirements. Raising this question, I definitely do not lessen the efforts of many Slovaks working hard to promote national objectives. However, my question shows that there is a lack of men who have been steeled in the fire of the national struggle in Slovakia and who are able to resist all temptations.

We can also meet those Slovaks, whose national awareness cannot be reproached with any failure but whose physical and spiritual lassitude keeps them away from the tasks aimed at promoting Slovak national ideas, especially in the event that these tasks would require them to work hard. Quite a high number of such people also document the weakness of the Slovak national character.

It is not easy to describe the features of a pure Slovak. This task is even more complicated since pure characters do not exist in real life. The model character is perfect and, as such, never exists. Speaking about model characters, about typical Slovaks, we do not take these models to really exist. Brief characteristics of the Slovak national characters are not based on physical but on psychological attributes. However, the basic features of the pure Slovak character are not dreamt-up—they are taken from real national life.

A pure Slovak is a man with pure Slovak intellectual and mental features functioning in full harmony. We fully accept that pure Slovak characters may vary to a large extent in real life, if we realize that the spiritual life of a man is the existing world of feelings, ideas and will, and that the behavior of a particular person is usually governed by one of these attributes.

Vigorous national awareness is the most significant attribute expected of the pure Slovak. His or her spiritual life should be immersed in purely Slovak ideas and feelings. His or her ideas and feelings should be mature, deep-

rooted and never affected by immediate and short-lived influences. Such a character should be a substantiation of the nation itself, of national struggles and desires, and represent the consciousness of the Slovak nation. Dignity should be the predominant feature of this character and it should be also far from cynical and indifferent.

2. *Immature Slovaks*

There are many immature national characters within the young Slovak nation. Immature national awareness is typical of these characters. They are expected to mature into different specific characters afterwards, according to the forces to which they will be exposed in their lives. These national characters have not politically matured yet; they are political and national waverers who are able not only to hide their national conviction but even to cross over to the side of their adversaries. Let us not mention the names; anybody familiar with Slovak circumstances can easily find many of them. This national character includes also the men, who hide their national conviction because of their marriages. Such cases are definitely not rare.

I admit that such people would have matured into pure Slovak characters under favorable circumstances, but they did not mature into pure characters due to the lack of them.

The tolerance of these people to the abuses endured by Slovaks, even though they themselves do not offend anybody, also demonstrates the weakness of their character.

3. *Schizophrenic Slovaks*

Schizophrenic Slovaks represent a specific kind of national character. This character is not standard; it should fall under social psychopathology studies, since it can be understood only when considered as a pathological condition. We will define this category of individuals, but we have to digress in order to understand the nature of a schizophrenic national character.³

4. *Slovak Magyarons*

Slovak *Magyarons* represent an interesting subject for psychological studies. As for their nationality and language, Slovak *Magyarons* are Slovaks, but

³ An incomplete paragraph [original editorial note].

they are Hungarians in their souls and hearts. These people are aware of their Slovak origin, but feel ashamed of it. Such people willingly speak poor Slovak in order to keep their origins a secret. Some of them Magyarize their names so as to conceal their origins.

This national character has been established for various reasons. Schools are the most significant factors in this case. Schools inculcate the *Magyaron* spirit in secondary and university students. Young men, who have not been nationally purified and refined at home, are left unprotected against the fire of temptation and many of them are not able to overcome it. The things that happen are really interesting and they should be recorded and observed. We can meet families in which the parents are firmly convinced of their Slovak nationality, while some children in these families are convinced of their Slovak nationality and others of their Magyar nationality. Observing such cases, we can discover that it is often the school that inflicts this denationalization.

However, the school is not the only cause of denationalization. We can find other examples. People employed in the state administration, having maybe not the best-paid, but also not the worst-paid jobs, often throw off their national awareness for the benefit of some welfare advantages and cross over to the adversary. Slovak national awareness suffers from moral decay. It is dreadful how often the youth who have not been nationally fire-refined and purified at home convert into Magyars. Even more appalling are the cases of adult men who often back off from the lines of national fighters even though they are expected to be nationally mature.

5. *Magyarized Slovaks*

In examining the reasons for denationalization, we can find several interesting facts. I think it is necessary to analyze these reasons in more detail before I formulate a final statement.

The basis of the denationalization of so many young Slovak men is laid in their homes. Slovak families, which consider themselves intellectuals, often do not bring up their sons and daughters in pure national awareness and in the Slovak spirit. It is true that we all often thunder against our adversaries, but that is definitely not what true national education should be about. When sending their sons to schools, Slovak fathers and mothers usually do not forget to instruct them to behave carefully towards Hungarian students. They usually recommend that they not speak Slovak in their presence.

The circumspection, having nothing but unpleasant consequences, is imprinted into the hearts of Slovak youth that way. Young Slovak men often

live in such conditions, that during their secondary school studies they only speak Slovak at home. I think it is clear, that such behavior inevitably plants a seed of denationalization. If Slovak national awareness has not penetrated deep—either by chance or by a personal inspiration—into the blood and belief of a young man, such a man is often lost to the nation forever. Sons with completely different attitudes may grow up in the same family—one can grow up as a man with pure and genuine national awareness, the second as a totally fanatic *Magyaron* and the third as a man who is neutral—seemingly, at least—but ready to vote against the Slovak candidate in national elections. If you know such families, you can fully understand the situation in which the parents live fully aware and proud of their Slovak nationality. I personally know a mother who weeps for her son who has become a fanatical *Magyaron* and for her Magyarized daughter.

National intellectual circles make mistakes in the education of their teen-aged children. The national awareness of Slovak intellectuals is not deep-rooted and experienced enough, and they have not obtained the satisfactory education based on national history. Several Slovak magazines have repeatedly mentioned the sorrowful and miserable knowledge of Slovak intellectuals of recent national history and national culture. Admittedly, the individual nation-oriented education of young people at home is far from perfect and this is incorrect. This situation should be considered as a pathologic social phenomenon, since it is a result of Slovak national idleness.

Philosophers dealing with history, including Nietzsche, say that human spirit is usually paralyzed due to historical events. However, the opposite statement applies to the small Slovak nation. As I see it, the current highly treacherous and perfidious environment in Slovakia arose from our spiritual and character weakness. We have little knowledge of our national history, moreover, the current development does not make us happy at all, and that is why we have turned into such an uncertain and timid nation. We need to refresh the Slovak national awareness in the young men, who usually enter real life unprepared and unequipped with sufficient knowledge. The lack of knowledge of national history and consequently the lack of national awareness have weakened the capability of our youth to resist various temptations and attacks.

Personal economic conditions, or rather economic dependency, represents the second source of denationalization. If a Slovak who is aware of his nationality and able to get enthusiastic about national ideas during his studies is offered a profitable position with the adversary, we can be nothing but sure that he will desert the Slovak nation. It is easy to find sons born to nationally

aware Slovak fathers, who for bread have become indifferent if not alienated to the Slovak national perspectives.

Some intellectuals sold out their nationality for more profitable positions, even though their Slovak bread was already ensured. They represent the most shameful wounds on the body of the Slovak nation. Many books could be written to narrate the sad stories about these people. In truth, no position in Slovakia provides great financial resources, but it is more respectable to eat one's own bread than to become rich by selling out the nation.

Family life is another factor of denationalization, and it is of the same seriousness and importance. Young Slovak intellectuals often marry Hungarian girls; and so two people of diverse opinions establish a family in the name of love.

I admit that love is one of the strongest movers of human life and of life in general, and that even gods were not able to withstand the temptation of love. However, Slovaks need to be careful and they also need to be advised in these matters. We have to accept the fact that nationally aware Slovak intellectuals will probably quite often marry Hungarian or *Magyar* girls, as they have always done, and that nationally mature Slovak girls will marry *Magyar* boys or native Magyars, as they have also always done. Matters of love stand above all others in human life. A man is prepared to sacrifice much, even everything, for love.

I consider marriages with persons of different nationalities as a significant problem with respect to Slovak national interests. In my opinion, this problem is even more significant than marriages with persons of different religious convictions. The nature of the Slovak soul and the weakness of our national character, analyzed in the previous theoretical chapter, result in the sad fact that the Slovak partner in the nationally mixed marriage is most often the object of denationalization. It would be definitely useful to weigh these facts. Our indifferent attitudes to this issue also demonstrate the weakness of our national character.

The summary statement based on the conclusions presented in this chapter is this: Guard your heart! And good advice can be given to everybody: Slovak boys, marry Slovak girls! Slovak girls, marry Slovak boys!

Translated by Pavol Lukáč

ISTVÁN BIBÓ: ON EUROPEAN BALANCE AND PEACE

Title: *Az európai egyensúlyról és békéről* (On European balance and peace)

Originally published: written in 1942–1944, in its own time it remained unpublished, though many of its arguments were merged into his essays, published between 1945 and 1947

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from the edition *Válogatott tanulmányok* (4 vols.) (Budapest: Magvető, 1986–1990), vol. I., pp. 327–364.

About the author

István Bibó [1911, Budapest – 1979, Budapest]: philosopher of law, political thinker, politician. He came from a Calvinist middle-class family of civil servants and intellectuals. He studied law at the University of Szeged, and specialized in the philosophy of law. In the late 1930s, he was a member of the populist movement, which had strong roots in Szeged. He was a close friend of the sociologist Ferenc Erdei, who was the most important left-wing ideologue of the populists. After the occupation of Hungary by German troops in March 1944, Bibó was involved in the underground resistance. In the democratic interlude after 1945, Bibó published a series of highly original essays on the key problems of Hungarian politics and history. After serving for a short while in the Ministry of Interior under Erdei, he acted as the head of the ‘Pál Teleki Research Institute’ (later renamed the ‘Eastern European Research Institute’) between 1946 and 1949, and became a prominent figure of the *Nemzeti Parasztpárt* (National Peasant Party). He also taught political sociology in Szeged. His most important works, analyzing the problems of nationalism in Central Europe and the chances of democratic development in Hungary, were published in this short period. After 1950, he was marginalized. In October 1956, he was a delegate for the Petőfi Party (the reformed National Peasant Party) in the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy. After the fall of the revolution, he wrote a series of memoranda to the international community justifying the revolutionary government’s actions and seeking to find an acceptable compromise respecting the Soviet geo-political interests but safeguarding the democratic and pluralistic political system that had emerged during the revolution. In 1957, he was arrested and was condemned to life imprisonment for his ‘counter-revolutionary activities.’ He was released in the 1963 amnesty, and worked as a librarian until 1971. His works were rediscovered in the 1970s, and became crucial references for the emerging opposition movement. He is considered the most important Hungarian political thinker of the twentieth century.

Main works: *Kényszer, jog, szabadság* [Enforcement, right and liberty] (1935); *A magyar demokrácia válsága* [The crisis of Hungarian democracy] (1945); *A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága* [The misery of the Eastern European small states] (1946); *Zsidókérdés Magyarországon 1944 után* [The Jewish question in Hungary after 1944] (1948); *The Paralysis of International Institutions and its Remedies* (1976).

Context

During the first four years of the Second World War, although actually participating in the war on the side of the Axis powers, Hungary seemed to be an island of peace compared to most other countries in the region. It managed to retain a certain degree of autonomy, and the government of Miklós Kállay (March 1942 – March 1944) in particular sought to establish secret links with Allied diplomats, with the intention of maneuvering the country out of the war. In this relatively optimistic atmosphere, the Hungarian public followed the discussions published in the Western press about the plans for a post-war reorganization of Eastern Europe. The general direction of these plans, seeking to solve the endemic nationality question, was towards the federalization of the region (see **Milan Hodža**, *Federation in Central Europe*).

The central concern of the mainstream nationalist public was securing the territories of historical Hungary that had been regained with the help of the Germans from Romania (Northern Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina) and Czechoslovakia (some of the southern regions of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine). In contrast, the populist, leftist and liberal intellectual circles tended to sympathize with the federalist option. Seeking to provide a historical and legal framework for a possible post-war consolidation and democratization of the region, István Bibó also entered the discussion on federalization, proposing, however, a radically different solution.

In his lengthy manuscript, which was written during the Second World War and which served as a basis for his famous essays published after 1945, Bibó gave an interpretation of the emergence of anti-democratic nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. The text, strongly influenced by the writings of the Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero (1871–1942), was an attempt to formulate an ideological basis for a new democratic government to be established after the end of the war. Taking the Congress of Vienna (which ‘invented’ the principle of legitimacy as an ideological tool to return to a mutually acceptable political and territorial order after the upheaval of the Napoleonic wars) to be an example of successful peace-making, while describing

the Versailles Peace Settlement as a tragic failure, Bibó sought to create a 'reference work' for the future peace-makers (significantly, the original title he intended for the book was 'The book of peace-makers') in order to devise a theoretical framework for settling the national conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe once for all. Significantly, at this point, Bibó tackled the problem of Italy and Germany together with the Eastern European 'small states.'

Bibó's interpretation started from the assertion that the "critical point of the European balance of forces" was the territorial and national chaos of Central and Eastern Europe. This region became the chronic hotbed of conflicts, due to the belatedness and unfortunate outcome of the processes of nation-formation. In his theory, the idea of national self-determination had the same social and ideological roots as the program of "ideological and emotional democratization" of society. According to Bibó, the process of extending the pre-modern privileges of the nobility to the entire national community and thus creating a modern national community unfolded without serious difficulties in the West. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, the multi-ethnic empires blurred the incipient national frameworks, thus hindering their political development. Consequently, for these nations, nobody laid the foundations of a modern national- and state-organization that other parts of Europe had experienced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In order to fulfil their national program, they had to turn to a system of references "behind the actual political establishment," they had to rely on the 'popular factors' and ethnographic realities, deeper than the institutional structures of the states they lived in. Thus the linguistic-cultural criteria became the central problem of national ideologies and linguistic nationalism could emerge as a "triumphant mutant." The 'nation-states,' created or envisioned by the various national revivals, ultimately opted for the linguistic homogenization of their inherited historical territories, thanks to their "tormenting sense of inner insecurity." This permanent feeling of threat in turn led to the pathological construction of 'anti-democratic nationalism,' mobilizing the mass energies precisely against the democratic political agenda. The most radical version of anti-democratic nationalism in Bibó's interpretation was fascism.

In Bibó's interpretation, the solution to the conflicts in Eastern Europe depends precisely on the elimination of this collective psychological obsession. He points out that this hysteria is ultimately centered on the 'symbolic geographies' of these countries: political debates became fixated on the question of 'territorial status.' Therefore, the task of consolidating the nation-states in the region required the adjustment of this process to the norm of 'self-

limitation,' that is the abandonment of the historical or fictitious narratives of the "glorious realm," once extending from the Baltic to the Adriatic sea, or from the Dniester to the Tisza (*Cro.*, *Rom.*, *Slo.*, *Srb.* Tisa), and so on. This meant a fundamental break with the Hungarian mainstream political discourse of the interwar period which aimed at the restoration of the multi-ethnic realm of the Crown of St. Stephen under a presumed Hungarian cultural and political superiority, but it also challenged the nation-building narratives of the neighboring states using geopolitical and historical arguments to incorporate territories inhabited by other nationalities. Bibó instead advocated a combination of the ethnographic principle with national self-determination, in which referendums would be held throughout the contested territories and the formation of large groups of 'national minorities' exposed to the homogenizing pressure of the majority would be avoided. For Bibó, this was the precondition for drawing fixed and legitimate borders. He suggested that the ensuing territorial stability, in the absence of sizeable minority populations feeding irredentist projects, might reduce emotional agitation, opening the way for the democratization of these societies and eventually supra-national cooperation. In this sense, Bibó's recommendations were rooted in the Hungarian populist tradition—which focused on building democratic nation-states rather than dreaming about the restoration of multinational polities—but without the ethno-cultural rhetoric of its main protagonists.

Significantly, even though his practical suggestions were obviously not taken into account, Bibó was among the very few political thinkers in wartime Eastern Europe who did not have to change fundamentally his theoretical argument after 1945. Based on the manuscript of *Az európai egyensúlyról és békéről*, his essays on Eastern European national problems and democratic development had a considerable resonance in the years immediately following the war, but after 1948, in the context of cultural and political Stalinization, his voice could hardly be heard. Released from prison in 1963, he was among the few prominent intellectuals who refused to cooperate with the gradually softening Kádárist regime and was practically banned from publishing his works. Significantly, Bibó's *oeuvre* became a crucial point of reference for the critiques of the regime in the 1970s. There is a wide range of interpretations from various authors, the most important being the *István Bibó 'Festschrift'* (1979–80), a symbolic joint venture of the reform-communist, liberal and populist wings of the emerging opposition movement, which became once again fragmented in the mid-1980s. This volume contained, among other things, the short version of Jenő Szűcs's famous text on

the three historical regions of Europe, which in many ways followed Bibó's ideas on the historical path of Central and Eastern Europe, but recontextualized them in terms of a tripartite model contrasting the Central European structures to those of Western Europe and Russia.

BT

On European balance and peace

The deformation of political culture in Central and Eastern Europe

It is a generally accepted notion today that Central and Eastern Europe, or, to be more exact, the whole area east of the Rhine between France and Russia is characterized by a certain inherent backwardness with respect to its political culture. Mention is frequently made of the backward and antidemocratic nature of social conditions in the region, the brutality of its political methods, the self-centered, petty and aggressive character of its nationalism; mention is made of the fact that in this region, political power is in the hands of aristocratic landowners, monopoly capitalists and military cliques whom these countries are unable to rid themselves of; it is argued that this area is a hotbed of all kinds of confused, obscure and mendacious political philosophies. All this seems to bear out the conclusion that the peoples and countries of this region are temperamentally incapable of a Western European type of democratic development. This whole concept is based on certain true facts, yet in its final conclusion it is gravely misleading. However, it lends itself ideally to the justification of why the troublesome and uncomfortable ideas related to the consolidation of the region should be shunned, and gives grounds for the various propositions coming from the right and the left, all rather superficial and perilous, which, as much as they differ from one another, share one thing: they are all appalling and dangerous.

Undoubtedly, these countries are quite a long way from the accomplished and mature democracies of Western and Northern Europe. Furthermore, we have no reason to doubt that the nature of their social structures plays a major role in this fact. The institutions that have provided the elementary school of democracy in Western Europe have reshaped the Central and Eastern European societies in a much less intensive manner. Feudalism in the Western sense, based on personal, contract-like relations extended only as far as the river Elbe, beyond which a rigorous and uniform serfdom prevailed. Progressing from west to east, the dominance of social methods and forms of communication tamed by a bourgeois lifestyle, Christianity and humanism

pervaded the lowest layers in a decreasing measure. As a result, the ending of the social role of a unified European aristocracy elicited a much greater shock in Central and Eastern Europe than in the West, where a developed social structure no longer or less typically based on birth privileges was by that time ready to take over the aristocracy's role. All this, however, fails to alter the fact that for centuries Central and Eastern Europe has been divided from Western Europe only by differences in degree, and that this area was the closest to Western Europe temperamentally as well as geographically. Germany (not to mention Italy) was also rendered an integral part of the West by the intensity of its urban life, the general prevalence of feudalism and the country's cultural achievements. In the countries east of them remarkable antecedents of political liberty have existed, and in fact one of the greatest hopes of nineteenth century Europe was the very intensity of the reaction that the European concept of liberty elicited in Eastern Europe. This hope remained unfulfilled, but the fact that this region fell behind Western Europe more than it had done before cannot be explained by social causes alone. [...]

Nor it is to be doubted that in these countries the aristocratic landowners, monopoly capitalists and military cliques possess a degree of power and influence that would not be tolerated in a country with a freer spirit and a more unified development. Yet the popular view holds that the petty, self-centered, aggressive and antidemocratic nationalism of this region is *caused by the interests* of the powerful or influential aristocratic landowners, monopoly capitalists and military cliques in keeping the peoples of these countries in a slavish obedience and diverting their attention from social issues; but this view is frightfully superficial. *In this form* it makes no sense. These interests are certainly lurking somewhere in the background, and they are indeed glad to find a political movement delivering them obedient masses. However, if this were the crucial factor, then we would have here, not a confined nationalism but mere servitude and beast-like backwardness. Even if it is confined and petty, nationalism is a serious mass emotion closely akin to democratism, and men and groups firmly rooted in interest relations are incapable, as we have argued elsewhere, of either stimulating or really experiencing mass emotions. At the most, they will strive to exploit and reinforce for their own ends the misleading and impeding effect of various historical shocks and fears on the political development of individual countries.

It is also true that this region provides a fertile ground for the proliferation of the most muddled political philosophies and the grossest political lies which can not even be put into words, let alone appear convincing in countries with healthy development. However, it would be childish to imagine that the dis-

torted development of a political culture can be caused by muddled philosophies or the agitation of a malevolent propaganda. A serious mass emotion can spring only from a strong impulse, and the impulse only from a real experience. The half-truths of muddled philosophies and the lies of propaganda can have a real effect on individuals or communities only if they have intensely terrifying and misleading experiences which render them susceptible to half-truths and lies. The latter can help them justify their self-deceptions, cherish their vain hopes, become inveterate in their false concepts and procure satisfaction for certain strong impulses. Half-truths and propagandistic lies roll off the back of a man with a balanced spirit. The question is what has made the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe unbalanced.

All the threads point towards some kind of political hysteria, and in dismissing political hysterics the first task is to disclose the historical shocks disturbing the development and balance of these countries. We should be suspicious of two things: the premature, explosion-like character of their democratism and the resulting difficulties in the formation of the national frameworks. Every country east of the Rhine—and this applies to Russia as well, which otherwise does not belong to the whole Central and East European complex—received the system of democratic concepts in a ready-made form, before the inner development and needs of their own societies could have brought about these changes organically. Similarly, nationalism, the democratic communal mass emotion spreading over Europe, overran Central and Eastern Europe earlier and more thoroughly than democratism itself. This is why social development east of the Rhine lacks the harmony of an ideological program and the conditions that have made social development in Western Europe so felicitous. Furthermore, in the case of Germany, Italy and probably Spain a terrible burden on their democratic development has been the fact that the spread of democratic ideas is linked to the historical memory of an unexpected and alien aggression: the Napoleonic invasion. [...]

The ultimate tipping of the inner political balance was, however, due to the painful and difficult process of *nation formation*. We have already discussed how in this region the disintegration of Germany and Italy and the establishment of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires had resulted in the disjunction of state and national borders, and how this led to the emergence of linguistic nationalism and through this to the intermingling of all national frameworks here. This in turn meant that the nations living here lacked what the Western European nations possessed in a self-evident and tangible way, both in reality and in the communal consciousness: the actual existence of their own state and national framework, a capital, the harmonious functioning of politics and econ-

omy, a unified social elite, etc. In Western and Northern Europe a country's rise and fall, its role as a great power or its shrinking, the acquisition and loss of colonial empires could remain a mere episode, a distant adventure, a pleasant or sad memory; yet eventually all this could be put up with without a deep shock, because they had something that could not be seized from them and could not become an issue of debate. In contrast, Greater Germany (*Gross-Deutschland*), a unified Italy (*Italia Unita*), a reborn Poland (*Polonia Restituta*), an independent Hungary or a free Czech state—however deeply-rooted psychological realities they may have been, and however strong the emotions associated with them—they were nevertheless only things existing in postulates. It had to be proved that Germany stands above everything else, that Italy is not a merely geographical concept, that Poland is not lost, and so on. That is, the national frame was something that had to be moulded, had to be restored, had to be fought over and something that one constantly had to be concerned for, fearing its loss not only because of the power politics of the existing imperial state frameworks but also because of the indifference from parts of the population and the instability of the national consciousness.

This situation is responsible for the most typical feature of the unbalanced political mentality in Central and Eastern Europe: *the existential fear for the community*, an experience shared particularly by the small Eastern European nations. In each one of them, their lives have been overshadowed by an alien and rootless sovereign power sometimes having an influence within European norms and sometimes with an intolerable pressure; a power which—whether he was emperor, tsar or sultan—deprived them of their best sons by offering a career to the dullest and prison or the gallows to the most upright. The conflict of historical and ethnic borders soon induced these peoples to have grudges against each other as well, and whenever they had the chance to do so, they tried out on each other what they had learnt from their emperors, tsars and sultans. Each of them have come to be familiar with the feeling of having the sacred sites of their national history in danger, lost or in the hands of strangers and foes, and of having all or parts of the populace under alien rule or oppression. Each of them have had areas they had reason to fear for or were justified in claiming back, and none of them have been spared from being at the edge of partial or complete annihilation. But neither did Germany and Italy escape this existential anxiety, despite their past, their power, their achievements and their incomparably greater size. They too were unable to rid themselves of the belief that their national unity has not been long-lived and is not complete yet, and they still feared that this unity could be destabilized by some external or internal collapse. For a Western European man the way Hitler or any statesman

from a small Eastern European country talks about the “nation’s death” or the “nation’s annihilation” is just an empty slogan: a Western European man can conceive an annihilation, subjugation or slow assimilation, but this overnight and entirely political “annihilation” is not a conceivable reality for him. This is why vulgar Marxism’s rejection of the national idea elicited such a different response in Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Western Europe on the other. In the West, where the national frameworks are seen as continuous and real facts with a long history, the Marxist viewpoint was just one possible theory among many, a bit dogmatic but quite constructive; it was one more extravaganza to be tolerated without much anxiety and fear by Western societies. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, the notion that the national concept is an ideology screening the interests of a confined group of capitalists appeared to be mortally dangerous for the very reason that in this region it did have a shade of truth. Not because in these countries the primary beneficiary and vehicle of the national concept have really been the capitalist bourgeoisie; in fact this role was primarily taken over by the so-called national intelligentsia instead of the capitalist bourgeoisie, and in this region these two classes happened not to coincide, and in fact not to be so closely related at all. It was still true, however, that in these countries, large sections of the population, for whom the new national frameworks did not coincide with the historically experienced reality of the dynastic state, have responded with a certain passivity to the national concept, and thus the national intelligentsia has made an immense effort to ‘teach’ the lesson of the *nation* to the *people*. Of course, this lesson could in fact only be conveyed by history, but in the meantime the conviction of vulgar Marxism that the national concept serves to cover up the interests of small social groups was a mortal threat to the efforts of the national intelligentsia to “instruct” the people. This is why it was possible to implant a well-nigh psychotic fear of Marxist socialism even in layers of the intelligentsia that had no serious interest in the capitalist system whatsoever.

Existential fear for the community has been the crucial factor that has made the situation of *democracy* and *democratic development* unsteady. One could argue against this statement that the difficulties of a nation’s emergence and the existential precariousness connected to it have also been present in some Western European style countries such as Norway, Finland and Ireland, and that Napoleon subjugated Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland as well without these experiences ever undermining democracy in these countries. This is true. No one claims that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have had a free social mentality or have been well-prepared for democracy. But they did start off on the path towards democracy, and except

for Western Europe and North America they were closer than any other part of the world to their destination. They have been halted on this path by historical shocks and the anxieties they had caused. Mature democracy is the equivalent of the psychological state of adulthood, whereas the historical shocks experienced by nations parallel the individual shocks that embroil the insufficiently resistant, immature psyche in various kinds of hysteria. Accordingly, the political culture and morals of finished, mature democratic societies are further strengthened by historical shocks instead of being undermined by them, whereas they tend to disturb the development of communities that have newly embarked on the path to democracy, entangling them into irresolvable spasms of collective psychology. To be a democrat means, above everything else, not to be afraid: not to be afraid of people with a different opinion, a different language or race, of revolutions, of conspiracies, of the enemy's unknown and wicked intentions, of hostile propaganda, of disdain, and more generally of all the imaginary perils that become real perils by the very fact that we are afraid of them. Central and Eastern European countries were afraid *because* they were not finished and mature democracies, and *since* they were afraid, they could not become one. The evolution of an undisturbed and free political life devoid of fear would have stumbled over these nations' fear complexes at the most diverse points: either it would have queried some war preparation or encumbered the implementation of some aggressive foreign policy rooted in fear, or would have made unstable some false political construction, the revelation of whose falsity was prohibited by national fears, or it would have offered too many opportunities to national minorities that were seen as threatening the national unity and alien, indifferent or hostile towards the national frameworks etc.

Thus, everything that *real* democracies know only in the hours of *real* danger has become a rule in such a constant atmosphere of fear and danger: the curtailment of public liberties, censure, the search for “traitors” and the enemy's “henchmen” and the imposition of order or the appearance of order and national unity at all costs to the detriment of democracy. The most diverse forms of distorting and corrupting democracy have appeared here, from the subtlest and quite often unconscious methods to the most brutal ones: pitting universal suffrage against democratic development, systems of coalitions and compromises based on unhealthy and unsound principles, election systems or corrupt electoral practices hindering or distorting the healthy formation of a common will, as well as coups and temporary dictatorships. [...]

Translated by David Oláh

STJEPAN RADIĆ: SLAVIC POLITICS IN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Title: *Slovanská politika v habsburské monarchii* (Slavic politics in the Habsburg monarchy)

Originally published: Prague, author's own edition, 1902.

Language: Czech

The excerpts used are from the second edition in Croatian, Stjepan Radić, *Slavenska politika u habsburžkoj monarkiji* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1906), pp. 15–18, 55.

About the author

See **Stjepan Radić**, *Speech at the night assembly of the National Council on 24 November, 1918*

Context

The turn-of-the-century emergence of German imperial *Drang nach Osten* politics, geared towards the political subjugation of the European east, the crisis of dualism in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the subsequent Hungarian pressure on Croatia, forced Croatian politicians to abandon the mainstream anti-dualist and anti-Yugoslav politics of *Stranka prava* (Party of Rights) as it proved to be inefficient under the new circumstances. Hence, a minor faction of the party adopted the concept of a 'Greater Croatia,' which was to encompass all South Slavic territories in the Habsburg Monarchy. At the same time, they advocated the anti-Hungarian centralist vision propagated by Archduke Franz Ferdinand. In the meanwhile, the major faction of the party endorsed the idea of an independent South Slavic state known as the 'Politics of the New Course,' and promoted by the new generation of Croatian and Serbian politicians (see **Frano Supilo**, *The memorandum to Sir Edward Grey*). These politicians mostly belonged to the *Napredna omladina*

(Croat-Serb progressive youth), a *fin de siècle* group of Croatian students from Prague influenced by **Tomáš G. Masaryk**'s political thought. Although Radić was a prominent member of the *Omladina*, he rejected its idea of unification with Serbia due to the alleged cultural differences between the Croats and the Serbs, expressed as the West and East respectively. Subsequently, Radić envisioned Croatian political emancipation as an outcome of an alliance with the Czechs and Poles within the monarchy. Thus, in his 'Slavic politics in the Habsburg Monarchy,' firstly published in Prague, he advocated the idea of 'Austro-Slavism.' However, the political pressure exerted by the *Omladina* prevented its republication in Zagreb. Radić advocated his Austro-Slavist idea until the final disintegration of the Monarchy in 1918, when he was finally forced to adopt the notion of 'Yugoslavism.'

The idea of 'Austro-Slavism' was introduced to Croatian politics by the *Narodna stranka* (People's Party) (see **Franjo Rački**, *Yugoslavism*) in the nineteenth century. Although inspired by **František Palacký**, the *Narodna stranka* did not elaborate on the idea of Austro-Slavism, but just used it as a strategy to get a more autonomous position in the Hungarian part of the monarchy. This was understood to be a transitional step leading to the party's final aim of creating an independent South Slavic state. Thus, the project mostly maintained the claim of an 'asymmetric' federalization of the monarchy, whereby Croatia would constitute a federal unit within Hungary. Radić, on the other hand, developed Palacký's idea along both political and economic lines, trying to reconcile the project for national emancipation with the idea of preserving the monarchy in the shape of a 'Danubian Alliance of Nations and States.' Hence, Radić inherited Palacký's idea of the construction of federal units based upon a combination of historical and natural rights. Subsequently, in order to enhance his federalist vision, he integrated into his arguments the idea, which he had picked up in Prague, that the interests of the Viennese court and the Slavs were identical but were jeopardized by German expansionism. Moreover, he developed a program for the social emancipation of the peasantry through the implementation of an economic corporatism. This was inspired by the Austrian Christian socialist idea of transforming capitalist businesses into partnerships between owners and workers, thus removing tensions that were typical of capitalist society. Hence, he also refused the Austro-Marxist idea of reconstituting the Austro-Hungarian Empire by giving cultural autonomy to the nations without reshaping the existing political units. This model was to be supplemented with the principle of the personal autonomy of each individual to use national rights, something which Radić saw as curtailing the natural rights of the na-

tion (see **Karl Renner**, *State and nation*). Radić also refused **Aurel Popovici**'s idea of an entirely ethnic construction of federal units, seeing in it a possible source of disputes among nations over ethnically mixed territories. Moreover, he labeled Popovici's idea a step towards 'Greater Germany.' He saw in it the reiteration of the hegemonic politics of the Monarchy, implemented by switching the center of power from the axis of Vienna–Budapest to Vienna exclusively, and thus paving the ground for German expansionism. Hence, Radić proposed that the federal government should only have the limited powers necessary for the functioning of the Monarchy as one unit (in terms of defense, foreign relations, finances and a common market), while all other powers should be conceded to the federal units. As national demands would be satisfied by such a policy, the units would, according to Radić, act in a harmonious alliance, while the central authority would preserve this harmony by practicing a foreign policy based on notions of neutrality and peacemaking.

Radić expressed the general principles of his 'Danubian Alliance' in the first part of the excerpt presented here. Inspired by Masaryk, he advocated the idea that national emancipation within the Habsburg Monarchy would only be achieved through a politics based on "Slavic morality." This notion emanated from the Herderian depiction of Slavic historical peacefulness and Slavic traditions of peasant democracy and solidarity, to which Radić subsequently added the spirit of Christianity, understood as being fundamental to the progress of humankind. Hence, he considered the reformed Monarchy as a unique space for the development of human welfare, conceived in absolute contrast to Western decadence, which was embodied in the materialistic individualism of France and England. He also used his ideal to counter German "barbarian imperialism" and Hungarian and Turkish "Asiatism," all of which Radić labeled, in opposition to Christianity, as the embodiment of despotism. However, Radić's main emphasis was on German political and economic expansionism, in which he saw the perpetuation of the feudal oppression over Slavic 'peasant democracy.' Since he viewed feudalism as the inheritance of papal traditions, Radić developed a discourse on 'Clericalism vs. Christianity,' which was inspired by Masaryk's perception of clericalism as being inimical to the national and democratic principle. Moreover, his anti-German and anti-Hungarian discourse was also intertwined with antisemitic sentiments, due to the fact that in Croatia at the turn of the century Jews were perceived as the main agents of Hungarian capitalist incursion. On the other hand, Radić was unwilling to equate Russian and German imperialisms, due to the fact that Russians, as Slavs, were characterized by the aforementioned

“Slavic morality.” Thus, he developed the ‘East–West discourse,’ in which the Monarchy was perceived to be a politically neutral mediator between the West and Russia. In order to achieve this, he called for the emergence of “Slavic mutualism,” that is to say, a common Slavic politics which would finally force the court to implement the federalization of the Monarchy. Slavic mutualism is most obviously expressed in Radić’s vision of five federal units—the ‘Alpine’ (Austrian), the Hungarian and the three Slavic units (Czech, Croatian and Galician)—in which he ascribes Slavic consciousness only to nations with a historical experience of statehood. These nations were subsequently envisioned to develop Slavic mutualism among the “related non-historical nations” (Czechs among Moravians and Silesians, Croats among Serbs and Slovenes, Poles among Ukrainians). Moreover, it is interesting that Radić included Slovaks within the Hungarian unit, probably as a ‘compensation’ for the latter’s ‘loss’ of Croatia.

In the second excerpt, Radić presents the general framework for the federalization of the Monarchy. In order to achieve national equality, Radić tried to reconcile the natural rights and historical state rights by assigning to the federal units the task of representing the nations lacking their own units, such as the Italians, Romanians and Serbs. Moreover, he envisioned a ‘Council of the Empire,’ a central Parliament, which would control the implementation of the rights of citizens and nations in the units. As a result, he strengthened the democratic principle by the compulsory implementation of minority representation in the local Parliaments. However, Radić did not observe the same principle when it came to elaborating his economic model. He endorsed Karl von Vogelsang’s model of business as a family of owners and workers, expressed politically in the form of economic corporations on both federal and central levels. This notion constitutes a starting point for Radić’s later theory of agrarianism (see **Stjepan Radić**, *The speech at the night assembly of the national council on 24 November, 1918*), which he fully developed in his ‘Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia’ in 1921. This was also influential for the project of the Yugoslav federation, which, in its principles, was almost identical to Radić’s Austro-Slavist project, making him the indisputable Croatian political leader of the interwar period.

Even at the time of its inception, Radić’s Austro-Slavist project was neglected by the larger part of the Croatian public dedicated to the Yugoslav project. Hence, it was largely marginalized in Yugoslav historiography and social sciences. Its reassessment came eventually in the 1990s, when Radić was recognized as an original thinker and as being among the first Croatian political scientists. As such, his ‘Slavic politics in the Habsburg monarchy,’

together with his 'Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia,' were accepted as some of the most elaborate political writings in Croatian history.

SD

Slavic politics in the Habsburg monarchy

5. Our ultimate political goal

The ultimate political goal of the Central European and Balkan Slavs is a huge federation of the peoples of Central and Southeast Europe, which would eventually naturally include Asia Minor and Egypt.

Some might say this is only the ultimate dream. However, almost all of this territory constituted a single state on several occasions in history, first under the ancient Greek culture, later under the Byzantine Empire and finally under the Turkish crescent. Hence, what was once achieved by the unilateral and xenophobic culture of Greece, the consistent and mobile diplomacy of the Byzantine despotism, and a strong and persistent religious enthusiasm of the Muslims can also be achieved by the gradual development of the revived Slavs, Romanians, Hungarians and Greeks as soon as these peoples free themselves from the Roman Caesarism, Asian tyranny, Germanic excessive individualism and Slavic aristocratic particularism!

And if we add thereto that on this territory there is a crossroad of all international trade routes and traffic, that this is the cradle of Christian teaching and the internationally celebrated Greek civilization, we must admit that in this moral, cultural and material centre of humanity, there must be no future reign of competing major powers, of Sultan's corruption or English and German exploitation. We must admit that serious problems that lurk behind the term 'the eastern question,' which comes to mind the moment we hear the names Constantinople, Suez, Egypt or Palestine, cannot be solved permanently as long as peoples living in this region are deficient in consciousness, moral and wellbeing.

If we, hence, analyze it from the serious perspective of the philosophy of history—and there is no better perspective for discussing the destiny of peoples—we must detect a major common historical feature of all of these peoples in the Greek plains, the Balkan valleys and on the plateau of Asia Minor, in the Danube valley, the lowlands and along the Syrian shores. For many thousands of years, this whole region has been exposed, at times, to the overflow and oppressions of Asiatic fanaticism, and, at times, to assaults and ex-

ploitation of Western European proselytism and egotism. This may be the reason why such a large number of contradictions are visible in the national character unlike anywhere else in the world, such a huge amount of pride and malevolence, sacrifice and selfishness, heroism and servitude all present at the same time.

The Germans have thoroughly studied this region and have convinced themselves that this region is, at times, governed by total intellectual and moral chaos, and, accordingly, by cultural infertility and economic and political impotence. This is why they have established their political and economic headquarters in Berlin with such a superior feeling of success, which spreads from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, from the Baltic to the Levantine Sea. The idealistic postulates of the Russian Orthodoxy for which Russian people would sacrifice everything, but which Russian intelligentsia looks down upon with the same amount of skepticism as the West European intelligentsia looks down upon Catholicism, cannot be victorious against the meticulously planned, omnipresent and so far successful modern Germanism based on Roman rule and Attila the Hun's methods of extermination. Hence, in the fight between the continuous outpouring of German industry and capital on the one hand, and the temporary assaults of Russian religious zeal on the other, it is no wonder that the Russian influence gives in to the German one. Russia sends its pilgrims to Palestine, Germany does the same with its engineers; Moscow casts an eye on the crucifix of Hagia Sophia, Berlin does the same with the Golden Horn in the Bosphorus; Germany is gathering its forces around the globe to change its disadvantaged position in the Mediterranean into a frightening advantage of a double-edged sword which protrudes directly from Europe into India. At the same time, the Slavs have recently started dispersing themselves to all four corners of the world with no purpose and reason and with a desperate heart and ignorant head, weakening themselves additionally with their internal disputes and conflicts against foreign tribes with whom they share a common history. There is just one way out of this situation which leads to our secured victory, just one way to reach a goal which would be supported by the most learned intelligentsia and the most ignorant masses alike: the goal of the federation of the Danube basin, out of which "the gigantic Switzerland of the three continents," "the united nations of the three parts of the world" would develop most naturally. This would put an end to the atrocious fight between modern European progress and the first cradle of human civilization.

What follows directly from the first two principles, namely from political and national federalism and from partial military and economic centralism, is the principle of absolute neutrality, the principle of an all-inclusive peacefulness.

At this moment, neutrality can only be attributed to Switzerland, Belgium or Luxembourg, though this might look excessive to some, and there can be no rational discussions about the neutrality of Denmark and Holland, or even the neutrality of Alsace and Lorraine. So far, neutrality has been nothing but a generous gift of jealous rival superpowers and we may as well call it the politics of necessary mutual concessions. This is why neutral states have had some impact only in the field of private international law (for instance, the World Postal Association with the headquarters in Bern) whereas in the field of international public law governing the freedom and slavery of people, what counts most is the rule of the sword of conquering states. It is, hence, quite logical to expect that international law would be far better off and international relations would improve if suddenly there emerged among the so-called major powers a new state which would know how to protect its neutrality with its geographical location as well as its people's ability to defend themselves.

Let us stick for the time being to today's Habsburg Monarchy. If we imagined it to be so different as to be governed with the total equality of its people whereas its foreign policy was formulated around the previously stated goal of a federation of the nations in the Central and Southeast Europe and beyond, we must, then, admit that its normal internal affairs and a total lack of selfishness in its foreign policy would liberate this Empire from Prussian control as well as from an eternal fear for its survival.

As long as the Habsburg Monarchy keeps its dual nature, it will, from the German perspective, remain superfluous in the Prussian neighborhood because the "civilizational task" that the governments in Pest and Vienna have ascribed to themselves is totally redundant when compared to the more sustained and ruthlessly "enlightened" activity of Prussianized Germany. However, if the monarchy in the Danube basin changed pursuant to the interests of all its peoples, it would automatically become an ally of France, where a return to the adventurous and conquering Caesarism is not at all possible. "Austria" would then not be left on its own even if Petersburg were ruled by supporters of harmony with Prussia who would not hesitate to use a kind of politics in order to enslave the West for the sake of Germany. And even if France gave in to its desire to conquer and if Russia did not show clearly all the signs of true world humanitarian politics, our Empire should not be afraid of losing in a defensive battle. It is exactly the history of the nineteenth century, let alone the ancient history, which testifies to the glory of the Habsburg Monarchy when it comes to defense.

The Monarchy was invincible when still unenlightened nations under its rule used to follow monarchical orders blindly. It has remained invincible

even now when almost all enlightened nations have so many justified reasons not only for discontent but also for the utmost bitterness. Imagine how inaccessible the fortress would become if battles on the highest level were led pursuant to ordinary needs of the common people and the needs of the highest cultural ideals. In that case, Magna Germania's extermination of non-Germanic peoples in the Danube basin, in the Balkans and from Asia Minor to the Nile and India would be effortless. All these peoples, and especially the Slavs, who would be summoned in their number, culture and location to start a great work, would sign their death penalty if, in the face of German Caesarism headed by Attila the Hun, they continued with their internal disputes and if they still believed that the biggest threat came from Roman clericalism and Russian tsardom. This "Russian tsardom" is not only completely different in its nature, but also opposes this monster from Berlin which is trying to combine Roman organization, the rage of the Huns, Christian patience and Jewish entrepreneurship for one purpose alone and that is to strangle and exterminate everything not speaking its language and lacking its spirit, using fangs of its raw force and fire from its insatiable pharynx [...]

7. General points of the Slavic Program in the Monarchy

All that has been discussed so far can be summarized as follows: we, the Slavs, do not recognize and cannot recognize two *monarchical* Parliaments and, accordingly, two delegations of the Empire because both stem from the dualism of the territory of the *monarchy* itself, which violently divides and weakens our people, let alone political and economic consequences that this division implies.

Hence, we want one single monarchy that we do not see as a centralist state either of the Slavs or of the Slavs, Germans and Hungarians. According to our program, it should be a monarchy organized more appropriately than the current one that represents mostly a polycentric state. Namely, it would be an organization of civil-political and economic-social nature which would represent itself in international law as a federation of the historical states and natural national entities.

Namely, we base our policy on the following facts: the Habsburg Monarchy has gone through successive crises because it has acted pursuant to political demands and national passions, adopting for monarchical affairs, on the one hand, purely local or totally national conditions, and trying, on the other hand, to limit affairs which are becoming increasingly important in our age only to specific states and countries which is totally in breach of its cur-

rent dualist system. We are, hence, equally against the Hungarian economic policy as we are against the big Germanic foundation of the central European monarchical alliance. This is why we want a uniform national-economic policy in the whole of Empire and we unanimously ascribe to it a national-economic character.

However, since material interests, no matter how permanent they may be, cannot constitute the basis for either a private body corporate, let alone a public organization, we, therefore, strengthen national-economic ties with the greatest civil freedoms and total national equality.

Therefore, according to our view, the Habsburg Monarchy has three tasks: to protect civil freedoms, to guarantee national equality and to offer the means for national wellbeing that are today not enjoyed by any small state and nation.

Translated by Iva Polak

AUREL C. POPOVICI: THE UNITED STATES OF GREATER AUSTRIA

Title: *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich. Politischen Studien zur Lösung der nationalen Fragen und Staatsrechtlichen Krisen in Österreich-Ungarn* (The United States of Greater Austria. Political studies about the solution of the national questions and legal crises in Austria-Hungary)

Originally published: Leipzig, B. Elischer, 1906

Language: German

The excerpts used are from Aurel C. Popovici, *Stat și națiune. Statele unite ale Austriei Mari* (Bucharest: Albatros, 1997), pp. 5–6, 9–11, 21–22, 390–391.

About the author

Aurel Constantin Popovici [1863, Lugoj (*Hun.* Lugos in Banat) – 1917, Geneva]: politician and publicist. He was the son of an artisan. After completing his primary and secondary education, he studied at the Hungarian Gymnasium in Lugoj (1873–1880), and then at the Romanian Lyceum of Beiuș (*Hun.* Belényes) (1880–1884). In 1885, he enrolled at the University of Vienna to study medicine and philosophy, but later transferred to the University of Graz. In 1891, he became one of the leaders of the Romanian National Party and one of the editors of the most important Romanian journal in Transylvania, *Tribuna* (The tribune). In 1893, after the publication of *Replica* (The rejoinder) in 1892, Popovici emigrated to Austria, then to Italy and, finally, to Romania. In 1899, he founded the journal *România Jună* (The young Romania) in Bucharest. In 1906, he published his most important book, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich* (The United States of Greater Austria), a book which was associated with the ‘Greater Austria’ movement and with the political circle cultivated by the heir to the throne Francis Ferdinand (1863–1914). Between 1908 and 1909, he was the editor in chief and director of one of the most important Romanian journals in Bucharest, *Sămănătorul* (The sower). In 1910, he expressed his criticism of modernity, democracy and cosmopolitanism in ‘Nationalism or Democracy: A Critique of Modern Civilization.’ In 1912, Popovici settled in Vienna. In 1916, after Romania’s entrance into the First World War, he moved to Geneva, where he died in 1917. His last contribution to the history of Transylvanian Romanian nationalism, *Le question Roumaine en Transylvanie et en Hongrie*, appeared posthumously. Popovici’s book on federalism was first translated into Romanian during the interwar period by the Romanian legal theorist Petre Pandrea (1908–1968), who also attempted to integrate his ideas within its general Central European

context. At the same time, Popovici's nationalist ideas were regarded as sources of Romanian integral nationalism by some of the right-wing and Legionary ideologues. It was only in the 1980s that Popovici's ideas were subjected to scholarly analysis, followed by new historiographic assessments in the last two decades.

Main works: *Principiul de naționalitate* [The principle of nationality] (1894); *Cestiunea naționalităților și modurile soluțiunii sale în Ungaria* [The nationalities question and its solution in Hungary] (1894); *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich. Politischen Studien zur Lösung der nationalen Fragen und Staatsrechtlichen Krisen in Österreich-Ungarn* [The United States of Greater Austria. Political studies about the solution of the national questions and legal crises in Austria-Hungary] (1906); *Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne* [Nationalism or democracy. A critique of modern civilization] (1910); *Le Question Roumaine en Transylvanie et en Hongrie* (1918).

Context

At the end of the nineteenth century, Transylvanian Romanians experienced the emergence of two types of political discourses. One was the discourse on national autonomy that later supported the union of Transylvania with Romania in 1918, while the other was the federalist discourse. In Popovici's work, these two directions were merged. The emblematic expression of such a process can be found in many of his writings, but explicitly in *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich*. Operating within this concept, he attempted to define a new nationalist route for Transylvanian Romanians based on a political topology with Vienna at its core. Popovici's federalism addressed this dual legitimacy and attempted to cope with the new political framework within which Transylvanian Romanians should situate their national demands after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. Popovici upheld the principle of ethno-national heterogeneity of the Habsburg Empire by interrelating the two loyalties he deemed essential: the loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the Austrian Monarchy. This dilemma was exploited in *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich*.

One of the controversial issues that animated the idea of a possible federalizing reform of the Habsburg Empire concerned the principle that should be followed. The two alternatives were the historical-traditional (based on the traditional crown lands) and the ethnic principle (based on national autonomy). Popovici advocated ethnic federalism, while the Austro-Marxists, such as **Karl Renner** or **Otto Bauer**, supported historical federalism. Although Popovici's concept of national autonomy was not broader than that of Karl Renner's, they thematically disagreed in the principle to be followed. To the former territorial

autonomy was essential in order to permit the nationalities symbolic access to their self-determination. To the latter, a supra-national element, embodied in the federal government, would satisfy the nations by offering them cultural autonomy based on the principle of personal autonomy.

The first part of the book focused on Magyarization and assimilation, both opposed by Popovici. He further argued that the solution to the nationality problem was incumbent upon the elimination of Hungarian hegemony, the dismissal of centralism and the adoption of federalism. The second part described the organization of the would-be 'Greater Austria,' composed of fifteen federal member states, including the motivations and the necessity of reforming and restructuring the Habsburg Empire. Popovici's main argument was that the concept of 'Greater Austria' was born and developed in a context of social and national conflicts, in which divergent social solidarities intersected with national conflicts. To understand what connected these nations under a common political agenda, it was important, Popovici believed, to note that dynastic legitimization strategies perpetuated and reproduced a strong and dynamic interaction of the House of Habsburg with the different nationalities. Insofar as the House of Habsburg possessed the exclusivity of power in the Empire, the Emperor was the only source of legitimacy available to the national groups.

Popovici's federalist endeavor was circumscribed and legitimated by the paradigm of Romanian loyalism and traditional constitutionalism in Transylvania. His writings and activity updated the old political connection of Transylvanian Romanians with the House of Habsburg, by combining it with their need for cultural and political autonomy. Ultimately, Popovici rejected the idea of a compromise with the Hungarian government and avoided an alliance with the Slav national groups. Hungarian nationalism and pan-Slavism were, for Popovici, the two forces destroying the Habsburg Empire. Federalism, he concluded, was the only modality to counteract Hungarian dominance and to support the national emancipation of the Romanians.

The concept of a 'Greater Austria' appealed to Austrian conservatives and to the middle-class Viennese society. In Hungary, the book was banned, but in Austria it generated many commentaries, expressed mainly in the journal *Österreichische Rundschau*, the unofficial journal of the 'Greater Austrian' movement. In Romania, the book was highly appreciated. Constantin Stere and **Nicolae Iorga** reviewed the book favorably. In Transylvania, on the other hand, the impact of 'Greater Austria' was ambiguous. Thus, the journal *Tribuna* and its adherents, being in opposition to the 'traditional' politics represented by Popovici, opposed the idea of a 'United States of Greater Austria.'

After 1918, the political loyalty shown by Popovici and other Romanian leaders from Transylvania toward the House of Habsburg became a source of political conflict and, as a result, his writings on federalism did not inform discussions on national autonomy and regionalism in Greater Romania. It was only during the 1930s, when it became clear that the Habsburg successor states failed to articulate any coherent policy of regional cooperation that intellectuals from Transylvania, and elsewhere in Central Europe, looked at federalist projects as intellectual and political sources for a new form of regional resistance to the rise of Nazism and Communism. During the 1980s and, more strongly, during the 1990s, a similar understanding of Romanian federalism in Transylvania filtered into discussions about the existence of 'Central Europe,' a geographical entity formed of those regions of Central and Eastern Europe which once belonged to the Habsburg Empire, and where the resulting civil plurality, ethnic diversity and religious tolerance were not eliminated by the communist experience.

MT

**The United States of Greater Austria.
Political studies about the solution of the national questions and
legal crises in Austria-Hungary**

Everybody, friends and opponents, has been ardently concerned by our fate; perhaps too ardently. A part of the foreign press maintains that our venerable Habsburg Empire is precipitously and unavoidably falling into ruin. And not only that part of the press which is not favorable to us, but also newspapers that are benevolent towards us, manifest, in this respect, a serious concern. Is this preoccupation well founded? Who could doubt it? Unfortunately, the evolution of our political life has caused, for some time, even to us, fear for the destiny of this Empire.

Faced with this collapse, which is gradually becoming general, the majority of the population of the country persists in a state of apathy, as if the destiny of our Monarchy were not at stake. Moreover, many people are unpleasantly impressed when *our Monarchy* is spoken of. Of course, the estrangement of the masses of people from the Empire is due, first, to the absurd official policy of the nationalities, and to the *mutilation of the Empire* that took place in 1867.¹

¹ The Austro-Hungarian Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867.

All these were predictable. Rarely, have any of the statesmen, with considerable expertise in Austria's political life, been able to rise above the level of everyday politics. Almost everyone was stuck with the insipid and very disgusting *issue of languages*; many are even today preoccupied with this issue. As if they were delighted in uncovering dirty issues, they are engaged with *decrees for languages, reconciliation conferences*, and then again with *conciliatory documents*, after the Polish method,² and all kinds of failed attempts to solve the issue of nationalities. [...] As regards the nationalities themselves, they only know their individual program. Each nationality wishes for this and that, but altogether they care little, if at all, for *how this Empire can be preserved*. But no one can deny that they all need this Empire. In fact, almost none of the nationalities, and none of the parties have a program of government for the Empire which includes a concrete solution to all the issues that pertain to the situation of the nationalities. [...]

However, this is only one of the multiple problems of the nationalities in the Empire. How could reconciliation among different nationalities be possible, when it starts from such an egocentric national point of view? Of course, the Germans are right when they do not want to hear of the federalism that the Czechs are planning. They realize that such federalism would only create for them, the Germans from Bohemia, a similar and 'equivalent' situation to that of the Germans in Hungary.

On the contrary, the Germans' doubts about the federalist system, which would be achieved on a national delineation, are—as will be shown below—entirely unfounded. No matter how much the Empire were to suffer from national fights, *it is the unrelated dualist structure, always on the verge of being denounced, and lately absolutely weakened, that is shaking it, and increasingly, is endangering its situation*. And exactly *because of* this disastrous constitutional division, the issue of nationalities cannot find, either in Austria, or in Hungary, a national solution which could offer a guarantee of stability and corresponding peace. The present situation, the outcome of a compromise born out of the application of a theory of the two souls, as Tezner³ so appropriately put it, has thus rightfully become a *mater discordiarum*, for the entirely exceptional situation created for the Hungarians was—and could not have been anything but—deeply offending to *all* the other nationalities. The complete disproportionate consideration which the Hungari-

² Popovici refers to the Polish-Ukrainian negotiations regarding the linguistic issue in Galicia.

³ Friedrich Tezner (1856–1925): Austrian legal theorist.

ans enjoy represents a provocation for all the other nationalities and continually *fuels* a constitutional *radicalism* which increasingly points, with respect to the solving of the nationality question, towards the application of the *confederal* principle as opposed to the *federal* one. After all, the other nationalities of the Empire are rightly, very deeply dissatisfied with the exploitation to which they are subjected for the sole benefit of the Hungarians. For, in fact, all the forces of the entire Empire are employed in the Magyarization of Hungary. [...]

Therefore, we need a new concept, the concept of the Empire of Greater Austria, in order to escape from this manure and to build for us all, on a solid foundation, a new constitutional edifice acceptable for all the nations of the Empire. At the same time, this Empire should be able to arouse the sympathy of the small neighboring nations of the East. *The dynastic principle, military competence, and above all, justice for all the peoples that make up this Empire*—these should be, in the future, as they were in the most distant past, the pillars to sustain its edifice.

The idea of the Empire of Greater Austria must, above all, establish *concrete forms* of justice for all the peoples of the Empire and here we should be led by the following considerations. We live in an era in which the national momentum drives all actions, especially those of the peoples that are prevented from exercising their right to self-determination. Thus, in our case, *the real essence* of all national conflict is not *constitutional* but *national-constitutional*.

All the peoples who are loyal *to Austria* and whose case we are discussing here have always been loyal, and deep in their soul they are still loyal to her, for among all these peoples there still exists an intimate and superior community of interest, which gives them the power to see in Austria, in Greater Austria, as she is presented here, a supporter of their special individuality.

However, the Empire should not only give the sensation of support, but it should become the genuine—and more than that—the only support for all these peoples. This will only be possible when its leaders will gratify, *suum cique*, the simple but decisive principle of renouncing *Austrian-Hungarian dualism* and *immediately create a federal imperial constitution based on the separation of nationalities*.

A Greater Austria, which would thus provide justice to all the peoples, would have a special mission to carry out in the distant south-eastern part of Europe, and by accomplishing this, she would have a secure future. [...] The question then arises: will our Emperor be able to give up the power to the Kossuthists and their allies? Will he be able and will he give over to these

traitors against the Empire and the dynasty, new means so that they could ruin this great Monarchy with such brilliant perspectives for the future?

I believe that a Habsburg cannot promote such a policy. No way! And if the coalition of those who pursue the destruction of the Empire, which is now downtrodden, apologize, it should never be helped to rise to its feet again. For it will destroy forever even the last hopes of the peoples in the Empire. The Resolution of Fiume,⁴ and many other proclamations showing that the idea of separating from the Empire means progress, is nothing but the result of violent national passions. But if the Hungarians triumph again, these passions will set a horrible fire, and will immediately spread to all the disappointed peoples, including the Germans.

The time has come. The Empire needs help. All the peoples are by the side of Austria, and all of them are waiting for their liberation from the dualist yoke. They are waiting for the salvation from their Emperor. The moment is historical and decisive for our future: will the Empire of the Habsburgs stand or fall? All the wrong can still be undone; all can still be saved.

Now or never!

Translated by Mária Kovács

⁴ The Rijeka (It. Fiume, present-day Croatia) Resolution of 4 October 1905 was a program of political reform according to which the Croat deputies from Croatia, Dalmatia and Istria hoped to obtain new concessions from the Hungarian political elite.

OSZKÁR JÁSZI: THE FUTURE OF THE MONARCHY

Title: *A monarchia jövője. A dualizmus bukása és a dunai Egyesült Államok*
(The future of the Monarchy. The fall of dualism and the Danubian United States)

Originally published: Budapest, Új Magyarország, 1918. German edition:
Der Zusammenbruch des Dualismus und die Zukunft des Donaustaaten
(Wien, 1918)

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from chapter 9 'Magyarország és a demokratikus föderalizmus,' (Budapest: Maecenas, 1988), pp. 59–71.

About the author

Oszkár Jászi [1875, Nagykároly (Rom. Carei, present-day Romania) – 1957, Oberlin, Ohio]: politician and political scientist. He came from a secularized Jewish middle-class family which converted to Calvinism during his childhood. He studied in Hungary, France and England. Inspired by positivist sociology (especially Herbert Spencer) and a non-dogmatic understanding of socialism, Jászi emerged as the most prominent figure of the Hungarian civic radical movement. He was editor-in-chief of the journal *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth century), which was the most important 'left-liberal' social sciences periodical of the time. Jászi was also secretary of the radical *Társadalomtudományi Társaság* (Social Sciences Association) and leader of the Civic Radical Party (founded in 1914). He played a prominent role during the Hungarian Revolution of 1918, and was a minister in the government of Mihály Károlyi, with the special task of negotiating with the representatives of the nationalities. In his talks with the Transylvanian Romanian leadership in Arad, he offered wide concessions, but being obviously too late this could not prevent their declaration of union with Romania (December 1918). After the collapse of the Károlyi government and the declaration of the Soviet Republic (21 March 1919), Jászi refused to cooperate with the Communists and emigrated to Vienna, becoming the editor of the *Bécsi Magyar Újság* (Viennese Hungarian journal). In the early-twenties, he attacked the 'counter-revolutionary' Horthy-regime, and tried to establish some kind of relationship with the liberal political elites of East Central Europe (mainly with Czech intellectuals). In doing that he lobbied for certain political concessions to Hungary provided that a democratic government was formed. From 1925, he lived in the

United States, where he taught sociology at Oberlin College and published a series of important political-sociological analyses. In the 1930s and 1940s, he adopted an anti-totalitarian stance and increasingly distanced himself from Károlyi, who was willing to cooperate with the communists on an anti-fascist political platform. Although Jászi visited Hungary in 1947, he did not settle permanently and spent the remaining years of his life in the United States. He is considered the most important Hungarian radical democratic political thinker of the twentieth century and ranked among the most prominent Central European scholars of nationalism.

Main works: *Művészet és erkölcs* [Art and morality] (1904); *A történelmi materializmus állambölcselete* [The political philosophy of historical materialism] (1908); *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzeti kérdés* [The formation of national states and the nationality issue] (1912); *Mi a radikalizmus?* [What is radicalism?] (1918); *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (1924); *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (1929); *Against the tyrant: the tradition and theory of tyrannicide* (with John D. Lewis, 1957).

Context

From the beginning of his political activities, Jászi was the proponent of concessions to the nationalities in Hungary, albeit within the framework of the overall democratization of the country. Nevertheless, in his works before the First World War, he considered the economic pressure of the processes of modernization to be the catalyst of greater integration. Consequently, he hoped to convince his mainly urban and Hungarian-speaking audience that the introduction of radical political reforms would not threaten the existence of the Hungarian state. A democratic Hungary—the ‘Switzerland of the East’—might become a strong focus of identification for its citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity. Jászi and his circle of social scientists in the journal *Huszedik Század* (like the sociologist Róbert Braun) formed the intellectual group in Hungary most prone to cooperation with the political leadership of the nationalities in the fight for universal suffrage and national emancipation. In the first years of the World War, he advocated the *Mitteleuropa*-project of Friedrich Naumann which envisioned a supra-national reorganization of the region dominated politically and economically by the Germans; while, in 1917–1918, he turned towards the program of national self-determination articulated by Woodrow Wilson, and became an ardent proponent of the ideas of pacifism and European integration based on universal democratization.

By 1918, it became obvious that the traditional focus of Hungarian politics, the dualist framework, was utterly untenable and the Czech, Romanian,

Italian and South-Slav secessionist movements were threatening the Monarchy with dissolution. It was in this context that Jászi formulated his federalist project. It was an attempt to find a common ground between several, rather divergent, positions. These included the political aims professed by the Entente (the satisfaction of the claims of the 'oppressed peoples' in Eastern and Central Europe), the program of the national movements in the region, the Austro-Marxist discussions on solving the nationality question in the Habsburg Monarchy (see **Karl Renner**, *State and nation* and **Otto Bauer**, *The Austrian revolution*), the idea of a Central European integration against Germany and Russia, the Hungarian discursive tradition of Danubian federalism (having its roots in the liberal nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century (see **Lajos Kossuth**, *Proposal Concerning the future political establishment of Hungary*), and, last but not least, the claim of the 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian state. By the summer of 1918, however, the Western powers had already agreed that the Monarchy was to be dissolved, and the green light was given to the formation of nation-states in the region. 'The Future of the Monarchy' appeared in October 1918, when its program was in many ways obsolete (the nationalities were openly claiming national sovereignty), but it expressed the way of thinking and intellectual horizons of the Hungarian radical-liberal public opinion.

Chapter 9 of the book contains the most important arguments which were meant to convince the Hungarian audience that connecting democratization and federalism was the only way out from the political and institutional crisis of the Monarchy. Jászi developed his argument in the form of an answer to the claims of Mihály Réz (1878–1921), a conservative legal scholar and theoretician of the nationality question close to the official establishment. Responding to these concerns, Jászi played down the possibility of the secession of the nationalities in the event of radical democratization, at the same time he did not envision the territorial federalization of Hungary proper. Instead, he advocated a 'pentarchy,' consisting of Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Illyria, which he considered to be the only viable political framework guaranteeing the stability of the region. In his opinion, the greatest opposition to this transformation in Hungary comes from the class-based chauvinist alliance of feudalism (the landed aristocracy and the 'post-feudal' gentry) and financial capitalism. Contrary to this 'oligarchy,' Jászi claimed, the broader Hungarian masses did not have an interest in the maintenance of the dualist system and would profit immensely from a federal and democratic transformation of the Monarchy. While developing his argument, he distanced himself from the Hungarian ethno-nationalist discourse which prophe-

sized the death of the nation if the nationalities were given a free hand in choosing their political allegiance. He also emphatically rejected the Vienna-centered and socially conservative projects of federalization, such as the *Grossösterreich*-plan promoted by **Aurel Popovici** and other political thinkers around Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent murdered in 1914. In his opinion, there was a chance that the democratic transformation of the country would create such a strong political bond among the different nationalities of the Monarchy that they would opt for cooperation rather than secession.

The concrete political program of the book was to a large extent illusory. What Jászi considered a highly improbable outcome, namely that national identification would supersede any other type of social and economic bond or interest, became the basis of the reorganization of East Central Europe after the Great War. The afterlife of his ideas is to be found in the history of political thought rather than in political history *per se*. Some of the key arguments of the book were developed in Jászi's later works, in which he analyzed the process of the dissolution of the Monarchy. He hoped to contribute, in the long run, to the formation of a democratic political culture in the region, abandoning the illusions of keeping to the 'historical' vision of Hungarian statehood. Therefore, his political and intellectual commitments were incompatible with the nationalist fervor of mainstream Hungarian political culture in the interwar period. This made him the constant target of attacks, on the grounds that he was personally responsible for the collapse of 'historical Hungary.' His ideas, however, found their ways to the populist movement of the 1930s, which envisioned a Danubian federation of agrarian democracies. As for the period after 1945, due to his staunch criticism of Bolshevism, Jászi's intellectual heritage was almost completely marginalized. There was a certain revival of the ideas of civic radicalism, however, in the 1970s and 1980s (reflected in the works of Péter Hanák and György Litván), when it became a common point of reference for some of the reform communists searching for intellectual precursors and some of the intellectuals of the 'democratic opposition' who considered Jászi the key figure of the anti-totalitarian left-wing tradition and a principal inspiration for solving the thorny national conflicts of the region in a rational manner.

BT

The future of the Monarchy. The fall of dualism and the Danubian United States

Hungary and democratic federalism

Is it true that it is in Hungary's best interest to fight to her last breath against the system of democratic federalism? The advocates of this doctrine are largely recruited from those who today still wish to preserve the dualistic system. From their perspective, the doctrine is perfectly justified. Indeed, this constitutional system provides abundant benefits for Hungarian feudalism and its ally, banking capitalism which could not be guaranteed by any other power relation of public law: the opportunity of a parity sharing of all the bureaucratic, military and diplomatic advantages granted by the glorious position of a great power (and this sharing will be all the more favorable for the Hungarian oligarchy as the anarchic internal strife and the inability to co-operate increases in the other half of the Monarchy); the uninterrupted enjoyment of tax and duty privileges of the latifundia; the occupation of all influential positions in the county and state administration and the hermetic exclusion of the growing middle-class of the nationalities from them by means of the hypothesis of "saving the homeland"; the so-called "self-government" serving submissively the interests of the ruling classes and keeping the proletariat and the masses of the nationalities firmly in check; the Hungarian and the Austro-German banking capitalism portioning out the fat bits between them, the ample state support of capitalism; the simplicity of channeling any kind of social unrest into the ancient emotional currents of the rebellious anti-Viennese *kuruc*¹ ideology which is always easily raked up. Undoubtedly, these are advantages that no other state structure could grant to feudalism and finance-capitalism. [...]

Thus the conservative state philosophy wishes to base the future of Hungary on a situation in which ten million Hungarians and ten million Austro-Germans try to keep up a dictatorial supremacy over about 9 million Czechs and Slovaks, 10 million Southern Slavs, 25 million Poles and 12 million Romanians. This supremacy would obviously be based on 50 million Germans in the German Empire, but they fail to consider that there are 80 million Russians confronting such a solution. This degree of chauvinistic mega-

¹ *Kuruc*: anti-Habsburg military movement in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries in Hungary, reaching its climax in the uprising of Ferenc Rákóczi II. In a metaphoric sense the term was used for the anti-Habsburg political and cultural trends of later periods as well.

lomania can only be explained by the influence of the often mentioned class rule psychosis!

This kind of logical class reasoning, however, cannot sway the emotions of the larger masses, so the advocates of dualism mobilize more instigating and more general arguments to discredit every initiative aimed at the overthrow of the dualistic system. There are basically six such arguments. Let us look at them one by one:

a) By a clever generalization, they make the concept of *democratic federalism* appear to be identical with the Germanizing *Grossösterreich* theory, or make it seem like Popovici's simplistic plans which would, on the basis of the ethnographic principle, dismantle ancient historical formations that make up organic economic as well as spiritual units. We have seen and we shall see in even more detail that our concept is logically the very antithesis of both.

b) *The plan of a Danubian United States would sever Croatia from Hungary and thus would deprive her of her free sea passage.*

However, the new confederation would not sever the ancient historical ties between them but place them upon a foundation more solid, because they would be more satisfactory for both parties. It is the advocates of dualism who often complain that Croatia costs us too much and that we keep losing money on the Croatian connection, while the Croatian parties all agree that one of the main grievances of the Croatian nation is financial: Hungary is growing wealthy at their expense. Such a mutual judgment of the situation is bound to embitter Hungarian–Croatian relations and sooner or later will result in embarrassing conflicts.²

In contrast, the planned new federation would sustain everything that is important and productive for the two states in this orientation (the unity of

² It is interesting to note that the Hungarian views with regard to the Croatian issue had been much more tolerant and considerate before the Compromise of 1867. In 1862 Lajos Kossuth wrote that as early as 1843 or 44 he had proposed at the assembly of Pest county ("and my proposal was accepted") that "if our Croatian brothers have grown weary of our 700-year-old contact, let the Parliament communicate to them that the Hungarian nation does not oppose their secession. Let them part in peace and may God help them in their separate ways." In both the minority problem and the issue of Croatia, the Compromise clearly brought a radical change: the spirit of consideration and fair-mindedness was replaced by the spirit of domination. And in any case, to the same degree as the dualistic system strengthens the Hungarian ruling classes and diminishes the weight of Austria, we may observe the declining standards and increasingly coarse tone of journalism and the literature of political science. The leading Hungarian circles apparently feel strong enough to evade all serious theoretical discussions. Now it is political power that makes up for the weight of arguments. [Author's footnote]

the market, joint defense, solidarity in foreign policy) but eliminate everything that may lead to discord or mistrust. And as for the passage to the sea, it goes without saying that the new alliance will manage all of its ports and its more important river systems upon joint principles. The major ports should be granted a certain international character and a far-reaching free autonomy, and the confederation would be in command of so many harbors that it would be easy to work out some kind of distribution of labor which would bring, for instance, Trieste³ mainly with the German, Fiume⁴ with the Hungarian, and Ragusa⁵ principally with the Slavic economic centers into close contact via the most effective routes. But to cut off any part of the alliance from the sea would be an endeavor just as futile and harmful as if Hamburg would suddenly decide to favor one state of the German Empire against all the others or to debar another one by force.

c) *The system of democratic federalism would sever the Slovak counties and the Serbian areas from Hungary.* This argument apparently finds a formal justification in the excessive demands of the Czechs and the desperate measures of the Serbs. However, we have already shown that even a quite extensive application of the ethnographic principle would produce precious little effect for the unity of the Czech nationality and even less for the interests of the Yugoslav state. Both of these claims seem to bear the marks of a revolutionary slogan and political character instead of a serious calculation based on *Realpolitik*.

If the Czechs and the Southern Slavs pursued such an irrational policy they would incite the resistance of the whole Hungarian nation against their aspirations for independence in return for some dubious and insignificant readjustments of the frontier. For it is quite evident that the Austrian forces maintaining the system of dualism would not be able in themselves to hold up the federal reform of the constitution, and the dualistic system can only be maintained as long as the whole of Hungary lines up beside it uniformly.

d) That may well be, but the danger to Hungary comes not only from the Czech and Yugoslav states to be established; the Slovaks and Serbs in Hungary would themselves be less and less willing to remain in the Hungarian state as the Czech and Yugoslav state will be gaining strength. We do indeed believe that both the Czechs and the Southern Slavs as well as their kinsfolk in Hungary would, for the time being, welcome enthusiastically the

³ *Slov.* Trst, in present-day Italy.

⁴ *Cro.* Rijeka, in present-day Croatia.

⁵ *Cro.* Dubrovnik, in present-day Croatia.

pentarchic state system outlined in the present study as well as the internal system of autonomous nationalities that would accompany a democratic federalism. But one must have an overwhelming ideological bias to fail to realize that the people of both the reborn Czech state and Illyria as well as their kinsfolk in Hungary would only regard this achievement as a *first payment* whose finalization would be followed by an even more vehement outburst of the Czech and Southern Slavic irredentist movements even without their being fomented by the Czech and Yugoslav states. Such a movement would emerge simply because no kind of democratic concession could make the situation of the Slovaks and Serbs so favorable that they would not feel an accession to the Czech state or Illyria preferable. Compared to the glamour of a Czech and Yugoslav state life, the autonomy granted loyally by Hungary would still be a rather confined and dissatisfactory framework for our Slovaks and Serbs. This assumption is even more likely as Czech and Southern Slavic democracy is already more developed than the Hungarian one, and it would progress even more rapidly within an adequate national statehood. [...]

This objection is the weight that can be brought up against our plan, because it is not based on a feudal motivation but, to the contrary, on the psychology of democracy, the *Gesetz der Strömung* in the sense formulated by Oppenheimer,⁶ who claimed that people migrate from the site of a greater social pressure towards the site of less social pressure. Well, no matter what kind of democratic transformation took place in Hungary, for her Slovaks, Serbs and Romanians she would always remain the site of a greater social pressure compared with the Czech state, Illyria and Romania, since it would always be better, more pleasant and more illustrious to be a Slovak in the Czech state, a Serb in Illyria or a Romanian in Romania than in Hungary.

Without doubt, one's first impression is that this objection is psychologically well-founded and its practical inferences are correct. Nevertheless, I believe that a more profound analysis of the situation may lead to the rectification of both the starting point and the deductions. The main aspects would be the following:

The whole argument is too strongly based on today's venomous relations which hinder our nationalities' cultural and political freedoms. Their desperation and resistance to this social pressure may easily give the impression to a superficial observer that our Slovaks and Serbs want to have nothing to do with us, and that what they primarily want is not cultural and political freedom but a common statehood with their kinsfolk. Those who think along

⁶ Franz Oppenheimer (1864–1943): German sociologist and political economist.

these lines indeed underestimate centuries-old bonds of a community of fate in the same state, existing economic and emotional values, which tie our nationalities to Hungary and which are becoming more and more manifest every day with the decrease of cultural and political pressure. That this view is not some piece of labored sophistry is shown by the examples of Switzerland and Belgium, which can keep their nationalities together in the vicinity of the most illustrious national states of the world. And yet in actual fact how meager are the opportunities of Switzerland, weak, tiny and scantily provided for by nature, or Belgium, condemned to the role of a buffer state, compared to the ones that a democratized Hungary with its liberated cultural forces could give to her nationalities. Once the cultural and administrative autonomy of the Slovaks and the Serbs is adequately ensured, once they can take their fair share of every sphere of Hungarian state life, once they can have free contact with their Czech and Southern Slavic kinsfolk in the areas of economy and culture, then their belonging to the Hungarian state will not be a burden for them, and it may even have further value, because in the great concert of confederates they would be able to make use of the bountiful economic, cultural and organizational advantages provided for them by the historical Hungary. They would be the truly competent mediators and developers of Hungarian–Czech and Hungarian–Southern Slavic economic and cultural connections!

It is true that to reach this stage, a quicker democratic and cultural progress is required, and it is also beyond doubt that the *existing democracy* of the Czechs and the Southern Slavs is more developed than the Hungarian one. But as we have seen, the *sine qua non* of the planned alliance would be the full-scale democratization of Hungary, which would make it possible for Hungary not just to reach, but even to surpass the Czech and Southern Slavic democracy, because the *potential energies* of democracy are greater and more wide-ranging here due to the more opulent economic, ethnographic and geographic resources.

But even if these statements were considered too optimistic, and even if Hungary did remain an area of relatively greater pressure for our Slovaks and Serbs, it does not necessarily follow that the irredentist endeavors would gain strength due to the changes outlined above. This depends only on whether the pressure would increase or decrease compared to the earlier situation. And who would dare to doubt that the international and internal changes we have recommended would alleviate the pressure immensely. If this pressure today cuts wounds into the bodies of the millions living under it, in the new order it would merely instill in a narrow layer of intellectuals a feeling of discomfort.

And in any case—*et nunc venio ad fortissimum*⁷—the influx from the sites of the greater social pressure to the sites of a lesser one can only take place under two conditions: the first is that this migration is actually possible; the second is that it does not require sacrifices disproportionate to the advantages to be attained.

Well, in our case the situation is further complicated by the fact that it would concern the migration of the population of whole regions and not isolated individuals, and this would only be possible through an annexation or cession. Yet we have seen that a Czech–Slovak unification would not be feasible without the creation of large blocks of Hungarian minorities, which would replace Slovak irredentism with an even more desperate Hungarian one. Moreover, such a situation could only be achieved by force, because the majority of the Hungarian nation would consider the violent dismemberment of a thousand-year-old state detrimental. Well, great and overwhelming pressure differentials can create a senselessly warmongering public calling out for goals that are in fact unattainable; but that a liberated Czech state and Illyria with their unimpeded growth or the nationalities in Hungary just released from the worst social pressure could be rushed into a war which would only serve the state-founding ambitions of a fragment of the Slovak and Serbian bourgeoisie would indeed be a preposterous idea that cannot be adopted even by those who, under the impact of the present war, tend to see human nature in the most pessimistic light.

e) In the present system of dualism Hungary enjoys half of the power; it would be foolish of her to content herself with one-third or even one-fifth of it. This argument evidently stems from the feudal theory that sees power as nothing else but dividing up all the influential offices and leading posts. This theory, however, is only valid from the point of view of the privileged classes. From that aspect the wider social strata power means an economic, spiritual and moral prosperity. And this can be much more fully guaranteed within a large and peaceful federation than in any other system based on blocking the development of certain peoples.

f) The system of democratic federalism would overthrow the rule of Hungarians in Hungary and would lead to the nationalities gaining ground. This argument is only true in the sense that the federal transformation of the whole Monarchy can only be achieved through the absolute democratization of all of its members and particularly Hungary. And in fact this democracy would

⁷ Originally, *Venio nunc ad fortissimum virum* – “I am coming to the strongest man.” (Cornelius Nepos).

by necessity ruin the present form of Hungarian supremacy, which pursues an arbitrary policy of assimilation: no democratic Hungary is conceivable without having an all-embracing regard for the rights of the national minorities. However, this trend of development would not mean the increase of centrifugal tendencies; quite the contrary, it would produce their definitive elimination, a real, intensive and spontaneous co-operation between Hungarians and the nationalities instead of the present system of dumb hostility, which revives, as it were, the *silent trade* of the primitive peoples between Hungarians and the nationalities.

The cultural hegemony of the Hungarians in Hungary is not based on force and the deprivation of rights but on their advantage in numbers, their economic strength, cultural prevalence and their favorable geographical position. All these advantages would be enhanced instead of being diminished by the new constitutional order. Hungary is the natural geographical center of the new confederation: she would be the organic and indispensable link among all member states. It is hardly possible to conceive an economic and cultural integration among individual states without her. This is why we can see during the whole course of our historical development how the neighboring countries have gradually established a more and more organic contact with Hungary. This has been true for Poland just as for Bohemia, for Croatia just as for Dalmatia, for Serbia just as for Wallachia. Albeit this contact was a loose feudal one, it is impossible to fail to notice the more realistic and deeper solidarity of interests beyond merely military and dynastic connections. Hungary has always played the role of mediator of Western—and above all German—culture to the East and the South. This role would, as a matter of course, remain and even increase in significance in the future. The more the cultural and economic life of the Danube Basin and the Balkans flourishes, the more significant will become Hungary's role as a mediator.

Indeed, even its greatest problem and frictional disorder, the question of nationalities, would become a source of strength and cohesion in the minute she took on the attitude of friendly co-operation instead of a hostile isolation towards the neighboring states and her nationalities. After all, in this case Hungary would enjoy a certain cultural hegemony not only due to her central position, her most ancient and most compact historical frameworks, her centuries-long routine in the art of politics, her favorable geographical conditions or the advantageous nature of her land, but also because containing the kinsfolk of all the member states of the confederation in her own area, she would have at her disposal a population with the function of a natural ethno-

graphic mediator for the transmittal of all economic and cultural stimuli, initiatives and organizations.

Unfortunately, so many emotionally overwrought Romantic passages have been written about Hungarian hegemony and supremacy that an almost unequalled *national megalomania* has developed. The average Hungarian newspaper reader will believe without the least hesitation that it would be enough to declare Hungarian independence, and this independent Hungary would be able to live in a proud isolation from its neighboring countries and in a haughty supremacy over her nationalities. Few people realize how impossible and utopian such a state would be or that the countries around Hungary are all strong and viable nations amongst which Hungary could only be a *primus inter pares* at most. And the more intensively she fulfilled her above mentioned historical mission of cultural mediation, the more adept she becomes at playing this role. But in no way could she behave as some lord dictating laws for vassal peoples. The replacement of this national megalomania with a real, modest but self-assured assessment of the nation's powers and advantages would be a major moral prerequisite of the new confederate relations. This could only be attained through the downfall of Hungarian feudalism, which had been principally responsible for the development of this morale.

Hungarian independence would thus not mean a haughty isolation but a sober self-determination; it would mean that Hungary could for once become a maker of her own fortune, and that she would have to sacrifice nothing of the opportunities of the future for the sake of a constrained constitutional system.

Translated by Dávid Oláh

PRINCE SABAHADDİN: A SECOND ACCOUNT ON INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE AND DECENTRALIZATION

Title: *Teşebbüs-i şahsi ve adem-i merkeziyyet hakkında ikinci bir izah* (A second account on individual initiative and decentralization)

Originally published: As a political pamphlet (edited by Satvet Lütüfi of Herzegovina), Istanbul, Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1908.

Language: Ottoman Turkish

The excerpts used are from a collection of Prince Sabahaddin's reprinted works published with the title *Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir? Ve izah'lar*, abridged by Fahri Unan (Ankara: Ayraç, 1999), pp. 97–103.

About the author

Prince Sabahaddin (Mehmed Sabahaddin) [1878, Istanbul – 1948, Neuchâtel (Switzerland)]: Ottoman intellectual, politician and member of the royal family. His mother, Seniha Sultan, was the sister of Sultan Abdülhamid II, while his father, Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, was an Ottoman bureaucrat who was dismissed from a cabinet ministry in 1878 due to his alleged involvement in a conspiracy against the sultan. Victimized by the Hamidian regime, Celaleddin Paşa and his two young sons fled to Paris in 1899 and joined the nebulous Young Turk opposition in exile, thereby increasing the group's prestige. In 1902, the two brothers organized a congress, with representatives from all ethno-religious communities of the Empire, in order to unite all forces of opposition against the Hamidian regime. Yet the congress (labeled 'the Congress of Ottoman Liberals' in European sources) revealed that the opposition had neither a common political outlook nor similar objectives. In the end, two main factions emerged as they confronted each other over the inflammatory issue of intervention. Sabahaddin was among the supporters of the idea of foreign intervention (albeit a limited and controlled one) along with many non-Muslim Ottoman (mainly Greek and Armenian) representatives in the congress, whose interests he would often be accused of serving. Following the split in the congress, Sabahaddin founded the 'Society of Private Initiative and Decentralization' (1906), with a monthly journal of its own called *Terakki* (Progress), while his opponents, with more centralist leanings, were organized under a society that was later to become the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP), which effectively brought about the 1908 revolution. Following the revolution, Sabahaddin returned to Istanbul, while his followers founded the *Ahrar Fırkası* (Party of Liberties), a political party with lib-

eral, decentralist leanings which constituted the most serious political opposition to the CUP. Avoiding an active political career, Sabahaddin propagated his sociologically inspired views on private initiative and the decentralization of government, which were largely informed by the conservative French sociological school of *science sociale*. In return, he was increasingly harassed by the CUP as a federalist and a traitor who collaborated with separatist national movements and religious fanatics. Accused of being involved in a counter-revolutionary uprising of religious conservatives, Sabahaddin had to leave Istanbul again in April 1909. He returned in 1918, after the collapse of the CUP regime, and publicly supported the national resistance movement in Ankara. These years witnessed the reprinting of his major work, *Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir?* (How can Turkey be saved?), in which he proposed the use of the *science sociale* method as a political tool that would radically transform the country's social structure as well as its inhabitants' 'backward Eastern mentality.' Sabahaddin had to leave the country again in 1924, this time due to a law that enforced the exile of all members of the Ottoman dynasty. Between 1924 and 1948, he lived in different countries in Europe, in dire circumstances, and occasionally publishing articles on a variety of topics. Along with **Ziya Gökalp**, Sabahaddin was among the founders of sociology in the late Ottoman context. His Ottomanist and decentralist views informed the liberal-minded opposition movements that confronted the increasingly nationalizing agenda of the CUP. His decentralist position was perceived as a significant threat during the Young Turk era, since the administrative and military elite that he severely criticized constituted the heart and core of the centralized state apparatus of the CUP (as well as the Republican) regime. Prince Sabahaddin was rediscovered in the 1950s as a 'founding father of Turkish liberalism,' as the rising liberal movement in Turkish politics endeavored to invent a rooted and continuous tradition underlying its own transformative agenda.

Main works: *Teşebbüs-i şahsi ve adem-i merkeziyyet hakkında bir izah* [An account on individual initiative and decentralization] (1908); *Teşebbüs-i şahsi ve adem-i merkeziyyet hakkında ikinci bir izah* [A second account on individual initiative and decentralization] (1908); *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetine açık mektuplar. Mesleğimiz hakkında üçüncü ve son bir izah* [Open letters to the Committee of Union and Progress. A third and final account on our school of thought] (1911); *Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir? Meslek-i içtimai ve programı* [How can Turkey be saved? The social science school and its program] (1919).

Context

By the first decade of the twentieth century, the issue of protecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, both from the encroachments of great powers and from the increasingly secessionist demands of its own nationalizing communities, had become a pressing problem for the Ottoman intelligentsia. Among the proposals to save the Empire, Prince Sabahaddin's is distinguished foremost by its radical call for extensive decentralization. Largely influenced by the French sociological school of *science sociale* (and above all by the works of its leading figure and his close friend Edmond Demolins),

Sabahaddin proposed a model of social analysis (tinged heavily with the Social Darwinist and Orientalist predilections of the group) based on a wholesale distinction between two types of society: the collectivist (*cemaatçı*) and the individualist (*infiratçı*). He categorized Ottoman society as a classic example of the former communitarian type, in which individual initiative is firmly circumscribed by the forces of the family, community or the centralized state. In diagnosing the causes of “backwardness” of Ottoman society, Sabahaddin argued that it was the constraining “eastern” social structure, rather than the presence of a monarch on the throne, that fostered despotism and blocked the channels of progress in the country. In an effort to turn a sociological method into a political program, he, therefore, proposed a radical social restructuring (comprising decentralizing administrative reforms and the implementation of an educational system to instill individualism) that would unite, westernize and emancipate the society, as well as constituting the necessary grounds for a full-fledged political revolution (envisioned both by the CUP, and later by the Republic).

During the opposition congresses in exile, Prince Sabahaddin’s decentralist position won the support of the revolutionary organizations representing the non-Muslim communities, as well as appealing to many provincial notables, who preferred a state that infringed less on their local power. But while he deplored bureaucratic hegemony, and was highly critical of the centralizing policies of the *Tanzimat*, Sabahaddin, nevertheless embraced the *Tanzimat*’s ‘Ottomanist’ model of cosmopolitan citizenship, which demanded the full equality of all imperial subjects without compromising in any form the political unity of the Ottoman state. Therefore, while promoting the virtues of cultural pluralism and democratic representation, he explicitly denounced the option of granting autonomy (*muhtariyet*) to the non-Muslim elements. As a solution to the secessionist threat, he called for the implementation of full administrative decentralization in the form of local assemblies that enabled the residents of different localities to participate directly in the administrative process. This, he believed, would remedy the backwardness of Ottoman economy and promote the rise of individualism in society, while also creating a far stronger commitment among the citizens towards the political integrity of the Empire. As such, Prince Sabahaddin’s program emerged as a clear alternative to that of the CUP, whose call for the equality of all Ottoman citizens entailed a far stronger central state that overrode the traditional privileges of ethno-religious minorities. Hence, considering the strong statist tradition in Turkey continuing into the Republican era (with the same bureaucrat-officer elite in power), Prince Sabahaddin can be considered as one of

the earliest critics of the centralized monopoly of power, although his reasons to do so hardly stemmed out of any true liberal convictions.

The excerpts provided here are from a political essay which constitutes one among a series of three 'accounts' published as individual pamphlets between 1908 and 1911, in which Prince Sabahaddin responded to brutal accusations by CUP sympathizers (usually of conniving with separatist groups) and criticized CUP agendas and policies, while delineating his own reform agenda based on the 'social science' method. The particular essay in question (usually referred to as the 'Second Account') emerged out of a polemic with a CUP member who, on the eve of the first elections after the reinstatement of the Constitution in 1908, published an article on the "election intrigues" involving the Greek Patriarchate's alleged manipulation of Sabahaddin and his followers (thus casting a slur on the liberal *Ahrar* Party), and their supposed espousal of secessionist movements. After organizing a 'conference' in the *Fevziye* coffeehouse on the day of the elections, Sabahaddin drafted his 'Second Account,' which was then published (along with an introduction and a reprint of the "election intrigues" essay) by Satvet Lütüfi and in which he responded to the latest accusations concerning his political allegiances. The text itself is interlaced with quotations from the author's earlier essays and declarations, highlighting his clear and unwavering commitment to the issue of political unity. Quoting passages from an "invitation" he had published in 1899 to involve minority groups in the constitutional struggle, Sabahaddin underscores his disapproval of separatist nationalisms, and reiterates his argument that the ethno-religious communities under Ottoman rule would only benefit from a revised form of 'Ottomanness,' reconfigured by a new set of collective values (individualism, private initiative) and a decentralized administrative system that promoted individual and local freedoms and diversity. Here, Sabahaddin calls attention to the crucial role of provincial assemblies (where all communities would be represented according to their population ratios) in enabling public participation in government and control over administration. The assemblies, he maintains, would nurture a strong sense of allegiance to the Ottoman state, help develop national trade, and hence contribute to the consolidation of a united front against ethnic rivalries and external threats.

Again with reference to a previous article, Sabahaddin argues that despite the rigid centralist and interventionist policies of the modernizing Ottoman state, the non-Muslim communities were already able to enjoy some form of decentralized autonomy in fields such as education, law and taxation, thanks to a continuation of their traditional rights and privileges. Thus, he maintains

that the non-Muslim communities, with their private schools, churches and alternative social institutions, were able to thrive and establish economical and intellectual dominance over the Turks, who suffered under the iron hand of a centralized bureaucracy. Sabahaddin demands the extension of these administrative liberties to the entire Ottoman community. Yet, clearly, his model of decentralization does not entail a secularized system of administration and education, but one that maintains the traditional and religious values and hierarchies particular to the diverse communities of the Empire. In this sense, his social vision is quite redolent of the modern conservatism of the *science sociale* group, who promoted decentralism as a policy to facilitate the return of the controlling power of local elites and aristocracy.

Prince Sabahaddin's 'Accounts' were the cause of fervent discussions among Ottoman intellectuals from all communities in the years that followed the Second Constitution. The question of decentralization (and the communal liberties and privileges it entailed) remained the most controversial issue of debate in a parliamentary regime that was increasingly constrained by the authoritarian tendencies of the CUP. It cannot be claimed, however, that the impact of Sabahaddin's views reached beyond the final conflicts of a disintegrating Ottoman political system. His works were rediscovered only in the 1950s, as the first democratically elected government of the Republic sought to provide a historical depth of field for its new agenda on political liberalism.

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A second account on individual initiative and decentralization

We are constantly accused, with the repetition of senseless and tiresome refrains, of supporting our Christian citizens, and of accepting their support. But we declare, with our whole intellectual presence, that we are not, and cannot be, supporters of anyone and any power but justice and truth. Hence, nine years ago, in order to maintain our political unity by means of establishing a just constitutional government, we invited diverse Ottoman communities to attend a congress. The printed invitation letter included these lines: "One prevalent idea among the different Ottoman communities is the aspiration to gain independence, in the manner of the small Balkan governments. Yet these small governments are only able to survive due to the international stability provided by the Ottoman presence in the East [...]. Even if, for instance, each Ottoman community was to be governed by an independent administration, it is obvious

that in order to accumulate an internal force that would resist the external forces looming in their four sides, they would have to channel the majority of their resources to military needs! Surely, living equally and in justice under Ottoman nationality is the safest way that would spare us from military, economic and other kinds of external aggression. Moreover, our neighbors, in all fairness, should submit that the revival of Ottomanness would constitute a service to the entire civilized world. Our state's history was made by great military conquests, but its future will be made by exalted achievements in the realm of civilization! A nation's fulfillment of achievements in the field of civilization is beneficial not only to its own people, but to entire humanity. We are sure that once they realize that a firm community, made up of various liberal parties, is established to achieve this grand aim, all Ottomans will be supportive in every possible way!" [...]

And now, let us quote some significant passages from the article entitled *How are the Muslims oppressed by centralization in our country, while the Christians benefit from decentralization?*, published in *Terakki* seven years after the declaration quoted above: "Individuals who have no background knowledge on decentralization consider our approach to be an act of favor towards the Christians and Europeans. Little do they know that the majority of the rights provided by this form of organization are already, and sometimes excessively, granted to Ottoman Christians. There is nothing easier than providing evidence to this fact; Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian and other churches supervise, with complete freedom, all matters related to the religious and public affairs of their communities through the agency of publicly elected civic and clerical councils. Let us briefly consider the most crucial examples: [...]"¹

The Christians, untouched by the incessant and harmful interventions of the government, are active in the realms of agriculture, industry and trade, and have reached a level of wealth that is beyond comparison to that of the Muslims. Hence, only through private initiative, they are able to collect the money necessary for the education and upbringing of their children, and with this money, they vastly surpass all Muslims in public instruction. While they are free to establish schools of their own choice, this privilege is denied to others. [...]

If the Aegean islands are preparing to throw themselves into the arms of Greece, then the means to prevent this is not a process of centralization but

¹ Following a discussion of community regulations on taxation and law, Sabahaddin focuses on the area of education.

military force. Military force, on the other hand, is enhanced by national wealth; and what would improve national wealth? ... Private initiative! ... The form of administration that would facilitate private initiative? ... Decentralization! ... With recurring proofs, the history of mankind declares and confirms this fact! Are we still oblivious to see and understand that centralization is a form of government where freedoms are monopolized, where majorities are suppressed by a minority and where the idea of enterprise is devastated! ... On the other hand, decentralization would unreservedly connect the Ottomans to the Ottoman state, as it would establish [a system of] national inspection not only in Istanbul via Parliament, but also throughout the provinces through the agency of local assemblies. This would steadily expand the level of our national trade and necessitate unified action against foreign powers, which would constitute a most potent instrument for suppressing nationalistic rivalries. Hence administrative decentralization would eventually culminate in political centralization, and intensify the power of Ottoman unity with the passage of each day! [...]

Granted that we are all motivated by a desire to defend the most sacred of rights, that of [dwelling in] the motherland; then let us try to defend this land with the kind of magnanimity she deserves [...]. A fair-minded nation's basis of sentiment hinges not upon animosity, but upon brotherhood [...] and global friendship!

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

GEORGIOS BOUSSIOS: THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF HELLENISM IN TURKEY

Title: *Τό πολιτικόν πρόγραμμα τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ ἐν Τουρκίᾳ* (The political program of Hellenism in Turkey)

Originally published: as a leaflet in Istanbul, 1912

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from the original which can be found at the 'Ion Dragoumis archive' in the Gennadion Library in Athens, pp. 7–9, 11–13, 24–25.

About the author

Georgios Boussios [1876, Grevena (Ottoman Macedonia) – 1929, Athens]: activist, politician and journalist. He was born into a well-off family of merchants. He concluded his primary education in his hometown. He then moved to Istanbul and studied at the Greek-Orthodox Commercial School on the island of Heybeliada (*Gr.* Chalki). After his father's premature death, he took over the family business. Soon, though, he was involved in politics, which cost him the loss of the family fortune. Initially, he took part in the 'Macedonian struggle,' the bloody conflict between Bulgarian and Greek guerilla bands for the control of the Christian populations in the region. He was arrested by the Ottoman authorities and imprisoned for three years in Monastiri (*Tur.* Manastır, *Mac.* Bitola). After the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, he was released thanks to the general amnesty granted by the government. He thus resumed his political activity. He was elected a deputy in the Ottoman Parliament for the *sancak* (sub-prefecture) of Servia (*Tur.* Service), in Western Macedonia. From the very beginning, he opted for cooperation with the non-Turkish deputies of the Parliament. In 1910, he was appointed the head of the *Ἑλληνικός Πολιτικός Σύνδεσμος* (Greek political association), the alter ego of the secret 'Society of Constantinople.' The aim of these associations was to coordinate the action of the Greek deputies. Moreover, due to his flamboyant and critical articles, when Young Turks returned to power with the *Bab-ı Ali* (Sublime Porte) coup, in 1913, Boussios was banned from politics and deported to Greece. In the 1915 Greek elections, he worked closely with **Ion Dragoumis**, a leading political figure of the period, in the part of Macedonia that had in the meantime been annexed by the Hellenic Kingdom in order to deal with the urgent problems of the 'Newly Annexed Lands.' His support for Dragoumis led him to identify with the royalist camp during the 'National Schism' (in 1916–17) against the supporters of **Eleftherios Venizelos**. In 1922, few weeks before the collapse of the front in western Asia Minor (Anatolia), in conditions of high tension and gloomy prospects, King Constantine I entrusted him with

the mandate of setting up a government. Thus, after the 1922 catastrophe in Asia Minor, he withdrew from politics. Parallel with his political activity, Boussios was systematically involved in journalism. Between April 1910 and December 1912, he published in Istanbul—whether under his real name or a penname—the newspaper *Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις* (Political review), which was closed down as a result of censorship and subsequently republished under different names. While there is no lively memory of him for his role in the politics of the Hellenic Kingdom, Boussios is remembered for his role in Turkish politics. He is described in the relevant accounts as Busho effendi, and he became notorious for having declared that “I am as Ottoman as the Ottoman Bank” referring to the joint British–French venture aiming at safeguarding the payments to the European stock market of the Ottoman public debt.

Main works: *Τό πολιτικόν πρόγραμμα τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ ἐν Τουρκίᾳ* (The political program of Hellenism in Turkey) [1912].

Context

Since the late 1880s, new generations, graduates of the schools like *Mülkiye* (Civil Servants Academy) and *Harbiye* (Military Academy) or schools established by Sultan Abdülhamid II himself, were inspired by liberal and constitutional ideas as well as Ottoman patriotism. However, these young officers and officials, generally known as the Young Turks (*Jön Türkler*), in contact with Western ideas and modes of social behavior, could not tolerate what they perceived as the decay of the Empire. The most radical among them gradually joined the *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP). In June 1908, the tsar of Russia and the king of Britain met at Reval (*Est.* Tallin) on the Baltic Sea, discussing, among other things, a proposal for the resolution of the ‘Macedonian Question’ based on foreign control. On July 1908, following these unexpected developments, but also as a result of widespread social unrest, the Young Turks organized an uprising in Reznă and Manastır (*Gr.* Monastiri, *Mac.* Bitola) and threatened to march on Istanbul. Thus, Sultan Abdülhamid was forced to re-establish the constitution of 1876 and proclaim elections.

In the meantime, the ‘long’ nineteenth century had been marked by the struggle in Macedonia (see **Krste Petkov Misirkov**, *On Macedonian matters*). Greek, Bulgarian, and also self-proclaiming Macedonian groups fought against one another in a determined attempt to attract the allegiance of the Christian populations. Greek officers and diplomats had already organized networks to that end. Lieutenant Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaïdis, who in 1906 had already founded the *Ὁργάνωσις Θεσσαλονίκης* (Society of Thessaloniki), set up, together with the diplomat Ion Dragoumis, a similar structure

two years later, the *Όργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Society of Constantinople). Initially, the primary concern of the Society had been to fight against the Bulgarians, even by seeking the support of the Ottoman authorities. However, the Young Turk movement altered the political environment dramatically. The elections proclaimed by the Sultan provided all ethno-religious communities (*millet*) with the right of representation in the new Ottoman Parliament. Furthermore, *müşavvat* /ισοπολιτεία (equality before the law) was once again officially introduced. This was part of a political project aimed at demolishing the old distinctions among the *millets* and bringing all Ottoman subjects under a common political umbrella by offering them Ottoman citizenship regardless of religion or culture. The project was certainly not a novelty. It had been initiated through the *Tanzimat* as a policy instigated largely 'from above,' contributing to the emergence of dynamic middle and upper bourgeois groups, mainly but not exclusively, among the non-Muslim communities. However, in terms of political culture, especially after the dissolution of the first Ottoman Parliament in 1878 the Ottomanist ideal had never been consolidated among the non-Muslim communities. When this project re-emerged during the Second Constitutional Period, it enjoyed widespread support among all communities and constituted the platform for a consensus among them. It was presumed that the modernization agenda heralded by the constitution provided the Greek-Orthodox communities with a unique opportunity to translate their social and economic influence into political authority.

The 'Society of Constantinople' worked towards this aim. However, despite some limited support from the Hellenic state, it did not really represent the official Hellenic policy. The Hellenic state had initially discouraged any involvement in Unionist activities, demonstrating its preference for the absolutist regime, not so much as a matter of principle but out of fear that any change would endanger the 'privileges' of the Patriarchate and the Greek-Orthodox communities. Furthermore, due to the Greek defeat in the 1897 war against the Ottomans, the supporters of irredentism had lost their political momentum, at least temporarily. The impact of the defeat, the interests of the *ομογενείς* (Greeks living outside the Hellenic state), as well as the Bulgarian threat had instigated in Athens an atmosphere of cautious friendship towards the Ottoman Empire.

This did not last for long, though, as the policy of the Unionists became authoritarian over time. Both the Hellenic state and the 'Society' granted their support to the opposition liberal party, whose most prominent figure, **Prince Sabahaddin**, advocated decentralization of the state and preservation

of the autonomy of diverse ethnic groups. Yet, the Greek-Orthodox were not unanimous in their support. The majority among them formed the 'Greek Political Association,' an alter ego of the 'Society,' also directed by Souliotis-Nikolaidis. After the prohibition on all ethnically-based political associations in 1910, the association was renamed the 'Constitutional Political Association,' a new formation open to deputies from all non-Turkish ethnicities.

The Parliament was eventually closed down and new elections were scheduled for the spring of 1912. The 'Constitutional Political Association' supported the oppositional *Entente Liberal* party. To its despair, the latter was badly beaten in the elections which became known as *sopalı seçim* (elections with a beating stick) due to the extensive violence used by the CUP members. However, decision-making over the electoral coalitions and the debate over the motives and the sincerity of the Young Turks triggered a conflict between the 'Association' which was also supported by the Hellenic state, on the one hand, and local Metropolitan and community authorities both in Istanbul and in the provinces with large Greek populations.

The main challenge against the non-Muslim communities was the elimination of their status of autonomy in educational and religious matters with 'privileges' (*Tur. imtiyazlar*, *Gr. προνόμια*) that had been institutionalized by the *Tanzimat*, but pre-existed in various forms well before that. Despite the widespread assumption that Gennadios Scholarios, a fervent anti-Western clergyman, was appointed Patriarch by Mehmed II in 1453 with full authority over the Greek-Orthodox population, recent scholarship has demonstrated that the 'privileges' were officially recognized only with the *Tanzimat* reforms in the mid-nineteenth century (see **Hovsep Vartanian**, *The constitutional truths*). The modernizing Young Turk regime treated the community 'privileges' as well as all *millet* institutions as remnants of the past which had to be abolished. It is exactly through these 'privileges,' however, that the Greek-Orthodox and most of the other non-Turkish communities envisioned their survival, rejecting the idea of a centralized homogeneous state and favoring a kind of federalist pattern, which would allow them a large amount of autonomy.

Boussios's speech 'The political program of Hellenism in Turkey' was delivered in this political conjuncture. After his electoral failure in 1912, he addressed the members of the 'Association' and described the political attitude of the Greek-Orthodox community throughout the constitutional period. The 'policy of subservience,' he claims, had been replaced, between 1910 and 1912, by the 'policy of ethnicities.' This boiled down to the defense of

the national autonomy of Hellenism of the Empire and gained the respect of Greek-Orthodox deputies both within the Empire and outside.

Thanos Veremis and Caterina Boura's introduction to the publication of Souliotis-Nikolaidis's account on 'Society of Constantinople,' dated 1984, was the first attempt to re-evaluate the political choices of the Greek-Orthodox at the turn of the twentieth century. During the last two decades, Greek revisionist views on the late Ottoman Empire led to a reassessment of the constitutional period as a whole, which was complemented by an extensive interest on the period witnessed among Turkish intellectual circles. Thus, the 'policy of ethnicities' is no longer considered to have been the only possible strategy of survival for the Ottoman Greek-Orthodox community.

VK

The political program of Hellenism in Turkey

[...] Whatever the reason and whatever the intention for proclaiming the constitution, we know one thing only, one thing only do we want and it is not possible but to want it, because it is an instinct [which exists] in us and in every race. We want to preserve our national self-existence. As we study the situation, we find that it is not possible for us to preserve our national self-existence under a constitution with only as many rights as we had gained before the constitution. [...]

If among these demands of ours, one can find equality before the law, that is a constitution. For if it does not exist, then that means the dissolution of ethnicities and the abolition of their existence. [...]

Nonetheless, this policy prevailed during the first two years of the constitution due to the momentum of servility. The result of this policy was two-fold. On the one hand, half a dozen people had a good time, feeding on the crumbs of their rulers' table, while on the other hand, there could be heard, everyday and without cease, the complaints of the nation, persecutions, violations, injuries and so many other illegalities which sullied the new regime and filled with desperation the souls of those who pinned so many hopes on the golden promises of its prime movers. [...]

The nation then, not we, but the nation, which did not know in detail [about] the other deceptions, [the nation] awoke and saw where the policy of flattery and servility was taking us. And we, who are no more than the flesh of its flesh and the mind of its mind, we felt, [along] with it, that a different

policy was needed. And the nation combined sincerely with other ethnicities which found themselves in the same position as us and, reinforced as much as possible, stood before those who only take power into account, and told them, to their face, the truth, the truth which always saves. It told them that this state will be destroyed if they continue this policy of domination, for, without a constitution, this state will not stand, as they themselves have seen, having been forced to rebel, but even a constitution only for them will not stand through domination; and it told them we do not mean to deceive them because it would be for the better and in our interest if both the state and the ethnicities were saved. This is the policy which experience has revealed to the nation—if these people could, they would see that it was the policy of true love for them because it was a policy of sincerity and not perfidy. [...]

This is what I had to say. With a political program of the nation as it is summarized in the petition by the members of Parliament, with a policy which is not servile, undignified and unavailing to us, or perfidious for the state, but a policy of true friendship towards other ethnicities which candidly tells the people in power that the only way for them to be saved is to sincerely accept the self-existence of the ethnicities as well as their equality before the law, we have increased the prestige of Hellenism, we have rendered the souls of the Hellenes more free, we have thwarted plans for the disintegration of ethnicities, we have laid the foundations for a more positive acceptance of our program. If this state is not destroyed, it is not possible for our program not to succeed. If it is destroyed, our ethnicity will thus be salvaged. We will protect this program and our policy as the apple of our eye. Nor is it possible to abandon them because of two or three members of Parliament who will supposedly not orate before 400 foot-stamping men, or because of some other reason. Political struggles, just as any struggle, have their trials and troubles. In the past, we suffered more, without the respective successes. We hold the flag of the just of the ethnicities, which constitute the very spirit of civilization of this century. We shall not abandon it, nor will we leave it to be seized by another ethnicity which will find itself at the head, when the moment comes, which will not be late in coming, for the recognition of our program which will save the ethnicities as well as the state.

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

TOMÁŠ G. MASARYK: THE NEW EUROPE

Title: *The New Europe. The Slav Standpoint*

Originally published: London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1918 (*Nová Evropa*, longer Czech version, Prague, Gustav Dubský, 1920)

Language: English – Czech

The excerpts used are from Thomas G. Masaryk, *The New Europe. The Slav Standpoint* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1972), pp. 75–80, 128–129, 138–141, 152–154.

About the author

see Tomáš G. Masaryk, *The Czech question*

Context

Masaryk, a well-known scholar and public intellectual, but a politician on the margins, was sixty-four when he left Prague in December 1914. In the summer of the next year he launched his campaign for an independent Czechoslovak state by giving a public lecture in Geneva on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the death of Jan Hus. Up to that point in his life, he had accepted that existence within the Austrian state was the only option for small nations such as the Czechs, though he always stressed the necessity of serious reform in the Empire. At the beginning of the First World War, basically three main options appeared in Czech politics. The most common among these three at that time, attracting social democratic, clerical as well as agrarian political streams, was a stance loyal to the Habsburgs, although critical of the military plans of the Central Powers and the Germanizing tendencies within the Monarchy. The second, less common and more daring option, was the neo-Slavism of some ‘Young Czechs’ and national socialists

who invested politically in the victory of the Russian Empire. The third option, a pro-Western, pro-independence stance, was formulated by Masaryk, because, shortly after the war broke out, he came to the conclusion that the Empire was not able to reform itself. At the same time, his democratic persuasion made him an opponent of tsarism, as his major treatise from 1913, *Russland und Europa*, demonstrates.

The idea of an independent Czechoslovakia was considered much more radical and less comprehensible in international circles than, for instance, the restoration of the Polish state or the unification of the Southern Slavs. Masaryk therefore began a concerted propaganda campaign among the Allies. 'The new Europe' was the most important of a number of writings in which Masaryk defended the Allies' cause and simultaneously argued for the independence of Czechs and Slovaks. He also intended the book as a kind of ideological manual for the soldiers of the newly formed Czechoslovak legions in the West and in Russia. He wrote the book in the winter of 1917–18, when the fate of Austria-Hungary was still unclear. It was not before the spring of 1918 that the situation changed as the Allies broke off their clandestine negotiations with Austria and the total surrender of both Germany and Austria-Hungary was declared the basic condition for an armistice. In this context, Masaryk found a more receptive audience and gradually gained recognition from the Entente's governments for his political and military leadership. In the fall of 1918, he delivered the final version of *The New Europe* and it was published in English and French.

Whereas Masaryk's initial interpretations of the war conflict was based on economic and geopolitical concerns, in *The New Europe* he anchored the conflagration in his historiosophical conception and sought to convince the readers that the Allies represented morality, democracy and liberty. He understood the war as a kind of 'world revolution,' a conflict between traditional "medieval theocracies," with their undemocratic and anti-national manners, on the one hand, and constitutional, democratic powers on the other. The key question for Masaryk was the postwar reorganization of the intermediate zone of small nations in Central Europe that would serve in the future as a barrier against German expansionism. In basic agreement with Herder, Masaryk understood the nation as a natural organ of humanity and supported acceptance of the principle of nationality in the new organization of Europe on the assumption that the multi-national empires had lost their reason for being. In contrast to his previous political stance, however, he supplemented his self-determination argument with historical state right reasoning that justified the continuity and integrity of the Bohemian Crown

lands in the future Czechoslovakia. This led to the inclusion of more than three million German inhabitants in the new state. In this work Masaryk distinguished between Czechs and Slovaks as two separate nations, but at the same time, he applied the construct of the 'Czecho-Slovak nation' as the envisaged state-forming political nation based on mutual understanding and shared political interest. Defending the creation of an independent republic, Masaryk nevertheless strove to remain faithful to **František Palacký's** conception of Central European federalism, which he sought to develop in opposition to Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa*, a contemporary liberal project based on the German cultural and economic dominance in the region. Masaryk considered the new democratic integration in Central Europe to be a part of a worldwide integration of all democratic states. Yet, from a practical point of view, he did not propose any positive program that would unite the independent Central European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, apart from building a bulwark against Pan-Germanism.

Masaryk repeated most of his basic convictions in 'The world revolution' (1925), a retrospective account of the First World War, although in a more nuanced way. Its main message, justifying the victory of the Allies and the existence of an independent Czechoslovakia as a manifestation of the progress of *Humanität* and democracy, served as a solid foundation for moderate Czech nationalist democratic ideology during the interwar years. Due to Masaryk's personal authority and influence as the 'President Liberator,' the legacy of his political writings formed the intellectual backbone of Czechoslovak democratic republicanism throughout the twentieth century. This legacy did not, however, remain unchallenged in Czechoslovakia either in intellectual or in ideological terms; Masaryk's vision of Central European integration was at the very outset overshadowed by **Edvard Beneš's** diplomatic doctrine directing Czechoslovakia to a firm adherence to the system of Versailles with strong French influence in the region.

MK

The new Europe

The opponents of small states and nations point to Austria as the classic demonstration that small nations must unite themselves into larger federated bodies, and as a proof that they cannot maintain their independence.

It is true that the Turkish danger brought about in 1526 the union of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary; but it is equally true that the Austrian Habsburgs

very shortly abused the free union and oppressed both Bohemia and Hungary. The Habsburgs became the right arm of the threatened theocracy and broke, with the help of Empire and Europe, Bohemia and her Hussite Revolution. With blood and iron and Jesuitism the Habsburgs crushed the Czech Revolution (1618) and culture. The whole history of Austria and her efforts for a uniting, centralizing and Germanizing state is proof and example of dynastic domination, but of no federation of nations. Austria was a federation only as long as it was the union of three free states; Austria-Hungary of today is not a federation of small nations. Such a federation can be found only in the writings of weak-minded courtier-historians and politicians: Austria-Hungary is the organized oppression of the majority by the minority; Austria-Hungary is the continuation of medieval dynastic absolutism.

The Dual Monarchy is composed of nine nations: Germans, Czechs with the Slovaks, Poles, Ukrainians, Serbo-Croats, Slovenes, Roumanians, Italians, Magyars. Some count the Slovaks as a separate nation; the Latins in the Tyrol are a separate nation, and a part of the Jews claim again nationality. In all other nationally mixed states, even in Russia, the so-called ruling nation is in the majority; only in Austria and Hungary does the minority rule over the majority. What is Austria? A dynasty with the aristocracy, the army and its higher officers, the higher bureaucracy and the church (hierarchy) furnishing the necessary spiritual police. Mickiewicz properly compares this anti-national state to the East India Company, in which 200 families exploit the nations.

Turkey also was a "federation" of nations—and she fell; with Turkey will also fall the anomaly of Austria, as Mazzini correctly foretold.

A real federation of nations will be accomplished only when the nations are free to unite of their own accord. The development of Europe points to that end. The program of the Allies answers fully to this development: free and liberated nations will organize themselves, as they find necessary, into greater units, and thus the whole continent will be organized. Should there be federations of smaller states, they will be federations freely entered upon, out of the real needs of the nations, not out of dynastic and imperialistic motives. Federation without freedom is impossible; that must be emphatically stated to those Austrian and other politicians who are promising autonomy and federation. We have now three instances they are free independent states that have become federated: Switzerland, America, and even Germany. Switzerland and America are republics; Germany is a monarchy, but her single states are independent. Do the Habsburgs want a real federation of independent states and nations? Surely not; in any case the Germans threatened that they would not permit a federalization of Austria.

According to the program of the Allies, the small nations and states shall be treated with the same respect politically and socially as the great nations and states. A small nation, an enlightened and culturally progressing nation, is just as much a full-fledged unit and cultural individual as a great nation. The problem of small nations and states is the same as the problem of the so-called small man; what matters is that the value of the man, the individuality of the man, is recognized without regard to his material means. This is the proper sense and kernel of the great humanitarian movement which characterizes modern times, as manifested in socialism, democracy, and nationalism. The modern humanitism recognizes the right of the weak—that is the meaning of all efforts for progress and for the recognition of human dignity: the strong will always help himself. The protection of the weaker and the weak, the protection of the small, of the individual, of corporations and classes, of nations and states—that is the task of modern times. Everywhere the weak, oppressed, and exploited unite themselves—association is the watchword of our era: federation, the free federation of small nations and states will be the consummation of this principle securing the final organization of the whole of mankind. [...]

This historical development is a double process: together with the individualization of all departments the organization of individuals is taking place. Politically expressed, there is going on the development of autonomy and self-government of individuals, classes, nations; and at the same time individuals, classes, and nations are uniting closer, are being organized and centralized. This process goes on within the nations themselves, but also between one nation and another—interstatism and internationalism become more intimate. Europe emphatically tends toward a continental organization.

The principle of nationality stands alongside the international (interstate) principle. The European nations, while becoming individualized, tend to draw closer together economically and with respect to communication (railroads, and so forth) and their entire technical culture; but individualization and centralization are deepened also spiritually by a growing interchange of ideas and of all culture (knowledge of foreign languages, translation, and the like). Europe and humanity are becoming more unified.

Between nationality and internationality there is no antagonism, on the contrary, agreement; nations are the natural organs of humanity. Humanity is not supernational; it is the organisation of individual nations. If, therefore, individual nations struggle for their independence and attempt to break up states of which they have heretofore been parts, that is not a fight against internationality and humanity, but a fight against aggressors, who misuse states

for the purpose of levelling them and enforcing political uniformity. Humanity does not tend to uniformity, but to unity; it will be the liberation of nations which will make possible the organic association, federation of nations, of Europe, and of all mankind. [...]

The geographical location of Bohemia and Slovakia in the very center of Europe gives to our nation a significant position; Bismarck said that “the master of Bohemia is the master of Europe”—the Pangerman politicians often quote this statement of Bismarck. Bohemia, with Slovakia, interferes with the Berlin–Bagdad plan; the shortest road from Berlin to Constantinople, to Salonika and Trieste leads through Prague or through Bohumín (Oderberg); to Vienna and Budapest, also, the shortest connection from Berlin is by way of Prague and Bohumín—Bohemia and Slovakia block the direct connection between Prussia and Austria and the Magyars.

The Czechs constitute the westernmost wedge driven into the German body; they constitute the farthest West in the zone of the small nations; they are the western outpost of the non-German nations in the East. The Czechoslovaks are not a Slav remnant like the Lusatians, for they have held their own against German aggression toward the East for more than a thousand years; the Czechs have opposed the Germans from the seventh century, from the original foundation of their State, up to the present day. The Slavs of the Elbe and Saal basins and of the Baltic shores have been Germanized or exterminated; the Czechs maintained their individuality. To be sure, they are surrounded by the Germans on three sides; toward the South they border on the Magyars, in the East on the Poles and the Ukrainians—a very difficult position in a world of national struggles, resembling the position of the Germans, of which the Pangermans so loudly complain. [...]

Legally, Bohemia is still an independent State. [...]

The Czechs have a historical right to the independence of the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia); they insist on the right to the independence of the State created by them. In addition to that, they have a historical and natural right to the addition of Slovakia, so brutally oppressed by the Magyars. (The Magyars have a proverb: *Tot nem ember*—the Slovak is not a man.) Slovakia, formerly the center of the Great Moravian Empire, was torn away by the Magyars in the tenth century, and was later for a short time connected again politically with its kinsman and was for a time independent. Culturally the Slovaks remained constantly in close relation with the Czechs. The Magyars depend culturally on the Slovaks. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks is therefore a legitimate demand. The demand was made not only by the Czechs, but also by the Slovaks. The Slovaks will employ their own dia-

lect in the schools and in the public administration; there can be no language question, because every Slovak, even without an education, understands Czech and every Czech understands Slovak. The Slovaks gave the Czechs in the period of their national renaissance a number of great authors (Kollár, Šafárik), and educated others (Palacký, and, in a measure, also Dobrovský). The Magyars, though weaker culturally than the Slovaks, attempt to Magyarize the latter systematically and brutally; this Magyarization was not the natural result of a cultural preponderance, but was merely artificially maintained by the administration, which resorted to violence and corruption, exploiting economic advantages. [...]

The Pangermans make the most of the cultural level of the German nation as an argument for its right to world domination; if culture is a necessary condition of political independence, then the Czechs and Slovaks deserve independence fully.

Independent Bohemia early achieved considerable progress in schools and in education; the Bohemian State was organized firmly at an early date and its administration in the hands of trained officials was excellent. Therefore, Bohemia managed to hold its own against Germany. Agriculture and industry were highly developed. Culturally the Czechs have won renown through their Reformation, they being the first nation to resist the medieval theocracy supported by the German-Roman Empire. From Prague University, the first university in Central Europe, there came forth John Hus, who by his martyr's death inspired the whole nation to resist the medieval theocracy of Rome. With Hus the entire Czech nation thus opened a new era.

In the Hussite period the Czechs distinguished themselves not only as warriors ("every Czech a captain"); alongside of John Zizka¹, the founder of modern military strategy, we have Hus, Chelcický², and Comenius, the teacher and educator of nations. The Czech national church, the Unity of the Brethren, according to the common judgment of history, was an attempt to put into practice the ideals of the purest Christianity. The Czech Taborites (the radical Hussites) made an attempt to practice Christian communism.

Rome and the Habsburgs, this time backed by all Europe, crushed the Bohemian Reformation; Bohemia, weakened by many wars forced upon her, united with Austria and Hungary, but this union, aimed at the Turkish menace, was employed by the Habsburgs for the suppression of the Czech Reformation. The anti-Catholic revolution of 1618 ended at the White Mountain

¹ Jan Žižka (c. 1360–1424): famous Hussite warlord.

² Petr Chelčický (c. 1390–c. 1460): Czech religious thinker and political thinker.

in Jesuit darkness; but traditions of former power and independence and the progressive ideas of the eighteenth century, especially of the French Revolution, inspired the Czech nation to a new spiritual and national life; the end of the eighteenth century marks the beginning of the renaissance of the Czechs and Slovaks as an organic part of the renaissance of all the nations of Europe. In spite of the constant struggle against the perjured dynasty, the Czech nation is today culturally and economically one of the most progressive nations. It has thus proved its virility, its energy and ability to hold its own against the pressure of imperialistic Germany and Austria; this high degree of culture, as we have emphasized before, being attained by the Czechs through their own strength, without assistance from the dynasty and from Austria.

Insofar, therefore, as culture is an argument for political independence (the administration of the State, especially the democratic administration, being facilitated by the enlightenment of the people), the Czechs and Slovaks can employ this argument with full justification, for they are not less cultured than their oppressors, the Germans and Magyars. [...]

The Czecho-Slovak State will undoubtedly be a republic.

This very war revealed sufficiently the reactionary and dangerous character of continental monarchism; the Czecho-Slovak nation is ripe for a republic. In the course of centuries we became accustomed to living without king of our own; the Habsburgs were to us always foreigners; the aristocracy also became estranged from the nation and attached itself closely to the foreign dynasty. The aristocracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina became Turkish and in Bohemia Habsburg.

The independence of the Czecho-Slovak State is a demand of political justice, by its geographical location in the center of Europe and by its century-long struggle against the German "Push toward the East," the Czech and Slovak nation is the anti-German vanguard of all the nations in Eastern Europe. Should the Czecho-Slovak nation remain in the sway of the Germans and Asiatic peoples allied with Germans, Magyars, and Turks, and should it actually fall, Pangerman Central Europe and its further political consequences will be realized. The Czecho-Slovak question is a world question and is the problem of this very war; free Bohemia or reactionary Austria, the free Czecho-Slovak nation or the degenerate Habsburgs—that is the choice for Europe and America, for the thinking Europe and America. [...]

I do not maintain that the liberation of Bohemia is the most vital question of the war; but I can say without exaggeration that the aims proclaimed by the Allies cannot be attained without the liberation of Bohemia. Her future will be the touchstone of the Allies' strength, seriousness, and statesmanship. [...]

The restoration of the Czecho-Slovak State is only a part of the task which Europe, or rather the Allies, will have to undertake in reorganizing eastern Europe; together with the Czecho-Slovak State there must arise an independent united Poland and an independent united Jugoslavia. Of all the acute national questions in the zone of small nations these are most acute and they are questions that are closely connected internally.

ANTON MELIK: A NATION IN THE MAKING

Title: *Narod, ki nastaja* (A nation in the making)

Originally published: *Ljubljanski zvon* (a monthly on literature and education), Ljubljana, 1918, vol 38, issue 8.

Language: Slovene

The excerpt used is from the original, pp. 476–484.

About the author

Anton Melik [1890, Črna vas (*Ger.* Schwarzen Dorf, present-day Slovenia) – 1966, Ljubljana]: geographer and historian. He studied in Vienna between 1911 and 1916, and in 1927 received his doctorate in geography from Ljubljana University. He started his career as a secondary school teacher in Ljubljana. From 1938 to 1966 he served as a professor of geography at the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana. From 1946 to 1950 he was the President of Ljubljana University. He served two terms as the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and was a member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Until 1958 he was a deputy to the ‘People’s Assembly’ in Ljubljana. From 1911, his works, literary texts and later essays on political, social and economic topics in the new Yugoslav state, appeared in Slovenian and Croatian newspapers, frequently under his pen-name Loboda. After the First World War, he wrote several historical and geographical reference books, overviews and secondary school textbooks. He was the editor of the literary monthly *Ljubljanski zvon* (The Ljubljana bell). After the Second World War, he primarily concentrated on the organization and institutionalization of the discipline of geography in Slovenia. He also participated in the preparation of documents that served as the basis for the drawing of the western border of Yugoslavia. His close attention to natural, historical, socio-economic and developmental features of the Slovenian regions made him a doyen of the discipline of geography in Slovenia. As the most prominent Slovenian geographer and one of the most prominent geographers in Yugoslavia, Anton Melik was a renowned public figure. His acceptance of administrative-political functions within the communist establishment and his political activity after the Second World War were seen by many of his contemporaries as highly controversial; some critics even accused him of power-mongering. However, Melik’s political activity after the Second World War can be attributed to his pre-First World War propensities. He welcomed the communist regime because it restored the western Slovenian border, stopped the German *Drang nach Osten*, and nationalized landed property.

Main works: *Zgodovina Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev* [The history of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes] (1919–1920); *Jugoslavija. Zemljepisni pregled* [Yugoslavia. A geographical overview] (1921, 1923); *Kolonizacija Ljubljanskega barja* [The settlement of the Ljubljana marshlands] (1927); *Slovenija. Geografski opis* [Slovenia: a geographical description] (1935, 1936); *Amerika in ameriška Slovenija* [America and American Slovenia] (1956).

Context

Melik matured during the period when the national awakening movement in Slovenia reached its peak. Like many of his contemporaries, Melik was driven, under the pressure of Germanization, to articulate a sense of (Slovenian) national awareness. The result was his resistant and combative personal stance in a series of publications dealing with the issue of borders within the nation-state. Melik's fundamental political stance rested on the conviction that because of the region's geo-strategic importance, the Balkans were always destined to be at the center of European and global political developments.

At the time of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, many Slovenes were convinced that they would cease to have any contacts with Germans, not even on the economic level. After 1918, the cultural orientation of Slovenia completely changed. With the establishment of Yugoslavia, new horizons and opportunities were opened for Slovenian culture, but the centralist rigidity of the kingdom under the Karađorđević dynasty soon began to obstruct the national and cultural ambitions of the Slovenes. According to the 1921 census, more than 90% of citizens living in the Slovenian part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were literate, while in other parts of the Kingdom this percent was only around 40%. In Slovenia, elementary schooling was incomparably more developed than the south-eastern regions of the country. However, the situation of higher education was quite the opposite. Unlike Zagreb and Belgrade, Ljubljana did not have a university. From the very beginning, there existed an irreconcilable contrast between the aspirations of the Slovenes and the expectations of other parts of the country. While Belgrade allocated most of its educational funds to literacy campaigns, Ljubljana worked towards the Slovenization of secondary schooling and the development of Ljubljana University, which had been established in 1919.

Before 1914, there was no wide support in Slovenia for the idea of resolving the Slovenian and South Slavic issue outside the framework of Austria-Hungary. **Ivan Cankar's** view, presented in the lecture 'The Slovenes and the Yugoslavs,' was isolated. Nothing at that time suggested that an age-old

monarchy would soon come to an end. The idea of Yugoslavia suddenly gained ground among the Slovenes towards the end of the First World War, prompted by the threat posed by the Germans. Nevertheless, it was evident that the intellectuals greatly differed in their views on the issue of developing closer links with southern Slavic nations. Although Yugoslavia was the choice of the majority among the Slovenes, in their imagination it was primarily a synonym for a 'nation-state' which would provide a framework for the fulfillment of Slovenian aspirations for self-determination. At the time of the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Slovenian (political) elite was divided on the question of whether the Slovenes, Serbs and Croats constituted one nation which had to be reunited after a tragic period of separation, or were three distinct nations which still had to formulate a way to found a common state.

Liberally oriented Anton Melik was among those who enthusiastically greeted the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Shortly before the formation of the Yugoslav state, the leading figures of the most influential political party in Slovenia between the two wars—the 'Slovenian People's Party'—declared that a person's identification as a Serb, Croat or Slovene was undemocratic, compared to the "democratic conception of the three-name Yugoslav nation." At the time of the breakdown of Austria-Hungary, the leader of the party, Anton Korošec, was one of the most prominent representatives of the "Yugoslav nation" in the eyes of the international community. It was only after the 'Slovenian People's Party' monopolized power during the parliamentary elections in 1923 and established itself within the Yugoslav political context as an autonomist party, did its public stance turn into the opposite of what it had been before.

After the Second World War, neither the political activity of the 'Slovenian People's Party' nor Melik's Yugoslavist mission were interpreted as efforts towards a uniform Yugoslav nation. On the contrary, Melik's historical and geographical textbooks written during the inter-war period were perceived to endorse Slovenianism, which Melik only saw as the battle for the autonomy of Slovenian science and culture.

According to his contemporaries' accounts, it was through his lectures as a secondary school teacher (1917–1927) and then a university professor (1927–1965) that Melik's love for Slovenian culture and his exceptional talent for narration found expression. Shortly after the unification, he began to write 'The History of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,' a popular science book written in the spirit of Slovenianism which served as the basis for many historical textbooks he wrote subsequently. In the book, he still used the des-

ignation “three-part nation,” or avoided a classification altogether. Still, the list of references was divided according to the individual nations. Svetozar Pribičević, the minister of education in 1921, pointed out that teachers in Slovenian schools did not devote sufficient attention to educating students in the Yugoslav national spirit.

The Slovenian experience of the first Yugoslav state (1918–1941) points to the fact that Slovenes, while they were articulate in their criticisms, produced no clear vision of how to achieve their own ideals. Their decision to join the Yugoslav state was born out of general enthusiasm and little judgment. It seems that Anton Melik’s perception of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was also informed by this dominant mindset. After the establishment of the Kingdom he stated that the “national liberation” thus achieved was the greatest turning point in history following the subjugation of the Slovenes to Frankish rulers one thousand years before. He held that the Slovenes now had to turn to Yugoslavia and Western Europe, and that Croatian and Serbian culture, and the learning and use of French in particular, would help them shape a new Slovenian “civilizational orientation.”

After Melik’s death his colleagues maintained that he never advocated the idea of a singular Yugoslav nation. For example, Ivan Gams attempted to prove that Melik’s article on the western border of the Balkans, running along the Ljubljana River, was written under pressure, rather than out of conviction. However, the article ‘A Nation in the Making’ suggests that, at least in the aftermath of the war, Melik was enthusiastic about the common Yugoslav nation, similar to many other Slovenian intellectuals. It has been argued that Melik did not write this article under pressure, but because he concurred with **Jovan Cvijić**’s view that the natural border between the Balkans and Europe was the watershed of rivers that flow into the Adriatic and the Black Seas respectively. For Cvijić, the border between the Balkans and Europe was the Soča river, but Melik is said to have shifted this border eastwards, to the Ljubljana river.

Today, Anton Melik is viewed as the indisputable founder of the science of geography in Slovenia, and his professional legacy informs research on any Slovenian region. The Geographical Institute of the Scientific Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, one of the main scientific and research institutions in Slovenia, bears his name.

A nation in the making

Introduction

The contemporary Yugoslav movement engrossed our entire Slavic south within a very short time. Its main demand, an independent Yugoslav state, rests on a dual conceptual basis, that is, political and national-cultural. The former is described by the popular motto of national self-determination: a nation is sovereign so it should be self-governed, self-administered and should decide autonomously, of its own free will, on its state organization; every such individual state organization should comprise one nation and cover its undivided territory, and should be free to decide on its relations with other, in principle equal, groups organized within nation-states. The second element of the Yugoslav movement's conceptual basis is the principle of national unity of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which is our guiding idea, now and in the future.

The political aspect of our national program rests on a modern, European, or better said, global idea, which is shared by all politically and culturally living nations; it is a fruit of their struggles, defeats and victories, and of more than a hundred years of political and cultural experience. Our national-cultural idea, on the other hand, is something that is specific to us, which, compared to modern, global, and particularly western European circumstances, appears as an alien phenomenon.

The Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs accepted the idea of the Yugoslav national unity as their national principle and as the highest national will, albeit in somewhat different forms. In an effort to realize it, we are still struggling against external and internal opponents. Because of this, and because of our future national and cultural endeavors, I find it very important that we should fully clarify our fundamental concepts and deepen and strengthen our views in many respects.

In order to be able to proceed with this deliberation, we first need to analyze the concept of national unity. First we have to define, by observing the existing nations, the content of the concept of nation and understand which traits are its essential components. In so doing we arrive at the following conclusion: nations are primarily larger or smaller groups of people who inhabit an undivided territory and speak the same language, which indeed branches into various dialects in individual regions, but nevertheless presents itself, outwardly and inwardly, as a common literary and cultural linguistic unit; furthermore, every part of a nation is characterized by the awareness of

the national community and the sense of belonging to the same nation. Every nation is a cultural unit; all of its parts share the same or very similar cultural views and sentiments, and even a number of ethnographic idiosyncrasies. If we take a closer look at the examples within the Roman, German and Slavic nations, we have to conclude that it is precisely the issues of cultural community and national awareness that are the most important. A literary language is an outward sign of unity and the idiosyncrasy of culture, and it represents the highest, the deepest, and the most potent trait of a nation [...].

Starting from the traits of a nation outlined above, the Yugoslavs, that is to say, the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs, share primarily tribal affinities; we also occupy a compact national territory and speak related dialects of the same language; finally, we are all related through shared national awareness, given that we all stated our will to be united within Yugoslavia. What prevents us from being completely compatible with the concept of nation delineated above is the fact that the literary language (and script) and our current and past culture divide us into three distinct groups. [...]

In our era, the modern Yugoslav idea arose as the expression of a natural developmental stage of our nation; among its strongest basis is the only correct recognition that the path to the full national unification of the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs is a political union. According to the modern Yugoslav idea, which is based on the awareness of the national unity of the Slovenes, the Serbs and the Croats, our linguistic and cultural differences are so negligible that our future life as a common nation is possible. Our common national life will proceed from the political community and will be a result of the common domestic and foreign political, economic, social and cultural life. We do not underestimate the differences among us that are a result of divergent development paths in the past, but it is our conviction that under the influence of the political and other changes in the life of the nation we will achieve over time, in addition to the enumerated signs of the Yugoslav national unity, also the cultural and civilizational community. That is when we, the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs will become the Yugoslav nation in its full scope and wholly consistent with the definition given above. Or, in other words: the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs are one and unique Yugoslav nation in the making [...]

Such a conscious making of the nation is, as has already been stated, a peculiarity of Eastern Europe, and of the Slavic world in particular. [...] I have already mentioned in passing that the national individuality of the Slovenes emerged under the influence of circumstances unfavorable for the Yugoslav community, and that it is a result of the political, that is, historical commu-

nity with the German nation. There lies the reason why we differ so much from our kindred tribes, and why we have become nationally, politically and culturally a nation apart. However, as already mentioned, an overview of the national-political events across the Slavic world over the recent period indicates that the process of nation-formation among the Slavs has not been completed yet. In accordance with this conclusion, we, the Yugoslavs, hold the view that individual Slovene, Croatian and Serbian national-cultural formations should not be considered the ultimate result of national development, but only a stage in that development and a necessary result of our history until now, much like the inevitable result of our future history will be—the Yugoslav nation. These are the main thoughts underlying our Yugoslav nationalism [...]

I think that what logically proceeds from the discussion up to this point is that anyone who accepts the national unity of the Yugoslavs, but at the same time maintains the principle of cultural separation of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, is self-contradictory. Those who do not acknowledge the process of cultural amalgamation do not acknowledge the formation of the nation either, and hence cannot speak about the national unity of the Yugoslavs, even if they are the fanatic fighters for our political union [...]

Our Yugoslav cultural future opens for us many possibilities. In much the same way as mankind in modern times tends to organize its administrative-political and economic life into national groups, where national states appear to represent a kind of cell that makes up the large organism that is the human family, the cultural development of humankind also proceeds by national groups, but even more so. We want to participate in this immense deed of mankind as part of the Slovenian–Croatian–Serbian cultural community. [...] These are our goals, the goals of the not-yet-joined elements of a nation in the making. They will be achieved over several generations, when that great synthesis among us is completed, that assimilation, that natural amalgamation willed by leading intellects and carried out unconsciously by a large mass of people and future generations. This process has begun in our time, but the laws that underlie it have been with us since long ago.

Translated by Olga Vuković

DIMITAR MIHALCHEV: IS UNITARY AND INTEGRAL YUGOSLAVIA POSSIBLE?

Title: *Възможна ли е единна и цялостна Югославия? На границата между политиката и философията* (Is unitary and integral Yugoslavia possible? On the borderline between politics and philosophy)

Originally published: in the magazine *Философски преглед*, IV, 1932, vol. III, pp. 197–227.

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 213–214, 220, 221–223.

About the author

Dimitar Mihalchev [1880, Lozengrad (*Tur.* Kırklareli, present-day Turkey) – 1967, Sofia]: philosopher and diplomat. Appointed a professor at Sofia University in 1920, Mihalchev was also a member of the Academy of Sciences starting in 1919. Mihalchev served as the academy's president between 1944 and 1947. As a philosopher, he was influenced deeply by the German philosopher Johannes Rehmke. After the publication of Mihalchev's first book in German (*Philosophische Studien*, 1909), Rehmke called him *filius ante patrem*. The main goal of Rehmkean philosophy was to go beyond subjectivism, or, similar to Husserlian phenomenology, neo-realism and neo-positivism, to go back to the objective world and to have its starting point in the given. Rehmke and Mihalchev appealed for a scientific approach and accordingly for a re-evaluation of the Cartesian legacy. Mihalchev was the founder and director of one of the most influential cultural periodicals in Bulgaria, *Философски преглед* (Philosophical review, 1929–1943). The journal was at the center of some of the most important intellectual debates of the 1930s. In the journal, Mihalchev wished to represent the whole political spectrum, although personally he tended towards a left-wing position, espousing a liberal version of Marxism. Among the most fervent critics of racial theories, nationalism and totalitarianism, Mihalchev was often accused of being a Marxist by his opponents (among them **Petar Mutafchiev**), while, at the same time, was criticized by the leaders of mainstream Marxism (such as Dimitar Blagoev and Todor Pavlov). Mihalchev was also an important political figure, especially in the field of international affairs. In 1913, he joined a delegation of Bulgarian intellectuals visiting European capitals with the purpose of advocating the 'Bulgarian cause' after the Balkan wars. He met the future Czechoslovak president **Tomáš G. Masaryk** in Prague. In 1923, he was sent as an ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and

succeeded in involving Masaryk in the negotiations between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Bulgaria, thereby preventing a possible military conflict. Mihalchev served as the Bulgarian Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1934 to 1936, and from 1944 to 1946. He participated in the negotiations over the peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1944. After 1945, Mihalchev was marginalized by the communist regime, but was nevertheless tolerated as a 'progressive' thinker.

Main works: *Philosophische Studien* [Philosophical studies] (1909); *Форма и отношение* [Form and relation] (1914); *Философията като наука* [Philosophy as science] (1933); *Расизмът като философско-историческа теория* [Racism as philosophical-historical theory] (1938).

Context

The idea of a Balkan federation was already part of Bulgarian public debate even before the foundation of an autonomous Bulgarian Principality. It was advocated by some of the leaders of the movement for national liberation (Georgi Rakovski, Lyuben Karavelov and **Hristo Botev**) and was an alternative to the dualist project. The project for a Balkan federation at the time had a clear anti-Ottoman orientation, which was also visible in its most concrete political manifestation: on 5 April 1867, an assembly of eighty Bulgarian social and political activists in Bucharest voted for a program for creating a Serbo-Bulgarian Kingdom. On 22 May, the Serbian prince Mihajlo Obrenović declared that he "fully accepted the conditions of the Bulgarians." His support for the federalist idea was also implicated in his backing the so-called 'Bulgarian Legion,' which was formed in Serbia by Georgi Rakovski with the purpose of 'liberating' the Bulgarian lands from the Ottoman Empire.

After the creation of an autonomous Bulgarian principality, and especially after the Serbo-Bulgarian war in 1885, the federalist idea was naturally compromised for a long period. It was revived again after the radical reconfiguration of the political scene following the Balkan wars and the First World War, which had been a veritable catastrophe for Bulgaria. Undoubtedly, the most significant change on the political map of the Balkans after the creation of the Bulgarian state at this period was the foundation of the unified state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, which, in 1929, was re-baptized as Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslav ideology, in its radical tendencies, was promoting the project for the unification of all southern Slavs under a single state, implying the integration of the Bulgarian state into Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, this claim was viewed extremely negatively and interpreted as a new version of Serbian chauvinism. However, in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, a period of profound political, economic, and cultural crisis in Europe coinciding with the rise of

totalitarian regimes, the project of a Yugoslav Federation acquired new dimensions. It is exactly in this context that Dimitar Mihalchev's article 'Is unitary and integral Yugoslavia possible?' should be approached.

The article starts with a short resume of the diplomat Nikola Antonov's pro-federalist essay, published in the previous issue of *Философски преглед*, which had provoked an intense debate. Mihalchev tries, on the one hand, to advocate Antonov's position and to develop it further, while, on the other hand, articulating it with a profound analysis of the problem in terms of political philosophy and collective psychology. His polemics address, at the same time, the Bulgarian critics of Antonov and the radical Serbian ideologists, who supported the idea of an 'integral Yugoslavia.' The main opponent in this respect was the group formed around the journal *Narodna odbrana*, whose views were best expressed by the texts of Vladimir Vujić and Živko Topalović. The latter's essay *Za balkanski sporazum* (About the Balkan agreement) was severely criticized by Mihalchev.

Mihalchev's politico-philosophical analysis (as it is termed in the sub-title of the essay) of the federalist problem proceeds from the question: "How can we understand the notion of an 'integral Yugoslavia'?" The philosopher argues that this term has two different meanings: the first, promoted by the Yugoslav ideologists, implied the existence of a 'unique Yugoslav nation.' In this perspective, the ultimate *raison d'être* of the integral Yugoslavian state is to embody the integral Yugoslav nation. Mihalchev provides an extended analysis of the concept of nation in order to prove that to speak of Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as one nation is nonsense. Accordingly, he severely criticizes the project of Yugoslavian statehood as a 'national' state. One could rightly add that in fact, such a project discredited the very federalist idea, substituting it with just another national ideology. On the other hand, Mihalchev states, the notion of an integral Yugoslavia could be understood as an 'integral federation' of all southern Slavic states, which would mean the creation of a powerful supranational political unity, in which autonomous national cultures would be preserved and respected. Mihalchev declares himself to be in favor of such integration and provides pragmatic political and economic arguments in support of his claim. In political terms, the integral federation of the southern Slavs could create not only a new European 'great power' capable of resisting the aggressive external forces and enjoying an autonomous statehood, but would also resolve the 'Macedonian problem,' which had been turning Serbs and Bulgarians against each other for decades. Moreover, he claims that there exist strong economical arguments in favor of such an integration.

Mihalchev's views remain moderately optimistic. He does not suggest immediate political action for the achievement of a federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Being aware that there was a strong negative psychological legacy to be overcome first, Mihalchev comes up with a project for cultural reform: to introduce the Serbo-Croatian language as obligatory in the Bulgarian educational system and vice-versa. Thus, he claims that getting familiar with each other's culture and point of view would stimulate empathy between the southern Slavs, which was a necessary condition for the common existence of these fellow-nations.

Mihalchev's article provoked an intense debate. The response from the nationalist circles, especially the newspapers of the pro-Bulgarian 'Macedonian Revolutionary Organization,' a splinter group of the IMRO, was ferocious: Antonov and Mihalchev were accused of being national traitors conspiring with Serbian nationalism (see for instance the article of Dr. Hristo Tatarchev, one of the founders of the 'Macedonian Revolutionary Movement,' 'Criminal and dangerous propaganda,' published in the newspaper *Македонија* [Macedonia]). Mihalchev responded to the criticisms with a short book entitled 'Response to my critics in the debate on an integral Yugoslavia. The future of our nation and the high task of the Bulgarian state' (1932), in which he further developed and clarified his arguments.

BM

Is unitary and integral Yugoslavia possible?

How shall we interpret this "integral Yugoslavia"? This was the guiding question of our exposition. "Integral" means "undivided." Undivided Yugoslavia! The meaning of this, however, is *twofold*. On one hand it means a *genuine, complete* Yugoslavia, i.e. a union of all South Slavs, including the Bulgarians, in a single state. In other cases, though, "integral Yugoslavia" would be taken to mean a state which not only brings together all South Slavs but is also based on a unified Yugoslavian population: *a unified Yugoslav people with a unified Yugoslavian culture*, which, as Vladimir Vujić puts it, can have *many ingredients* but *only one final product*. In the writings of various Yugoslav authors on the subject of "integral Yugoslavia" these two meanings are not always distinguished.

The issue of what comprises nationality is very complicated and could not be discussed in detail within the scope of this article. Some authors emphasize the primary role of *long-lasting shared fate* in the formation of any nationality and therefore define the nation as a "fateful community" (*Schicksalsgemein-*

schaft). Others stress the importance of *shared character traits* for the understanding of nation and nationality (*Charaktergemeinschaft*). Yet others maintain that there is no nation outside the *shared language*, bridging ages to bring together the generations that we take to comprise one people. What, then, would be the things that make a multitude of men a nationality? 1) *Religion*? Obviously not. There are nationalities, such as the Germans, who have two religions and yet are one and the same nation. 2) *Territory*, maybe? Again not, because as important as the initial settlement can be for the emergence of the nation, it gradually loses its authenticity: a community can be ousted from its territory and still remain “the same people.” It is true that the particular features of the country are not irrelevant to the *character and history* of its population. Still, territory cannot explain the nation as an antecedent historical category. 3) If we speak of *shared fate*, we should note that it befalls every political party, every city, every association, etc.; yet they are not and cannot be a nation or nationality. 4) Should we take *shared culture*, many people would jump to remind us that a Bulgarian and a Turkish artist living and working in Paris for many years would be culturally much closer to one another than the Bulgarian artist resident in Paris and the Bulgarian peasant grazing his sheep high up the Balkan mountain. 5) Sharing one *language* is still not a sure sign of a shared nationality, as I could speak German fluently (like a German) and still be an ethnic Bulgarian. Besides, in North and South America, in Denmark, Norway, etc. you would find *different* nationalities speaking the *same* tongues, even the same *literary* languages. 6) As for the so-called *blood relationship* (“*blood or racial origin*”)—no way. Because a man like Prof. Dr. Joseph Fadenhecht¹ has no “racial kinship” to us, true-bred Bulgarians, yet is he not an excellent Bulgarian, considering himself and being esteemed as one of us? People like Lyuben Karavelov,² Peyo Javorov, Ivan Kirilov, the poet Nikola Furnadzhiev,³ the sculptor Andrey Nikolov,⁴ the cartoonist Iliya Beshkov⁵ or the musicologist

¹ Joseph (Yossif) Fadenhecht (1873–1953): Bulgarian professor of law and politician (member of the Democratic Union since 1924). He was member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and he was five times elected as member of the Parliament. In 1918 he served as Minister of Justice in Alexander Malinov’s government.

² Lyuben Karavelov (1834–1879): influential writer, poet and journalist, leader of the ‘Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee’, close ally of Hristo Botev.

³ Nikola Furnadzhiev (1903–1968): one of the so-called ‘September poets’, an avant-garde leftist group which emerged at the beginning of the 1920s.

⁴ Andrey Nikolov (1878–1959): one of the most important early modernist Bulgarian sculptors.

⁵ Iliya Beshkov (1901–1958): influential painter and cartoonist, and a member of the Родно Изкуство (National art) movement.

Stoin may have some Gypsy blood in them: this fact does not stop them from being genuine creators of the new, the newest Bulgarian culture. Dr. Ninčić⁶ undoubtedly has Semite blood; so what? Is he not an excellent Serb and a prominent Yugoslav public figure?

Still, there is no nation in the world without a shared historical fate or a common lot. There is no nation (except the Jewish, where things are more complicated and disputable) without a common language and a common culture. And finally there is no nation where the shared historical circumstances, the shared fate and the common culture have not more or less defined some similarities in the character of its people. This proves that it is not *language alone* that creates the nation and unites the people in one and the same nationality. All we who consider ourselves Bulgarian are connected by more than just the language of our fathers and forefathers. There is more to it. Each one of us has felt the influence of a certain culture.

The single Yugoslav culture (having many ingredients but a single final product) that Vladimir Vujčić⁷ talks about, is yet another misunderstanding. If Serbs and Bulgarians are two nationalities and if there is no nationality outside autonomous culture, *any shared Yugoslavian culture is completely out of the question*. As a goal, be it realistic or utopian, it might make some sense, but as a “historical reality” it is a self-delusion built upon the indubitable kinship of some ingredients of the spiritual fabric we call Bulgarian or Serb national culture. Identical cultural “*elements*” and “*cultural values*” can be seen in all sorts of cultures, but the idiosyncrasy of any national culture is contained *not in the separate elements* but precisely in the peculiar unity of these values or elements.

This, however, is merely *one side of the story*. For if “integral Yugoslavia” in the sense of a unified Yugoslavian state with a *unified Yugoslav people* is the doomed offspring of utopian hopes, the idea of an *undivided Yugoslavia* stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea is quite plausible.

I have no doubts that such a *genuine* Yugoslavia is not only possible, desirable and economically sensible, but that it is the *historical position we are currently approaching*.

There are some factors that must be understood and taken into account. I set aside the fact that the Serbs fought for Macedonia three times in a single decade, suffering great human losses. There is something even more important than the transient social attitudes this has bred. It is the fact that for to-

⁶ Momčilo Ninčić (1876–1949): Serbian economist and politician.

⁷ Serbian historian.

day's Yugoslavia the valley of the Vardar river has already become a *primary economic necessity capable of motivating a state no less than the national interest of its population*. Keeping in mind its geographical location vis-à-vis the export markets, the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia (even had Fiume been Yugoslav) would always be only locally relevant and could never replace the Vardar route, whose end point is the crux of importunate Belgrade appetites. In other words, we are in the midst of a *deep contradiction*. Macedonia, which has no substantial significance for the economic life of Bulgaria, is *nationally* ours but *economically* already Serbo-Croatian! *Excising* the Vardar valley from today's Yugoslavia means no less than choosing to *destroy* the Yugoslav state. It is time to realize that the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute cannot be solved by the destruction of either Yugoslavia or Bulgaria. The only *broad historical solution* is the *synthesis* of states: when Bulgaria and Yugoslavia come together under the same confederate roof, only then will Macedonia be nationally ours and economically Serbo-Croatian. Not the petty shortsighted thoughts of mutual destruction but a broad configuration of a greater Yugoslavia—this is the historical position we are striving towards. Serbs and Bulgarians, fighting for the *particular interests* of their countries and nationalities, are *unwittingly* moving away from what sets them *apart* to what will bring them *together*. Quite befitting Mephistopheles's line: "Du glaubst zu schieben und du wirst geschoben" ("You think you are driving, yet in fact you are being driven.").

What we mean is an *all-encompassing* Yugoslavia. She alone can bring a lasting and final solution to political, national and economic disagreements and problems of the South Slavic peoples. It is the only thing capable of *balancing* Serbian vanity and the real significance of Bulgarians. The day after it becomes reality, the Balkans will bear the *hallmark of the South Slavs*. The population of today's Yugoslavia and Bulgaria share this idea. They are mostly driven by the mutual respect built on both sides of the border throughout these severe wars. They are driven by various economic, political and cultural incentives. We have seen that even now, the Yugoslav country and its government, despite the animosity towards Bulgaria, feels a serious and irresistible need for good will and deep understanding, with the latter to ensure its peace and proper development. Even the post-war economic evolution of both countries started *reigning in* political impulses, trying to *burst the dikes of national frontiers*. All those projects for pan-European customs unions, Danube federations, etc. are nothing but the echo of that brutality of economic needs, something which is always stronger than the national vain-glory of smaller and bigger states clinging to their old political shells. It

seems to me that even if the Soviet economic and political system stays encapsulated on the territory of the Old Russian State, in less than 50 years the small countries of Europe will inevitably fall within the limits of greater economic and political entities. In this vein we, the South Slavs, are pushed closest to that new stage by the post-war reality. As Hegel has taught us, the only *free* man is the one who sees through historical *necessity* and walks its course. Or, to put it in historical terms: *freedom* means *conscious necessity*. This great thought should be the motto of Bulgarian–Yugoslav relationships.

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI: ADDRESS DELIVERED IN VILNIUS

Title: *Przemówienie w Wilnie 20 kwietnia 1922 roku* (Address delivered in Vilnius, 20 April, 1922)

Originally published: *Pisma-mowy-rozkazy*, vol. V, Warsaw, Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1933, pp. 255–260.

Language: Polish

The excerpt used is from the original

About the author

Józef Piłsudski [1867, Żułów (in the district of Święciany, *Lit.* Zalave/Svenčionys, present-day Lithuania) – 1935, Warsaw]: politician. Piłsudski was born to a family belonging to the Polish-speaking gentry in the Lithuanian part of the Russian Empire. After his brother's imprisonment for participating in an anti-tsarist conspiracy, Piłsudski, who was also suspected of having participated in the attempt at killing the tsar Alexander III, spent the years between 1887 and 1892 in Siberia. Immediately after his return, he joined the *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* (Polish Socialist Party, hereafter *PPS*) and soon became one of its most prominent ideologues. Between 1894 and 1900, he published *Robotnik* (Worker), an illegal gazette which, for many years, was considered to be an example of successful underground activity. Between 1905 and 1908, as the leader of an armed *PPS* squad, he organized and participated in violent political demonstrations against Russian administration. During the First World War, Piłsudski joined the Austro-Hungarian Army, becoming the leader of the Polish military units, the *Legiony*. In 1917, he was arrested by the Germans, to whom he refused to subordinate. He was released from prison in November 1918, and became the head of state and commander of the embryonic Polish armed forces. Piłsudski encouraged military cooperation between Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine, and worked for their political unification. His federalist program was opposed by the 'National Democrats' led by **Roman Dmowski**, who advocated the partial annexation of the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Poland and the assimilation of their inhabitants. The program was also rejected by the political elites of the Eastern European nations. In the Polish-Soviet war (1919–1921) Piłsudski led the army to a victory in the Battle of Warsaw, which made him a national hero. However, he had also earned the distrust of the political elite, who saw in him a dangerous potential dictator. After declaring his withdrawal

from politics, Piłsudski retired to his house in Sulejówek (near Warsaw). In 1926, he came back as the organizer of a *coup d'état* which led to a process of political 'restoration' (the so called *sanacja*). In 1930, Piłsudski dissolved the Parliament and imprisoned the agrarian, socialist and nationalist political leaders. His foreign policy focused on the dual threat of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. His funeral in 1935 was among the most lavishly celebrated official ceremonies of inter-war Poland. It also enhanced the officially administered cult of Marshall Piłsudski, who remained to be one of the most celebrated and controversial figures in twentieth-century Polish history.

Main works: *Rok 1920. Z powodu pracy M. Tuchaczewskiego "Pochód za Wisłę"* [Answer to M. Tukhachevski's "The Vistula offensive"] (1924, English ed. 1972); *The Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier* (1930); *Pisma-mowy-rozказы* 9 vols. [Writings-speeches-orders] (1930–1936); *Pisma Zbiorowe*, 10 vols. [Collected writings] (1937–1938).

Context

The simultaneous collapse of three East-Central European powers (Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany) released the suppressed national movements in the area. Obviously these nationalities shared the same experiences and in many ways similar problems of underdevelopment and unstable international status. What divided them sharply were their territorial ambitions, inevitably leading to conflicts. The Republic of Poland reestablished in 1918 was in fact involved in armed conflicts with almost all her neighbors. Particularly complicated was the interethnic structure in the East, where the bigger cities such as Wilno (*Lit.* Vilnius) and Lwów (*Ukr.* Lviv) inhabited by Poles and Jews were surrounded by territories with predominantly non-Polish populations.

It is striking that one of the most common themes in the vision of renewed Polish statehood was the idea of national and ethnic multiplicity, which, in its most elaborate form, took the shape of political federation. This entity was usually envisaged as reuniting all nationalities of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, comprising predominantly Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Furthermore, according to many authors, this political conglomeration was to bind together some other nationalities that were perceived as close relatives and 'younger brethren' of Poland. Interestingly enough, such a (predominantly) Slavic federation was promoted at the same time by those Polish authors who rejected the very project of revitalizing Polish statehood. We can easily find federalist motifs used by conservatives, pro-Russian Slavophiles, socialists with national and internationalist predilections, and liberals.

The Polish federalist idea shared by Józef Piłsudski was informed by several intellectual sources. One of the pioneers of Polish federalism was Adam Czartoryski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the court of tsar Alexander I. Czartoryski aimed at reconstructing Europe as a peaceful union of free states. Subsequently, the Polish federalist idea incorporated the Hegelian philosophy of history, which is particularly visible in the texts of August Cieszkowski and **Stefan Buszczyński**, and in conservative Habsburg federalism (represented by **Michał Bobrzyński**, Paweł Popiel, Władysław Studnicki).

Józef Piłsudski, being a socialist, the political and military leader of a new state, tried to turn federalist ideas into political reality. He counted on the support of the Prime Minister and famous musician Ignacy Jan Paderewski, whom Piłsudski used to call in his letters, a “furious federalist.” Paderewski presented his political program in 1917, proposing to President Woodrow Wilson that “the form of a re-established Poland ought to be the United States of Poland” comprising Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine. During the First World War, the idea was shared by Polish, Lithuanian and Jewish organizations from Vilnius and from other parts of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who saw their future in a Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which they considered, a credible bulwark against Russia. Piłsudski’s federalism also aroused strong opposition. **Roman Dmowski** and his National-Democratic party advocated the annexation of parts of the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth as the basis of a future Polish national state. An additional threat derived from the encroachment of Soviet Russia through its alternative federalist structure, as well as from Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalism.

Józef Piłsudski tried to enhance the federalist idea through facts. Immediately after the Poles took over Vilnius from the Bolsheviks, he published ‘The address to the citizens of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania’ (Vilnius, 22 April 1919), where he promised to give the inhabitants “an opportunity to settle the internal, ethnic and religious matters in a manner of [their own] choice, free of any oppression or violence on the part of Poland,” and to organize a government run by local politicians. The most striking feature of this short text is that it addresses the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy as a whole, without taking into account ethnic, national or cultural divisions. This political experiment had little chance of success as the Red Army not only soon re-conquered Vilnius, but also reached the suburbs of Warsaw. The political atmosphere in East-Central Europe had changed following the final victory of the Polish defenders of the capital city. Ukraine and Belarus were divided according to the Polish–Soviet treaty, and Lithuania was de-

clared an independent state. The federalists were by no means among the dominating political forces in Poland and Lithuania. As a matter of fact, Piłsudski's idealist federalism no longer corresponded to the political reality.

In 1920, Józef Piłsudski organized the so called 'riot of General Lucjan Żeligowski,' whose military units consisted of Poles from Lithuania and Belarus. Żeligowski conquered Vilnius and its environs and formed the semi-independent state of Central Lithuania. The Lithuanian forces immediately counterattacked, but without success. The case of Central Lithuania was examined by the League of Nations. Vilnius and its area belonged essentially to Poland until 1939, and later was conquered by the Red Army and transferred to the Lithuanian state, which itself soon became part of the Soviet Union.

Both Żeligowski and Piłsudski were born in Lithuania. They represented the archaic state patriotism of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, being at the same time army commanders and politicians of the 'modern' Polish state. The original idea of Piłsudski was to reformulate the long tradition of the Commonwealth and Polish federalist ideology into a new form of a federated anti-Soviet block, consisting not only of the former lands of the Grand Duchy but also of the Polish Crown as well as Latvia. Piłsudski did not leave any detailed political account of his federalist ideas. However, among his writings one can easily find traces of this political program. His speech, given in Vilnius in 1922, when Central Lithuania was incorporated into the Polish state, is the final expression of the multinational and multicultural tradition of *Rzeczpospolita* against both the Polish ethno-nationalism of Roman Dmowski and Lithuanian nationalism.

This however did not amount to the end of the Polish federalist idea, which was regenerated in the inter-war period as well as under occupation and in exile. Thus Piłsudski's federalism is a representative example of modern Polish political discourse. It shares all its weaknesses, foremost of which was the subordination of federalism itself to the prevalent objective of the nineteenth century national movement, namely the reestablishment of Polish statehood. The idea to reestablish a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth always appears to have been tricky, with the border between internationalism and imperialism being very thin. The 'democratic' traditions of the early-modern Polish political system had apparently lost their meaning long before the moment when they could be fulfilled.

Address delivered in Vilnius, 20 April, 1922

Gentlemen,

I address you as the Head of State and Supreme Commander of Poland and as a Vilnian. I must confess I find these functions inseparable: and as I speak to you here, I can safely say that I would not be the Head of State and Supreme Commander of Poland were I not born in Wilno.¹ Whether as a good Vilnian I managed to fulfill my duty as the Head of State and Supreme Commander well, I leave for history to judge.

I will concentrate mainly on the past. I believe that if one does not respect and value one's past, one is not worthy of respect in the present and has no place in the future.

Gentlemen! Scattered all over the world are the remnants of mankind's progress, the vestiges of immense work and effort of individuals and communities that merit our admiration and respect regardless of our opinion of them. These vestiges are small and insignificant marks on the map, which have become the focal points of history, and where the sacrifice of the numberless dead and rivers of blood spilt bespeaks the great historical revolutions that often decide the fate of great empires and nations. All capitals past and present are such vestiges. Huge effort of will and immense amounts of work, often without respect for the laws of God and Man, would be concentrated in one place to build those monuments of human spirit and determination that we call capital cities. Whether we take the example of St. Petersburg, the capital the tsars built with tremendous human effort and creativity in the midst of a muddy and desolate northern landscape by the powerful will of the remarkable emperor Peter the Great, or the city of Rome, which is like no other, the symbol of eternity, or any other capital, all of them epitomize those grand historical enterprises whose purpose remains a great existential mystery beyond our comprehension. The one capital that stands out in my mind is my beloved Wilno, elevated to the status of capital not by Polish hands, I hasten to add, but as a result of the tremendous effort of Lithuanian people at the time when they were in open conflict with the entire world, Poland included. It was the unswerving determination of the great heroes of pagan Lithuania, whose country stretched from sea to sea, from the walls of the famed Moscow all the way to the banks of the grey Vistula River, and it was

¹ The Polish form Wilno seems to be more appropriate than Vilnius, taking into consideration the timbre of Piłsudski's speech. However in this text it is used only in the nominative. Other forms, such as Vilnian, refer to the Lithuanian name of the city.

the will of great knights, which were displayed in historical disputes between Witold² and Jagiełło³, that erected these walls and laid the foundations of our city as their capital. Then came the time of the great historical achievements of the Jagiellons, when the two countries formed a union and it was this city—the capital whose status was equal to that of Cracow—that became the emblem of power, strength, culture and civilization in its successful conquest of the then barbarous East.

For three years now I have been the Head of State and Supreme Commander of a country with a population of up to thirty million. My position has allowed me to watch the endeavors of thousands and millions of people; I realize therefore what a challenge they have presented historically. When I see that in the age of steam engine and electricity, the efforts of modern-day Poles fall short of building a simple tenement house in Warsaw or Wilno that would crumble into ruin within twenty years time, I cannot help but pay tribute to the dexterity that, before the technological advancements of today, allowed people to construct soaring towers lasting for centuries and to build walls the sight of which prompts me to say with pride rather than melancholy: “The land was here before us, and it will outlast us.”

I also remember from historical accounts that when the Jagiellons, during their reign as kings of Poland, were involved in long-lasting disputes, they were reluctant to leave their beloved Wilno for Krakow. The last king from the Jagiellon dynasty, who, when involved in his famous love adventures on the banks of Wilja River⁴, had the courage to stand up to the entire Polish nation when it tried to deny him his right to love, made the eternal union between the two nations his crowning achievement. I am happy to welcome the representative of Lublin⁵, whose presence at this occasion is a reminder of that great historical act.

Later, there came a period of turbulence for Poland and both nations. The end of a long and fierce struggle saw the efforts of so many generations come to nothing. Our capitals, the historical symbols and the monuments of our fate and power, lost their significance. But even then it was here that the

² Witold (*Lit.* Vytautas) (1350–1430): Grand Duke of Lithuania, one of the emblematic figures of Lithuanian history. He extended the borders of Lithuania in the east and supported the Polish king Władysław Jagiełło in the war against the Teutonic knights.

³ Władysław Jagiełło (*Lit.* Jogaila): Grand Duke of Lithuania and, after being baptized in 1386, king of Poland.

⁴ Wilja – (*Lit.* Vilnele, present-day Lithuania).

⁵ Lublin (nowadays in Poland): a city, where, in 1569, a Polish–Lithuanian union was decided upon by the representatives of the gentry and the king Zygmunt August.

flame of patriotism, whose warmth kept the whole of Poland alive, was re-kindled. If you look at the poetry of our bard Mickiewicz, whose name is familiar to every Polish child, three quarters of it is concerned with the history of Lithuania, its battles, its suffering and its defeats. And for every child in the far reaches of western Poland that poet's genius is deeply associated with names that have a foreign ring to them, names like Grażyna, Aldona, Wallenrod and so on.

Allow me, gentlemen, to recall one more memory from those troubled times, one that has the greatest personal significance for me. When I was born, not far from Wilno, and my mother, who was mourning, shed tears over my cradle, the creak of ropes could still be heard from gallows erected not only here, on Łukiszki Square, but also in the distant Kowno.⁶ I cannot but mention that the fighting in that region was even fiercer, bloodier and more determined. Even when the fighting stopped, not only here, but also in the Kingdom, in Warsaw, the uprising in Żmudź⁷ continued at the cost of the lives of hundreds of people who did not even speak Polish.

As I am addressing you here, paying tribute to our great past, I cannot wave aside those tremendous efforts of both nations that made the beloved Wilno the capital and the symbol of that heroic past. I cannot but pay homage to the blood spilt in the common cause.

Gentlemen! Wilno is today on the brink of a new era, an era radically different from the one known in its history. I do not know and do not wish to know what our children will think and feel in the future. I want to believe that they will be better, smarter and happier than we are, simply because they will grow up in less cruel circumstances. However, out of respect for the past events and the blood spilt in the common cause, on this day of great Polish triumph which all those gathered here are so deeply aware of, I cannot help but reach out, despite our differences, to the people in Kowno, who probably regard our triumph as their defeat and a reason for mourning. I cannot help but reach out with a message of love and reconciliation. I cannot think of them as anything but brothers.

I should like to end my speech as a Vilnian would. At my age one looks calmly in the direction from which, as they say, there is no return. I realize that after so many profound moments in my turbulent life, so many ovations and jeers, I am not likely to live through many more experiences of similar emotional intensity. There are, however, emotions so pure and innocent that

⁶ Kowno – *Lit.* Kaunas.

⁷ Żmudź – Samogytia.

they are childlike in nature—and those will certainly yet be my lot. Today is one of such emotional days. I feel like a child on the anniversary of his mother's birth. A child's undiminished admiration takes no notice of his mother's imperfections. Whether others find her attractive or not, she is always beautiful and admired, and on her anniversary, her child's heart is filled with joy. Like that child overcome by emotion I say, "Long live Wilno!"

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

MICHAŁ RÖMER: ANSWER TO JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI

Title: *Odpowiedź Józefowi Piłsudskiemu* (Answer to Józef Piłsudski)

Publishing House: Unpublished until 1989 (first edition: *Znak* 409/1989, pp. 72–75.)

Language: Polish

The excerpt used is from the original.

About the author

Michał Römer (*Lit. Mykolas Römeris*) [1880, Bohdaniszki, *Lit.* Bagdoniškys (present-day Lithuania) – 1945, Vilnius]: journalist and politician. After studying in St. Petersburg, in Cracow and at the *Ecole des Sciences Politiques* in Paris, Römer worked as a lawyer in Vilnius, where he also published the moderate Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wileńska* (Wilnian gazette) (1906). During his studies in France, Römer met Juozas Petrusis, promoter of the idea of Lithuanian national revival based on the co-operation of the inhabitants of the land regardless of their ethnic identity. In fact, Petrusis influenced many of the Polish-speaking members of the Lithuanian gentry. During the First World War, Römer escaped from Vilnius to join the *Legiony* of **Piłsudski**. He supported the latter's federalist ideas, but rejected the proposal to organize a Polonophile Lithuanian government which would compete with the Lithuanian nationalist government in Kaunas. According to Römer, independence was a precondition for a federation between Lithuania and Poland (which was the equivalent of the political agenda of the Polish Socialist Party). In 1920, when the Polish forces entered Vilnius, Römer was forced to choose between the two loyalties. Finally, he moved to Kaunas to become one of the most influential academics in Lithuania (he was the rector of Kaunas University). As a professor of law he represented Lithuania at the International Court in The Hague. His main achievement was the enlargement of Lithuanian sovereignty over Klaipėda (*Pol.* Kłajpeda, *Ger.* Memel) against Germany. After the Soviet government ceded Vilnius to Lithuania, Römer became professor at the new Lithuanian university which replaced the Polish Stefan Batory University. Nowadays one of the universities in Vilnius bears the name of Mykolas Römeris, an acknowledged authority on Lithuanian historiography and jurisprudence.

Main works: *Stosunki etnograficzno-kulturalne na Litwie* [The ethnographic and cultural features of Lithuania] (1906); *Litwa. Studium o odrodzeniu narodu litewskiego* [Lithuania. Study on the revival of the Lithuanian nation] (1908); *Administracinis teismas* [Administrative court] (1928); *Dabartinės konstitucijos* [Contemporary constitutions] (1932); *Valstybė* [The state] (1934–1935); *Sovietų naujoji 1936 metų konstitucija* [The new Soviet constitution of 1936] (1938).

Context

Michał Römer represents the group of Polish and Lithuanian citizens that were in fact unable to precisely define their national identity. Many of them were attached to the tradition of the multinational Commonwealth of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For those people, the collapse of the Russian Empire meant not only the freedom of their motherland, but also the painful end of ‘traditional federalism’ rooted in the history of the Commonwealth. Michał Römer formulated in his diaries the idea of a multinational federation in Central Europe, which would include Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Belarus and Latvia. The point of disagreement with Piłsudski (see **Józef Piłsudski**, *Address delivered in Vilnius*) was the principle of independence of all states participating in that federation. Römer strongly disagreed with the primacy of Poland. Neither of the two federalists, Römer or Piłsudski, could imagine that their beloved city of Vilnius would remain outside their state.

Römer’s protest against the Polish occupation of Vilnius was a marginal offshoot of the diplomatic attempts to restore Lithuanian sovereignty over Vilnius. His impact on subsequent Lithuanian political thought was relatively small. The group that Römer attempted to attract to the idea of Lithuanian statehood, that is the Lithuanian Poles, chose the Polish solution. Thus Römer’s answer remains as ‘archaic’ in its pre-nationalist formulations as Piłsudski with his idea of the East-Central European Commonwealth.

Being the ‘man in-between,’ Römer has generally been met with certain reservation in both Polish and Lithuanian national historiographies. In the late 1980s, the Polish–Lithuanian historian Bronisław Makowski (Bronius Makauskas) started to work on Römer’s diaries. He also published the letter sent by Michał Römer to Józef Piłsudski, written in reaction to the speech made by Piłsudski in 1922, after the incorporation of Central Lithuania into the Polish state. Since then, several (predominantly Polish) authors have analyzed Römer’s political ideas. In Lithuania, however, he attracts mostly the attention of researchers specialized in the history of jurisprudence.

Answer to Józef Piłsudski

To
Citizen Józef Piłsudski
The Supreme Commander and Head of the Polish State
in Belvedere, Warsaw

Sir, I have read your speech delivered in Vilnius. I read it in Kaunas. Accept, Sir, the bitter comments from a native son and Lithuanian citizen. You have listened to the opinions of Poles, some of whom admire you and some of whom hate and condemn you. However, a man who lives by the Vistula River and acts as the Supreme Commander and Head of the Polish State, yet calls himself a 'Vilnian' and delivers a speech in Vilnius, has no right to evade the judgment of the Lithuanians. Sir, you realize the importance of Vilnius and everything that is associated with this minute mark on the map which is called a capital and which encapsulates the history of the nation and the country. You have expressed this in your speech. Therefore, having called yourself a Vilnian, you cannot limit the historical and patriotic judgment of your actions to the Polish perspective, but you have to accept the judgment of Lithuania. For Poland, whose aim is to make it part of its territory, Vilnius is not a capital, it is not—and cannot conceivably be—what you make of it in the first part of your speech. The Polish state does not view the acquisition of Vilnius as an act of appropriation of foreign territory, but as an act of national unification. Hence, Vilnius is no different to Poland from Lublin, Poznań or even Łomża. This is the Polish *raison d'état* and the way Poland justifies her right to Vilnius, which is contested by Lithuania on the European stage.

Lithuania, however, perceives her right to Vilnius in the way you have outlined in your speech, and that is her basis for claiming it as her capital, that is her recourse to the law and the reason for her protest against incorporating Vilnius into Poland. In your speech you have pronounced yourself as belonging both to Polish and Lithuanian history, therefore your deeds belong to Lithuania as well as Poland, which makes you responsible for Lithuanian history. A Pole could never say the things you have said about Lithuania, for if he did, he would have negated the basis for Poland's claims.

The opening part of your speech—in which you pay heartfelt tribute to ancient Lithuania, for which Vilnius is a crowning achievement and the symbol of Lithuanian perseverance, the great capital of a nation—is both powerful and beautiful. Its main point boils down to the saying that you quote yourself: the land was here before us and it will outlast us.

In view of what you have said in your speech about Lithuania and its capital, the above mentioned saying can only be interpreted in one way: that Vilnius had been part of Lithuania before we (that is the Poles) arrived, and it will be part of that country regardless of what we try to do (that is when we leave). In other words, Vilnius—Lithuania's accomplishment and its capital city—can never be anything else than what this nation intended it to be. Any other arrangement is bound to pass into oblivion, any attempt at fabricating an alternative to Vilnius's true character, whether through an act of annexation, parliamentary resolution or something else, will fail and crumble like that defective tenement house built for profit by contemporary Poles in Warsaw or indeed, Vilnius. The land will outlast us: Vilnius will regain its position, become part of Lithuania again as her rightful capital and her creation. It is with unprecedented power that you affirm the Lithuanian character of Vilnius in your speech. No Lithuanian could express it more clearly and profoundly. Vilnius is not only the capital of Lithuania—it is her tragedy, while for Poland it is a mere tidbit to satisfy her greed.

What is ironic for the history of Vilnius and your own, Sir, is the fact that you said all the above on the occasion of Poland's seizure of Vilnius, when the profound truth about Vilnius and Lithuania was contradicted and the raising of the Polish flag in Vilnius celebrated. What is more—it was said by the Supreme Commander of Poland! For that reason, the ending of your speech, in which you applaud the act of annexation and call it Vilnius's anniversary, has no logical or emotional connection with its opening part. For how can you call Vilnius's funeral or at least the attempt at burying its true nature, its anniversary?

Sir, in the first part of your speech you are a Vilnian. What you have said no Pole could be capable of saying. The ending of your speech, however, is an act of betrayal of Lithuania by which you belie the very ideas you have initially expressed and understood. It is an act of condemnation of your own actions—hear my words, Sir—for by delivering the first part of your speech you have already declared yourself a Lithuanian. The latter part of your address could well be spoken by a Pole, and it would contain nothing that a Lithuanian, even today, would find appalling. It could not, however, be spoken by a Lithuanian from the opening part of your speech.

One cannot serve two gods at once, especially when they are at war with each other. I am not surprised that the Poles condemn you for the first part of your speech, which you delivered as a Lithuanian—it threatens the very basis of their claims. As the Supreme Commander of Poland you have to be completely Polish and cannot remain a Lithuanian in Poland's conflict with that country. If, however, you wish to be a Lithuanian in that conflict, then you

cannot be the Supreme Commander of Poland. Towards the end of your speech, in concord with the expected standpoint of the Supreme Commander of Poland, you become a Pole. At the same time, clearly contradicting what you have just said, you reach out to the Lithuanians and call them “brothers.” While you seemed like a brother to them in the first part of your address, you destroyed that kinship yourself in the latter part of your speech. How can you expect your gesture to be accepted! After all, the occasion you were celebrating was nothing else but an act of taking Vilnius away from Lithuania. Are such circumstances appropriate for demonstrating “brotherhood”?

I realize the unbearable position of Lithuanian Poles, who are neither entirely Lithuanian nor Polish. I am one of them. In the times when the interests of both nations are common such duality can be fruitful, in the times of conflict, however, it becomes a burden. In the times of conflict a man is faced with a choice: he can either stand aside, or, if he wants to remain active, he has to choose a side. Under no circumstances can this man comprehend, say and believe one thing and then legitimize—let alone maintain in one speech—another which is in clear contradiction to what he said earlier. For this reason, Sir, you, who have proven your greatness in recreating independent Poland and paving the way for its creative reconstruction, you are forever weak and conquered in the case of Lithuania. The bankruptcy of your eastern policy has always been inevitable and your lofty ideas of federation do not resemble the magnificent passage of an eagle but rather the crude stomping of a dwarf. Your actions in that matter, by the force of events and possibly contrary to your intentions, do not serve to advance your cause, but are a mere tool in the hands of Poles, of typical Polish ethnographic nationalists, whose servant you have become and whose machinations and speculations you have to legitimize and actively support. Lithuania will judge you not by the opening part of your speech, but by the nature of your actions, which ruthlessly wrench at her flesh. Instead of a memorable achievement, you are building in Lithuania a shabby tenement house bound to crumble into ruins. Perhaps it is against your wishes, Sir, but that is in effect what you are doing. In all of your speeches and actions concerning Lithuania there is something strikingly typical: you begin with one thing and finish with another, you stand up as a Lithuanian and sit down as a Pole, you wish to fly like an eagle but trudge like a dwarf instead. You will not succeed and you will not be remembered as one of Lithuania’s heroes as long as you are not ... Wallenrod!¹

¹ The hero of Adam Mickiewicz’s poetic novel, *Konrad Wallenrod* (first edition in Petersburg, 1828), was a master of Teutonic knights who hides his Lithuanian

As long as you are not like him, your work in Vilnius is neither great nor is it your own. It is the work of a reign of violence; it is part of Polish nationalism in its crudest form. [...] Therefore you are not worthy of such words as those spoken in the first part of your speech in Vilnius, in which you talk about the great tragedy of that city as a Lithuanian would.

Sir, I fought under your command for the independence of Poland. I believed that her independence would also pave the way for the independence of my motherland—Lithuania—that it would be the guarantee of Lithuania's independence. I still have not lost faith in spite of all that has happened so far. [...] I worshipped you, Sir, in the struggle for Poland's independence, of which you were a true hero. You are not a hero, however, in the history of Lithuania. Bear these harsh words from one of your soldiers. I only say this because you have called yourself a Lithuanian and have spoken like one—therefore you will be judged by Lithuania.

I realize that the status of Vilnius as an integral part of Lithuania, which will inevitably be restored cannot be restored by 'uprooting' us, the Lithuanian Poles, who are that part of Lithuanian society that in the course of history has not only accepted, but mulled over the culture of this country and has given birth to a new strain. A strain that produced people like Kościuszko, Mickiewicz, as well as you, Sir, a strain so unlike in character and desires to the ethnographic Polish strain, cannot perish and has the right to exist and bear fruit in the motherland. Lithuania in its revival will constitute a synthesis of the whole nation, in which that strain will find its place. Vilnius will be a central and essential part of that synthesis. But the method you have chosen does not lead to a synthesis, but to a division and a reign of Polish ethnic nationalism in its crudest form, which seeks to bury Lithuania.

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

origins. Sacrificing himself for his natural motherland, he betrays the Germans causing their defeat. The tragic choice between two loyalties leads to a tragic end: Wallenrod commits suicide after having confessed his treason to the Teutonic knights. The book was widely known and discussed, often criticized for its immorality. The impact of this unusual work lasted for several decades serving as a *cliché* for dozens of revolutionaries. It was radically rejected after the suppression of the January uprising in 1863–1864. However, the thesis that Poles as a nation represent a particular tendency towards betrayal appeared often as a popular motif in political debates in Galicia (where it was raised by the Ukrainian socialist Ivan Franko) and other regional contexts.

MILAN HODŽA: FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Title: *Federation in Central Europe. Reflections and reminiscences.*

Originally published: London, Jarrolds Publishers, 1942

Language: English

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 3–8.

About the author

Milan Hodža [1878, Sučany (*Hun.* Szucsány) near Turčiansky Svätý Martin (*Hun.* Turócszentmárton) – 1944, Clearwater, Florida]: politician and journalist. He was born into the family of a Protestant pastor. After being banished from the gymnasium in Sopron (Hungary) he concluded his secondary education at the German gymnasium in Sibiu (*Hun.* Nagyszeben, *Ger.* Hermannstadt, in Transylvania). Between 1896 and 1898 he studied law in Budapest, and, between 1916 and 1918, philosophy in Vienna. Before the First World War, he was active as a journalist and became a member of the Hungarian Parliament, where he closely collaborated with Romanians, Croatians, Serbs and other non-Magyar representatives in an effort to carry through democratizing reforms, a national educational policy, and land reform in Hungary. He became a member of the so-called ‘Belvedere workshop’ formed around the archduke Franz Ferdinand, which was critical of Austro-Hungarian dualism and was forging plans for the transformation of the Empire into a modern federalized state. In inter-war Czechoslovakia, Hodža served in several subsequent governments as the Minister of Law Unification, Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Education respectively. He was an active member and a prominent representative of the powerful Agrarian Party. Besides, he was a co-founder and member of the International Agrarian Bureau. In 1935, he became the Republic’s first Slovak Prime Minister. Unable to reach a deal with the Sudeten-German politicians he resigned and left Czechoslovakia in 1938. He tried to establish a Slovak democratic exile representation that opposed the political conceptions of President **Edvard Beneš**. Unlike him, Hodža promoted the idea of federation in Central Europe throughout the war and warned against the danger of Sovietization. In 1941, he moved to the USA, where he was briefly active among the American Slovaks. Throughout his life, he remained an active publicist. In the postwar period, Beneš’s political camp and later even more effectively the communists tried to marginalize Hodža’s legacy. But it was rediscovered in the late 1980s by the Slovak anti-communist dissidence, and following the 1989 turnover, some of his most important works were re-published. The high esteem that the historical persona of Milan Hodža enjoys in today’s Slovak

society was symbolized by the transfer of his remains from Chicago to the National Cemetery in Martin in June 2002.

Main works: *Československý rozkol* [The Czechoslovak schism] (1920); *Slovenský rozchod s Maďarmi* [The Slovak divorce from the Hungarians] (1928); *Články, reči, štúdie* 7 vols. [Articles, speeches, studies] (1930–1934); *Federation in Central Europe* (1942).

Context

After the collapse of the Versailles system in the late 1930s and the incipient war, many European politicians and political analysts started to reflect upon the previous 20 years and devise alternative political strategies for the post-war settlement. Central Europe, with its weak political safeguards, minority regimes and fragility of borders was among the crucial topics of these discussions. Especially during the earlier years of the Second World War, the idea of a Central European federation, aimed to create a stronger political and economic unit in the region stretching between Germany and Soviet Russia, acquired some prominence. The common experience of German occupation drew closer together the Czechoslovak and Polish exile leaderships represented by President Edvard Beneš on one hand and Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski and his deputy Stanisław Mikołajczyk on the other. They agreed to form a closer political and economic association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe after the war. These efforts found their counterpart in similar initiatives between Greek and Yugoslav exile leaders forging plans for a future Balkan federation. The situation, however, started to change with the growing influence of Soviet politics in the region after 1942. Stalin understood, not without some justification, that any federative or confederative plans for post-war Central Europe would have anti-Soviet and anti-Russian agendas. Due to his pressure and as a result of further disagreements, the Czechoslovak exile government in London let their earlier agreement with the Poles stagnate and then collapse, a development further assured by the new Czechoslovak–Soviet treaty of alliance in December 1943.

Apart from the central political representatives of the occupied nations, many others came up with their own future federative solutions and Milan Hodža took a prominent place among them. In 1942, he published his *Federation in Central Europe* in which he crowned his life-long efforts as both a pragmatic politician and political thinker. His own personal history and rich experience in Central European politics enabled him to treat—in contrast to

many others of the time—the question from a markedly well-informed, if personally engaged, historical perspective. As he writes in the preface “the Central European deal is not a sequel to any war-time debate. It has, in fact, emerged from history.” Hence, he starts by describing the last attempts of the federative re-composition of the empire from 1905 under the intellectual leadership of **Aurel Popovici** and the auspices of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This so-called ‘Belvedere workshop,’ in which Hodža took part, represented for him a direct precursor of all sensible future attempts for a federative solution in the region. Nevertheless, the efforts and initiatives of understanding and cooperation between the various ‘nation states’ in Central Europe (understood in a geographically broad sense including the Balkans) in the period between the two wars were based on quite a different logic than the turn-of-the-century federalist concepts. For Hodža the international efforts to build an Agrarian front in Central Europe in the 1930s was the peak of this development. In Hodža’s mind the federation should have consisted of four Slavic and four non-Slavic countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece. Consequently, his treatment combines three complex issues that he thought could not be separated: Central European and European geopolitics, the national question in Central Europe, and the development of democracy which was closely connected with the issues of modernization and agrarian reform. Regarding geopolitics, Hodža’s basic argument was that only a settled federation in Central Europe could bring stability and peace to postwar Europe. This federation would form a strong economic and political unit opposing both a new potential German *Drang nach Osten* as well as the Soviet attempts to control the region. Hodža’s consequent federalist stance and opposition to the emerging ‘geopolitical bloc logic’ was among the main reasons for his disagreements with Edvard Beneš. As to the internal organization of the future federation, Hodža suggested a threefold solution on the basis of the historical factors and the complexity of the region: agrarian democracy accompanied by a democratic economy and steady modernization efforts, moderate nationalism endowing the right to cultural and linguistic autonomy for the individual nations, and, finally, international cooperation based on geopolitical, economic and democratic national interests.

Hodža’s book was quite positively acclaimed by a number of Central European exile politicians and his plan received attention from British and American intellectuals and officials from the Department of State. Nevertheless, for obvious reasons, such as the emergence of spheres of influence in post-war Europe and the beginning of the Cold War, Hodža’s book remained

only a draft plan without any direct political relevance. His book became a point of reference not only for some anti-communist exile politicians but also for the growing West European federalist movement, by which *Federation in Central Europe* is often mentioned as one of the direct precursors of the European Community as an economic and political project. After 1989, the book was translated into German and Slovak. In a post-communist Slovakia that searched for the roots of its own democratic tradition, Hodža was regarded with high esteem and was clearly perceived as the most prominent Slovak federalist of all times. During the 1990s his last book was regarded as a valuable source of inspiration for debates concerning political and economic cooperation in Central Europe.

PL–MK

Federation in Central Europe

Preface

War events in Central Europe obviously fully vindicate the idea of a solidly organized future co-operation of all those eight states, which are placed in complete geographic coherence between Russia, Germany and Italy. According to pre-war statistics, that means a space of about 582,000 square miles, i.e., not very much at variance with the total of the territory of the United Kingdom plus France plus Germany plus Italy, which is about 620,000 square miles.

For the overwhelming majority of Central European nations, and at the end indeed for all of them, it is precisely their present condition which provides the evidence that only understanding and co-operation could ever strengthen their security, and that lack of this co-operation has proved to be a critical point with them.

Some of their neighbours may be less enthusiastic about their federation schemes. Still, one day they will have to realize that the small and middle-sized nations of Central Europe mean about one hundred million people in the aggregate. It certainly would be a futile undertaking to attempt to extinguish the national life of one hundred million people, or to drive them away from their homes.

As for Soviet Russia, one day she may be interested in an independent and strong bloc established between herself and Germany. For Western Europe and its permanent and indelible forces, Central Europe means for them the indispensable continental pivot of European security. It has to become in fact

much more than the object of tactical interest in an extraordinary situation. It is rather in the light of a durable political interest that not merely the one or the other Central European country will contribute to the building of a new Europe, but that it is the united potential of all of them which is to be one of the indispensable supports of the peace to come.

The Central European Deal is not a sequel to any war-time debate. It has, in fact, emerged from history. It became acute, not for the first time, 136 years ago, after Napoleon's victory at Slavkov (Austerlitz), when the Emperor of Austria left what we may describe as the great German commonwealth. Habsburg then concentrated upon the old Austria and Hungary. It was thus that the modern Central European problem was being posed.

Its practical meaning and importance were going to be whether Central European non-Germans should be doomed to be dominated by Germans against their own interests, thus unnaturally multiplying the German economic, geographic and political potential, and overthrowing any reasonable balance of power in Europe.

It was this problem, which was approached in 1848 and 1849 when revolution had been sweeping across Europe from Paris right up to Vienna, Prague, Zagreb and Buda-Pest. Then, not only non-German and non-Magyar leaders, but some Austro-German leaders also, fought for a federation of all the peoples of the Empire. The Parliament of Kroměříž (Kremsier) in 1849 presented a programme, which deserved the renown of a Magna Charta of an empire rebuilt upon a basis of autonomous nations. Neither Francis Joseph, the Emperor, however, nor his ministers were men of creative energy. Francis Joseph's unwillingness to become a constitutional monarch was rivalled only by his incapacity to be a wise and strong leader of an empire of nine races. Besides, his foreign policy in the 1850s took a turn which unavoidably ended in throwing him into the Prussian grip, first by a lost war and then, from 1879 onwards, by an alliance which made him in reality a pure and simple instrument of the Hohenzollern.

The political significance of Francis Ferdinand, the heir-apparent until 1914, lay in his ambitious effort to have the Habsburg Empire rebuilt on a more reasonable basis. The Empire reform could not be essentially different from that sketched in the years 1848 and 1849, and newly formulated by the young generation of non-Magyar leaders (and a very few Magyar leaders besides) in the period from 1905 onwards. As for the Habsburg, this was the last possible attempt to accept the establishment of a political unit based upon autonomous nations on the territory of old Austria-Hungary. As for these nations, their way was clear. Either a commonwealth of self-governing na-

tions would have been achieved, or their right of self-determination would one day have to be put into effect.

When at present a trend towards modern federation in Central Europe has to be considered, it may be useful to know also what from 1905 to 1914 was its first and certainly rather primitive stage. Its goal was to make old Austria-Hungary relinquish in a peaceful way her stubborn Magyarizing centralism, to make her safe for a federative reform. Her federalized transformation might have been at that time a point of departure for establishing in peace and by evolution a Central European Commonwealth of Nations. This was the goal very many non-Magyar and non-German and also some German leaders of that period were aiming at.

It may also be of some interest to know what Francis Ferdinand—in whom a last effort of the old Habsburgian energy seemed to revive—really stood for.

It is the period of about ten years preceding the First World War that I am dealing with in the opening of this book. It is not history of course; rather, it is reminiscence and report. It is not “Memoires”; just recollections and observations which I strictly wished to confine to events and to suggestions connected with the subject in question.

Naturally I can relate only what I and my friends saw and did. But what we witnessed and collaborated in covers practically everything that was prepared especially as far as the old Hungary of this period was concerned.

There were very few men engaged in personal collaboration with the late Austro-Hungarian heir-apparent to prepare a peaceful Danube solution. As I was one of them, I feel it to be my duty to report upon it.

The efforts of this period were a failure. In June, 1914, Francis Ferdinand was shot dead. Liebknecht junior, the late German Socialist leader, was violent and malicious enough to voice the suspicion that in official Berlin his death was felt to be a God-sent—*ein Gottesgeschenk*. Anyway, in a few months amidst the battles of the First World War, in the winter of 1914–15, Germany made a particular kind of Central Europe her most important war aim. She obviously wished to establish her domination over a *Mittel Europa*, which she had made her sphere of interest in 1879 by the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance set up by Bismarck and Andrassy.

The First World War, however, produced in a revolutionary way a Central European solution to a much higher pitch than that in which a slow and pacific evolution started with Francis Ferdinand could have resulted. On the soil of old Austria-Hungary, and practically of Central Europe, a number of sovereign states were built or rebuilt.

After lasting for twenty years, from 1918 to 1938, the Central European order as set up by Versailles is partly destroyed, partly altered in its foundations and partly living under the threat of being overthrown as well.

Does it mean another failure?

This appearance of double failure, the one in building up a first primitive stage in the period 1904 to 1914, and then that in preserving the Versailles solution does not seem actually to have the meaning of failure. We simply have to face a fact, which no statesman and no historian and no sociologist should deny. This fact is that a definite shape of Central Europe, comprising a federation of its free nations, has to share all the pains of a new Europe which could not succeed in being created in a pacific way by diplomatic channels, and which has to emerge out of blood and toil and suffering like all great achievements and political settlements.

A federalized Central Europe is one of the absolute necessities of a new post-war order. It is the only organism possible for making use of the national forces which in that region can preserve the principles of national and individual liberty and ordered freedom, and can join a reasonable system of production and consumption and market policy upon which the new Europe will be built. If there is a new Europe to follow, it is neither prepared nor able to renounce a hundred million freedom-loving people and a hundred million possible consumers.

For the breakdown of the Central European new order of 1918, Versailles is being made responsible. In this country very many political thinkers have been taking this view for years. Now a number of them admit that Versailles may have committed mistakes, but that the main political principle upon which it constructed a new order was the only one possible. It was the principle of the national liberty and independence of the small peoples. Meanwhile, very many national sovereignties already accepted modifications imposed upon them by a new and steadily developing European trend towards tightening collaboration. After a twenty-years' experience, the position may be clear to all. Versailles's mistake was certainly not in clothing small peoples with the right of self-determination. The mistake may lie in the fact that these small nations of Central Europe were not authoritatively advised to set up a co-operation which would provide them with the advantages of a great commonwealth able to normalize and stabilize its relations with its neighbours and all concerned and therefore able to be a strong factor of peace and security.

With reference to my reminiscences, this Commonwealth of Central Europe is the suggestion, which I am putting forward in this book.

I feel that I belong to those entitled to do so because it is the final goal, which I have aimed at during my whole political career. First, from 1905 onwards in old Austria-Hungary, I had to fight an ambitious foreign domination as a leader of an ethnic minority, as did my Serb, Croat and Transylvanian political friends. Then, as a Minister of a rebuilt state I had to fight very many of my own friends who were too jealous to sacrifice the illusion that small neighbours placed between colossal neighbours would be able to preserve their sovereignties without building up a co-operative solidarity between themselves.

In the second chapter of this book I relate a story of efforts aimed at this goal. These efforts succeeded in creating in 1936 and 1937 an economic co-operation of my country with the Danubian countries based upon a preferential system. It was the substantial first stage of a Danubian plan associated with my name. Certainly this system was not perfect; yet it was focused upon the aim to achieve one day an economic unit implying a customs union and common currency.

In the same chapter I also refer to a satisfactory start in tightening economic relations and political friendship between my country and Poland. From the viewpoint of a new Central European order, it is comforting to see her to-day represented by those men who from 1923 to 1926 were prepared to foster far-reaching settlements with Czecho-Slovakia and the Danube valley.

In order to conceal nothing which could impair the setting up of a future Central European evolution, I am devoting parts of the second chapter of this book to a review of a typical Central European minority problem. As a sequel to old migrations in Central European countries there always will be minorities, which, if not fairly handled, may become a chronic disease also in any kind of future of this part of the Continent. I speak of the Czecho-Slovak Minority Deal as one of those most mentioned in that region.

Federation, moreover, is conditioned by international understanding, which in its turn requires the democratic spirit as the indispensable atmosphere for international co-operation. So, in speaking of Central European understanding, we have to take a critical look at the assets and liabilities of Central European democracies and their dramatic vicissitudes. One chapter of this book is specially devoted to reports and observations upon this matter. Czecho-Slovak democracy is dealt with at some length—certainly not because of its particular merits, which may be questioned in very many respects as those of any other Central European democracy. Its great merit, however, lies in its having survived up to the time of the Munich breakdown. One

other merit is its having reached the capacity of achieving the systematic co-operation of its main elements, and its having succeeded in shaping a constructive democracy enrooted in social security and a particular kind of Central European New Deal.

When speaking of Central Europe's shouldering any policy, and in particular a policy of international understanding, it appears unavoidable to point out the social structure upon which it may embark.

No doubt the Central European social structure differs essentially from that of the western democracies. There are, of course, political elements familiar to this country. Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Austria possess also considerable bourgeoisie and industrial workers. In Hungary, the gentry continues to prevail. But also these nations, and particularly Yugo-Slavia and Roumania and Bulgaria, are not able to rely upon their comparatively weak bourgeoisie and industrial workers. The bulk of their populations is peasantry. On the average it amounts in the whole of the eight Central European states of 1918–1938 to 64 per cent. Is this peasantry able to complete a middle-class and to make it fit for economic and political efficiency and for social security? Or, above all, did it take part in fighting for individual and national liberties, which particularly in Central Europe are continuously to be defended against their foes, however strong they may be? It appeared unavoidable to devote to this crucial matter several pages of two chapters of this book.

My suggestion concerning a federation of independent countries of Central Europe is just a suggestion. Many detailed schemes certainly have to be discussed, as they already have been by some outstanding authors in this country. They wish to offer material to those responsible for the future of Central Europe. A federation of races is, of course, also a matter of legal rules, but it is substantially a matter of good will and expediency. My suggestion is not made on behalf of any persons or any party, but on my own account — it is for this reason that I declined friendly offers to introduce this book by usual "Forewords"; none the less, this does not mean that it is not shared by anyone else. Dealing in practice with Danubian co-operation, I have for many years past known thoroughly the opinion of my country and that of very many important and numerous quarters in nearly all Central European countries: so I also know that a spontaneous co-operation of all these countries is already strongly enrooted in the minds and feelings of very many, so that it may emerge one day as the principal feature of Central European political aims to come.

HRISTO BOTEV: THE PEOPLE

Title: *Народът (Вчера, днес и утре)* (The people [yesterday, today and tomorrow])

Originally published in the newspaper *Дума на българските емигранти*, I, No. 1–2, 10/25 June 1871

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from *Съчинения*. Vol. II, ed. by Stefana Tarinska (Sofia: Български писател, 1979), pp. 13–18.

About the author

Hristo Botev [1848, Kalofer (Balkan valley, present-day central Bulgaria) – 1876, in the Balkan mountain, near Vratsa]: poet, journalist and revolutionary leader. He was born into the family of the teacher Botyo Petkov, one of the figures of the ‘National Revival.’ His birthplace, Kalofer, was in the Balkan valley, which was itself the heartland of the political and cultural revival movement (see **Ivan Vazov**, *Under the yoke*). After completing primary school in his hometown, Botev continued his education in Odessa. In 1865 he left school, and upon his return to Kalofer in 1867, he succeeded his father as teacher in the local school. However, because of his revolutionary activities, he had to leave Bulgaria and settle in Romania (first in Bucharest, then in Brăila), where he took an active part in the affairs of the Bulgarian revolutionary émigré community. These émigré revolutionaries gathered around the ‘Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee’ (BRCC), led by the influential writer, poet and journalist Lyuben Karavelov (1834–1879), a close ally of Botev whose newspaper *Знаме* (The flag) became the main organ of the revolutionary party. After the uprising of May 1876, Botev organized a detachment of armed volunteers and crossed the Danube on 16 May. He was killed on 20 May in the evening after the battle while on sentry duty in the camp. His literary work was influenced by poets such as Byron, Pushkin and especially Lermontov. In his poems (he composed only 20), he integrated motifs from Bulgarian folklore, and thus, according to his apologists, created the quintessential expression of ‘Bulgarian cosmogony.’ Politically, he was on the left, his ideas bordering on communism and anarchism. His political journalism was extremely sharp and highly literary, equaling in style his canonized poems ‘Hadji Dimiter’ and ‘The hanging of Vasil Levski.’ In 1885, a committee was founded for the commemoration of the anniversary of the poet’s death. This committee was in fact the first Bulgarian non-governmental organization. With the attendance of Prince Ferdinand a monument to Botev was unveiled in 1890 in the main

square of Vratsa, where the first regular commemorations took place. Some of the most influential political leaders of the newly founded Bulgarian state, such as Zahariy Stoyanov and Stefan Stambolov, significantly contributed to his mythification, and within a decade, Botev became a central figure in the national pantheon of the independent Bulgarian state.

Main works: *Песни и стихотворения от Ботѣв и Стамболова. Книжка първа* [Songs and poems by Botev and Stambolov. Book I] (1875).

Context

Botev's ideas were strongly influenced by radical leftist ideologies, communism and anarchism and as a result, he expressed sympathy with the oppressed peoples all over Europe. He also called for universal revolution, thus enthusiastically celebrating the Paris Commune of 1871 in his 'Ridiculous Lament, Creed of the Bulgarian Commune.' His commitment to internationalist solidarity was related to the radical negation of the politics of the European Great Powers. To Botev, these powers were not only the imperialistic oppressors of their own people and of their colonial slaves, but also the main reason for the survival of the politically and economically corrupt Ottoman Empire. The reason for their support of the Ottoman Empire was, according to Botev, their common fear of Russian power and of the development of other powerful Slavic states. It is not difficult to discover in this statement, the author's Pan-Slavic overtones.

The main targets of Botev's polemic in the text are the ideas of the *evolutionists* and the *dualists* (see *Memorandum of the Secret Central Bulgarian Committee*). In all his writings in the revolutionary press—from Karavelov's newspapers *Независимост* (Independence) and *Свобода* (Freedom), through Botev's *Дума* (Word) to *Знаме*—Botev takes issue with those ideas that privilege the evolutionary development of the nation (in terms of education, civic and church institutions, economics and so on) within the Ottoman Empire, since these could presumably lead, in the long run, to liberation or to a dualist regime similar to the Austro-Hungarian model. Contrary to these views, Botev suggests a revolutionary solution and becomes one of its main ideologists. Revolution is not thought in national terms but also as a social movement. In his eyes, the enemy comprised Ottoman political power, the economic power of the Bulgarian *чорбаджии* ('chorbadzhii'—from the Ottoman Turkish 'çorbacı,' notables, who enjoyed high social standing and whose main function was to mediate in social, administrative and fiscal terms

between the Ottoman authorities and local Christian population) and the clergy, all supporting evolutionary models.

The present text is also peculiar for its visions concerning Bulgarian national character, implying a sketch of national characterology. Generally in his works, Botev's extremely idiosyncratic and expressive metaphorical style is very often directed against the Bulgarian people for their patience and subservient passivity. In 'The People,' however, Botev creates an image of the Bulgarian people not very different from that of his own ideological rivals, the 'Enlighteners.' This image includes some perennial attributes in reproducing the myth of the 'noble savage'—innocent, naturally moral and uncorrupted by civilization. The Enlightenment figure of the noble savage was in fact very popular in the period of Bulgarian revival. It was used as a compensatory tool for self-identification of the Bulgarians, neutralizing the stigmatization of being 'underdeveloped' or 'uncivilized.' In opposition to the civilized but supposedly 'corrupted' Greeks, who were the main rivals of the project for Bulgarian cultural revival, the Bulgarian people were close to nature and uncorrupted. The celebrated features of the Bulgarian people in Botev's text were a patriarchal, virtuous spirit, egalitarianism and collectivism. Botev is also one of the first proponents of the idea of the anti-institutional spirit of the Bulgarian people: this spirit remained intact and unassimilated during the Ottoman 'yoke' thanks to its inherent resistance to state institutions, presumably already developed during the period of Bulgarian medieval statehood. According to Botev, Bulgarians remained persistently separate from this 'Byzantinized' elite. It is worth mentioning that sixty years later, this idea was transformed into a systematic theory of the "philosophy of Bulgarian history" in the works of the historian **Petar Mutafchiev**. In devising this theory, Botev was influenced by the doctrines of Russian populism blended with communist and anarchist ideas.

Finally, we should stress one important feature of Botev's position: his extremely negative attitude towards the Turks. If Greek cultural and clerical expansionism was the main rival for the Bulgarian Enlightenment, the Turks, together with their 'servants,' the Bulgarian *chorbadzhii* and clergymen, were, for him, the embodiment of political and economic oppression. Botev identifies Ottoman political power with the Turkish people (the term *Turk* is used as a common name). Other leaders of the revolution, however, such as Vasil Levski, claimed that 'the enemy' was not the oppressed Turkish people but the Ottoman state and that, as a result, in the free Bulgarian Republic, all citizens would be equal, irrespective of their ethnicity and religion. Botev's romantic rhetoric did not escape the trap of orientalizing and barbarizing the

cultural other. Thus for him, "The Bulgarians and the Turks [were] two tribes with opposite characters, manners and habits, with opposite worldviews."

BM

The people

Hark ye, masters dualists and educators! Hark ye, you wretched Bulgarian people! Hark ye, brother immigrants! If you hear, then think what should be done. Turkey is no longer capable of giving us any rights and relief, because it no longer has the right to exist, and therefore dualism is a dream, utopia, madness; Europe and political circumstance only grant freedom to those who can rise to it. Herzegovina proves this. So what should we do? Keep quiet? Wait? Leave the Bulgarian people at the will and mercy of diplomacy? This is sheer madness, ignominious and inhuman. We need protests, rebellion, insurrection and revolution.

O tempora, o mores! Learn ye Medea's art and pour in this barbaric tribe's veins new, human blood, and only then will we doubt our faith that Turkey has no life, no future; but while the Turk bears this character, this fanaticism, this barbarian blood, no eloquent Turkophile, no profound dualist or renegade can convince us that the Turk will ever be able to walk the way to that political and moral purpose sought by the human spirit, free from all guardianship by clerical hierarchies and political Mandarins. Until that day there will be nothing more eloquent than the bleeding wounds on the nation's body and the chest of its emigration, sores, the mere sight of which brings to mind everything that must be revenged.

To repeat—Turkey has no life, no future, it lies moribund on its deathbed and no dervish incantations of its Mandarins, no diplomatic prayers of Western doctrinaires will save her from the anatomist's knife. Treated by an old method, with political phlebotomies and operations, with diplomatic chloroform, she lost her arms and legs, province after province, weakening until finally surrendering to that dreadful disease that pervaded its heart and had entered its lungs and bloodstream; no operation is possible anymore. The doctors realized this, too, and after the Cretan sherbet fed Turkey by the Paris consultation in 1868, they prescribed for a peaceful death one last medicine: dualism.

Does the folk pharmacology of the Balkan Peninsula have the ingredients for this prescription, can it revive Turkey and, most important of all, is she capable of drinking it, numb as her mouth and throat can be—this even Ali

Pasha¹ will never know, even if he lived longer than Methuselah² and studied the Bulgarian people, its social life, its resolute disposition and staunch persistence. Otherwise, he would be now reading between the lines of our church statutes, lines and words, which would tell him: “Ali, this people is what ails Turkey, and dualism is Turkey’s ticket to death!” But Ali Pasha is a Turk—a fanatic and fatalist, he lays all his hopes in the canine animal force of his tribe and taking the Bulgarian people to be those who kneel and whimper before him, he sings and chants: “Allah lives on, Turkey lives on! Many a slave she has ...” Thus think our nabobs and clerics, those amphibians who bring us the rust of Western prejudice and the garbage of an already rotten European civilization—without seeing the new signs of life either where they studied or here where they teach.

Not so the healthy part of our people and its emigration, not so every decent and honest Slav, every modern man whose head does not catch cobwebs but holds brains, whose chest keeps a beating heart, not frog-spit. For us, the reforms in Turkey, the promises and the dualism are no more than hollow words, ghosts and utopias that may come true somewhere in China or Japan, but not in the Balkans, a peninsula caught between the Turks and the Bulgarians, two tribes of opposite dispositions, customs and characters, of opposite outlooks. The way out of this hard and loathsome situation is not the new shackles, the new division of tyranny, but a national revolution, a radical coup—the Triumphal arch of every people, especially ours that has no past, no present, only a future and its brightness, a future in which it can speak with other Slavs and lay his contributions at the feet of all humanity.

Cast a glance at the history of the Bulgarian kingdom from Boris to its falling into the hands of the Turks and you will see that all the bygone historical and political times of our people have been almost entirely Byzantine and that they were crammed with tsars, boyars and clerics, while the people were always separated by a deep social morality from the depravity of its rulers, a depravity that permeated the richer strata through Christianity.

Our people manifested their strong and resolute will by rising against their tsars and clerics, as in the times of Bogomil and Samuil; but this only happened when violence reached their homes, where the Bulgarian was always morally free, when it reached their families, and their notion of honor—in a

¹ Mehmet Emin Ali Pasha (1815–1871): great statesman of the period marked by the reforms known as *Tanzimat*. He became grand vizier five times during the reign of the Sultans Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz.

² The oldest person whose age is mentioned in the Bible; his name is used as a synonym for a long living man.

word, the deep social life peculiar to all Slavic peoples and the Bulgarian people in particular.

Morally separated from his rulers, as we have said, the people often left them to fight Byzantium on their own, or to dispute the succession to the throne; those were the greatest reasons the Greeks conquered Bulgaria once, and the barbarian Turkish hordes brought her to ruin and bent its people to their will.

Yet for all that suffering, for all that dreadful violence that would thaw a stone, the Bulgarian shut himself with his offspring from the Turks, and once again sang not the Byzantine mass but his elegiac heroic song, left the arrow and the sword for the sickle and plough, went to fairs and churchyards—and whenever the barbarian trampled on his hearth (always surrounded by daughters, sons and grandchildren)—he dropped the plough and sickle, the shepherd's stick and pipe, reached for his father's sword or his brother's rifle, gathered his 'true sworn fellows' and took to the woods to revenge the wrongs of the Turks and moneyed men, to take their stolen treasure and protect the poor man and his village.

Such has the Bulgarian always been, and here he stands today unalloyed by foreign influence, true to his patriarchal life, to his pristine state—even after so much suffering, shouting at dawn from his doorstep: singing the requiescat of Turkey, of slavery; cursing his past, so grim and hateful, cursing his present, so hard, bitter and forgettable, and crying, "my future, my future!" Turkey and its unbidden leaders bring him on a silver platter reforms, dualisms and hierarchies, and yet he's always speaking of his future!

What, then, is this future of his?

Our people have their singular life, their singular character, their singular physiognomy, setting them apart as a nation—let it go its natural ways and you'll see what public life it will develop, help it or at least let it break free from this barbaric tribe it has nothing in common with and you'll see how it settles. Don't ye see the seed, the germ in its communes with no centralization, in its guilds and fellowships, men's, women's and children's alike? Don't ye see what we have said above?

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

SVETOZAR MARKOVIĆ: SERBIA IN THE EAST

Title: *Srbija na istoku* (Serbia in the East)

Originally published: Novi Sad, Srpska narodna zadružna štamparija, 1872

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from Svetozar Marković, *Srbija na istoku* (Niš: Gradina, 1972), pp. 172–173.

About the author

Svetozar Marković [1846, Jagodina (present-day central Serbia) – 1875, Trieste]: the founder of the socialist movement in Serbia. As an exceptional student of the *Velika škola*, the first high school and later university in Serbia, he won a state scholarship to continue his studies in natural sciences first in Russia, then in Switzerland. During his stays abroad, he was influenced by the Russian *narodnik* socialist ideas, which in the 1860s spread throughout Europe. Due to his vitriolic articles in the newspaper *Zastava* (The flag), in which he criticized the government and the constitution of 1869, he was deprived of his state scholarship and was forced to return to Serbia in 1870. There he first tried to ‘radicalize’ the ideas and activities of the ‘United Serbian Youth’ (see **Draga Dejanović**, *To Serbian mothers*). He harshly criticized the movement for lacking determination, relying too much on phraseology and too little on action. In the 1870s, he gathered around him the first socialist grouping in Serbia. The radicalization of his socialist vision caused a political and personal clash with Vladimir Jovanović and the ‘Liberals,’ a development which indirectly resulted to the dissolution of the ‘United Serbian Youth’ in 1871. The same year Marković launched the newspaper *Radenik* (Worker). Under the threat of being arrested, he fled to Ujvidék (*Srb.* Novi Sad), then in Austria-Hungary, only later to return to Serbia in 1873 and settle in Kragujevac, where the National Parliament was seated. During the same year, with the financial and political support of **Pera Todorović**, Marković issued the newspaper *Javnost* (The public). Soon, Marković was detained and sentenced to nine months in jail. After *Javnost* was banned, he first launched the *Glas javnosti* (Voice of the public), and then the *Oslobodjenje* (Liberation), using them as a means to spread his views on changing the constitution, attacking the growth of state bureaucracy and supporting the ongoing uprising in Bosnia. His ideas and political attitudes were accepted and publicly promoted in the Parliament by members of the opposition, which then comprised many of Marković’s friends and colleagues from the university (including Nikola Pašić and Pera Velimirović). With his newspaper articles, Marković served as an inspiration and rich

source of political ideas for the parliamentary opposition. He died prematurely in 1875. Nevertheless his writings remained influential and were widely cited by many groups as examples of early socialist thought in Serbia. The post-war communist authorities, for instance, claimed their socialist roots by including excerpts from Marković's writings in many popular readers published after the Second World War. Still, it is significant that we cannot talk about a real political inheritor of Marković's. Today almost no one refers to his legacy in the political field, while some important educational institutions, including the Belgrade University library, are named after him.

Main works: *Srbija na istoku* [Serbia in the East] (1872); *Opština i Sud i pravda* [Community, court and justice] (1874) *Celokupna dela* [Collected works] 2 vols. (1911–1912).

Context

Svetozar Marković published *Srbija na istoku* in 1872, when he was in exile in Novi Sad. The text envisions a radically different social and political organization of Serbia in accordance with the principles of *narodnik* (populist) socialism. Marković's radicalism was of extreme importance to the development and dynamics of political life in late nineteenth-century Serbia. He is considered to be the founder of socialist ideology in Serbia, and his idea of a "people's state" remained a direct source of inspiration for the political projects and party programs that appeared after his premature death in 1875. This, in particular, pertains to the People's Radical Party, the first officially-established party in Serbia. Party leaders—**Pera Todorović** and Nikola Pašić, amongst others—who had closely collaborated with him during the 1860s, claimed a direct connection with Marković's ideas and work. At the core of Marković's socialist ideology was the idea that it was possible to combine socialism as a modern political project with traditional patriarchal Serbian institutions, such as *zadruga* (the extended family) and communal self-governance. His conception of social development suggested that for the Serbian society it would be better not to follow the capitalist path of development particular to Western societies. This, he argued, would reverse the effects of the intrusion of capitalism and the modern bureaucratic state on Serbian society and its social institutions. In such a configuration, the notions of a 'people's state' (*narodna država*), 'people's party' (*narodna partija*) and 'people's sovereignty' (*narodni suverenitet*) figured as key notions for establishing political difference vis-à-vis the other political projects of late nineteenth-century Serbia. More particularly, these notions clashed with the views held by the liberals regarding the same issues.

In Marković's opinion, the people's state should rely on the people, the majority of whom were peasants. The people should be directly represented in the National Assembly by the members of the People's Party, then still the parliamentary opposition, who would be willing to directly "defend the people's interests in the assembly" without the interference of the state bureaucracy, which was considered by Svetozar Marković and his followers to be the worst social nuisance afflicting Serbian society. In this way, the notion of the people's state squares with the notion of a society that would be governed by "the ordinary people".

The constitution of 1869 represents the turning point in the future development of democracy in Serbia, as it implied the replacement of the old patriarchal institutions with modern ones. Political and social debates relevant to the first national constitution revealed two political orientations that would shape the future of Serbian society. These orientations included divergent conceptions of democracy, different understandings of the state, the role of political institutions and the basis of political sovereignty. They could be described as the 'people's democracy' or 'self-governing democracy' and 'liberal democracy' respectively. The first type of democracy relied on the ideas of people's sovereignty and the primacy of national patriarchal institutions and values in the transformation of Serbian society. According to this model, the proponents of which gathered around Svetozar Marković, social development would be possible even without endorsing capitalism. The other orientation, inspired by European liberalism, argued that individual human rights represented the basic ground for democratic development and for the building of a modern state and its political institutions. These two visions on the origin and functioning of democracy mirrored the dividing line within the 'United Serbian Youth' (*Omladina*), a division between socialism and liberalism as political visions for Serbian society, and they were personified in the figures of Svetozar Marković and Vladimir Jovanović respectively.

Marković criticized the Liberals for being too moderate and compromising, in particular when they made a political deal with the Regency after the Serbian ruler, Prince Mihajlo (from the Obrenović dynasty) was assassinated in 1868. This deal gave way to the drafting of a new constitution, which was proclaimed in 1869 and strengthened the rule of the government over the Parliament. Marković thought that this move would be detrimental to the democratization of political life in Serbia. He argued that a true political democratization would bring about social change, the major aspects of which would be the collectivization of labor and land. These ideas became more popular later, when they were promoted in political institutions by several deputies who

supported Marković's ideas in Parliament. The imputed confrontation of the ordinary people with absolutism and bureaucracy showed an important tendency that would be notable in the future political history of Serbia.

Inspired by the ideas of Russian *narodniks*, Marković argued for the appreciation of old Slavic (Serbian) economic and social institutions that would bring into life the principle of people's self-governance. He thought that these institutions, such as the *zadruga*, based on collective property and communal obligations would help to build an "original, Slavic social structure". Inspired by the Russian *mir* (collective land property), Marković pictured an idealized life in *zadruga* and proposed it as an economic alternative to contemporary society. In *Srbija na istoku* he described the economic, social and spiritual values of collective life in the *zadruga* and proposed this as a perfect organizational model for the transition to socialist society. Furthermore, he dealt with the national question in the Balkans and the role of Serbia in the process of the liberation of other neighboring nations. He criticized the "great-Serbian hegemony of the ruling elite", claiming that current ideas referring to the liberation of the Balkans were just a cover for achieving the expansion of Serbia. Marković suggested that the Serbian people together with other peoples in the Balkans had to liberate themselves in order to be organized into a federation of free and equal states. His idea of the federation of the peoples from the Balkans seems to be a bit contradictory: while its explicit aim, according to Marković, was the unification of all Balkan people "as free persons and equal workers", on the basis of alliances of local self-determined communities, he also argued that the unification could be achieved as an alliance of states. For him, the guiding principle for establishing different forms of alliance would not be nationality but free will and the determination of those who would constitute it. Marković nevertheless argued that the federation should pave the way not only for social revolution but also for the resolution of the national issue. In this way, the idea of federation involves the concepts of 'internal' and 'external' liberation, ideas that constituted an important part of his socialist political program.

Marković firmly believed that the combination of Serbian patriarchal institutions and values with the ideology of socialism would enable the Serbian people to simultaneously accept the fruits of Western liberalism and capitalism, while keeping the 'national essence' and national soul, intact. This represents the main contradiction of Marković's socialist conception that remained unresolved in the parliamentary debates after his death, in particular the debates on various modernizing projects (such as the building of a railway through Serbia) conceived after 1878.

The influence of the *narodnik* ideas was evident in the political concepts of the 'Radicals.' They emphasized the political aspects of Marković's program, which included the critique of state bureaucracy, arguing for the strong political role of the National Assembly. After Marković's death, the socialism of his closest allies gradually turned towards nationalism, which fully blossomed in the work of the People's Radical Party that was founded by people coming from Marković's socialist circles.

IE

Serbia in the East

XIII. Conclusion

The notion that revolution is the only legal grounds and the only possible way to create a new Serbian state has taken deep root with all educated men in the Serbian nation—as much with the sons of the conquered people of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Old Serbia, as with the citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and Austria-Hungary.

The legal foundation of the new Serbian state would then cease to be the statehood of the independent Serbian mini-countries of Serbia and Montenegro; these very states would cease to exist themselves; and what remains is the whole of the Serbian nation, as a collection of separate individuals who are laying the groundwork for a new legal order based on general agreement.

To create such a state of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula, to shatter all shackles of statehood which divide and constrain the Serbian nation, *are all, in fact, Serbia's main tasks.*

Whoever wishes, may say that Serbia is a lawful country. Monarchic, legitimate, it needs to respect foreign laws. It must not break all legal ties and cause "anarchy" and "barbarity" and then expect legal order to develop from such chaos.

He who says so neither wishes nor is able to arrive at Serbian unity, let alone achieve freedom for the Serbian people.

"Serbia" is not its prince, nor is it its ministers, nor is it its leaders, nor captains, judges or village mayors, governmental offices and bureaus. Serbia is the Serbian people living in Serbia, according to whose will, or better still, upon whose *endurance* both the prince and governmental offices and the whole state system rest. When people whose minds are confined to bureaucratic forms say "Serbia", they always imagine the "official" Serbia (if I may call it so), i.e. the bureaucratic tool used to govern the Serbian people, with

all the laws, acts, decrees, etc. But by Serbia we understand the people which inhabits it, the people which initiated a *revolution* in Turkey at the beginning of this century, instigated the struggle for the liberation of the entire Serbian nation from foreign domination. Had it obeyed the laws of the Turkish system, it would not even have started the Serbian revolution. It is the task and duty of this nation to carry on this revolution ...

What happened in Serbia at the beginning of this century when the Serbian people demolished the Turkish legal system whilst having no legal system of its own, when a state of lawlessness arose in Serbia? Did anarchy and barbarity consume Serbia then? No, they did not; quite to the contrary, the people were able to immediately create a state system far better than had been the system of the Turkish Empire and, what is more, basically far better than the current bureaucratic system.

We have no proof that the same thing would happen nowadays; nonetheless now that the Serbian people have lived through the lengthy and bitter experience of statehood, it would certainly not adopt foreign forms and laws in the name of civilization the way it did in the principality of Šumadija.¹ Through revolution, the Serbian people liberate its patriarchal institutions, the remains of its former civilization, from the pressure of Turkish violence, as well as from the pressure of alien institutional forms. The Serbian people have the chance to build an authentic Slavic state system drawing upon its own national institutions and notions and upon contemporary science, to form a society founded on liberty, equality and fraternity—which is something all progressive peoples of the world strive to achieve.

Translated by Linda Krstajić, Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

¹ Šumadija is the name of the central region in Serbia. It is considered to be Serbia's 'heartland' in a cultural and historical sense, for both the first and the second uprising started in Šumadija. Still today it is believed that the 'spirit' of the nation and the intensity of the folk life are best preserved there.

JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI: ON PATRIOTISM

Title: *O patriotyzmie* (On patriotism)

Originally published: *Walka*, 1 October 1902, pp. 4–6.

Language: Polish

The excerpts used are from Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe. Wydanie prac dotychczas drukiem ogłoszonych*, vol. 2. (Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1937), pp. 22–27.

About the author

See: **Józef Piłsudski**, *Address delivered in Vilnius*

Context

In the 1890s, three modern political movements emerged in Polish politics: the nationalist, agrarian, and the socialist parties. Their activities were illegal in the Russian-controlled regions of pre-partition Poland. This forced them to coordinate their efforts from Western Europe, or to engage in underground activity, walking in the footsteps of their democratic forerunners from the first half of the nineteenth century. The relatively militant character of these movements was one of the reasons for their ideological inconsistency. Along with a lot of uncertainty in political agendas, there were many individuals who shifted camps, moving from the socialist to the nationalist side of the political spectrum (rather than the other way round). Among these three main political trends, the socialists were the most successful in connecting their image with the tradition of national revolts and uprisings, thus attracting a considerably wide spectrum of adherents. At the same time, the socialists attracted groups that refused to correlate national struggle with class struggle. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the spectrum from which the socialist party recruited its followers gradually narrowed down, with its rightist as well as its leftist wings being eradicated. The

quoted text refers to the moment right before this major division within the socialist camp.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Piłsudski was a well-known political figure but by no means an outstanding theoretician. Nevertheless, his text has the merit of being straightforward and concrete, unlike the more elaborate texts by the Marxist theoreticians Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz or Leon Wasilewski. It summarizes socialist ideology, and, at the same time, marks the starting point of Piłsudski's intellectual development.

The socialism advocated by Piłsudski was characterized by a strong conviction about the necessity of restoring Polish independence, and therefore was criticized not only by Polish nationalists, like **Dmowski**, but also by internationalist social democrats. Rosa Luxemburg (*Pol.* Róża Luksemburg), contrary to Piłsudski, refused to include the independence of Poland among the postulates of socialism. In her opinion, the Polish working class had to unite with the working classes of Russia, Germany and Austria, since, even if an independent Polish state existed, it would only be a reactionary one. The ideologists of the *PPS* tried to find a path between these two extremes: modern nationalism and Luxemburg-type internationalism. Piłsudski's text is an illustration of the belief in the international solidarity of democratic nations intertwined with the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The impact of the Russian revolution of 1905–1907 caused an open split in the Polish socialist camp. The left wing of the *PPS* advocated collaboration with progressive political forces in Russia to achieve the autonomy of the Polish Kingdom in a democratic Empire. Piłsudski, on the other hand, set up a new political party, the *PPS—Frakcja Rewolucyjna* (*PPS—Revolutionary Faction*), which propagated the idea of Polish independence. The left wing of the *PPS* gradually merged with the social democrats to form the Polish Communist Party. On the other hand, some former socialists followed Piłsudski in his political pursuits. Many years after publishing this text, Piłsudski described these pursuits as marking a turning point in his political career when he “got off the red tram at the stop named *Independence*.”

The text reiterates the postulates of nineteenth-century Polish patriotism, based on the democratic ideal of embracing the common cause of all peoples. Piłsudski combined the pre-modern regional patriotism of Lithuania, rejecting at the same time modern Lithuanian nationalism, with Polish national convictions, and a socialist agenda strategically used as an antidote for possible conflicts between East-Central European identities. In 1902, when Dmowski formulated the program of Polish integral nationalism, Piłsudski

advocated the struggle against the tsar and declared his belief in the international solidarity of the working class.

The *PPS* was among the most significant political forces of the inter-war period. Although many of its leaders declared their personal sympathy for Piłsudski, they disagreed with his internal policy. After the coup in 1926, *PPS* turned against the government and thus against Józef Piłsudski. During the Second World War, the *PPS* actively participated in the activities of the Polish authorities both in the territories occupied by Germany and in exile. After 1945, the Party regained official status. In the second half of the 1940s, with the emerging effort to blend the socialist and communist movements, the conflict between the *PPS*'s socialist patriotism and Luxemburgian internationalism broke out once again. One of the communist leaders, Władysław Gomułka, proposed that the new Workers Party should follow the principles of the *PPS*. The opposition group, enjoying the support of Stalin, condemned Gomułka and (similar to the Soviet policy towards **Josip Broz Tito**) accused Polish socialists of pursuing nationalistic agendas. During the communist regime, the *PPS* belonged to this politically contested tradition. In the 1970s, it became an important point of reference for the left-wing democratic opposition. The party was reestablished after 1989, but it failed to regain its previous influence.

Piłsudski's political agenda was heavily criticized not only by nationalists but also by postwar Polish Marxists, who 'unmasked' the imperialist undertones of his ideas. Piłsudski's policies were interpreted as an expression of his personal hatred toward the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, a new wave of historical publications described his policies in a more favorable light, and Piłsudski became a symbolic figure for the right wing democratic opposition. Since 1989, he has commonly been accepted as one of the most significant personalities in Polish history.

MG

On patriotism

Today, when one nation to another, as one man to another, is not a brother but a wolf, we usually encounter two types of patriotism: one rapacious and the other defensive.

Both are closely interrelated, since just as there are no winners without losers, there is also no resistance without invasion. The first type—rapacious patriotism—is nowadays the political slogan of most European powers. At its

disposal it has: millions of bayonets and cannons; thousands of advocates, ministers, journalists and scientists; and enormous sums of money from the exploitation of the working class. It pushes entire nations to fight in wars, brother against brother; it conquers other countries and sucks out their life blood. But if we look at it closely, we will see that the prime mover of this chauvinist hullabaloo spreading across the whole world is not patriotism proper, i.e. the feeling of love and devotion towards one's motherland. At the bottom of this trend lies a disease of contemporary nations, based on the suffering and exploitation of the working class.

In every country, the bourgeoisie, the masters of today's world, find themselves in warlike competition with their counterparts from other countries and nations. In order to exist and develop, they require the largest possible market for its goods, they have to prevent their competitors from penetrating those markets they conquer by imposing tolls, tariffs, and by granting charters. The larger and more powerful the state, the larger its market and the easier it is to protect its own industry and commerce and to impose favorable prices for its goods on other countries. [...]

The bourgeoisie uses chauvinism to kill two birds with one stone. Capitalism divides the world into exploited and exploiters and provokes the struggle between them. This struggle, which engages an ever-increasing number of working-class people, presents a threat to the hegemony of the bourgeois. National chauvinism, which sets one nation against another, serves to unite what had been ruptured by the class struggle and prevents the disintegration of a decaying society. Like typical despots, the bourgeois try to cover the filth of exploitation and the scale of workers' poverty behind a tattered rag of national greatness, stained by the blood and tears of suffering peoples.

Such is the rapacious patriotism in Europe. Russian chauvinism, with which we have had to deal for a long time here in Lithuania, is not altogether different. At its bottom lies the exploitation of a conquered country to the benefit of the invaders. The only difference is that firstly, the process is led not by the bourgeoisie but by barbarous tsarism, which hopes to prop up a waning political system by giving its subjects other countries to exploit like one throws bones to a hungry dog; and secondly, instead of goods, of which there is no excess in Russia, the tsar floods the conquered markets with live cargo—thousands of hungry and willing state officials.

Rapacious patriotism is in such contradiction to the basic sense of justice, so poisonous to the invaders' morality and the life of the conquered that every decent man, regardless of his convictions, must protest against it. Among the socialists there can be no two ways about it. They must fight it to

the death and reveal its true nature by showing how much human suffering is hidden behind its mask.

To finish the subject of rapacious patriotism we shall mention Polish chauvinism. True, it does not have a state apparatus at its disposal, and being persecuted and limited by martial laws, it presents no great threat to anybody. Nevertheless, making use of its cultural and economic advantage, it sometimes acts with hostility towards Lithuanians. It is an established fact that priests often engage in Polonization. It happens with the support of bishops and prelates who often send to Lithuanian parishes priests who do not speak a word of their parishioners' language. Moreover, it is no secret that a certain portion of the Polish intelligentsia is resentful to the development of Lithuanian culture and even tries to antagonize the Polish people against their neighbors.

Any attempt at provoking nationalist conflicts must be met with our resolute opposition. Conflicts and quarrels drain our strength and allow our persecutor—the tsar—to take advantage and reinforce his rule over us. Down with them! Let us root out among our comrades nationalist and religious prejudices. Among the raging storm of tribal hatred, let us celebrate peace and brotherhood regardless of national and religious differences.

Defensive patriotism is altogether different. It is caused by an invasion and it spurs people to respond. In principle, it is right, because it inspires people to repair the harm that was done [to them] and to fight for one of the basic human rights that has been trampled. Especially in Lithuania, where no child hears its native tongue spoken at school, where throughout the country there is not a single library or newspaper for millions of Poles, Lithuanians and Belarusians, where the Lithuanian nation is forbidden to print books in its own language, where a significant portion of the society—the Jews—has no access to education and only limited freedom of movement, where it is strictly prohibited to speak the language of some local citizens, and where in the twentieth century there is still religious persecution, the patriotism of the oppressed is a manifestation of a natural self-defense, and the struggle for national rights, in accordance with the needs of all social classes, is an urgent matter on everyone's lips.

But even among the conquered nations people are divided into classes: the exploiters and the exploited, and the conflict of interest between them inevitably leaves its mark on the beliefs and actions of each group. Let us then look closely at the nature of our privileged classes' patriotism and the way in which they defend national rights. [...] They claim that the nation should be united in the face of hardships and violence at the hand of our enemies. The

respective social classes should, for the time being, lay to rest their conflicts with one another, so as not to diminish the strength of the nation through internal struggle. Those who have led the country so far—the privileged classes—should remain at the forefront of the struggle for independence because of their experience and education, as well as the possibility of attracting attention and support of the world's powers thanks to their positions and wealth. The working class should follow their lead and trust them completely. This is more or less what all advocates of patriotism say, calling for national solidarity, be it Polish, Lithuanian or Jewish.

Let us, however, take a closer look at this patriotism in practice, at the way this solidarity is manifested—the solidarity that is supposedly first and foremost the duty of those who proclaim it. Can anyone remember a case where a landowner, a factory owner or a craftsman yielded to the demands of his compatriot workers, sacrificing part of his profits to the common cause? Yet everyone knows of contrary examples. Everywhere we look, we see landowners, factory owners and craftsmen, our “leaders”, seeking help from the invaders’ courts and police against their own people, their “followers”. [...] It is curious how national solidarity manifests itself in the acts of its advocates and leaders. It is full of hypocrisy and double-dealing when it prays at the altar of patriotism with the devil of exploitation and dirty dealings in its pocket.

The patriotism of our affluent classes appears is no less repulsive when we judge it by the way members of those classes act toward the invaders. Appalling cowardice is the order of the day, fawning and bootlicking the enemy and their politics. Let us look at our towns’ leaders, whispering patriotic prayers: town councilors of Wilno¹, Kowno² or Grodno³. Poles have a majority in town councils, yet they still vote for increasing the number of policemen and spies, giving away municipal land for the monuments of Muravyov⁴ and tsarina Catherine, in a word, anything that pleases a given state official. Take a look at our gentry, shivering with fear in the face of even the lowest ranking officials, contaminated with the spirit of conciliation and flunkeyism,

¹ *Lit.* Vilnius.

² *Lit.* Kaunas.

³ *Bel.* Hrodna.

⁴ Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov (1796–1866): Russian statesman and general, governor of the Northwestern Territories (including Lithuania and part of Belarus). He was known as a fervent adherent of forceful Russification. Muravyov directed repressions against participants of the November (1830–1831) and January uprisings (1863–1864) as well as against the Lithuanian national movement (he banned the usage of the Latin alphabet as well as the Lithuanian language in print).

protecting their children from rebellious urges and collecting money for scholarships named after governors and ministers. Look at Lithuanian intelligentsia, begging for governors' consent to give back one church or another. Look at those Jews, who in spite of contemptuous treatment by state officials write submissive applications and use humility or bribes to obtain the smallest of abatements. [...]

As we can see, bourgeois patriotism, whether rapacious or defensive, has one thing in common. It aims at hiding class conflicts behind the veil of national solidarity against other nations and thus preventing the decay of the system in which the bourgeoisie is at the top. Wherever it can, it is rapacious and walks over those it defeats; if, on the other hand, it is on the losing side, it humbly resorts to bootlicking. Hence our attitude towards such patriotism is the same as towards its rapacious kind. We have to fight and unmask it, curbing its influence on the working class.

There is, however, a healthy kernel of patriotism. It is the natural feeling of love for one's country and its culture, which leads us to defend the right of the nation to sovereignty wherever that right is denied. [...] Our motherland, which has Kościuszko and Mickiewicz among its native sons, saw those two great patriots struggling not only against the invasion, but also against the enslavement of its people by their own masters. In the present situation this noble patriotism must lead our ranks under the red banner of socialism.

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

BOHUMÍR ŠMERAL: THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Title: *Národnostní otázka a sociální demokracie* (The national question and the social democrats)

Originally published: in *Protokol IX. sjezdu Československé sociální demokratické strany dělnické* (Prague: Zář, 1909) pp. 116–151.

Language: Czech

The excerpts used are from Bohumír Šmeral, *Výbor z díla*, vol. I (1902–1921), ed. by Jan Galandauer (Prague: Svoboda, 1981), pp. 132–152.

About the author

Bohumír Šmeral [1880, Třebíč (*Ger.* Trebitsch, Bohemian-Moravian Uplands) – 1941, Moscow]: politician and journalist. In 1896 while still in secondary school in Třebíč, Šmeral joined *Pokrok* (Progress), a social democratic workers' association. Later, while studying law at Prague, he was active in the Czecho-Slav Social Democratic Workers' Party. In 1899–1918, he was an editor of the party newspaper, *Právo lidu* (People's right). In the meantime he translated Friedrich Engels, Karl Kautsky, and other socialist theorists into Czech and became one of the most important theoreticians in the party. At its ninth congress, in 1909, he was elected to the executive committee, becoming the main representative of the Marxist Internationalist branch of the party and the chief theorist of the 'national question,' in which he was inspired by the Austro-Marxists **Karl Renner** and **Otto Bauer**. In 1911, Šmeral was elected a deputy to the *Reichsrat*, where he became the *spiritus agens* of the parliamentary club of the Czecho-Slav social democrats. At the beginning of First World War, he played a leading role in loyalist pro-Austrian politics and was among the initiators of the establishment of the 'Czech Union' in the Diet uniting the Czech political representatives in the name of national interests. Nevertheless, the growing nationalist emotions both within as well as outside the party forced him to resign from all party functions in September 1917. In May 1921, Šmeral helped to found the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, becoming its first chairman until 1924, and managed to attract mass support from among Czech workers. With the beginning of the 'Bolshevization' of the party, however, he was ostracized. In 1926, he was removed from the executive board of the Communist International and was totally marginalized in the Party at home. In the service of the Comintern, he was sent to China and Mongolia and later worked in various places. He was allowed to return to Czechoslovakia only after the 1935 turn towards the Popular Front tactics in the Communist movement. After his death, he left behind a highly contested and unsuccessfully suppressed leg-

acy of the non-Bolshevik origins of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Today, contested as he is, Šmeral is seen as one of the most original Czech theorists of radical socialism.

Main works: *Kdo jsou a co chtějí sociální demokrati?* [Who are the social democrats and what are their aims?] (1906); *Materiálie k dějinám dělnického hnutí v Rakousku, zvláště se zřetelem na dělnické hnutí české* [Materials concerning the history of the workers' movement in Austria, especially with regard to the Czech workers' movement] (1906); *Národnostní otázka v sociální demokracii až do sjezdu hajnfeldského* [The national question in social democracy until the Heinfeld congress] (1909); *Pravda o sovětském Rusku* [The truth about Soviet Russia] (1920), *Boj za osvobození Číny* [The fight for the liberation of China] (1927).

Context

The Czecho-Slav Social Democratic Workers' Party was founded in 1878 at a congress in Břevnov (now part of Prague) as a section within the Austrian social democracy. In the 1890s, the party already had a considerable following, particularly among the industrial working class. In 1893, it adopted an autonomous status while still belonging to the Austrian Social Democratic Party in Cisleithania. In the elections of 1907, the first with universal suffrage, the Czech Social Democratic Party emerged as the strongest Czech political party, with 39.8 percent of the general vote in Bohemia and 30.7 percent in Moravia. In its first declaration in the *Reichsrat*, it distanced itself from Czech nationalism and the politics of state rights, and denounced the efforts to divide the Empire into national states, while stressing that it was only socialism that could bring both social and national justice.

In their first Břevnov political program, Czech social democrats declared as their task organizing Czech-speaking workers not only in the Bohemian Lands, but also in Vienna and Lower Austria. They did not question the multinational character of the party; in the light of the strong national antagonism in Austria in this period, however, they saw the old supra-ethnic principle prevailing in the Social Democratic Party of Austria as being outdated. Therefore, stressing the principle of autonomy of the Czech branch, they pushed forward the concept of the 'federalization' of the all-Austrian party which was finally acknowledged as a principle at the Vienna Congress in June 1897. In this conception, the federalist solution was understood as a precondition for a true workers' internationalism.

Among the Viennese social democratic leaders, however, and even more so in the headquarters of the trade unions, the projected federalization of the party was perceived as an element that sharpened the national differences,

and hence damaged the unity and power of the workers' movement in Austria. This situation led to the 'conflict of the trade unions' in 1910. The imperial 'Trade Unions Commission' insisted on one, unified organizational structure, whereas the majority of Czech social democrats protested against what they understood as redundant supra-ethnic centralism. The International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen, in 1910, condemned the stance of the Czechs, who did not, however, stop fighting against Viennese centralism until the First World War. At that time, the Czech social democrats found themselves in a peculiar position on the domestic political scene. Apart from their Marxist internationalism, the social democrats refused the main tenet of Czech politics of the last forty years—namely, the state rights argumentation based on the historical rights of the lands of the Bohemian Crown. As a result, the nationalist politicians called them enemies of the nation and the Czech National Socialist Party was founded in 1897 by the political activist and journalist Václav Klofáč in order to alienate Czech workers from the social democrats. With their program that combined moderate reform socialism and nationalism, the Czech national socialists significantly challenged the social democratic policies, though they never achieved a higher percentage of votes than their social democratic opponents.

After 'federalizing' itself, the Austrian Social Democratic Party turned towards the national question in the Empire, which was addressed in the nationality program accepted at the congress in Brünn (Brno) in 1899. Based on the Austro-Marxist nationality conception formulated by **Karl Renner** and **Otto Bauer** it called for the establishment of a democratic federation that would consist of autonomous, nationally defined districts instead of historical lands. All districts dominated by one nation would form a national branch that should possess full autonomy in national issues. The Marxist Left in the Czecho-Slav Social Democratic Party, whose main representative was Bohumír Šmeral, picked up this concept and elaborated on it. At the IX Prague Congress of the party in September 1909, Šmeral gave a long speech on the national question, the most eloquent formulation on the subject from within the Czech workers' movement. With direct reference to **František Palacký's** 1848–49 ethnic federalist program, based, however, on a Marxist, historical materialist understanding of history, Šmeral expressed his belief that the 'Czech question' would achieve its most appropriate solution only within the borders of multinational Austria-Hungary. He claimed, however, that the state must reform itself. In contrast to other Czech political parties and their state right arguments, Šmeral called for the full national autonomy of every nationality in Austria, and for the democratization and decentralization of

state administration. The final result, in his view, was obviously not the establishment of a liberal democracy, but the historical victory of Socialism.

Šmeral retained these views in the subsequent years, which led him to support the activist policy towards Austria during the First World War. Especially after 1915, this policy was increasingly challenged within the party by the revisionists around František Modráček and by the independentists of Gustav Haberman. It was eventually marginalized after the **Masaryk**-led campaign for an independent Czechoslovakia also attracted most of the social democratic leaders. The new Stalinist leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after 1929, and even more so the official Communist discourse after the Second World War, praised Šmeral's 'internationalist' views. It denounced, however, his nationality conception and pro-Austrian stance as an unacceptable Austro-Marxist political reformism that, allegedly, anticipated his 'rightist' position in the 1920s. Today, his federalist ideas are seen as an integral part of the turn-of-the-century Czech politics. Those advocating such a policy saw their future within Austria, though a significantly restructured one.

MK

The national question and the social democrats

Constitutionally, Austria-Hungary must reform itself from the present dualistic-centralistic non-popular constitutional structure into a democratic federation of free and equal nations. This is necessary not only in view of the economic and cultural power wielded by its various nationalities, but also because it serves the needs of our foreign policy. [...]

The reform of relations between the Empire's ethnic constituents is as important a problem for Austria as was hitherto the introduction of universal suffrage. The chief aim of social democracy is to exercise a decisive influence on the development of these relations, as it was in the struggle for equal voting rights. This is the touchstone that will prove whether at heart we are now sufficiently mature, sufficiently socialist, sufficiently free from short-term tactical considerations and able to rise above the past and present state of these relations to become the one true expression of historical necessity in today's Austria, and the creators of tomorrow's new Austria of free, autonomous nations.

If social democracy is to fulfill its task in this regard, it will be necessary for the social democratic parties of all ethnic communities to accept a unified

plan for the transformation of the Empire, which is complete and precise in every detail. This should be our new nationalities program, the elaboration of which should be a major aim of this congress. [...]

Now with your permission I shall expound my own view of the basis on which our new nationalities program should be constructed.

Before a builder can erect a new building, he must have knowledge of the laws of mechanics, physics, chemistry, and so on, in as far as they affect the construction process. So we too, who would be workers on the great edifice of a whole new state, must first be aware of the laws of social development upon which depend the birth, growth and subsequent mutations of every social organism. [...] The chief influence of capitalism was its tendency to create large state entities. Only a large state can provide an adequate market for the products of capitalist manufacture; only a large state has the power and authority to protect the interests of its capitalists both within and beyond its own confines. Besides its tendency to create large states, capitalism also had the effect of fostering the idea of nationhood. [...]

In short, industrialism gave rise to national consciousness and the national movement, through which the nation, in as far as it was perceived as a unified whole, undifferentiated as to class, regained decisive influence and power within the state. Wherever these two tendencies—to create both larger states and national awareness—overlap and a great nation with a sense of nationhood provides the basis for the creation of a great state, the result is a great capitalist nation-empire: France, unified Germany, unified Italy! Where this is not the case, however—where a tendency (albeit born of the same causes) to create small national groups, each with its own aspirations to power and separate identity, is opposed to the creation of a large state—the process is far more difficult and painful. For then it is not simply one nationality fighting an absolutist state, but several, which are in addition fighting for power among themselves. The historical process must create an entirely new constitutional and institutional model, which would meet every nation's cultural and national need for independence, as well as its immediate economic needs within a large state. This is the way things are developing in Austria-Hungary today, and the aim of the program that we at this congress wish to formulate must be to understand and to expound this development, and thereby facilitate and hasten it. [...]

The most important and powerful force and that most suited to quell nationalist passions is the working class. This is a consequence not merely of its views or attitudes, but also, and chiefly, of its material interests. Economically, Czech workers have nothing to gain by being opposed to German

workers, or workers of any other nationality, in the way that, say, the petit bourgeois have. On the contrary, working people share common economic interests regardless of their nationality. The Czech working class cannot be considered in isolation from the German working class, and *vice versa*. Its sense of national belonging is not most perfectly expressed, as it is for bourgeois patriots, in the motto: "Each to his own". This would mean, in proletarian parlance: "Czech workers! Work only with other Czech workers; work only for Czech employers!" Ultimately this would lead to the principle now being invoked to justify the shameful practice of strikebreaking: "Czech workers! Forget your own interests and support Czech capitalists, so that you may live with them in harmony!" [...]

However, the fact that the Czech working class is being forced into a stance of extreme opposition *vis-à-vis* the Czech bourgeoisie does not in any way imply a lack of national awareness. The more aware and educated it becomes, the better its own social and material interests will be served. Awareness and education can only be achieved through good Czech schools, Czech newspapers, Czech literature, etc. It is not the flimsy tissue of sentiment, but a tougher fiber by far, personal interest, that binds the Czech worker to those most noble manifestations of a nation's life: national schools, a national literature, a national culture. How much worthier is such a bond, conjoining as it does the selfish interests of the working class with those of the whole nation, than the merely economic aspirations, and means to their attainment, that are the wellspring of bourgeois radical patriotism! Indeed, the principles of socialism, properly understood, will result in the workers of one nationality assisting those of another, oppressed, nationality to assert their own cultural identity. Yes, German workers too will realize, not on mere principle but in their own interest, that their Czech fellows, if they are not to be strikebreakers and troublemakers at work, should have access to education in schools whose language of instruction they understand. Similarly, Czech workers have a vested interest in the rights and enlightenment of their Slovak or Croatian fellows and so on [...].

But all these formal, legalistic reasons are for us of secondary importance. We have other, purely practical reasons for opposing a political program of state rights. With its most unpopular aspect, and for us social democrats its most unacceptable, I shall deal first. We must reject this program as unfair, since, in the case of the Germans, it breaches the principle of fair treatment for minorities. Anyone who honestly and sincerely supports the state rights program must of necessity be fundamentally opposed to the state in its present constitutional form. Anyone who sees state rights as the main thrust of

Czech policy, rather than a mere embellishment, can entertain no thought of compromise; he will not be satisfied until the three Sudeten lands are constituted into a single independent and sovereign empire with its own central Parliament and its own ministry; until this new state frees itself from the union with Austrian state and these two otherwise mutually alien states are united by, at most, only a single sovereign—which is precisely the goal the Hungarian policy of state rights repeatedly strives to attain. And this is where we social democrats, heedless of the belligerent zeal of patriotic chauvinists, must ask ourselves: Is it possible, for reasons of simple justice alone, for Czech politics to go down that path? A reactivated state consisting of the Sudeten lands would not be a Czech state, but a Czech–German one, where a whole third of the population would be of German nationality, and where the Czechs would enjoy a perpetual two-thirds majority in Parliament and government. Quite naturally, we Czechs would like to see a change in the present centralized constitution of Austria, where we as a people are outnumbered. And for this very reason we should be neither surprised nor offended by the Sudeten Germans’ unyielding resistance to the formation of a new state entity that would confer on them exactly the same oppressed status that is now the lot of the Czechs within the Austrian Empire. If we do not understand this, we are sanctioning the unjust conditions in which we ourselves live today. For this moral reason alone, and particularly for us, the state rights program cannot be countenanced. [...]

As opposed to slogans about state rights, the aims of the Czech social democrats’ nationalities policy are:

1. Absolute autonomy for each of the Austrian Empire’s ethnic communities based on the principle of individual rights with respect to national culture.

2. In all other respects, the creation of a democratic, decentralized state administration and bureaucracy based on the principle of self-determination. [...]

Translated by Robert Russell

CONSTANTIN DOBROGEANU-GHEREA: NEO-SERFDOM

Title: *Neoiobăgia* (Neo-serfdom)

Originally Published: *Neoiobăgia. Studiu economic-sociologic al problemei noastre agrare*, Bucharest, Socec, 1910

Language: Romanian

The excerpts used are from Ion Popescu-Puțuri et al. eds., *Opere complete* (Bucharest: Politică, 1977), pp. 11; 62; 75–76; 136; 160–161; 365; 368–369.

About the author

Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (Solomon Katz) [1855, Slavjanka (present-day Ukraine) – 1920, Bucharest]: literary critic and socialist politician. He was born into a Jewish family; his father was a merchant. Dobrogeanu-Gherea began his studies in his native village and continued his secondary education in Ekaterinoslav. In 1872, he enrolled in the Faculty of Sciences in Kharkov (*Ukr.* Kharkiv, present-day Ukraine), where he became a member of revolutionary and populist (*narodnik*) circles. Under surveillance by the tsarist secret police (the *Okhrana*) for revolutionary activities, he moved to Iași in 1875. In 1876 he moved to Bucharest, where he participated in the establishment of the first socialist groups with the help of other Russian revolutionaries and émigrés. During the Turkish–Russian war of 1877–1878, Gherea was arrested and deported to Siberia. He managed to escape and in 1879 returned to Romania. Settled in Bucharest, he contributed to the foundation of the first socialist journals in Romania, including *Besarabia* (Bessarabia) (1879), *România viitoare* (Future Romania) (1880) and *Contemporanul* (The Contemporary) (1881) and gained notoriety as a literary critic. In 1882, Gherea became the owner of a restaurant at the railway station in Ploiești, which became a meeting point for socialist revolutionaries from Romania and abroad. He was also involved in politics, being a founding member of *Partidul Social Democrat al Muncitorilor din România* (Social-Democratic Party of Romanian Workers) in 1893, and the author of its political program. As a result, he was often considered as the intellectual father of social democracy in Romania. During the First World War, Gherea lived in Switzerland, and returned to Romania in 1919, shortly before his death. Gherea was equally praised for his contribution to the development of socialist thinking in Romania and for his social-literary criticism which focused on the social significance of the work of some Romanian classics, including **Mihai Eminescu** and **Ion Luca Caragiale**. This form of criticism found many supporters during the interwar period, including **Garabet**

Ibrăileanu and **Nicolae Iorga**. In 1948, Gherea was posthumously made a member of the Romanian Academy. He was condemned by the communist regime in its early years, but was partly rehabilitated by Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1966. During the 1970s, Dobrogeanu-Gherea's complete works were edited and he became one of the main intellectual sources used by the communist ideologues to illustrate the 'long-tradition' of Marxism in Romania. After 1989, although slightly marginalized by the new historiography, he gained his position as one of the main promoters of Romanian social theory.

Main works: *Anarhism și socialism* [Anarchism and socialism] (1887); *Studii critice*, 5 vols. [Critical studies] (1890–1897; 1925); *Conceptia materialistă a istoriei* [Materialist conception of history] (1892); *Neoiobăgia* [Neo-serfdom] (1910); *Aminiri din trecutul depărtat* [Reminiscences from the remote past] (1912); *Conflictul româno-bulgar* [The Romanian–Bulgarian conflict] (1913); *Războiul sau neutralitate* [War or neutrality] (1914).

Context

At the beginning of the twentieth century Romania was a predominantly agrarian country. Yet, the Romanian peasantry lived in pitiable conditions. Social commentators connected the poverty and the backwardness of the Romanian peasantry to both the lack of efficient legislation to protect its economic interests and to the inability of the Romanian state to create the markets required for economic growth. After the peasant revolt of 1907, which was brutally crushed by the army, it became clear that the peasant society was dominated by profound unrest and dissatisfaction. This event generated an affluence of cultural and political literature dedicated to explaining the condition of the peasantry, but this literature fed into a more general debate about the nature of development of the Romanian society and culture. Some authors, like the Poporanists (see **Garabet Ibrăileanu**, *The critical spirit in Romanian culture*), argued for the creation of a peasant economy dominated by small, independent holdings. Others, like the Sămănătorists (see **Nicolae Iorga**, *The national culture and its surrogates*; and **Aurel C. Popovici**, *At the crossroads of two worlds*), viewed the peasantry as the core of the social life in Romania, insisting that social harmony and gradual evolution could only be achieved if Romanian peasants are unaffected by industrialization and urbanization, both considered detrimental to Romanian national values.

The increasing acuteness of the peasant problem in Romania prompted the emergence of new political doctrines and cultural movements as responses to the putative solutions proposed by liberal and conservative parties. Within

these debates on the nature of economic and social development in Romania Gherea proposed a third way. Although he shared the Poporanists' claim about Romania's economic backwardness, he did not agree with one of their central arguments, namely that Romania should continue to remain an agricultural country. He strongly believed that Romania could overcome economic underdevelopment, improve social conditions and create an economically-efficient peasantry; yet he saw these developments as accompanying Romania's industrialization. As part of a global economy, Romania was bound to follow other, economically more advanced countries: the cultural and intellectual imitation of Western Europe, characterizing Romania's elite since the early nineteenth century, needed to be corroborated with adopting Western capitalist strategies of economic development.

Gherea discussed first the economic conditions of the peasantry, describing at length the effects of the land reforms and the European liberal legislation introduced in Romania during and after the rule of Alexandru Ioan Cuza (r. 1859–1866). He, then, analyzed the moral, cultural, juridical and political effects of the agrarian system existing in Romania. Agriculture was, for him, the centre of this economic transformation, and one could not create a resourceful agriculture without sorting out the peasant problem. The land reform of 1864, instead of creating a class of healthy, independent peasants, had legalized coerced work in the form of labor contracts, resembling more semi-feudal forms of production than capitalist relations between patrons and workers. In fact, neither the peasants nor the boyars were landowners in the juridical sense, but rather co-proprietors; the peasants, for instance, had no shared individual rights over communal land. The capitalist transformation of Romania, as seen by Gherea, was based on an anomaly: the state allowed the boyars to claim modern property rights to lands to which they had only feudal rights. Gherea termed this specific form of political economy, which enabled the landowners to exploit the peasants without fulfilling any of the obligations owed to them, *neo-iobăgie* (neo-serfdom).

Although a supporter of Marx and Engels (comparisons between the concept of neo-serfdom and Engels' concept of "second serfdom" were often made), Gherea disagreed with the Marxist model of capitalist development, which denied the peasantry an active political role. He decried, for instance, the gradual disappearance of the peasant handicraft industry, which only added to the peasantry's lack of political participation. To overcome the neo-serfdom conditions of the Romanian society, as well as the contradictions between the juridico-political and socio-economic structures, Gherea assigned the peasantry an active role in the social life of the country; the peas-

antry, he added, should be the agent of organizing agricultural production around capitalist principles.

In essence, Gherea aimed to explain social reality by working out his own original program that would reflect Romania's specific sociopolitical development. Gherea's critique of other theories of national development followed from the suppositions which guided his own theory of national specificity. Ultimately, what prevailed, in Gherea's analysis of the Romanian society and national economy, was not the nationalism of the Poporanists and their ideas of peasant democracy, or the socialist principles of replacing private property with public ownership, but complete industrialization and modernization. Gherea did not advocate a "separate path" for Romania, his division of "backward" and "advanced, civilized" countries notwithstanding. He therefore coupled economic and social modernity with the traditional virtues of Romanian national character, arguing for the maintenance of the nation-state, as the ideal vehicle for the creation of a capitalist system.

Upon its publication, Gherea's book was discussed widely in the Romanian press. Russian socialists, like Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), also commented it favorably. During the interwar period, some of the arguments put forward in 'Neo-serfdom' were taken up by the corporatist author Mihail Manoilescu (1891–1950), in his attempt to find a way to increase the productivity of agriculture, and encourage high productivity industry, two essential conditions for the functioning of the corporatist state. During the 1950s, Gherea was labeled anti-Marxist and his writings marginalized. One argument was that Gherea was too much influenced by the conservative critique of "forms without substance" articulated, most exemplarily, by **Titu Maiorescu** (1840–1917). Another argument was that Gherea was not critical of sociopolitical forms borrowed from Western Europe, allegedly corresponding neither to Romania's native conditions nor to its stage of economic, social and political evolution. With the emergence of a new scholarship on the relationship between economic underdevelopment and modernization during the 1960s and 1970s, Gherea's ideas of neo-serfdom were revived by many Marxists scholars in Western Europe using Romania and other countries in Eastern Europe as case-studies for their analysis of the economic dependency in Latin America and Asia.

Neo-serfdom

After Gypsies and serfs were freed from serfdom and Western social-political and social-juridical order introduced, it had become obvious for most of those participating to or witnessing these profound social transformations that from this moment on, we had truly transformed into a civilized Western country. The social-juridical and political arrangements appeared as a sort of civilized garment which, replacing the Oriental one, transforms *ipso facto* the Oriental into a civilized person.

There were, of course, those of the 1848 generation who saw clearer and deeper; who realized that by changing this clothing—no matter how important this was in many ways—the individual's mentality and soul, and the profound social relations, especially socio-economic, have not changed. These individuals realized that a top-hat and a tailcoat can easily conceal a *Balkan* mentality and soul, and Balkan social relations: to use a term which has become common now. But they hoped that in time the new order will come into being, through the masses' moral and cultural education and schools, and through the functioning of institutions, which—it goes without saying—need some time to adapt to people and people to them. [...]

The years 1864–1866 were the honeymoon of 1848 liberalism. The Belgian constitution, one of the most liberal in Europe, was introduced to the Romanian lands. How many beautiful hopes, and how quickly and cruelly abandoned! It did not work from the beginning. It showed—as it was easy to predict—that the engine is crippled, that it cannot function, that on these socio-political and economic foundations the production does not advance, and that many powerful interests are at risk.

The neo-serfdom system instituted since 1866 has placed the peasant, as exploited material, at the owner and leaseholder's absolute power, and made possible and profitable his exploitation, now more intensive and exaggerated than the one permitted under the Organic Regulations.¹

One of the saddest consequences of our socio-economic system is, of course, the peasant revolt. In 1907, these revolts wrote one of the bloodiest and most tragic pages in our history, and history will judge them. History will judge the events of 1907 and give every one what they deserve. That's for sure. This work is not historical but sociological. It aims to explain the deep causes of social phenomena characterizing our agrarian life and thus,

¹ Constitutional documents adopted in 1831 in Wallachia and 1832 in Moldavia, respectively.

necessarily, the causes of this tragic phenomenon called peasant revolts. The problem to solve, however, is as important as the judgment of history—in some respects even more important.

What amazes and must amaze at first anyone who is slightly familiarized with social analysis is the periodicity of peasant revolts. In our country, revolts have something in common with the economic crises of the capitalist society explained by Karl Marx; they have the same periodicity, occurring nearly every ten years and growing in violence. [...]

We could analyze other factors which determine peasant revolts, but those enumerated and analyzed so far are enough; more so, as they are the main factors, representing all others. Our neo-serfdom, with its double-character of bourgeois capitalism and serfdom feudalism; multiple feuds, antagonisms and contradictions resulting from it; social anarchic relations in the countryside; the lack of legal norms; civic administration instituted without legal basis; the illegality which systematically affects the peasantry—all these create in the villages an atmosphere of dormant revolt. And in this atmosphere there appear powerful instigators, spreading in all villages and hamlets. These are: the state, through all its functions of a modern Western state, and the upper classes which appeared in the village itself: the peasant bourgeoisie. These powerful, large social forces gather and prepare—yearly, daily, hourly—explosive material, which, once accumulated in sufficient quantity, needs just a spark—one of many resulting from social fights—to explode. What was the spark in 1907, we all know. It was the anti-Semitic propaganda.

We are a country which is economically backward, and to catch up with the civilized capitalist countries, which have surpassed us so much in their cultural and economic development, we must follow the same path. And to follow this path we do not have to face fatal and invincible obstacles, resulting from our backwardness, or from the fact that we had come too late to the feast of universal capitalism and we cannot partake—as if all seats were taken—as argued by the Russian *narodniks* for Russia and by Mr Stere in our case.² No! What obstructs us to follow this cultural and economic path of development is our detested national household, with its neo-serfdom, with its bureaucratic state, with its unproductive consumption, etc. So, then, it is up to us and it is in our hands that, modifying and reforming our national household, we walk safely on the same path followed by advanced civilized nations.

² Constantin Stere (1865–1936): Romanian writer and theoretician of Romanian poporanism.

Oh, no! A poporanist-peasant society cannot be our ideal! Or the existing society; or the ideal-Romantic one! Oh, no! Not in a stable where it is so quiet to chew, and where one can vegetate so peacefully; and not in the courtyard where the hens, ducks and geese rummage around the soil, the roosters announce the dawn, and where Rostand³ found material and inspiration for his gobbledygook poems. Nor can a rustic-idyllic society be our and the country's ideal.

Where fight and life bubble, where the siren calls the workers, where the working people dig out of the entrails of the earth, where massive hammers break blocks of steel, where the forest of chimneys point toward the sky, announcing the human victory against nature, where ships cross the oceans, where in gigantic cities passions and ideas are fought, today's formidable culture and the immense culture of tomorrow is formed, where the great fight between work and capital is gauged, resulting into a new world... there and only there can our and the country's ideal be. This enormous unrest, struggle and relentless tumult are not pains announcing death but are birth pains. There, *the future* is born!

Translated by Marius Turda

³ Edmond Rostand (1868–1918): French poet and dramatist, promoter of neo-Romanticism

AUGUST CESAREC: THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND OUR MISSIONS

Title: *Nacionalno pitanje i naši zadaci* (The national question and our missions)

Originally published: *Borba, organ Nezavisna radničke partije Jugoslavije*; a series of four articles published in August and September 1923. The excerpt is the third article, published on 30 August 1923 under the sub-title *Osnovni naš nacionalni stav: federalizam*

Language: Croatian

The excerpt used is from August Cesarec, *Izbor članaka*, ed. by Nusret Seferović (Beograd: Kultura, 1962), pp. 30–35.

About the author

August Cesarec [1893, Zagreb – 1941, Zagreb]: writer and publicist. As a gymnasium student he joined the *Nacionalistička Omladina* (Yugoslav Nationalistic Youth), a radical revolutionary group of young Serbs and Croats advocating the idea of unitary Yugoslavism. In 1912, he was sentenced to three-year imprisonment for taking part in the assassination attempt of the Croatian *ban* Slavko Cuvaj (see **Franjo Rački**, *Yugoslavism*). In 1915, he went to occupied Serbia. In 1918, he joined the Socialist Party, and in 1920, was linked to the Communist fraction after the dismantling of the party. During the 1920s and 1930s, he became, along with his friend **Miroslav Krleža**, the most prominent Croatian left-wing intellectual. Simultaneously, Cesarec spearheaded the ‘socially engaged’ literary project, which ultimately led him to part ways with Krleža, who advocated the autonomy of art. He spent three years in the USSR (1934–1937), and published an enthusiastic account of Soviet life. Shortly before the German attack on Yugoslavia, he was imprisoned together with other Croatian communists, and was finally put to death by the *Ustasha* regime in July 1941. In socialist Yugoslavia, Cesarec’s intellectual contribution was perceived to be in line with that of Krleža, which had strongly contested Croatian ‘petit-bourgeois’ nationalism, and advocated the national emancipation of Croatia within a socialist South Slavic federation. However, after the 1990s, based on some of his works from the late 1930s which strongly emphasized the notion of Croatian national identity, Cesarec was reinterpreted by some critics as an advocate of an independent socialist Croatia.

Main works: *Đački pokret* [The students’ movement] (1912); *Sudite me: ispovijed siromaha* [Put me on trial: the confessions of a poor man] (1925); *Careva kral-*

jevina: roman o nama kakovi smo bili [The emperor's kingdom: the novel of what we were] (1925); *Stjepan Radić i republika* [Stjepan Radić and the republic] (1925); *Zlatni mladić i njegove žrtve: roman o svijetu na stranputici* [The golden youth and its victims: a novel about the world on the side-track] (1927); *Tonkina jedina ljubav* [Tonka's only love] (1931); *Psihoanaliza i individualna psihologija* [Psychoanalysis and individual psychology] (1931); *Bjegunci* [Fugitives] (1933); *Današnja Rusija* [Today's Russia] (1937); *Novele* [Short stories] (1939); *Sin Domovine* [The son of the homeland] (1940).

Context

In the aftermath of the First World War, the newly founded Yugoslav socialist movement advocated the idea of a unitary Yugoslav nation. This was partly motivated by the early post-War Comintern policy, aiming at an international proletarian revolution in a politically unstable Europe. However, it was also embedded strongly in the ideology of pre-war Croatian and Serbian socialist parties, as well as that of the left-wing faction of the 'Yugoslav Nationalist Youth,' a South Slavic youth movement from Austro-Hungary that advocated the national-revolutionary idea of radical Yugoslav integralism. All these factions considered the unitary Yugoslav nation as a precondition for south Slavic social emancipation. Along the lines of the Comintern agenda, the party labeled emerging non-Serb national identities as the invention of a reactionary bourgeoisie, thus focusing exclusively upon the notion of revolutionary class struggle. This position was even more radicalized after the break up of the socialist movement and the emergence in 1920 of an independent *Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije* (Communist Party of Yugoslavia, hereafter CPY), led mostly by the adherents of the ex-'Yugoslav Nationalist Youth.' The members of this group claimed that the process of Yugoslav national unification had been achieved, and hence they demanded the immediate start of socialist revolutionary activities. Due to its support of unitarism, and due to the efficient administrative measures of the government in curtailing communist agitation, the party, which had emerged as the strongest anti-regime political force in the chaotic conditions of the initial post-war years, would diminish into a minor political force by the early 1920s. The party was forced to abandon unitarism under the impact of new directives from the Comintern, stipulating the endorsement of the national-self determination principle as a precondition for socialist revolution.

Starting in 1922, this change of policy was the result of a broader strategic shift within the Comintern towards a communist alliance with the agrarian movements of the East European nations. Thus, the Comintern forced the CPY to support non-Serbian demands, in particular **Stjepan Radić's** Croatian Peo-

ple's Peasant Party, which labeled Yugoslavia and the other nascent East European states as "counter-revolutionary Versailles creatures," thus insisting on their dismantling. These newly emerged nations were expected to be incorporated into a 'Balkan-Danube federation of worker-peasant states.' By 1923, these new directions prompted a debate concerning the issue of nationality between two groups. On the one hand, there was the pro-Comintern left-wing faction, which was the majority and consisted mostly of ex-Yugoslav Nationalist Youth members, and on the other hand, there was the unitarist right-wing opposition, which comprised mostly the older generation of Serbian socialists. Finally, in 1924, the CPY announced its support of the national-self determination rights of the Croats, Macedonians and Slovenes within the framework of a Balkan-Danube alliance, endorsing the preservation of Yugoslavia only as a short-term arrangement. This policy was further radicalized in the early 1930s in the form of a program for the dismantling of Yugoslavia in line with the revival of the Comintern policy of 'class struggle.' It was eventually reversed after the appointment of **Josip Broz Tito** as the party leader in 1937, when the CPY adopted the notion of a South Slavic socialist federation, taking the USSR as its model. This notion remained valid throughout the entire life of socialist Yugoslavia until its final demise in the 1990s.

Cesarec's text represents the most profound expression of the left-wing faction's standpoint in the 1923 debate. It primarily targeted the 'right-wing' faction that considered peasant movements politically backward. It also argued against the claim that the notion of nationality was of an exclusively bourgeois character. Under Comintern pressure, the right-wing faction was forced to endorse political concessions to non-Serbian nations. Still, it kept insisting on the progressive character of unitarism as a catalyst for the "united working-class anti-capitalist front," due to its purported impact on the efforts of the backward Serbian bourgeoisie to reach the level of its more progressive Croatian and Slovenian counterparts. Thus, Cesarec first condemned the way the unitarian principle had been implemented, accusing its proponents of having undermined the revolution, as Serbian hegemony had only managed to transfigure Yugoslavia into "a state of nations." He also stressed his conviction that South Slavic unity could be defined according to "objective" criteria, thus revealing that he conceded to the existence of distinct South Slavic national identities only for strategic reasons. However, in order to support federalism, Cesarec firstly embarked on a reinterpretation of South Slavic political relations. This led to a shift away from the previous perception of the roles of the Croatian and Serbian peasantry. The latter, previously considered as the progressive agent of South Slavic unity, was now

viewed as its primary obstacle, due to its support for Serbian hegemony. On the other hand, Cesarec interpreted the Croatian peasant movement and other non-Serbian national initiatives as being progressive, since their demands for federation paved the ground for a socialist revolution. Ironically, since he followed the Leninist notion of federation as a transitional stage in achieving communist democratic centralism, Cesarec's federalism ended up achieving what the party had always opted for, that is the unitarist objective.

Although his vision of federation as an alliance of already shaped Croat, Serbian and Slovene nationalities resembled Stjepan Radić's idea of South Slav federalism, the latter was discredited by Cesarec on the grounds that federalism could not possibly be realized due to the ethnic heterogeneity of the South Slavic territories. This tension between the proclaimed principle of federation and an inherent centralist inclination was present throughout the entire history of the CPY, leading non-Serbian political agents to accuse Tito's socialist regime of promoting a 'Greater Serbian' ideal. However, Cesarec's undisguised advocacy of South Slavic federalism, almost without reference to the Comintern's 'Balkan–Danube alliance' project, distinguishes him from the left-wing mainstream that closely followed Comintern instructions.

In socialist Yugoslavia, Cesarec's text was labeled as the most outstanding indication of the CPY's turn from unitarism to federalism, and was also interpreted as a direct predecessor of the party's federalist program during the Tito era. In the 1990s, this reading was abandoned due to attempts to reinterpret Cesarec through his position in the late 1930s, when he had allegedly become an advocate of an independent communist Croatia.

SD

The national question and our missions

III. Our basic national standpoint: federalism

I have said that the bourgeoisie in Serbia—though at this point I prefer say the Serbian bourgeoisie outside Serbia¹—is experiencing the events of 1848 in the region north of the Danube and Sava and west of the Drina²—though

¹ 'Serbian' denotes the ethnic Serb population in present-day Serbia, while the 'Serb' denotes the ethnic Serb population from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the term 'Serb' is used as a generic term which refers to a whole Serb ethnic population.

² Cesarec refers to the region inhabited by "Prečani" which means literally "people living across or on the other side", that is to say, the population living across or on the other side of the Danube and Sava and west of the Drina River. The term is

at this point I prefer to say the events of 1848 in Croatia. Naturally, this comparison is not at all perfect and can reveal quite opposing features! However, it does reveal two important similarities: first, that the Serbian bourgeoisie is suppressing the national revolution of the Croats and the Slovenes in the same manner as the Croatians have done to the Hungarians; and second, that the Serbian bourgeoisie, as once the Croatian one did, used to side with Russia and the Habsburgs, while now it functions in its international relations as a total and official vassal siding with the main leaders of today's European counterrevolution, England and especially France. I may add that the Serbian bourgeoisie is not going through any national revolution such as the one that occurred in Croatia in 1848 because it went through it a long time ago or it is going through it to the extent to which the Serbs north of the Danube and Sava and west of the Drina are going through it, and that, at the same time, this bourgeoisie maintains power which enables it to support this final national revolution of the Serbs with violence against the revolutions of the Slovenes and Croats as well as the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Therefore, we have to conclude that even on the national level, this bourgeoisie was progressive until unification—of course, with some interruptions—but ceased to be so after the unification. This bourgeoisie is still not progressive today; to the contrary, it is reactionary.

"What does this mean, did you not say initially that Yugoslavia meant progress?" I hear some complain. "And who guards this progress today but the Serbian bourgeoisie? So, how can it be that this bourgeoisie is no longer progressive?"

However, it is enough to recall some claims from my other paper, in which I stated that this progress came from above and not below. Moreover, this progress was carried out without the people's vote at the exact moment when the people should have been asked—at the moment of the state's establishment—and this created a knot before our very eyes in which our national question became entangled: Yugoslavia as a state means progress, but progress does not mean Yugoslavia as it currently is. The unification of nations means progress, but progress does not mean the unification that is about to be carried out. By neglecting the manner in which our nation has become part of Yugoslavia, in which it has never integrated formally and from which it has remained ideologically separate, the Serbian bourgeoisie has shown total inability to realize that our people, especially those from north of the Danube

used by Serbians to denote Slovenians and Croats, as well as Bosnian and Croatian Serbs.

and Sava and west of the Drina, can reach a new stage only via a step-by-step policy of national compromise in order to be able to develop along the lines of the ideological unification following formal unification. On the contrary, due to clear objectives and numerous personal reasons, the Serbian bourgeoisie has opted for a reactionary method of imposed unilateralism and dictatorship realized politically in the form of centralism, which simply means a grave violation of the principle of national self-determination and national subjugation disguised in some abstract principle of national oneness.

It is the fault of the Serbian and, until the end of 1920, the Croatian and Slovene bourgeoisie that national oneness has become a mere abstract principle without content. Even though objectively speaking we still constitute one nation, the common people do not feel this way at all! And we must, by all means, draw the conclusion that Yugoslavia, which is based on the principle of the nation-state, is, as a matter of fact, a state of nationalities, a state of the peoples.

All other conclusions that have by now become our missions' duties regarding the national question are drawn from this conclusion which is historically justifiable and completely understandable only to those who look at history through a dialectical lens and who see in history a guarantee for the proletariat, for that matter, not absolutely necessary for a more regular and more individual development of our nation in the future, in accordance with our objective national oneness.

In his propositions prepared for the Second Congress of the Comintern, under item 2 Lenin has emphasized the following: "[...] The Communist Party, as a conscious representative of the fight of the proletariat for the sake of overthrowing the oppression of the bourgeoisie, must, even when it comes to the national question, start not from the abstract and formal principle, but from the following: first, with the exact estimation of the specific historical and especially economic conditions; second—which I will give in brief—with the exact identification of interests of the working class in contrast to "general" national interests and interests of the bourgeoisie; and third, with a clear delineation between the oppressed nations and oppressing nations."

Let us see how we can comply with Lenin's conditions. As regards the Serbs, I believe that I have already fulfilled these conditions and I will discuss them in brief or make them more transparent: first, their bourgeoisie protects itself from an economically superior one using political hegemony, and it is politically and nationally violent and reactionary; second, the interests of their peasants are based on the objective agreement with other peasants and the working class, and are, hence, completely in opposition to the

interests of the bourgeoisie. However, let us not be mistaken, their peasants believe that their interests are safe from the bourgeoisie due to their partial objective benefits. And third, the Serbs are still the ruling nation in comparison to other nations even though from the point of view of class, they are partially oppressed by their own bourgeoisie.

Let us look at the opposite side without beating around the bush, or at least at the most serious example, that of the Croatians.

We notice the following. First, the Croatian bourgeoisie, though economically better positioned and as such better equipped to lead an economic unification of the state, is politically oppressed. Nevertheless, it is developing economically and even unifying the country economically by investing its capital all over the country. But due to its political limitations this economic development is slow.³ Second, its economic interests and the economic interests of other classes—the workers and peasants—are, as anywhere else, diametrically different due to class exploitation by the bourgeoisie. But this opposition, historically and politically speaking, shows two different phenomena that do not exist on the Serbian side. These are the following: first, the Croatian bourgeoisie, more than the Serbian one, is creating better conditions for leading the revolution of the proletariat and for instigating the industrialization and capitalist era of the proletariat; second, it is deprived of the political power and cannot function as a political and national oppressor of other classes and peoples. Moreover, all classes, especially the peasants, force the bourgeoisie to appropriate more progressive politics. And this is how we finally come to the answer under the third point: the whole Croatian nation,

³ Indeed, the reason for the decline of the Croatian bourgeoisie is not only connected to the situation conditioned by the Serbian hegemony, but also to the overall European condition marked by crises and the standpoints of numerous bourgeoisies in relation thereto. Even for the topic of our discussion, it would be useful to show the economic connections and foreign affairs of the Croatian bourgeoisie in relation to the situation in Europe. However, we cannot focus here thereon; it is clear that the Croatian bourgeoisie represents one of the European counterrevolutionary factions by siding hesitantly with England, which is increasingly becoming more dangerous than France, and tomorrow this faction may become reactionary. However, on the whole, the standpoint of the Croatian bourgeoisie in this matter is not as defined and visible as the standpoint of the Serbian one. However, it is extremely important to note that unlike the Serbian peasants, the Croatian as well as the Slovenian peasants stand side-by-side with their bourgeoisie more prominently, something which is especially visible in their standpoint towards Soviet Russia and Vrangél's White Army. This can be attributed to one reason alone: the burden of feudalism and the unresolved agrarian question are not tormenting Serbian peasants to the same degree [Author's footnote].

notwithstanding class differences, feels nationally oppressed—bourgeoisie, peasants and workers alike.

If the same kind of analysis were applied to other nations, the results would be similar, provided we identified those other nations territorially as the Montenegrins, or nationally as the Slovenes, Macedonians or the ethnic minorities. We also see that all these nations have launched their struggle for self-determination against the rule of the Serbian nation, by using various slogans such as federation or autonomy.

We have seen that what lies behind the Serbian slogan of centralism—besides hegemony and reaction—is only an abstract principle of national oneness: hence, who knows what catchwords such as federalism, confederacy and autonomy may stand for.

First of all, we will not go far if we identify those slogans as being exclusively bourgeois even if they are also definitely bourgeois slogans. It is our historical sin that both the bourgeoisie, and the peasants, have identified them before we have. It is common knowledge that the bourgeoisie hides its class interests behind such slogans. Moreover, it was because of such slogans that the bourgeoisie itself started cooperating with the Bosnian feudal lords after the Vidovdan Constitution in exchange for Serbia prior to the stated Constitution. These are all historical sins of the bourgeoisie that will come around to haunt it. These are our sins as well and we must expose them with our class politics. However, this does not mean that we have done enough by expressing our disapproval because disapproval itself does not mean anything, or it means everything—to the Serbian bourgeoisie, the emblem of national oppression.

We must not, not even for a moment, forget the historical meaning of the Croatian and Slovene bourgeoisies which they adopted unquestioningly when they sided with the ultimate national revolution. The historical meaning of these two bourgeoisies already lies in the fact that unlike the Serbian bourgeoisie and notwithstanding their rejection of national oneness and support for federalism, they have unconsciously become the most important factor of a possible step towards achieving oneness, or at least national reconciliation as a precondition for centralism: this, following the rage of nationalism, is our ultimate goal in a distant future. As progress used to be on the side of the Serbian bourgeoisie, so is historical-dialectic progress on the side of the Croatian and Slovene bourgeoisies. The materialization of this progress is visible in their slogans on federation and autonomy, which are not based on some abstract principle but on the totality of specific national movements of the common people.

Hence, we cannot deprive the bourgeoisie of its right to national self-determination or even oppose their slogans based on the pretext that they come from the bourgeoisie alone; on the contrary, we must support them but we must do so in a wiser manner than before. It is our duty to warn the common people that their fight for self-determination is safer if they join forces with us, but we have to be aware that we will gain their trust only to the extent to which we show them that we are prepared to help them now when they follow the bourgeoisie and not us, which, in turn, means that we will be helping the bourgeoisie itself.

In this respect, we still need to be aware of our basic standpoint and our duty that I will elaborate on in conclusion.

Until recently, we have consumed ink writing about ourselves as being the only supporters of the idea of national oneness (which is actually true), and today, observing a revolt among the people, we have placed the emphasis on self-determination of the people that might go as far as separation. Is it enough? Is it not too geeky and insufficiently specific? I believe that we will keep on repelling the masses instead of drawing them closer by using such general slogans, and we will continue to give reasons to the federalist bourgeoisie to successfully present us to the peasants and workers as social patriots and label us as agents of national oppression imposed by the Serbian bourgeoisie. However, we need to add some fuel of living concreteness to our dry slogans in order to make them burst into flames that may become the guiding lights of the masses. The only way we can achieve this is by positioning ourselves in relation to the specific demands of individual nations or countries as verified twice during elections.

So, what shall we do?

We are all against centralism, today's state centralism led in the name of national oppression—though we are always for centralism of the party.⁴ We have to be against it notwithstanding the standpoint of the Serbian peasants. "Democracy of the proletariat must now be aware of the Russian chauvinism of the great Russian peasants—not in the sense of concessions but in the

⁴ However, some may ask whether state centralism implies the centralism of the party. These two are not related. Even when the latter was put into jeopardy, we should not place it above the national revolution leading to the Croatian separation. However, this very separation is highly unlikely, despite the apparent interests of even the most radical Croatian bourgeoisie and peasants on the national level. Hence, the slogan of self-determination until separation has, in this respect, probably no solid ground and is interesting only to those who hide their unconscious opportunism behind this most radical word in relation to the current forceful oneness of the state [Author's footnote].

sense of fight—and it will have to remain so, probably for a very long time.” However, when we have finally found our way, we now must admit that we have stopped half way through. Now when our sick leg is well again, we are afraid to step forward courageously and consistently and say what we stand for, since we have said what we are against. We, the democratic proletariat, can only support what the oppressed peoples of certain counties have voted for on two occasions: autonomy, where people seek autonomy—be it within the state along with the Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and Montenegrins, or outside the state within a wider federation with the Macedonians and possibly the Montenegrins, or for federation or confederation as desired by the Croats.

“Federation represents a transition toward the total oneness of the workers of different nations”, as Lenin has stated in the above quoted works. Only subjectively do we represent different nations today. So, can anything stop us or is it not our obligation and basic mission to support and vote for this transitory form that will surely be transitory even after our revolution of the proletariat?

All other duties come out of this basic mission. I will not elaborate on them because I believe that they depend on local specific conditions in various counties and among various peoples. What matters is that I believe that the further duties as well as our whole national politics can be successful only if we accept our basic duty and standpoint, namely, federalism. When I say federalism I actually mean what some nations of Yugoslavia name differently—autonomy, confederation, etc.

Translated by Iva Polak

OTTO BAUER: THE AUSTRIAN REVOLUTION

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About the author

Otto Bauer [1881, Vienna – 1938, Paris]: politician, sociologist and political journalist. Coming from a well-off Jewish bourgeois family, he studied law in Vienna, earning his doctoral degree in 1906. He joined the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SDAP) and became one of its main ideologues. A founder, together with **Karl Renner**, Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding, of the socialist educational movement *Die Zukunft* (The future) and contributor to various party periodicals, Bauer proved his theoretical talents with the publication of *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (The national question and social democracy) in 1907. In the same year he founded *Der Kampf* (The struggle), the theoretical journal of the party, and after the election success of the SDAP he became secretary to his party's parliamentary group until 1914. A soldier and prisoner of war in Russia during the First World War, Bauer assumed the leadership of his party's left wing upon his return in 1917. He became Austrian secretary of state at the end of the war; however, he stepped down in July 1919 after his policy of unification with Germany was rejected by the Entente in the Treaty of Saint-Germain. A successor of Viktor Adler, the party's founding father, Bauer remained its guiding personality for the two decades between the wars. During the 1920s he published series of books devoted to the Russian and 'Austrian' revolutions as well as various theoretical and tactical questions of the socialist movement. Despite suggesting radical approaches, in 1927, during demonstrations, and 1934, during the February workers' uprising, he turned out to be rather conciliatory in practice and condemned violence on the part of both the government and the workers. In 1934, after the social democratic *Schutzbund* (defensive alliance) was crushed by the Austro-fascist Dollfuß regime, Bauer fled to Brno (*Ger.* Brünn) in Czechoslovakia, where he established the exile bureau of the party and continued the publishing of the illegal *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (Workers' paper) and *Der Kampf*. Due to the increasing pressure of Nazi-Germany on Central Europe he fled to Paris in 1938, where he died of a heart attack in the same year. Prominent social democratic leader and theoretician, Bauer is considered the foremost representative of Austro-Marxism. His concepts of democratic socialism, integral socialism or the "third way" proved to be an inspiration as well as a bone of contention for European socialist thought throughout the twentieth century.

Main works: *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* [The nationality question and social democracy] (1907); *Der Weg zum Sozialismus* [The road to socialism] (1919); *Bolschewismus oder Sozialdemokratie?* [Bolshevism or social democracy?] (1921); *Die österreichische Revolution* [The Austrian revolution] (1923); *Der Kampf um Wald und Weide* [The struggle for forest and pasture] (1925); *Kapitalismus und Sozialismus nach dem Weltkrieg* [Capitalism and socialism after the World War] (1931); *Der Aufstand der österreichischen Arbeiter. Seine Ursachen und seine Wirkung* [The uprising of Austrian workers. Its reasons and consequences] (1934); *Zwischen den Weltkriegen? Die Krise der Weltwirtschaft, der Demokratie und des Sozialismus* [In-between the World Wars? The crisis of world economy, democracy and socialism] (1936); *Die illegale Partei* [Illegal party] (1939).

Context

November 1918 meant an overall change for Austria that—militarily defeated and economically exhausted—transformed from a multinational empire and European great power into a small Central European state with little of its own distinct identity. In political terms, the constitutional monarchy was replaced by a republican regime. The rest of the former *Reichsrat*—turned into a provisional national assembly—gave Austria a new constitution and elected a government, the so called *Staatsrat*, whose leadership was entrusted to **Karl Renner**, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. The new context dramatically altered the political situation of SDAP from basically a party of protest and steady opposition in Parliament and in the streets to the political pillar of the state-building next to the other major party, the Christian Socialists. The new role proved to be all the more demanding for social democrats as they were trying to come to terms with their own ambiguous positions on the state and the exercise of power, a dilemma already reflected in their attitudes towards the war effort.

After 1914, a fundamental schism appeared between the patriotic ‘right’ and anti-war left. The first, led by Renner, supported the Austrian war effort by invoking patriotic emotions among the workers and calling for a *Burgfrieden* (party truce) with the bourgeois parties during the war in an effort to preserve Austro-Hungarian territorial integrity. The other camp personified by Friedrich Adler and other Austro-Marxist leftists attending the international socialist congress in Zimmerwald, Switzerland in September 1915, denounced the ‘social patriotism’ and advocated militant pacifism and the consequent internationalist stance of the workers’ movement. Critical of the right-wing socialists, as the leftists were, they simultaneously tried hard to dissociate themselves from the Bolsheviks under Lenin’s leadership, who had begun to use the congress as a slipway to the launching of the Communist International. After the war, the Austrian party, now dominated by its left

wing, with Otto Bauer in the forefront, found itself in-between the reformist socialism of the Second International and the radical and subversive revolutionary tactics of the Third International under Moscow's directions. The establishment in 1921 of the short-lived *Arbeiterschaft sozialistischer Parteien*, irreverently nicknamed the Two-and-a-half International, epitomized the efforts of Austro-Marxism, which according to Bauer "had always striven to adopt a middle course between reformism and Bolshevism".

The emergence and subsequent consolidation of the Austrian Republic rested from the very beginning on a working agreement between the Christian socialists and social democrats. A show of unanimity was a requirement for both, the revitalization of material and spiritual resources needed to rebuild the country as well as the negotiations with the victorious Allies with the main aim to impress on them the overwhelming popular desire for unification with the German Republic. Propelled by the dynamics of its newly-won importance and authority, the social democrats could not but consider the state as an ally in the battle for the realization of their social demands. And, indeed, the two years of the socialist support for the coalition brought the working class substantial material, political and social benefits; at the same time, though, it did not lead to any change in the country's economic structure or property relations of the bourgeois society. Once the party left the government and resumed its traditional role in opposition, Otto Bauer felt the need to account for the peculiar historical situation of the first few post-war years and square it with Marxist theory. *Die österreichische Revolution*, published in 1923 by Bauer, former adherent of the supranational empire, is an impressive attempt to give a fair and critical judgment of the Austrian Republic and its accomplishments. Inspired by the theory of state as a neutral social agent developed by Hans Kelsen, the outstanding jurist and philosopher of law, and Karl Renner, Bauer referred especially to Engels's concept of the equilibrium of power reached by the embattled classes in the course of their historical fight for progress. This was, according to Bauer, exactly the case of Austria after the short period of proletarian supremacy. The country had been a genuine 'people's republic' (*Volksrepublik*) from 1919 to 1922 when social democrats took part in the government. From a historical point of view it was just a transient phenomenon, a result of a peculiar 'Austrian revolution' initiated, at the beginning, by the 'national revolutions' of Czech, Polish and South-Slavic bourgeoisies in their disruptive campaign against the Empire, leading, however, to social revolution in German-Austria and Hungary. In the period of the 'people's republic,' the state ceased to be an instrument of class rule and instead assumed the role of mediator between pro-

gressive proletariat and conservative peasant population. After the external influences upset the balance in 1922, the state once again threatened to revert to its original oppressive and exploitative role, a development that in Bauer's view the social democrats were destined to prevent.

Not only formerly privileged groups in the society such as the high clergy or the former imperial army officer corps, but also a large section of the middle classes never ceased to disparage the 'ill-begotten' republic, whose birth and achievements were far from being revered as a unifying national symbol. Hence, it was the Austro-Marxists who generally became associated with the legacy of the first Republic, the political reins of which they lost early on. But there was a fundamental ambiguity in the social democratic politics represented among others by the present text of Bauer: discrepancy between the constitutional and revolutionary alternative, between the equivocal acceptance of parliamentary democracy and refusal to resort to any violent means on the one hand, and the fervent revolutionary rhetoric never supplemented with dedicated action on the other. By many sympathetic left-wing critiques in Austria and elsewhere, this ambiguity has been considered one of the main theoretical flaws of Austro-Marxism as much as a practical failure of the social democrats in their abortive fight for the Republic.

MK

The Austrian revolution

[...] The fight we have to fight is a struggle for class power. Whether class interests will be implemented or not depends on the power of the classes. The latter will be decisive for the proportional distribution of the costs for each class to bear for the financial restructuring of the state. But it's not simply a matter of power and interests. Just as any major class struggle, our fight for class power and class interests involves the fight between different concepts of how life shall be fashioned in government, society, culture and the intellectual spheres. Each fighting class represents one of these concepts.

As long as the state does not possess the means to violently crush mass movements, it must seek the approval of the masses; it must achieve a consent based on the free will and comprehension of the masses. The state can thus only lead the masses by mental and intellectual means. Once the state will be in possession of the means of violence in order to oppress and throw down the masses, it will have no need for intellectual leadership skills. They will be then substituted by the means of violence. As long as the state can lead the masses by mental means, it needs intermediate organizations. This

function transforms the organizations into state-organs. They thus become co-dominators of the state. Once the state possesses the means of violence to throw down the masses, it will not require the intermediation of organizations. The development of a functional democracy brought about by the revolution will then shrivel and waste away. The state will fall back into a purely parliamentary democracy. As long as the state does not possess any means of violently overthrowing the proletariat, democracy will truly become the self-government of the entity of the nation (*Volksgesamtheit*). As soon as the state possesses sufficient means to oppress the proletariat and once the bourgeoisie obtains the majority of seats in Parliament during the elections, it will have absolute control over the proletariat. Democracy will be then transformed into a mere form of the bourgeoisie's class rule. This is what the fight is about: it is a struggle between the mental and violent forms of governmental leadership, a fight between functional and parliamentary democracy as a method of governance, between a democracy that means self-government of the whole nation and a democracy reduced to a form of class rule.

The result of this fight will be decisive for the attitude of the working masses towards the state. Until the revolution of 1918, the state had been a foreign and hostile power to the working masses. After the revolution of 1918 the working class suddenly was one of the supporters of the idea of the state. The will to maintain and to protect the Republic motivated the working people to self-discipline and self-control during those turbulent years of hunger between 1919 and 1920. Republican enthusiasm encouraged the working class to become pioneers in the defense of the Republic during the crisis of the Burgenland in 1921. The proletariat was determined to defend the Republic and thus it was willing even to make sacrifices during the financial and political fights of 1922. The change in the relations between the working class and the state had an effect on their relation to national politics. Until the revolution of 1918 the working class was a deadly enemy of national politics that reinforced the rule of the Austro-German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy over other nations living in the Habsburg monarchy. After 1918, the working class supported national politics, which since then stood for the right for self-determination of the Austro-German people. The working class supported the national idea in the struggle for the *Anschluss* to Germany in 1918–1919, the struggle for Burgenland in 1921, the struggle against the submission under foreign rule of international financial control in 1922. Yet, this submission caused a backward movement. If the state will again be transformed into a class organization in which the propertied class will violently exercise power over the workers, then the working masses will alienate themselves from the

state and will perceive it once more as an alien and hostile power. If the nation organizes itself for rule by the propertied class, then the violently oppressed working class will once again be in great opposition to the national idea. Hence, from the point of view of the working class, the question is whether the working class will be part of the authority exercising power in the state and the nation or whether it will be ruled by the state which will be dominated by the bourgeoisie and which will in turn constitute the nation. From the standpoint of the state and the nation, the question is whether the state and the nation will integrate the working masses, on which all state organizations and cultural life are based, or whether the state and the nation will shrink to organizations of the propertied class, whether it will violently rule over the working masses as if they are mere subjects of the state and the nation and will thus refuse to integrate the working masses.

These are the problems in their governmental, national and cultural dimensions in the transitional period we live in. Our next task will be to clearly delimitate the goals we want to fight for in this transitional period within the possible and the attainable. We must also adopt our fighting methods for the transitional period. We must be aware though, that the goals of the transitional period must be preliminary ones. Our tasks will be much greater and different once the transitional period passes and the disrupted revolutionary process starts anew. We must also be aware that the unstable balance of the new system of states and economy that emerged from the war can be annihilated earlier than we might have thought by events introducing a new revolutionary era.

However, during the transitional period the barriers of the treaties of St. Germain and Geneva limit our national existence. In this period we can merely defend the rest of our national independence but we cannot break open the barriers. But once new revolutionary upheavals in Europe will tear into pieces the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Riga and abolish the state system created by them, once the inner structures of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia experience a major crisis and once the permanent but latent danger of war in the territories of the ancient Austro-Hungarian Monarchy becomes acute, then we will find ourselves facing the same questions concerning our national existence as in 1918. The Treaty of Geneva does not solve the problem of our independent, national existence.¹ Neither does the financial restructuring of the state solve

¹ The Treaty of Geneva in October 1922 signed by Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and Great Britain provided a solution for the Austrian financial crisis but also introduced a ban on a possible unification of Austria with Italy or Germany and put the Austrian economy under international financial control.

the problem of national economics. No, it poses the problem to begin with. The Austrian economy now functions under the conditions of a state inhabited by merely five million people. Therefore, the Austrian economy will strive to break down the barriers of the small size of an economic territory during every European crisis. During every crisis in Europe we will find ourselves facing the same problems as in 1918: a supranational federation of the Danubian nations or a fusion of the Germans; restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or *Anschluss* to the German Republic.

The only possible and attainable goal during the transitional period is the People's Republic, in which no class will rule over any other, but in which all classes of the nation will share power. But the People's Republic alone won't overcome class antagonisms. Class differences cannot be abolished as long as the capitalist social order is maintained. Neither can class struggle come to an end as long as the peoples are divided into classes with different interests and ideals. The People's Republic is nothing else than the expression of a momentary balance of class power. Yet, the balance is threatened by the continued class struggle. Once major concussions in Europe arise, they will provoke a decisive class war between capital and work. Then, the balance of class power will be destroyed also in Austria. We will then only have the choice between a counterrevolution of the bourgeoisie or the revolution of the proletariat, the choice between capitalism and socialism.

We must beware of two fatal mistakes. We must beware of the mistakes of the Communists that expect the working class to fulfill certain tasks during the transitional period that can be only solved during a new revolutionary period. They confuse the present and the future.

On its way from feudalism to capitalism, mankind had to experience many successive revolutionary developments. Each of these processes caused transitional forms of governance and social life. These transitional forms were only resolved through the following revolutionary process, which in turn created higher preliminary forms. Finally, transcending the manifold transitional forms, mankind went its way from an absolute feudal system in the thirteenth century to a purely bourgeois state in the nineteenth century. In the same way, mankind will have to go through long revolutionary processes, through many transitional forms of governance and social life, on its way from capitalism to socialism.

The revolution of 1918 constitutes one of the many revolutionary processes succeeding each other. The revolution that destroyed the old Habsburg Monarchy was not ours. It was not the revolution of the Austro-German proletariat but of the Czech, Yugoslav and Polish bourgeoisie. But the Austro-German

proletariat used the national-bourgeois revolution in order to annihilate the absolute authoritarian state on our soil, in order to strengthen the rule of the proletariat in the state, in the country and borough, in all caserns and offices, in all schools, factories, workshops and estates. The effect of the revolution was a People's Republic, a transitional form of social life that is still based on the capitalist economic system. Yet the latter is no longer under the rule of the authoritarian classes of the capitalist society alone. We now find ourselves in a transitional condition of public life, in which the bourgeoisie no longer controls the state by itself. But the proletariat alone does not yet rule the state. The state is no longer the bourgeoisie's tool to subjugate the proletariat, neither is it a tool of the proletariat to overcome the economic rule of the bourgeoisie. Today, the revolution of 1918 is finished. For the moment, the task of the proletariat is restrained to the defense of the results of the revolution against the reaction of the bourgeoisie. We must now defend the transitional conditions of governance and social life. Once persisting problems become urgent and introduce a revolutionary process, then the transitional period that emerged from the revolution of 1918 will be overthrown. A new revolutionary process will then bring about a new, higher transitional form of life. This way, the working class must experience many revolutions to come. After every revolutionary phase, the working masses must defend the emerged transitional governmental and social forms of life against setbacks until a new revolutionary process allows the proletariat to develop a higher transitional form of public life emerging from the turbulences of the revolution. The working class is thus obliged to strive for higher and newer forms of governance and social life. It must rise to achieve new phases in the historical transformation process of the capitalist to a socialist society. It must strive until the goal is attained until socialist society becomes a reality. In this revolutionary process, the idea of the People's Republic that emerged from the revolution of 1918 will be realized and concluded. Today, the People's Republic is only an expression of the momentary balance of the fighting classes. This balance will in turn be repeatedly overthrown in the class struggle. Yet, the People's Republic will be fulfilled only in the socialist society. Due to private property of the means of production, the socialist state will abolish class antagonisms within the nation; it will overcome class differences and class struggles. Only then will the people's community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) be realized and no longer be torn apart by classes fighting each other.

Translated by Agnieszka Wiercholska

ABRAHAM BENAROYA: THE SOCIALIST FRENZY OF TWO DECADES

Title: *Ὁ σοσιαλιστικός ὄργασμός δύο δεκαετιῶν* (The socialist frenzy of two decades)

Original published: In installments in the newspaper *Ταχυδρόμος* (Postman) in 1931

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from the latest edition entitled *Ἡ πρώτη καριέρα τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ προλεταριάτου* (The first career of the Greek proletariat) with an introduction by Angelos Elefantis ('Αθήνα: Ἴολκός, 1975), p. 69–72.

About the author

Abraham Benaroya [1887, Vidin (present-day north-west Bulgaria) – 1979, Holon (Israel)]: journalist, trade unionist and socialist theoretician. In 1907, he graduated from high school and became a teacher of Bulgarian at a Jewish school in Plovdiv (*Tur.* Filibe, *Gr.* Filipoupolis). He had already been involved in socialist activities while in high school. In 1905, he founded the first socialist newspaper in the Ottoman Empire *El journal del laborador* (Newspaper of the workers) in *Ladino*, that is Judeo-Spanish, the idiom used by the Sephardic Jews of the Balkans. Following the Young Turk revolution, he left Plovdiv and went to Salonica (*Gr.* Thessaloniki, *Tur.* Selanik, *Bg.* Solun) via Edirne (*Gr.* Adrianoupolis, *Bg.* Odrin) with the intention of taking advantage of the new conditions created in a city where the largest community was Jewish. In September 1908, he managed to found a socialist Sephardic society, which, in April 1909, was named the 'Labor and Socialist Society.' In July 1909, Benaroya played a key role in the foundation of the *Federacion Socialista Laboradera* (Workers' socialist federation), which became the major workers' association in Thessaloniki, and managed to bring together workers and intellectuals from different communities. The Jews and the Bulgarians were the most numerous. He then published the newspaper *Solidaridad obradera* (Workers' solidarity), the official paper of *Federacion*. Benaroya was not a Zionist. In his view, the solution of the 'nationality issue' in the Ottoman Empire would be achieved through the social liberation within a federative multinational state. He was also critical of the nationalist fervor that led to the Balkan wars. Therefore, he clashed with the 'nationalist' socialists such as Nikos Yiannios (1885–1958), among the founders of the *Σοσιαλιστικόν Κόμμα Ἑλλάδος* (Socialist Party of Greece) in 1911. At the end of the First World War, in November 1918, Benaroya played a leading role in the foundation of the *Σοσιαλιστικόν Ἐργατικόν Κόμμα Ἑλλάδος* (ΣΕΚΕ) (Socialist Workers'

Party of Greece). He was one of its leading figures until 1924, when the former leadership, Benaroya included, was ousted and the party was renamed the Communist Party of Greece. The removal of the old guard in 1924, cost the Communist Party the alienation of a great deal of its supporters, who could not identify with the Bolshevik policy of the young leaders. Moreover, the accusation of being a 'reformist' or 'social democrat' would haunt many important figures of the Labor movement. It was only in 1968, after the split in the Communist Party of Greece, that the contribution of figures like Benaroya was recognized. The new Interior Communist Party of Greece created its own genealogy and political heritage. It turned to the roots of Greek socialism, to the era before the domination of Bolshevik orthodoxy, and promoted figures such as Benaroya among its ideological forefathers.

Main works: *Ὁ σοσιαλιστικός ὄργασμός δύο δεκαετιῶν* [The socialist frenzy of two decades] (1931).

Context

As an outcome of the Young Turk revolution and the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution in July 1908 (see **Georgios Boussios**, *The political program of Hellenism in Turkey*), favorable circumstances were created for political and trade unionist activity. In July 1909, Salonica, the city where the revolution had itself gained momentum, witnessed the founding of the *Federacion Socialista Laboradera*, that united workers from all ethno-religious communities. The Committee of Union and Progress, the secret society set up by the Young Turks, dominated political life and tried to eliminate trade unionism through a series of repressive measures. When it did not manage to achieve this goal, it turned against the *Federacion* itself and, in November 1911, its offices were closed down. Despite the persecution, the *Federacion* remained powerful until the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and its members played a significant role in the emergence, first, of the Greek Socialist Party in 1918, and of the Greek communist party in 1924.

The most heated debate among the leading figures of the *Federacion* was the nationality question, which constituted a widely contentious issue for all social democrats in the period before the First World War. What was at stake was how the nationality question was going to be combined with the international aspiration of socialism, especially in relation to the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire. The fundamental principle of the *Federacion* was the creation of an association "in which all nationalities could participate without abandoning their language and their culture." In other words, each nationality would be able to retain its specific character while joining forces to achieve the common task: the socialist ideal. The Balkan Wars delivered the harshest

blow to the *Federacion*. As a reaction to the wars and to the annexation of Salonica to the Hellenic state, the party turned even more anti-imperialistic and internationalist, and the conflict between different internal groups ended up with the domination of the leftist faction led by Joseph Hazan.

Following the annexation to the Hellenic state, the whole city lived in a state of emergency. The socialists refused to accept the annexation and considered it an act of occupation. In particular, within the Jewish community, this led to an expansion of the Zionist movement. To make things worse, the Jewish community would experience a real disaster with the fire of 1917, which eliminated the commercial center of the city. The authorities took advantage of the calamity relocating the Jewish community far from the center. The community would gradually adapt to the new circumstances. A large part of it would also gradually develop a Greek national awareness, which became apparent in the participation of many Greek Jews in the Greek–Italian war of 1940–1941 and in the resistance movement against the ensuing German occupation. However, the devastating final blow for the Jewish community came in 1943, when almost 50,000 people were deported to concentration camps all over Germany. Only a few thousand managed to return, thus turning a population which used to consist a good half of the city's population into a tiny minority.

Benaroya's early involvement in socialist activity coincided with the transition of a multi-communal Ottoman Salonica, mobilized by the constitutional regime introduced in 1908, into a Greek city which sought homogeneity and preferred to marginalize 'foreign' elements. In his account, 'The socialist frenzy of two decades,' Benaroya narrated the history of the Greek socialist movement through his own experience. His aim was to defend his choices and views, which cost him his position of leadership. The language he employs in the text is of a peculiar unadorned style. However, it is known that his Greek was not sufficient and that he started learning it after 1908, when his activity brought him into contact with Greek socialists. Consequently, it is certain that somebody else helped him by polishing the language of the text.

In the excerpt presented here, he describes his first visit to Athens, where he met the leader of the first period of the Greek socialist movement, Platon Drakoulis (1858–1934), who advocated a mix of utopian, socialist, Christian and anarchist ideas, as well as the new leader Nikos Yiannios along with many other important figures. Among other things, the text is interesting for depicting the first celebration of the 'Workers' day' in Athens. During the demonstration that day, the police arrested the socialist group, and Benaroya

was declared to the police as a ‘foreigner.’ In fact, this was the way he felt about himself, despite the fact that he would become, later on, one of the central figures of the Greek socialist movement. It was only in 1966 that Benaroya entrusted his text to the historian Georg Haupt in the hopes that it would be republished in Greece. The text was eventually published in 1975, a year after the fall of the military dictatorship in Greece under the title *Η πρώτη καριέρα του ελληνικού προλεταριάτου* (The first career of the Greek proletariat). The publication was clearly aimed at providing a genealogy for the socialist movement on behalf of this part of the communist left that wished to break with the Bolshevik tradition and embrace the ideas of the first generation of socialists.

VK

The socialist frenzy of two decades

His first visit was to the Athens Workers’ Center, which had been founded a year earlier. But the socialist Israelite at once encounters an environment different to that of Salonica, Belgrade and Constantinople. In the Center’s main hall, instead of a picture of Marx he encounters an icon of Christ; instead of the hospitable concern of his comrades, a cool and indifferent attitude by all, including his fellow printers. He wonders whether there is a separate socialist center in Athens. He is accompanied to what was then called the *Σύνδεσμος των Εργατικών Τάξεων* (League of working classes), led by Drakoulis, on Pireos Street. He walks in and encounters once again the figure of Christ rather than that of Marx. The practically old Drakoulis welcomes the political exile in a somewhat more “socialist,” human way.

Thus, Benaroya learns of the existence of a ‘Socialist Party’ presided over by Drakoulis and a ‘Socialist Center’ led by N. Yiannios, known to him from Constantinople. The Socialist Party had the ‘League of Working Classes’ under its care and published *Ερευνα* (Research) (a magazine). The ‘Socialist Centre’ had under its influence the *Πρόοδος* (Progress) trade union, which published *Άμυνα* (Defense) (a fortnightly trade union newspaper). Benaroya rushes over to the *Klafthmonos* coffee house, which housed the offices of the ‘Socialist Center’ in its “loft.” Here he was welcomed differently. He is a comrade coming from abroad. Socialist sentimentality, curiosity and finally pure courtesy welcome the Israelite exile. Intellectuals and workers surround the foreigner and besiege him with thousands of questions.

The Socialists

During that time, the “loft” of this coffee house was the meeting-place for practically the whole of Greek socialism. It is where its leader would appear, the one-time *demoticist* school teacher from Constantinople, N[ikos] Yiannios, editor of the first Greek socialist newspaper to be published in Constantinople, *Ὁ Εργάτης* (The worker), he too a collaborator of S. Papadopoulos as well as of the socialist member of Parliament Vlachov and the—more orthodox than him—Bulgarian socialists of Constantinople. Here in Athens, N. Yiannios’s pre-eminence was unquestionable. A sober teacher, he always treated his followers like a teacher who taught socialism at night, the same way as he taught... French during the day: with authority and severity. That is where Yannis Pikros (a pseudonym of the then student and present-day lawyer Papaioannou), a poet and lively intellectual, came to socialism from the aristocracy; that is where H. Apostolidis, then a powerful intellectual journalist, [would go]; and also the well-known writers S[pyridon] Melas and D[imitris] Hatzopoulos (the two latter, having walked out later due to their ... “trade union” principles, put together a separate group, while Apostolidis, having disagreed with Yiannios, departed); and Ch. Michalis, Ioannidis, Zekos, Delazanos, Paliouras, etc., all workers.

Present there was also K. Athanatos, then very young and now distinguished as a journalist, who was already editor of *Ἀνάστασις* (Resurrection), a magazine for socialist youth. Lectures, discussions and lessons on socialism and Marxism were held regularly. It was late April, and May Day was going to be celebrated for the first time according to the new calendar. At the ‘Socialist Center,’ discussions and preparations were taking place. At Drakoulis’s Center as well. The ‘League of Working Classes’ decides to hold a celebration. Negotiations are held concerning a joint celebration, but no understanding is reached and the ‘Socialist Center’ is left to act freely. The decision is made: the members of the ‘Socialist Center’ and anyone from the *Πρόδος* trade union who wishes to will gather at the countryside coffee house of *Metsi* near the Stadium. A celebratory issue of *Ἀμύνα* (Defense) will be published. There, at the coffee house, the red flag will fly for the first time, speeches will be made and socialist hymns will be sung. Thus had spoken the leader N. Yiannios and thus it would be. But socialist hymns could not be sung by all, because the majority did not know them. Pikros undertook the task and set to work. He translated two or three. And Benaroya took on the job of music teacher. At the Zappeion [Square], on isolated benches, preparatory “concerts” were held. The socialist workers of Greece, still only a

handful of people, were taught the socialist hymn of the Internationale as translated by Pikros.

On Mayday, the program was carried out in its entirety. N. Yiannios spoke first, the poet Pikros and others read socialist poems, the foreign guest also spoke, and then came the turn of another, the student Papadimitriou. The red flag was flying, the sounds of the socialist hymns had reached the ears of the gendarmerie, and before Papadimitriou's speech came to an end, the police arrived, arrested everyone *in flagrante delicto*, and, having lowered the flag, led everyone—about twenty-five people in total—under escort to police headquarters. Those apprehended were somewhat daunted at first, despite the encouragement of their leaders, but they recovered along the way, and the escort quickly turned into a demonstration, with cheering, songs and protests. Curious and surprised, people gathered and thus May Day according to the new calendar, assisted by the police, made its appearance in the middle of Athens.

At police headquarters, Commander Mr. Zymvrakakis, half-amused, half-solemn, interrogated the 'Organizing Committee.' The position of those arrested who were still arriving had not been decided. The exile Benaroya, under the threat of a new exile and despite exhortations to escape, did not want to miss such an "important" event. But comrade Athina Gaitanou Gianniou (among the celebrants there were three women) managed to convince an officer that [Benaroya] was a "foreigner" who happened by chance to be there and to free the "foreigner." But as soon as we arrived at police headquarters, all those arrested were released together with the 'Organizing Committee,' upon which they poured out into the streets, cheering: Long Live May Day, Long Live Zymvrakakis (!).

Nowadays the demonstration is larger and Klafthmonos Square reverberates with the sound of shouting and song. In the "loft," the leader, solemn and severe as always, reviews the events of the day and the celebration comes to an end.

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

ATTILA JÓZSEF: BY THE DANUBE

Title: *A Dunánál* (By the Danube)

Originally Published: in Ferenc Fejtő, ed., *Mai magyarok régi magyarokról*, Budapest, Cserépfalvi, 1936

Language: Hungarian

The text used is from the critical edition: Attila József, *Összes versei* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1962), pp. 409–411.

About the author

Attila József [1905, Budapest – 1937, Balatonszárszó]: one of the most important Hungarian poets of the twentieth century. His father was a soap-maker, most probably of Romanian origins, who left the family in 1908. József's mother, a laundry-woman, raised him and his two older sisters in poverty. After the death of his mother, his sister married a well-to-do lawyer and took the adolescent Attila into her custody. His poetry gained the attention of the reputed poet Gyula Juhász, who helped him publish poems in periodicals and wrote an introduction to his first published volume. He entered the University of Szeged to study Hungarian and French but he never finished his studies. In 1925, he went to Vienna and enrolled at the university there. He became acquainted with the left-wing emigrant artists Béla Balázs, Lajos Kassák, Lajos Hatvany and Andor Németh (who became his best friend). In 1926, with the help of Lajos Hatvany, the most important supporter of modernist literature in the first decades of the century, he went to Paris. He studied at Sorbonne, where he also joined the *Union Anarchiste-Communiste*. In 1927, he returned to Budapest. His poems were published in many modernist and leftist periodicals and dailies, including the major social-democratic paper *Népszava* (Voice of the people), the modernist *Nyugat* (West), the civic radical *A Toll* (The pen), and the Transylvanian leftist *Korunk* (Our epoch). After the failure of his plans to marry an upper-class girl, he was hospitalized with neurasthenia. Both in his poetry and political ideas, he sought to fuse Marxism, psychoanalysis and existentialism. His un-orthodox understanding of the communist doctrine brought him into conflict with the Hungarian Communist Party in 1935. In 1936, he became editor of the newly founded *Szép Szó* (Beautiful word). At this time, his psychological condition was deteriorating and he spent several months in hospital and in a sanatorium. He committed suicide by throwing himself under the wheels of a passing freight train. After his death, Attila József was not immediately made part of the national poetic canon, as he was rather marginal both politically and aesthetically. No longer a communist, he was not glori-

fied by the radical left, but, at the same time, he definitely did not have anything to do with the official discourse. After 1945, he was canonized as a proletarian poet, erasing the memory of his conflict with the Communist Party. In the 1960s, the complexity of his existential poetry was gradually rediscovered and he became one of the common intellectual references for asserting creativity, intellectual autonomy and political liberty.

Main works: *A szépség koldusa* [The beggar of beauty] (1922); *Nem én kiáltok* [It is not I who shouts] (1925); *Nincsen apám se anyám* [I have neither father nor mother] (1929); *Döntsd a tőkét ne siránozz!* [Fell the tree-trunk, don't cry]¹ (1931); *Külvárosi éj* [Suburban night] (1932); *Medvetánc* [Bear dance] (1934); *Nagyon fáj* [It pains me much] (1936); *Összes versei és válogatott írásai* [Collected poems and selected writings] (1938).

Context

By the early 1930s, the intellectual opposition to the neo-conservative regime that had emerged a decade earlier was, to a large extent, divided into two subcultures: the so-called ‘populists’ (*népiek*) and ‘urbanites’ (*urbánusok*). In a way, this division can be considered a local version of the intellectual cleavage typical in all Eastern European cultures, going back to the Russian debate of Slavophiles and Westernizers. However, in the Hungarian case, the two camps perhaps shared more common features than was the case in other contexts. The members of the two groups came from the very same generation, reaching maturity in the late-twenties, and, up to a point, there was a common generational agenda that connected people of different backgrounds. This generational identity was disrupted by the radicalization of politics, along with economic and political crises. The sharpening of the rhetoric, also due to the international success of extreme nationalism, catalyzed an open conflict between these intellectuals. They formed two camps, which, although having many things in common, launched increasingly violent attacks against each other, combining personal and aesthetic divergences with political references, couched in different definitions of the nation.

The ‘populists’ connected their radical program of economically emancipating the peasantry with an ethnic rhetoric that identified the peasantry with authentic ‘Hungarianness.’ They accused the other side of neglecting the cause of the countryside and concentrating exclusively on the world-view of the urban intelligentsia, which they often described as ‘non-Hungarian,’ that

¹ The title contains a deliberate ambiguity. In Hungarian “tőke” means tree-trunk but also capital. Therefore, it can also be translated also as “Fell the Capital!”.

is, predominantly consisting of assimilated Jews. In turn, the 'urbanites' blamed the 'populists' for making concessions to the 'official ethno-radicalism' of the circle around the right-wing radical politician Gyula Gömbös. For the 'urbanites,' this meant that the 'populists' ultimately chose to sacrifice their democratic commitment on the altar of their ethnicism, which, in the context of conflicting intellectual subcultures, entailed antisemitism. Thus, in the early 1930s, the two branches of Hungarian reformism spent most of their energy fighting and symbolically excluding the other from the 'progressive camp' and from 'Hungarianness' respectively.

Attila József was on friendly terms with the leading figures of the 'urbanites.' At the escalation of the conflict, he made his preferences obvious and defended them from the accusation of not being 'sufficiently Hungarian.' On the other hand, he had a certain empathy for the 'populists.' In the late 1920s, he was member of a youth organization called the 'Bartha Miklós Society,' which was one of those intellectual groupings that had a common generational reform agenda. For a very short time he was even tempted by the discourse of ethno-cultural radicalism. In addition, he was one of the initiators of the 'village sociography' movement, which turned out to be the crucial literary genre of the 'populists' in the 1930s. Attila József was convinced that the conflict was damaging the chances of a progressive movement, and thus he continued to refer to the 'populist' intellectuals in positive terms, as in, for example, his other 'national' poem, *Hazám* (My country).

The poem *Dunánál* was the first item in the volume of essays, *Mai magyarok régi magyarokról* (Present-day Hungarians on ancient Hungarians), edited by the intellectual circle around the journal *Szép Szó*, which was one of the focal points of the 'urbanite' cultural camp. This circle consisted of such figures as Pál Ignóty (the son of the founder of *Nyugat*), the prominent liberal publicist Zoltán Gáspár and the young social democrat journalist Ferenc Fejtő. This volume was an attempt to counter the claims that the 'urbanites' were 'anti-national.' It was also published with the intention of finding common grounds for the democratic opposition in light of the increasing totalitarian danger. The selection of themes and contributors was fairly heterogeneous and was not really successful in creating a full-fledge 'urbanite' historical narrative. A personal confession as much as a political statement, Attila József's poem captures the spirit of the times, searching for a new ideological synthesis, and is also perhaps the most beautiful formulation of this symbolic offer of redefining the nation.

To create an integrative imagery, the poet turns the Danube into a geographical and historical symbol, allotting to it metaphysical attributes. Specu-

lating about what it means to relate to one's ancestors, he claimed that they indeed acted 'through us.' Nevertheless, the forefathers of the present-day nation cannot be described as a homogenous Hungarian ethnic community, but a mixture of different ethnicities, social and political platforms. Present-day Hungarians (in the translation it is rendered as 'new Hungarians') are the outcome of historical confluences, containing different ethnic and historical itineraries. The author invites his readers to relate both to the conqueror Árpád and the conquered indigenous chief Zalán (whose army was crushed by Árpád), or to István Werbőczy, who codified the noble privileges after the peasant revolt of György Dózsa in 1514, and to the defeated peasant leader himself. The contested past can thus be a basis of reconciliation. Coming to terms with these 'common things' is necessary for transcending the political and ethnic dividing lines.

The attempt at bridging the differences between the intellectual camps seeking to challenge the conservative-authoritarian mainstream in the mid-thirties was not successful. While individual friendships occasionally linked intellectuals coming from different subcultures, the 'populists' and the 'urbanites' continued to pursue their own cultural and political programs while retaining a measure of suspicion towards each other. Attila József's 'message' in this sense did not have an immediate impact. In the long run, he was nevertheless an important reference for attempts to supersede this conflict dividing the intelligentsia. In a way, this was the case after 1945, when he was appropriated by communist cultural policies, which sought to create a 'progressive' synthesis, selectively appropriating some elements from both the 'populist' and the 'westernizer' canons. More importantly, in the 1960s his poetry and philosophical ideas had a huge impact on various intellectual circles in Hungarian culture which were seeking to create a synthesis of European modernist trends and local cultural traditions. Nevertheless, the debate between 'populists' and 'urbanites' resurfaced again in the 1960s and 1970s; and with the emergence of competing groups opposing the communist regime, it had a decisive influence in shaping the ideological outlook of the new political movements in the transition period.

BT

By the Danube

I sat there on the quayside by the landing,
 a melon rind was drifting on the flow.
 I delved into my fate, just understanding:
 the surface chatters, while it's calm below.
 As if my heart had been its very source,
 troubled, wise was the Danube, mighty force.
 Like muscles when you work and lift the axe,
 or harvest, hammer, excavate a grave,
 so did the water tighten, surge, relax
 with every current, every breezy wave.
 Like Mother dandled, told a tale, caressed,
 laundered the dirt of all of Budapest.
 A drizzle started, moistening the morning
 but didn't care much, so it stopped again.
 And yet, like someone who under an awning
 watches the rain—I gazed into the plain:
 As twilight, that may infinitely last,
 so grey was all that used to shine, the past.
 The Danube flowed, and like a tiny child
 plays on his musing, lively mother's knee,
 so cradled and embraced and gently smiled
 each playful wave, waving hallo to me.
 They shuddered on the flood of past events
 like tombstones, tumbling graveyard monuments.

II

For a hundred thousand years I have been gazing
 and suddenly I see what's there to see.
 A flash, and time is fully-grown, embracing
 what generations scan, and show to me.
 I see what they've not seen, for they defended,
 embraced, dug, murdered, their living to ply,
 and they see now, in cold matter descended,
 what I can't see when I'm to testify.
 We all relate, like blessed to the damned,
 mine is the past and theirs is the today
 We write poems—my pencil in their hand,
 I sense them and remember what to say.

III

Mother was Kún,² Father was Székely,³ partly,
 and half, or maybe, pure Romanian.
 From Mother's lips the food was sweet and hearty,
 from Father's lips the truth was radiant.
 They embrace again when I am stirring.
 This fills my heart with deep melancholy –
 we are all mortal. It's me, re-occurring.
 "Just wait, we'll soon be gone! ..." they say to me.
 They call, we are now one: this oneness I know
 has made me strong, for I remember well
 that I am every parent in the boundless
 succession to the primal lonely cell.
 I am the First, who splits, proliferating
 till I become my father and mother,
 then father and mother split, procreating
 the multiplying me—and none other!
 I am the world - the ancient, endless story:
 clan fighting clan for creed or crazy greed.
 I march among the conquerors in glory,
 I suffer with the conquered in defeat.
 Árpád and Zalán, Werbőczy and Dózsa –
 Slavs, Mongols, Turks and other variants
 in me, we shall redeem the long foreclosure
 with gentle future—new Hungarians!
 ...I want to work. It's hard for human nature
 to make a true confession of the past.
 The Danube, which is past, present and future
 entwines the waves in tender friendly claps.
 Out of the blood our fathers shed in battles
 flows peace, through our remembrance and regard:
 creating order in our common matters,
 this is our destiny; and it will be hard.

Translated by Peter Zollman, in Ádám Makkai, ed., *In Search of the
 'Miracle Stag.' The Poetry of Hungary* (Chicago: Atlantis—Centaur,
 1996), pp. 668–669.

² Cumanian; a Turkic *ethnie* in medieval Eastern Europe, which was gradually assimilated by the other nations, but which retained a certain communal autonomy in central Hungary until the nineteenth century.

³ Szekler.

MICHAL CHORVÁTH: THE ROMANTIC FACE OF SLOVAKIA

Title: *Romantická tvár Slovenska* (The Romantic face of Slovakia)

Originally published: Prague, Václav Petr, 1939

Language: Slovak

The excerpts used are from Rudolf Chmel ed., *Slovenská otázka v 20. storočí*, (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1997), pp. 242–261.

About the author

Michal Chorváth [1910, Slovenské Pravno (*Hun.* Turócábrahámfalva) – 1982, Bratislava]: literary critic, essayist, poet and translator. Between 1928 and 1936 he studied medicine at Charles University in Prague. Later, between 1936 and 1940, he received degrees in philosophy and aesthetics from Comenius University in Bratislava. Chorváth belonged to the young pro-communist intelligentsia, with a close relationship to the avant-garde group *DAV*. In this period he wrote poetry and published in many left-wing literary and cultural journals. Later, his main interest shifted towards literary and drama criticism. In 1944, he took part in the ‘Slovak National Uprising’ and became an ardent advocate of the Uprising against its critics. After the Second World War, he occupied several official positions related to the political and cultural activities of the Communist Party. After the communist coup in 1948, he was elected a member of the ‘Slovak National Council,’ and lectured at Comenius University. Between 1953 and 1954 he was the editor-in-chief of the communist cultural weekly *Kultúrny život* (Cultural life) and also wrote for the daily *Pravda* (Truth). Together with **Ladislav Novomeský** he became a prominent theoretician of socialist realism as well as one of the major figures shaping Slovak communist cultural policy. After 1955, he turned again to literary and academic activity, working for publishing houses and the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He became politically active only after the suppression of the Prague Spring communist reform movement in 1968. He became a member of the federal Parliament in Prague and head of its cultural committee. Chorváth was one of the prominent advocates of a synthesis of communist ideology with Slovak culture, and in many ways instrumental in turning this idea into reality.

Main works: *Romantická tvár Slovenska* [The romantic face of Slovakia] (1939); *Za nové obzory* [For new horizons] (1953); *Cestami literatúry* [On the paths of literature] (1960); *Davisti a film* [The DAV-group and cinema] (1983); *Básnické dielo Jána Kostru* [Ján Kostra’s poetic work] (1962); *Literárne dielo Jána Poničana* [Ján Poničan’s literary work] (1972).

Context

During the interwar period, powerful national ideologies presented a great challenge to radical socialist and communist politics in Czechoslovakia. In 1918, Slovak social democrats were supporters of the unified state with the Czechs. Later, the party merged with the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and, with Ivan Dérer as its principle leader, became a major site for promoting the ideals of Czechoslovakism, a political trend that aspired towards the unitary state of the Czechoslovak political nation. A completely different path, however, was taken by the left-wing branch of the social democrats, many members of which participated in the short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic in 1919—an offshoot of the Hungarian Soviet Republic—only to establish the Communist Party of Slovakia in January 1921 under the initiative of Slovak, German, Hungarian and Ruthenian radical socialists. In May of the same year, the party united with Czech, Polish, German and Jewish communists from Bohemia, creating the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) with numerous national sections and an increasingly centralized administration.

As early as 1921, the issue of centralism versus autonomy was disputed among Slovak communists. Slovak nationalism, along with the changing policy of the Comintern regarding the national question, became a major issue of debate and contestation in the intra-party politics of the 1920s. At the same time, in the public sphere Slovak communists could hardly compete with Slovak autonomists represented by Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, which styled itself as the sole defender of Slovak national interest in the Republic (see **Martin Rázus**, *How to reach an agreement between the Czechs and Slovaks*). After the Bolshevization of the party that was introduced by the new leadership of Klement Gottwald after 1929, the CPCZ launched a harsh critique of 'bourgeois Czechoslovakia' and 'Czech imperialism,' and included among its political instruments the right of self-determination for all Czechoslovakia's nationalities up to the point of secession. This was to change only after the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany and the turn towards the concept of popular front in mid-1930s. The CPCZ joined the bandwagon of the 'defense of the Republic' and started to support the Czechoslovakist line, which was met favorably by the Czech public, but which further alienated the Slovaks and the national minorities.

This meant a dilemma for the young Slovak communist intelligentsia that emerged in the mid-1920s, gradually replacing in leadership the older generation of the anti-Habsburg struggle. The main cultural mouthpiece of the

new generation was the revue *DAV*, which endorsed political and aesthetic radicalism, national pride and warm emotions towards the Slovak homeland. Its main aim was to modernize and enrich Slovak indigenous culture with humanistic and socialist values (see **Ladislav Novomeský**, *The current state and the development of Slovak culture*). Critical to the concept of unitary Czechoslovak state from the very beginning, the young Slovak communist intellectuals had to look for a way between the Prague's centralist policies—also endorsed from the mid-1930s by the leadership of CPCZ—and the Slovak autonomists dissatisfied with the position of Slovakia in the common state. Michal Chorváth's essay is one of the most interesting attempts to deal with this dilemma. In his broad social-cultural analysis of Slovak romanticism, going far beyond the standard Party politics, he takes as his point of departure the common stereotypes of the 'characterological' differences between the "rationalist" Czechs and the "Romantic" Slovaks. In his careful scrutiny of the Romantic legacy, Chorváth clearly renounces all the contemporary organicist and neo-Romantic discourses searching for substantive or authentic fundamentals of national life and, instead, speaks for a synthesis of universalist rationalism with the Romantic emotional strength present for instance in popular culture.

The essay, which was published in 1939, the year of the breaking up of Czechoslovakia, came out too late to stir up any serious polemic or intellectual debate. It remained the most interesting work of Chorváth who later, as so many of his *DAV* colleagues, became a prominent communist 'apparatchik.' It is an eloquent example of his generation's ambition to create a specific Slovak socialist culture by combining their Marxist political and social stance with a deep understanding towards national emotions and the traditions of national culture. As such the essay has been elevated or condemned during the post-war communist dictatorship depending on the changing position and acceptability of Slovak national communism. Despite the political career of the author, even nowadays the essay remains one of the most important contributions to Slovak political thought and national criticism.

PL-MK

The Romantic face of Slovakia

The idea of Romantic Slovakia is so firmly rooted in the minds of Czechs and Slovaks who seek to characterize the differences between their natures and to determine the mutual relationship of the two cultures that we encoun-

ter this notion in literary publications, political comments and newspapers almost every day. Although the necessity of this term in the analysis of Slovak–Czech relations is obvious, except for rare and unsatisfactory exceptions there cannot be found, in the scientific research of Slovak culture or in popular presentations of its results, a precise definition, or an insight on what consequences the term might have for evaluating the lives of the two nations, which are driven by fate to continuous mutual influence. Researchers and critics obviously rely on those Romantic definitions that have been delineated and established for the understanding of Western cultures, and especially for the needs of artistic criticism. I am not aware that these definitions have been thoroughly analyzed and convincingly defended in relationship to Slovak culture, especially in its current form. [...]

In this treatise we could not avoid mentioning these problems for they influence the direction of our research. There is a considerable difference between the common definition of Romanticism and Slovak Romanticism. In any field we focus on, in which the Romantic nature is most prominent, we can detect features that don't appear Romantic and their connection with the excited and chaotic mood, the eternal fountain of Romanticism, can only be inferred. The efforts to harmonize these features at any price appear to be mistaken. It will be more effective to explore Slovak Romanticism as an independent cultural phenomenon whose nature is to be determined. If we succeed in this, the relationship between Slovak Romanticism and Romanticism in general will reveal itself. Our intention is to strive for an appropriate description of Slovak Romanticism in all its important aspects.

The reasons for writing about Slovak Romanticism using such a provisional definition are many but two stand foremost in our mind. First, there are many concrete problems in Slovak Romanticism, the solution to which will determine the further development of Slovak culture in the near future. The reader will easily identify these problems and their importance from the following lines. Second, I find it important to explain to people outside the Slovak environment why this and that is happening in Slovakia, why this and that is said or written here. If Slovakia's characteristic feature is Romanticism, as opposed to, for example, Czech rationalism or, more precisely, Czech Classicism, both sides must understand the polemical arguments of their opponents and their actions in quite a different light than they were meant, for both sides interpret them in their own fashion, according to their respective worldviews. [...]

The nature of Slovak Romanticism

Slovak Romanticism is a modern movement. It emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century and is clearly related to the vigorous development of learning in Europe, especially east of the Rhine and north of the Alps. It is typical that it has touched primarily new nations, Germanic and Slavic ones, which, despite having absorbed Christian civilization, have retained a fresh memory of their barbarian past in the folk tradition.

The blossom of the Romantic movement was determined by the decline of religious feeling and the disintegration of medieval social stratification. The criteria of spiritual life, deemed objective and valid before, had lost their force, and a replacement for authority was to be sought in subjective belief. Thus subjectivity is the first characteristic of the new movement. Revolt is the second, for to loosen the new social organization, freedom of conviction and scientific research was needed. This was impossible to achieve without revolutions against the power-holders, who understood that once there was freedom of exploration, their power would vanish. The development of science strengthened the implementation of rationalism to an unprecedented extent. On the opposing side there was a new eruption of mysticism and a search for new artistic and spiritual sources in the celebration of nature and human instinct. The knowledge of the basic elements of human nature brought forth cynicism and cruelty on the one hand and sentimentality and the tragic, leading to the *Weltschmerz* of the Romantic man, on the other. Results included impetuosity in research and boredom following a mystery solved too quickly.

The awareness of the unity of mankind faded away, replaced by nationalism; broad Latin or French education was replaced by the study of the specific nations striving to prove their independence as quickly as possible. On the other hand, slogans of equality and fraternity awakened humanism, which had been lulled into sleep by the previous age. We see that the Romantic movement is, from its beginning, composed of contradictions and that its real aim is the endless voyage towards new dreams of nebulous and uncertain content. This underlines the mystique of action and oeuvre. The new spiritual slogan of the Romantic man is evolution, the unstoppable march of progress, captivating every individual.

In Slovakia Romanticism captured only the most educated layers of society: the people in general remained untouched by Romanticism. This is shown quite clearly by the limited success of the Slovak uprising of 1848. Yet the educated layer, steering Slovak culture in the Romantic direction,

determined its nature. If there was some resistance from the older generation, the young have broken it with their *élan* and activities, surpassing everything hitherto done in Slovakia.

There are various explanations for the fact that Romanticism scored a complete victory in Slovakia, dominating till the end of the century and, in a sense, till today. The usual one is that Romanticism is a part of Slovak tribal and Slavic nature. This theme is usually developed by claims that the geographical nature of Slovakia has imprinted its features on the Slovak character and that nature's influence has struck a sentimental chord, facilitating perceptions of natural and, in general, aesthetic beauty. Others say that the climatic difference between mountain ridges, where Slovaks spend most of their lives, and the deep valleys, helped to mould a character prone to extremes, that hard life generated resilience and fortitude, that the enclosure in mountain valleys helped to preserve the original customs and characteristics and, finally, that Slovakia, placed between East and West, had taken part in Western as well as Eastern learning. Fiction or fact, the truth is that Štúr's generation, laying the foundations of modern Slovak culture, was convinced of the rightness of these theses and thus made Romanticism one of the chief features of the Slovak nationality. [...]

The first traces of Slovak Romanticism lead us back to the Reformation and Counter Reformation. Reformation means religious subjectivism, and though the Counter Reformation fought it successfully, it did not have the strength to root out the Protestant minority, which, because of constant harassment from the Catholic side, had to stay alert for battle at all times. Of course, religious disputes did nothing to support the retreat of religious subjectivism, nor of religious fanaticism. This is one of the reasons for the often-cited religious devotion of Slovaks.

Thus, at the time when Romantic ideas began to influence Slovakia, the seed of Romanticism was already planted. The last source of Slovak Romanticism was the national idea and the fight against Magyarization in the former Kingdom of Hungary.

Magyars and Slovaks have looked for the refuge in nationalism for the same reasons. National pressure is often quoted as an impulse, yet there are reasons of greater importance for our research. Europe's cultural unity was falling apart and each cultural centre began to emphasize its own cultural hegemony. Magyars, as the founders of the state and holders of central power, claimed an exclusive cultural mission for their nation. Slovaks, on the other hand, saw no advantage in adopting the language of a small and relatively insignificant nation, and their intelligentsia started to lean towards the

Slavic world, closest to them in language and culture. That this concept was dangerous for the Hungarian state was shown clearly over the course of a century, and thus attempts to destroy the Slovak nation followed. Yet the Hungarians did not have enough power to do it. The feeling of Slavic mutual-ity, on the other hand, was only in its infancy and the support from the Slavic world was merely superficial.

The competition between Magyars and Slovaks was an unequal one. The Magyars could refer to their splendid history—the Slovaks had no such thing. Yet, the historical authenticity of a nation was, in the age of growing interest in history, a strong argument. Slovaks have reached for it through the pens of Šafárik,¹ Kollár,² and Štúr's generation.³ Slovak Romantic history was founded, placing Slovaks at the centre of the Slavic world, reinforcing nationalist ambitions. A great interest in popular education and folk art was born, perceived now and in the past as the proof of the original Slavic culture and a thousand year-long history of the Slovak nation. This is the starting point of Slovak Romantic nationalism.

This Romantic reverie of Štúr's generation and its followers had its counterpart in the whole of contemporary Europe and would not have presented a danger had the Slovaks had the opportunity to implement their goals in political praxis and prove their worth in the face of harsh reality. Yet history teaches us that they were gradually stripped of any possibility of coordinated cooperation, their significant political activities were stifled at the very beginning, and by the 1870s they were deprived of their very last educational and cultural institutions. In such a situation the critical force of the Slovak intelligentsia began to fade and the level of education declined. The propensity towards daydreaming and reverie grew stronger. [...]

The second half of the last century was a time of a great industrial, political and cultural expansion for the former Kingdom of Hungary and for the rest of the world as well. Slovakia, the most industrialized part of the state from time immemorial, having the largest number of cities, had played, up to recent times, the most significant political role. It was the core of the state before the Turks were driven out and it seemed poised to demonstrate its im-

¹ Pavol Jozef Šafárik (1795–1861): Slovak philologist, poet, literary historian and ethnographer, one of the first promoters of Slavistics as a specific academic field.

² Ján Kollár (1793–1852): Slovak poet, writer, archeologist and literary historian, the main source of Pan-Slavic ideology of his time.

³ The generation of Slovak patriots with the central figure of Ľudovít Štúr (1815–1856) entering public life in the mid-1830s and credited with the development of a coherent Slovak national program.

portance in this period too. Yet in the changed national situation Slovakia could not show its worth, or more precisely, it could assert itself only if it yielded rapidly to the pressures of Magyarization. Every element lacking deep roots fell away and lost the connection with the Slovak community. At once the nation lost its yeomanry, its most politically experienced element, together with the bourgeoisie and its economic power. A harsh moral shock followed, for the rapid changes did not permit a real assimilation and the superficially Magyarised layers were of most unsound quality. Magyar megalomania, drunk by the apparent successes and growing political powers, did not feel the need to examine its gains and isolate itself from elements seeking merely to jump on the bandwagon. This seemingly phenomenal success thus became the seed of the inner disintegration of the Hungarian nation and foreshadowed its political bankruptcy.

The most interesting point here is that the *Magyaron* layer,⁴ which occupied Pest, Slovak cities, and local administrations and which was recruited to a large extent from the Slovak environment, stood between the two nations as an independent subversive layer influencing, through its origins and familiar connections, the Slovak national organism too. Almost no patriotic Slovak family was without its renegade, who, though despised, remained a part of the family circle. It is also worth mentioning here that after the 1918 revolution this *Magyaron* layer found, to a large extent, its way back into the Slovak nation.

What we have to explore here is the nature of the *Magyaron* influence. Slovak art has characterized this layer quite precisely, depicting its moral cynicism and proclivity towards carefree living. Each of our elder compatriots can testify to it from their own experience. The *Magyarons* perceived the daydreaming of Slovak patriots as a ridiculous exaggeration and a sign of inferiority. They were keen on destroying the Romantic visions of Slovak patriots through the analyses of man stripped down to his instincts, which, as they thought, justified their defection. Just as Hobbes observed that, after the loss of all values, the only remaining one was that of power and state, so his unknowing followers thought that the idea of the Magyar state and its power would outweigh the universal and humanistic dreams of Slovak patriots. Thus the *Magyarons* acted as the first apostles of disillusionment in the Slovak environment, leaving their mark there.

⁴ *Magyaron*: a term with strong negative connotations for those ethnic Slovaks who have accepted Hungarian language and culture at the expense of their own Slovak heritage.

At the end of the last century the decline of the primary oneiric Romanticism becomes obvious. The cause was not so much the influence of the *Magyar* element, as the fact that the dream of a great upheaval and liberation of all Slavic nations did not come true. Czechs recovered from this shock quite easily and their critical attitude towards the Romantic dream of nationhood started to spread into Slovakia too. The young generation attempted political action again, with much success. And though their work was of great importance, their critical attitude led only to the disillusionment and ideological desertion of the majority of the Slovak intelligentsia, and to a new, intensified oppression from the Magyar side. We cannot predict what would have been the end of this realistic movement had the World War not interrupted it.

With the First World War and the entry of Slovakia into the Czechoslovak Republic, all conditions changed and Slovak Romanticism developed a completely new face. It is remarkable that this enormous change, fulfilling almost every Romantic dream of the older generations, did not generate a new wave of Romantic visions. That can be ascribed to two reasons. The most important one is that the Slovak nation changed from an esoteric church into a mass organization, including the previously lethargic Slovak people. On the other hand, under the direct Czech influence, the critical attitude of the new generation was reinforced. We must also not forget that those layers of the nation hitherto estranged by the Hungarian spirit had again rapidly adapted to the changed situation and claimed their place in the nation. It is hard to presume that they would lose the foreign spiritual veneer so quickly.

But there were other, more consequential reasons. The young generation had to cope with new ideas they had lost touch with during the last decades. *Fin de siècle* was experienced in Slovakia only individually; now it was necessary to cope with it at once, and in the name of the whole national culture. Painful personal misgivings were joined by the national ones: are we a nation at all? Are we robust enough as a nation and as individuals? Do we possess a true cultural creativity? A new wave of naturalism and cynicism following the First World War put more emphasis on these questions.

Unfortunately, the Czechs, who had solved these questions in the 1890s, had no sympathy for such issues and dismissed them under the heading "Romanticism". They were full of state-political designs and did not see that the Slovaks were occupied with completely different problems which had to be solved before they could become their equal partners. True, the split of Slovaks into the Czechoslovak and Slovak movements occurred only inside the Slovak body politic, and only there did it carry its real significance, yet the Czechs had nevertheless adopted a one-sided attitude, not seeing that the

issue was not the struggle to preserve the state, but an important moral question about whether the Slovaks really were capable of cultural creativity on their own, whether they were equal members of the world community. It was not possible to exclude the Czech influence, yet it cannot be denied that it should have been more sensitive and devoid of self-righteousness. Slovaks, on both sides, were demonstrating impatience, for it was felt that this was a crucial period. An aversion to the patronizing attitude arose, strengthened by those who hated Czechs, because, in this new situation, they had lost their power, or exclusive claims to property. The Czechs have supported them unwittingly, by their lack of insight into the game and their power policy, which has played into the hands of their opponents. The Slovaks could not but see that the Czechs were the decisive political and economic element in Slovakia, and that they had no interest in giving up this influence to new, impatient people.

We can't blame the Czechs; on the contrary, they are to be praised for their efforts to provide education to the widest strata of the population. Yet, if they understood the matter, they would have to know that the first result of democratization in an educational system is the flattening of the peak levels. Considering that this leveling went hand in hand with high demands on cultural and political leadership of the newly arising bourgeois intelligentsia, we can understand the potential and real consequences. We see why the young generation, having had immense difficulties getting into state politics—there were times when this was impossible—felt an aversion to the Czechs and looked for its place in the ranks of the opposition.

These facts had not only a state-political but also a cultural impact. We have mentioned that Slovakia was only now hurriedly acquainting itself with the new ideas of the end of the last century and in them experienced its personal and national insecurities. It is not surprising that they would turn them into a tool against Czech rationalism and Czech cultural influence in general. It was a mix of both Romantic ideas and disillusion that were, however, united by their contempt towards rationalism and the emphasis on the value of idea, or fiction, in human life.

The new ideology, hard to classify as Romantic, yet obviously stemming from the Romantic disillusion, prevailed more easily due to the separation from the official, academic science—there was much to criticize it for, still it had preserved a scientific spirit—and thus appeared as purely Slovak and anti-Czech.

The young generation, having no hope of a career in universities or state administration, deprived of control over public and economic life, embraced

politics, art and journalism. Growing up without scientific critique—for the rift between them and Czechs and Czechoslovaks grew steadily—the young generation has slowly lost certitudes and dared to make ever-bolder promises, thinking it would know how to fulfill them if it only had the political power. And thus the political takeover became its chief program, and everything else conformed to it. [...]

Slovakia's misfortune is that it did not have a personality with universal authority in the last decades. The chief remedy could arise out of the secondary and tertiary schools. Since these were of low level in the past regime and Slovakia does not have enough educated teachers today, it is hard to expect a radical change in the foreseeable future. Thus the Slovak academic revival won't arrive for another decade. [...]

Conclusion

Slovak Romanticism cannot be regarded as the final shape of Slovak nature and culture, but at most as one of its aspects, albeit a dynamic one, like a gap that needs to be bridged. Romanticism is not dangerous per se; what is dangerous is the lack of its counterweight, rationality, resulting in unbalanced cultural development. Dangerous is the lack of a sense of measure and equilibrium, all of this supporting confusion and passivity. To overcome this uncertainty is imperative for Slovak culture and its future.

The Romantic face of Slovakia hasn't been and isn't its only face today. The fact that the common people have not participated in it, providing an example of balanced and at the same time creative culture, cannot be over-emphasized. Naturally, we cannot go so far as to perceive folk culture as an ideal: that would be to repeat the initial mistake of the Slovak Romantics. Higher culture is inevitable; any return to the primitive would be a mistake. It is exclusively the tenor of such folk culture, which cannot be imitated, only developed, that can serve as a model.

To make this possible in Slovakia, first several spiritual constants, without which artistic creation is impossible, must prevail. The gap between nationalism and universalism must be bridged to enable comparison with other cultures. Slovakia must get rid of the feeling of inferiority, hindering in various ways its reflection of self and others. Finally, it must create a critical research method, enabling it to pronounce opinions of more than a momentary value, more than the dilettante "perhaps", "could be either way". As for the ethical renaissance, what Slovakia needs is less moralizing and more emphasis on self-control and systematic effort.

This is the way that could lead toward a new, higher Slovak culture, in which the notions of “people” and “intelligentsia” would lose their present exclusive character. The beauty of Romanticism would not necessarily be lost; lost would be the marks of tepidity, confusion and dilettantism, typical of contemporary Slovak Romanticism. This will happen sooner or later. If Slovakia is to fulfill its historical role, whatever it may be, any other development is unfathomable.

Finally, we have to add that the turmoil resulting from spiritual uncertainty, central to this essay, is not an exclusively Slovak phenomenon, even if it, perhaps, did not acquire the same acuity and urgency elsewhere. To master it at home and at least in its immediate surroundings may be the cultural and historic role of Slovakia.

Translated by Pavol Lukáč

NAZIM HİKMET: THE LEGEND OF THE NATIONAL MILITIA

Title: *Kuvayı Milliye destanı* (The legend of the national militia)

Originally published: The first version of the poem was completed in 1941, only fragments of which were published in collections and anthologies in 1943 and 1946. The entire work was secretly circulated until being published in 1965 with the title ‘The legend of the War of Independence’

Language: Turkish

The excerpts used are from the 2001 reprint of the 1968 edition: Nazım Hikmet, *Kuvayı Milliye* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), pp. 11, 71–72, 89–90.

About the author

Nazım Hikmet (Ran) [1902, Selanik (Gr. Thessaloniki, present-day Greece) – 1963, Moscow]: poet and playwright. Recognized as Turkey’s first and foremost modern poet, Nazım Hikmet was born to a family of pashas and bureaucrats. Following his elementary education, Nazım was enrolled in the Ottoman Naval Academy and started publishing his first poems at seventeen. In 1919, during the Allied occupation of Istanbul, he was discharged from the army on medical grounds. The following year, he fled home to join the independence struggle in Anatolia. In the course of the long trip to Ankara, the center of the independence movement, he encountered a group of Turkish students deported from Germany for being involved in the Spartacus movement, who introduced him to the ideas of Marx and Lenin. During the Independence War, the Soviet government allied with Ankara in its struggle against imperialist powers. The institutionalization of the Turkish communist movement and its contacts with the Soviet regime were thereby tolerated, albeit with a great deal of suspicion, by the Kemalist regime. In 1921, Nazım received a grant from the Turkish Ministry of Education to visit the Soviet Union. As a member of the Turkish Communist Party, Nazım spent three years in Moscow which were decisive in the shaping of his literary and political outlook. Relishing the revolutionary zeal of the early Soviet years, Nazım attended classes in the Communist University for the Workers of the East, and was deeply inspired by the innovative works of Russian Futurists such as Mayakovsky and Meyerhold. Returning to Istanbul in 1924, he started publishing essays and poems in *Aydınlık* (Light), the monthly journal of the Communist Party, where, for the first time, he incorporated modern political and revolutionary themes into Turkish poetry, employing a free and highly experimental style. In 1925, as the new Republic sought to consolidate its power by suppressing all forms of political dissent, Nazım, along with many left-wing intellectuals, was

charged in absentia for engaging in ‘subversive’ activities and sentenced to fifteen-years in prison. He fled to Moscow and stayed there until 1928. Upon his return, following a brief period of imprisonment, he contributed to the efforts to rebuild the Communist Party, which had largely been crippled by the authoritarian Kemalist regime. Having by now gained a reputation as a poet, Nazım worked in journals and film studios, spearheading the nascent avant-garde movement in Turkish literature and drama. Between 1929 and 1938, he was recurrently in and out of prison, while publishing several plays, novels and poetry collections. The turning point came in 1938, when he was found guilty (by a farcical military tribunal) of inciting revolt among military students and sentenced to twenty eight years in prison. He composed some of his most celebrated lyrics during his long imprisonment. In 1949, an international committee of artists, organized by the poet Tristan Tzara, campaigned for Nazım Hikmet’s release. The next year, he was awarded the Peace Prize (along with Pablo Picasso and Pablo Neruda) by the World Peace Congress. Nazım was released in a general amnesty in 1950, and to avoid being drafted escaped once again to Moscow, where he lived with Polish citizenship until his death in 1963. While he remained an unassailable political and artistic icon for the Turkish left wing, for many years, Nazım was considered to be a traitor by conservatives. It was only after the 1980 coup, with the full eradication of the leftist movement in Turkey, that his artistic legacy was gradually embraced by a broader public.

Main works: *835 Satır* [835 lines] (1929); *Jakond ile Si-Ya-U* [Gioconda and Si-Ya-U] (1929); *Sesini kaybeden şehir* [The city that lost its voice] (1931); *Benerci kendini nicin öldürdü?* [Why did Banerjee kill himself?] (1932); *Taranta Babu’ya mektuplar* [Letters to Taranta Babu] (1935); *Simavna kadısı oğlu Şeyh Bedrettin destanı* [The legend of Sheykh Bedrettin, Son of the judge of Simavna] (1936); *Kurtuluş Savaşı destanı* [The legend of the War of Independence] (1965); *Memleketimden insan manzaraları* [Human landscapes from my country] (1966–67); *Son şiirleri* [Last poems] (1970).

Context

The long and painful prison years from 1938 to 1950 were among the most productive in Nazım Hikmet’s literary career. Acknowledged in Turkey as the most controversial and powerful literary figure of his time, fragments of the poet’s works were secretly circulated among friends, intellectuals and students. During this period, Nazım worked simultaneously on several projects, all informed by his intimate personal encounters in the context of prison life. One project, entitled ‘Human Landscapes in Turkey’ was about compiling a biographical encyclopedia of common Turkish individuals from all walks of life, including workers, peasants, students, clerks and housewives. Omitted in standard historical works reserved for ‘great men,’ these silent and underprivileged masses were cherished by Nazım as the real and unacknowledged agents of historical change. Another major project, begun in 1939, was an epic on the War of National Liberation, narrated, again, from the perspective of numerous

men and women participating in the struggle for independence. The individual stories were dispersed within a broader narrative on the actual course of the war, which, for purposes of historical authenticity, drew heavily on Mustafa Kemal's published accounts on the independence struggle. When completed in 1941, the overall tenor of the initial draft, entitled *Milli kurtuluş destanı* (The legend of national liberation), was distinctly patriotic and bellicose. In the same year, Nazım sent a copy of the manuscript to president İsmet İnönü, with the hope that a favorable impression might change his tarnished image as a 'traitor' and help facilitate his release. Several copies of the manuscript circulated in the Parliament and among diverse intellectual circles that were captivated by the forceful patriotic zeal of the epic. No amnesty was granted, however, amidst the turmoil and anxiety of the war years. While all of Nazım Hikmet's books were banned at this time, part of the initial version of the 'Legend' was published in a collection of poems in 1943, and later, in 1946, some fragments were included in an anthology.

Between 1941 and 1945 the 'Human Landscapes' project was extended and further articulated with the integration of subplots derived from the events of the Second World War. The idea was to turn the compilation into a multi-volume epic providing a comprehensive social panorama of Turkey in the twentieth century. The structure of the entire work was daringly innovative, freely incorporating both poetry and prose fragments through the use of Modernist montage techniques and cinematographic sequencing. In 1942, the eclectic and open-ended structure of the plot was unified with the motif of the railway journey, whereby a train departing from Istanbul and traveling through Anatolia forms the main stage for the narration of individual stories. This restructuring prompted a radical shift in the make-up of the project, and the *Milli kurtuluş destanı* was integrated into the second book of the 'Human Landscapes' series. Here, the 'Legend' appears as a text within the main body of the text, and is represented as a manuscript written by an imprisoned poet and read by a waiter in the kitchen of the first-class dining car of the train. The particular collation of the present and the recent past generates a striking dramatic effect as it reveals the ironic contrast between the sacrifice and misery of the war and the luxury surrounding the first class passengers representing the Republican status quo (contractors, provincial elites and members of the Parliament). As it stood within the broader epic, therefore, the patriotic 'Legend' contributed significantly to an underlying critique of the Republican regime as a corrupt and exploitative plutocracy.

After his release in 1950, Nazım Hikmet decided that the only part of the epic he could safely publish in the forbidding climate of the Cold War was

the section on the War of National Liberation. He therefore extended and re-edited the war episodes and prepared them for a separate publication entitled *Kuvayı Milliye destanı* (The legend of the national militia). The revised text, as a chronicle of the heroic exploits of the resistance struggle, was clearly intended to appeal to a broader audience. The highly complex structure of the original narrative was replaced by a chronological sequence of stories starting with the end of the First World War and terminating with the final victory against the Greek army in 1922. The 'Legend' was largely divested of its acrid political overtones as it was detached from the broader narrative of the 'Human Landscapes' project. Still, in its dramatic account of the national struggle 'from below,' it represented a radical alternative to the conventional story line centered around the defining figure of Mustafa Kemal. The image of the leader, whom Nazım genuinely admired as the mastermind of a triumphant anti-imperialist struggle, is only invoked in a short but decisive passage in the 'Legend' featuring an unidentified commander resembling "a blond wolf."

For unknown reasons, the 1950 manuscript remained unpublished during the poet's lifetime. An incomplete version of the text was published in 1965 with the title *Kurtuluş savaşı destanı* (The legend of the War of Liberation). While the entire text of the 'Human Landscapes' was published in 1966–67, a complete and annotated edition of the *Kuvayı Milliye destanı* appeared only in 1968. With its strong emotional and patriotic charge, the 'Legend' always carried the potential to appeal to a wide spectrum of readers in Turkey. By the 1990s, as the stigma around Nazım Hikmet's name waned, even some ultra-nationalists are known to have recited sections of the 'Legend' in their public speeches. Indeed, if it were possible to put aside his political commitment to communism, the *Kuvayı Milliye destanı* would make Nazım Hikmet the quintessential Romantic nationalist of the Republican era.

AE

The legend of the national militia

[from section 1]

They who are numberless
 like ants in the earth
 fish in the sea
 birds in the air,
 who are cowardly
 brave
 ignorant
 wise
 and childlike,
 and who destroy
 and create,
 my epic tells only of their adventures.

They who fall for the traitor's lie
 and drop their banner on the ground,
 leave the field to the enemy
 and run for home,
 and they who pull a knife on the renegade
 and who laugh like a green tree
 and cry without ceremony
 and who swear like hell,
 my epic tells only of their adventures.

[from section 7]

The night was bright and warm,
 and in their wooden beds on the ox-carts
 the dark-blue bombshells were stark-naked.
 And the women
 hid their glances from one another
 as they eyed the dead oxen
 and the wheels from past convoys...
 And the women,
 our women
 with their awesome, sacred hands,

pointed little chins, and big eyes,
our mothers, lovers, wives,
who die without ever having lived,
who get fed at our tables
after the oxen,
whom we abduct and carry off to the hills
and go to prison for,
who harvest grain, cut tobacco, chop wood and barter in the markets,
whom we harness to our ploughs,
and whom with their bells and undulant heavy hips
surrender to us in sheepfolds
in the gleam of knives stuck in the ground –
the women,
our women,

walked under the moon now
behind the ox-carts and shells
with the same ease
and accustomed weariness of women
hauling amber-eared sheaves to the threshing floor.
And scrawny-necked children
slept on the steel of 15-centimetre shrapnel shells.
And the carts advanced under the moon
beyond Akşehir toward Afyon.

Translated by Randy Blasing and Mutlu Konuk in: Nazım Hikmet, *Human Landscapes from My Country: An Epic Novel in Verse* (New York: Persea Books, 2002), pp. 150 and 185.

[from section 8]

To the left, at a distance stands Corporal Ali,
His face and eyes smeared in blood.
A cavalry platoon passes by, in full gallop.
[... and Ali] hears this song:

“Gallop[ing], full speed, from Far Asia
and jut[ting] out into the Mediterranean like a mare’s head
this country is ours.”

To live, like a tree, alone and free
and in brotherhood like a forest,
this yearning is ours...

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LIBERATION FRONT

Title: *Temeljne točke Osvobodilne fronte (slovenskega naroda)* (The fundamental principles of the Liberation Front [of the Slovenian people])

Originally published: *Slovenski poročevalec*, 8 November, 1941 and 1 January, 1942

Language: Slovene

The excerpts used are from Tone Ferenc, *Temeljne točke Osvobodilne fronte* in *Enciklopedija Slovenije* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1999), p. 227.

Context

In the aftermath of the First World War, the Slovenian workers' movement split into a non-revolutionary socialist fraction, and a revolutionary, communist one. The latter under the name *Delavska Socialistična Stranka za Slovenijo* (Workers' Socialist Party in Slovenia), became an integral part of the newly founded Communist Party of Yugoslavia (hereafter CPY), established on July 1920 at a congress in Vukovar. In December 1920, the Cabinet of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes banned the Communist Party by a decree known as the *Obznana* (Proclamation). In August 1921, based on the 'Law on public safety and order,' the party was declared a criminal organization, so throughout the period between the two World Wars it operated as an underground movement. In 1923, the leadership of the party abandoned its unitary agenda regarding the national issue, and in January 1924 adopted a federal national program. The national issue in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was also discussed at its clandestine congress held in Dresden in November 1928; the decision was to focus on the struggle against the monarchy and the Serbian (centralist) bourgeoisie, and fight for the break-up of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In April 1934, the communist parties of Yugoslavia, Italy and Austria signed a common declaration on the Slovenian issue which had been dictated by the Comintern's headquarters in Moscow. Fearing the consolidation of

Fascism, the Soviet Union had abandoned its previous practice of denouncing all links with non-communist parties. The local communist movement in the occupied Julian March (*Slov.* Julijska Krajina; *It.* Venezia Giulia) had lost touch with the wider popular movement because of its fervent nationalism. To counter such developments, the Comintern revised its position on the national issue, since it aspired to use the popular appeal of nationalism in order to engage the masses in a struggle against fascist ideology.

In September 1934, at a conference in Ljubljana, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia defined its stance towards the national issue: it adopted a resolution to establish the Communist Party of Slovenia as soon as possible, and issued guidelines on establishing links with other left-wing political groups. As early as June 1935, the CPY abandoned its policy of supporting the break-up of Yugoslavia. More detailed guidelines were issued regarding the organization of the Popular Front in accordance with the program drawn up by the Comintern in the same year. The aforementioned tripartite declaration issued in April 1934 did not have any direct effect; even the attempt to isolate the masses from bourgeois politics in the Yugoslav part of Slovenia was ineffective. The text was especially critical of the largest political party in Slovenia between the two wars, the conservative Slovenian People's Party, which in the summer of 1935, joined the government of the Serbian Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović. A large part of the involved public in Slovenia saw this political move as a betrayal of the party's program, the strongest point of which was the demand for Slovenia's legislative autonomy.

By pursuing such politics, the Slovenian People's Party aided considerably the rise in strength of more radical political actors in Slovenia that drew on the popular front movements in France and Spain. However, the attempt to form a popular front in Slovenia in the second half of the 1930s received mixed reactions. In 1937 the Communist Party of Slovenia (hereafter CPS) was established in Čebine, and although at that time it was still a minor and clandestine movement, it quickly gained a foothold in political, cultural and workers' organizations. Soon, though, a number of national defense associations emerged, forming a common anti-fascist front. In the summer of 1940, the CPS brought together its supporters within the organization called the *Društvo prijateljev Sovjetske zveze* (Association of the friends of the Soviet Union).

During the period of Soviet–German cooperation stipulated by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the communists' activities were directed against the capitalist world order. Following the outbreak of the German–Soviet war, on 22 June, 1941 the 'Liberation Front of the Slovenian People' (hereafter

LF) was organized on the basis of the 'Association of the friends of the Soviet Union.' Although the LF was coalition-based, the principles of the Slovenian communists prevailed from the very onset. From January 1942, it also became a revolutionary organization, planning social revolution and hoping to the change of the system that had been in place before the German occupation of the country. The LF was a peculiarity within the Yugoslav Partisan movement, because it retained a degree of independence, particularly during the early stages of its development. Towards the end of 1942, the Yugoslav centralization and unification processes interrupted the emancipatory evolution of the LF. The leadership of the CPY began to view the LF as an impediment to the Yugoslav integration process. Accusations of separatism and nationalism were also leveled at other liberation movements across Yugoslavia that exhibited any such peculiar traits. The 1943 'Dolomite declaration' brought the structure of the LF in line with that of the Yugoslav liberation movement.

The German occupation of Slovenia not only swept away the previous governing apparatus but also caused the disintegration of the traditional political parties. Some renowned politicians from the Slovenian People's Party, and even some from the liberal camp, emigrated and tried to influence the domestic situation from abroad. To that end, they founded the 'Slovenian National Committee' in London.

As for the non-communist resistance movement at home, in late March 1942, an agreement was reached on the establishment of the *Slovenska Zaveza za narodno osvoboditev* (Slovenian alliance for national liberation). It brought together members of the Slovenian People's Party and the Yugoslav National Party as well as the members of smaller liberal, socialist parties and representatives of the center. It functioned as a supra-party organization and, thanks to the wide consensus among the involved political parties, it was perceived as the legitimate representative of the Slovenes until the capitulation of Italy. At first it did not counter the LF, its main goal being the liberation of Slovenia. Its program anticipated the radical social and economic reform of the Slovenian society. However, internal conflicts reduced its power, which only reinforced the prevalent belief that only the communists were capable of organizing the resistance. Accordingly, the LF became a true mass movement. Those that remained outside were either collaborators with the occupying forces, individuals who did not want to take sides, or those who did not accept the leading role of the CPY within the LF.

The absence of traditional political parties in the struggle against the occupying forces created an unexpectedly wide political space for the LF to oper-

ate during the initial months of the occupation. In September 1941, it established the *Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni odbor* (Slovenian national liberation committee) to function as a sovereign governmental body. The leadership of the LF, which throughout the war had its headquarters in the Italian province of Ljubljana, endeavored to establish a united and evenly-spread network of organizations across the Slovenian territories. However, it soon became clear that this goal could not be achieved, mainly because of the differences in the nature of the German, Hungarian and Italian regimes occupying Slovenia. The circumstances were by far most suitable in Ljubljana, where the LF evolved into a widespread political and organizational network.

During the Second World War, the Slovenian political scene was dominated by two important agendas: the 'Fundamental principles of the Liberation Front' and the program of the Slovenian political émigrés in London. The London group came to an agreement with the Yugoslav government in exile. This document, comprising seven points, formulated the future political set-up of the Balkans: 1. the restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; 2. the establishment of a free Slovenia as an equal partner with other Yugoslav entities; 3. the participation of all involved entities in the process of deciding the internal organization of the Kingdom; 4. the organization of common affairs, such as foreign policy and defense policy, and the formulation of general guidelines for co-existence within the Kingdom; 5. the organization of Yugoslavia as a single economic unit with its own democratic system of state organization and governance; 6. endeavors towards a union with Bulgaria; and 7. Yugoslavia as the backbone of a future Balkan Union.

The program of the LF was formulated in the summer of 1941 when it was still called the 'Anti-imperialist Front.' Its political and ideological profile was finally shaped by a unanimous agreement in November of the same year. It was formed around seven fundamental principles, and two new ones were added in December. In the summer of 1945, the program was further supplemented to include views on the new government system. The fundamental principles were published in LF bulletins and distributed as pamphlets.

The capitulation of Italy paved the way for a swift emergence of a 'people's government' in Slovenia based on the LF's principles. The concept of the government developed under the strong influence of communists who took over key positions within the new power mechanism. Following the end of the war and the formation of socialist Yugoslavia, the role of the LF further increased. It provided the organizational framework for political life and was the driving force behind the implementation of the policies of the CPY. As a political agent within the government, its task was to supervise and di-

rect the activity of governmental bodies and to organize and lead the reconstruction of the country by way of various forms of labor mobilization. From 1945 to 1947, the ruling apparatus organized a number of rebuilding projects across the country. One of the aims was to establish a new political mythology, including the cult of Partisan resistance fighters, the revolution, the communist party and its leader, **Josip Broz Tito**. In 1953, the LF, a component of the 'People's Front of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,' was renamed the 'Socialist League of Slovenian Workers.' The wartime protagonists of the LF occupied the highest positions within the new government.

The Slovenian national liberation war (1941 to 1945) was a complex social, political and military phenomenon which even today has an impact on political and intellectual life. For decades it was understood through a narrow interpretation of war as dictated by the victors. The mythicized and idealized representation of Partisanhood during the post-war years stifled and simplified its complexity. More critical interpretations of events during the Second World War appeared only in the wake of radical social changes during the late 1980s. These new accounts reveal the predicaments regarding the LF and its formation.

One dilemma concerns the alliances formed after the foundation of the LF and the relations among these allies. The prevalent thesis during the period of the socialist regime was that the predecessor of the LF was the 'Association of the friends of the Soviet Union,' which proves the continuity of the policies of the 'Popular Front.' During the 1990s, this thesis was challenged by a younger generation of historians unburdened by the experience of the War (Bojan Godeša in particular). The second important question is the relationship between the 'Anti-imperialist Front' and the LF. Today, most historians support the thesis that the 'Anti-imperialist Front' had a transitory character that was shaped by the political circumstances of the time.

MR

The fundamental principles of the Liberation Front (of the Slovenian nation)

1. Uncompromising armed struggle against the occupying forces.
2. This struggle is the basis for the liberation and unification of all Slovenes.
3. Starting from the position that the community of the Yugoslav nations is natural and inevitable, the LF does not accept the fragmentation of Yugo-

slavia and works with all its strength towards the understanding and unity of its nations. At the same time, it strives for the close association among the Slavic nations under the leadership of the Great Russian nation, based on the right of every nation to self-determination.

4. The LF is reshaping the character of the Slovenian nation through its liberation struggle and the rousing of the masses. The Slovenian people who fight for their national and human rights create a new image of active Slovenianhood.

5. All groups participating in the LF have undertaken the obligation to be loyal in their relations with it.

6. After the national liberation, the governing of Slovenia will be undertaken by the LF as a whole.

7. After the national liberation, the LF will introduce a consistent people's democracy. Any question outside the framework of national liberation will be resolved consistently in accordance with the principles of people's democracy.

8. In accordance with the solemn declaration by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, after the national liberation the issues pertaining to the internal system of United Slovenia and its foreign relations will be decided by its people. The LF will realize and defend using all the means at its disposal this fundamental right of the Slovenian nation.

9. The national army in the Slovenian territories evolves from the Slovenian Partisan units that fight the war for national liberation and from the *Narodna zaščita* (National Defense), which all nationally conscious Slovenes are invited to join.

Translated by Olga Vuković

JOSIP BROZ TITO: NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE LIBERATION WAR

Title: *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svjetlosti Narodnooslobodilačke borbe* (National question in Yugoslavia in the light of the Liberation War)

Originally published: *Proleter* No. 16, September 1942

Language: Serbo-Croatian

The excerpts used are from Josip Broz Tito, *Borba za oslobođenje Jugoslavije I, 1941–1945* (Beograd: Kultura, 1947), pp. 130–148.

About the author

Josip Broz Tito (originally named **Josip Broz**) [1892, Kumrovec (present-day Croatia) – 1980, Ljubljana]: politician, the leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death. He was born into a poor peasant family, of a Slovene mother and a Croatian father, in the Croatian region of Zagorje. Between 1907 and 1910, he learned the locksmith's trade in Sisak. He then worked in Zagreb as a metal-worker, where, he became part of the socialist movement. During the First World War, he served as a non-commissioned officer in the Austrian army and took part in combat on the Eastern front in Galicia, where he ended up as a prisoner of war in 1915. After the revolutionary clashes in 1917, he fled first to Petrograd and then to Siberia. In 1920, he went back to what had in the meanwhile become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, where, as a Communist Party organizer, he continued to work under strong regime pressure. He was imprisoned between 1928 and 1934. In 1934, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (hereafter CPY) and adopted the code name Tito. He spent the next two years in Moscow working for the Balkan section of the Communist International (Comintern). After his return to the country in 1937 with a Comintern assignment to purge dissident elements from the CPY, he was appointed the Party's secretary general. In this capacity he followed faithfully Comintern policies, thus contesting Serbian policies towards other Yugoslav nationalities and schemes to fragment the Yugoslav state. Following the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia and attack on the USSR in 1941, Tito organized and led the communist anti-fascist resistance against the Germans and their Croatian allies in what became known as the Liberation War of 1941–1945. In 1942, the partisan movement and the communist-dominated provisional government under his leadership came into conflict with the *Chetniks*, a Serbian resistance movement that favored the restoration of pre-war monarchy. After unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the rival groups, the Allies gave their support to

Tito in 1944, and a year later recognized him as prime minister, thus clearing the way for the Communist Party's monopoly over power in post-war Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito was the first post-war president of Yugoslavia, later to be proclaimed president of the state for life. During the 1950s and 1960s, he first insisted on the need to build a new type of community based on the idea of belonging to the same Yugoslav nation. Starting at the end of the 1960s, Tito changed his attitude towards acknowledging the importance of national differences, claiming that the co-existence of the different nationalities should be based on the concept of "brotherhood and unity." Although the ideology of "brotherhood and unity" prevailed until the very end of Yugoslavia, yielding varied levels of dedication among the public, there are opinions that it was exactly the national identities, energies and sentiments it had attempted to suppress that engendered the wars and violence of the 1990s.

Main works: *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svjetlu Narodnooslobodilačke borbe* [National question in Yugoslavia in the light of the Liberation War] (1942); *Borba za oslobođenje Jugoslavije* [Struggle for the liberation of Yugoslavia] (1945); *Izgradnja nove Jugoslavije* [Building of the new Yugoslavia] (1950).

Context

The text, written in 1942, represents the communist view on the national question in interwar Yugoslavia, and on the question of the borders of the future state. This view is inscribed in a long and influential leftist tradition in the political history of Serbia, starting with **Svetozar Marković** and including names such as Svetozar Miletić, **Nikola Pašić**, **Pera Todorović**, Mita Cenić and Dragoljub Jovanović among its major proponents. The Communist Party started to organize itself in the early 1920s within harsh political circumstances and under repression by the regime. Still, it came to articulate a clear political alternative to the nationalist policies of the ruling elite in the years prior to the Second World War. Their counterpart as well as opponent on the left side of the political spectrum was the People's Peasant Party, led by Dragoljub Jovanović. The latter's program was organized around three interrelated key notions: democracy, socialism and peasantry. Jovanović rejected revolutionary methods in favor of democratic procedures. Unlike the ideologues of the CPY, he argued that the onset of socialism would only be possible through the development of democracy, and not through the dictatorship of the proletariat as proposed by the communists. As for his views of the national question, Dragoljub Jovanović believed that the national question of the Serbs as well as the Croats could be best solved within Yugoslavia, within the confines of an all-South Slav state. Both the communists and the Peasant Party severely criticized the royal dictatorship and the political conditions in pre-war Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the CPY's methods of po-

litical organization proved to be more suitable for the forthcoming events. The developed organizational infrastructure of the communists, their readiness to take initiative and adjust to extra-parliamentary methods of political fighting helped them diffuse their revolutionary ideas. However, popular support for the CPY's program cannot simply be explained as the result of an efficient method devised according to the given circumstances. It proposed a solution to a problem that seemed insoluble by means of the 'traditional' national programs. Moreover, this program offered the simultaneous pursuit of both liberation from foreign occupation, and radical social change.

The communists' underground activities during the Nazi German occupation, which began on 27 March 1941, led to the Liberation War of 1941–1945. In this programmatic text, Tito claimed that the Liberation War was an exceptional twofold achievement: the liberation of the country and the solution of its national question based on the national sovereignty of the Yugoslav nations. Thus, he opposed other existing views of national/political identification, such as the royalist one represented by Draža Mihajlović's Chetnik movement connected to the King's government, which was in exile in London.

The text illustrates the notion of "brotherhood and unity" which was later developed further by the Yugoslav communists. It speaks about the advantages of the communists' solution to the national question in Yugoslavia, and explains in detail the model of the equality of nationalities to be developed after the victory of the CPY. In postwar Yugoslavia, interwar politics and its actors were accused of having created a "Greater Serbian hegemony" and of having provoked conflicts and distrust among the nations, thus making a successful resolution of the national question impossible. Therefore, they were severely criticized on ideological and class-based grounds. Reflecting the dominant narrative of the Liberation War, Tito accuses the ideological and political opponents of the Partisans for having disrupted their just fight.

IE

National question in Yugoslavia in the light of the Liberation War

Today, the People's liberation struggle and the national issue are indivisibly linked in Yugoslavia. Our people's liberation struggle would not be so relentless and so successful if the nations of Yugoslavia did not see in it, besides victory over fascism, also victory over those in favor of the previous regime and victory over those who oppressed and sought to further oppress the people of Yugoslavia. The words *People's Liberation Struggle* would be

a mere phrase and even a deception if it did not, besides a general Yugoslav sense, also have a national sense for each nation individually, that is to say if it did not at the same time also mean, besides the liberation of Yugoslavia, the liberation of Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims, etc., if it did not truly aspire to the freedom and brotherhood of all the nations of Yugoslavia. And that is where the essence of the people's liberation struggle lies.

Today's people's liberation struggle could not end in victory over the occupiers and their henchmen if there was no national unity: if Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims did not take part in the ranks of the People's Liberation Army. The total liberation of each nation separately could not be achieved if the peoples of those nations did not now take up arms and go into battle for the common victory of all the nations of Yugoslavia over all the enemies of the people.

The main obstacles in the way of such complete unity in our struggle are those who look back, those who aspire to re-establish the old system that existed before the collapse of Yugoslavia. Those are the leaderships of the different former civic parties; here we can also see the so-called London line: "Wait, the hour has not yet come." Here we can see Draža Mihajlović and his *Chetniks*, who, under the slogan "For King and Country", are fighting on the side of the occupiers, against our People's Liberation Army and Partisan detachments; here we can see, in short, all those who fear the people taking up arms, for they know that they will no longer be able to implement reactionary ideas concerning the organization of Yugoslavia against the will of the people.

The exiles in London offer the nations of Yugoslavia dark prospects for the future and terrible danger for all those nations that have been oppressed since the creation of Yugoslavia. That government in exile in London would use gendarmes' rifle butts and *Chetniks'* knives to unite the nations of Yugoslavia if, by some misfortune, they were to come to power in Yugoslavia again.

Macedonians, Albanians, Croats, Muslims, etc. fearfully wonder what would happen to them if the old system were to return. The government in exile in London is already threatening; *Chetniks* are already slaughtering wherever they can with the help of the occupiers and are sharpening their knives for even more terrible butchery – that is what all the nations fear. But we are calling on all not to fear; salvation from such atrocities is possible. But it is only possible if they take up arms now without hesitation, and go into the sacred battle being fought by our heroic People's Liberation Army against the occupiers for the freedom and equality of all the nations of Yugoslavia. That is the sole path to salvation that should be taken by all the nations of Yugoslavia.

I must here underline the fact that from the very beginning to the present day, Serbs themselves have accounted for a large majority in the ranks of our People's Liberation Army and Partizan detachments, instead of being the other way round. It has been Serbian, Montenegrin, Bosnian and Lika Partizans and brigades, made up almost exclusively of Serbs, that have been conducting a merciless battle not only against the occupiers but also against Draža Mihajlović's *Chetniks* and other enemies of the oppressed people. What does this prove? It proves that all the nations of Yugoslavia, which have in the past been oppressed by the protagonists of greater Serbian hegemony, have their best and most reliable allies amongst the Serbian nation. The Serbian nation has given and is still giving the greatest contribution of blood in the battle against the occupiers and their treacherous henchmen, not only Pavelić, Nedić and Pećanać, but also Draža Mihajlović and his *Chetniks*, for the full freedom and independence of all the nations of Yugoslavia. The Serbian people do not wish a return to the old regime, just like Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims. The Serbian nation is well aware of why the national tragedy came about and who the main culprit is, and this is why Serbs are fighting so heroically and why they despise the domestic traitors. It is therefore the sacred duty of all the other nations of Yugoslavia to participate with the Serbian nation at least as much, if not more, in this great liberation war against the occupiers and all those that help them. The banner of the People's Liberation Struggle against the occupiers which was hoisted by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1941 is at the same time also the banner for national freedom and equality of each nation's individuality. It is that same banner which, unblemished, has been borne by the Communist Party since the creation of Yugoslavia, struggling without compromise for national freedom and the equality of all our nations. Never has the Communist Party renounced its principles as laid down by our great teachers and leaders Lenin and Stalin that each nation has the right to self-determination up to secession. And never will the Communist Party renounce that principle. But, at the same time, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will never allow that right to be abused by enemies of the people and for those enemies to create a medieval dark and colonial servitude, as is the case of Pavelić's "independent" Croatia,¹ instead of freedom and independence. It will fight to protect us from the abuse of that right.

¹ Ante Pavelić (1889–1959), Croatian right wing politician in interwar Yugoslavia. In the period of the Dictatorship (*šestojanuarska diktatura*) in 1929, he emigrated first to Vienna and after that to other European countries, where he continued political work aiming at creation of an independent Croatian state. At the beginning

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia will continue to fight for the brotherly, free and equal community of all the nations of Yugoslavia. It will fight equally against the protagonists of greater Serbian hegemony, which aspires to renew the oppression of the other nations of Yugoslavia, just as it will fight against those who wish to sow dissension and hinder the brotherly unity of the nations of Yugoslavia for the interests of any imperialist power.

The question of Macedonia, the question of Kosovo and Metohija, the question of Montenegro, the question of Croatia, the question of Slovenia and the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina will easily be resolved to the satisfaction of all only if those questions are resolved by the people themselves. And each nation gains that right when its people take up arms in our People's Liberation Struggle.

Translated by Linda Krstajić, Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

of the Second World War he returned to Croatia only a few days after the German troops marched in, and Slavko Kvaternik proclaimed Croatia's independence under the auspices of the Italian government. Pavelić proclaimed himself a commander (*poglavnik*) and formed a government in which he took the positions of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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